The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine
Office of Congressional and government Affairs
At A Glance
 
 
Public Law
: John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
: 115-232
Session: 115th Congress (Second Session)

 

The following are excerpts, highlighted in red, from the final legislation and/or conference report which contain references to and studies for The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.  (Pound signs [##] between passages denote the deletion of unrelated text.)
 
HR5515           Thornberry (R-Texas)       06/27/18
Enrolled (finally passed both houses)
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2019 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
 
######
 
 
SEC. 3132. NUCLEAR FORENSICS ANALYSES.
 
    (a) Independent Assessment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall seek to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences for an independent assessment of nuclear forensic analyses conducted by the Federal Government.
 
    (b) Elements.--The assessment conducted by the National Academy of Sciences under subsection (a) shall, at minimum, include the following:        
 
(1) An assessment of a representative sample of nuclear forensic analyses from across the Federal departments and agencies, with particular emphasis on the validity, quality, value, cost effectiveness, gaps, and timeliness of such analyses. 
 
(2) An assessment of the methodologies used by nuclear forensics analyses from across the Federal departments and agencies, including the scientific rigor of such methodologies.
 
(3) Recommendations for improving nuclear forensics analyses conducted by the Federal Government, including any best practices or lessons learned that should be shared across the Federal departments and agencies.
 
     (c) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the assessment 
of the National Academy of Sciences under subsection (a).
 
     (d) Briefing on Senior-level Involvement in Exercises.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the involvement of senior-level executive branch leadership in recent and planned nuclear terrorism preparedness or response exercises and any other exercises that have nuclear forensic analysis as a component of the exercises.
 
     (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
        (1) the congressional defense committees; and
        (2) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
 
 SEC. 3133. REVIEW OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ACTIVITIES.
    
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an arrangement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct a review of the defense environmental cleanup activities of the Office of Environmental Management of the Department of Energy.
 
(b) Elements.--The review conducted under subsection (a) shall include--
        
(1) an assessment of—
 
(A) project management practices with respect to the activities described in subsection (a);
 
(B) the outcomes of such activities; and
 
(C) the appropriateness of the level of engagement and oversight of the Office of Environmental Management with respect to such activities; and
        
(2) recommendations with respect to actions to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of such activities.
 
 
######
 
***********************************************************************************************************************************************************
HRpt 115-863 - To accompany H.R. 5515 – To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2019 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
Conference Committee
(7/23/18)
-- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
######
 
 
SUBTITLE A—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING
 
 
######
 
 
SEC. 2805. UPDATES AND MODIFICATIONS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORM 1391, UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA, AND MILITARY INSTALLATION MASTER PLANS.
 
(a) Flood Risk Disclosure for Military Construction.—
   
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall modify Department of Defense Form 1391 to require, with respect to any proposed major or minor military construction project requiring congressional notification or approval—
       
(A) disclosure whether a proposed project will be sited within or partially within a 100-year floodplain, according to the most recent available Federal Emergency Management Agency flood hazard data; and
       
(B) if the proposed project will be sited within or partially within a 100-year floodplain, the specific risk mitigation plan.
   
(2) DELINEATION OF FLOODPLAIN.—To the extent that Federal Emergency Management Agency flood hazard data are not available for a proposed major or minor military construction site, the Secretary concerned shall establish a process for delineating the 100-year floodplain using risk analysis that is consistent with the standards used to inform Federal flood risk assessments.
   
(3) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—For proposed projects that are to be sited within or partially within a 100-year floodplain, the Secretary concerned shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report with the following:
     
(A) An assessment of flood vulnerability for the proposed project.
       
(B) Any information concerning alternative construction sites that were considered, and an explanation of why those sites do not satisfy mission requirements.
       
(C) A description of planned flood mitigation measures.
   
(4) MINIMUM FLOOD MITIGATION REQUIREMENTS.—When mitigating the flood risk of a major or minor military construction project within or partially within the 100-year floodplain, the Secretary concerned shall require any mitigation plan to assume an additional—
       
(A) 2 feet above the base flood elevation for non-mission critical buildings, as determined by the Secretary; and
       
(B) 3 feet above the base flood elevation for mission-critical buildings, as determined by the Secretary.
 
(b) Disclosure Requirements for Department of Defense Form 1391.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall amend Department of Defense Form 1391 to require, for each requested military construction project—
   
(1) disclosure whether the project was included in the prior year’s future-years defense program submitted to Congress pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code; and
   
(2) inclusion of an energy study or life cycle analysis.
 
(c) Incorporation of Changing Environmental Condition Projections in Military Construction Designs and Modifications.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall amend section 3-5.6.2.3 of United Facilities Criteria (UFC) 2-100-01 and UFC 2-100-02 (or any similar successor regulations) to provide that in order to anticipate changing environmental conditions during the design life of existing or planned new facilities and infrastructure, projections from reliable and authorized sources such as the Census Bureau (for population projections), the National Academies of Sciences (for land use change projections and climate projections), the U.S. Geological Survey (for land use change projections), and the U.S. Global Change Research Office and National Climate Assessment (for climate projections) shall be considered and incorporated into military construction designs and modifications.
 
(d) Inclusion of Consideration of Energy and Climate Resiliency Efforts in Master Plans for Major Military Installations.—Section 2864 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
   
(1) in subsection (a)(2)—
       
(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and” at the end;
       
(B) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and
       
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
   
“(E) energy and climate resiliency efforts.”; and
   
(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
   
“(3) The term ‘energy and climate resiliency’ means anticipation, preparation for, and adaptation to utility disruptions and changing environmental conditions and the ability to withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from utility disruptions while ensuring the sustainment of mission-critical operations.”.
 
(e) Definition of Military Installation Resilience.—Section 101(e) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
   
“(8) MILITARY INSTALLATION RESILIENCE.—The term ‘military installation resilience’ means the capability of a military installation to avoid, prepare for, minimize the effect of, adapt to, and recover from extreme weather events, or from anticipated or unanticipated changes in environmental conditions, that do, or have the potential to, adversely affect the military installation or essential transportation, logistical, or other necessary resources outside of the military installation that are necessary in order to maintain, improve, or rapidly reestablish installation mission assurance and mission-essential functions.”.
 
(f) Adjustment and Diversification Assistance for Responding to Threats to the Resilience of a Military Installation.—Section 2391(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
   
(1) by striking “, or (E) by the closure” and inserting “, (E) by threats to military installation resilience, or (F) by the closure”;
   
(2) by striking “(A), (B), (C), or (E)” and inserting “(A), (B), (C), or (F)”; and
   
(3) by striking “action described in clause (D), if the Secretary determines that the encroachment of the civilian community” and inserting “action described in clause (D) or (E), if the Secretary determines that either the encroachment of the civilian community or threats to military installation resilience”.
 
 
######
 
 
“Sec. 4807. Cost-benefit analyses for competition of management and operating contracts.”.
 
(c) Termination of Superseded Provision.—Section 3121(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 126 Stat. 2175), as most recently amended by section 3135 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1207), is further amended by striking “2020” and inserting “2018”.
 
SEC. 3132. NUCLEAR FORENSICS ANALYSES.
 
(a) Independent Assessment.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall seek to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences for an independent assessment of nuclear forensic analyses conducted by the Federal Government.
 
(b) Elements.—The assessment conducted by the National Academy of Sciences under subsection (a) shall, at minimum, include the following:
   
(1) An assessment of a representative sample of nuclear forensic analyses from across the Federal departments and agencies, with particular emphasis on the validity, quality, value, cost effectiveness, gaps, and timeliness of such analyses.
   
(2) An assessment of the methodologies used by nuclear forensics analyses from across the Federal departments and agencies, including the scientific rigor of such methodologies.
   
(3) Recommendations for improving nuclear forensics analyses conducted by the Federal Government, including any best practices or lessons learned that should be shared across the Federal departments and agencies.
 
(c) Submission.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the assessment of the National Academy of Sciences under subsection (a).
 
(d) Briefing on Senior-level Involvement in Exercises.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the involvement of senior-level executive branch leadership in recent and planned nuclear terrorism preparedness or response exercises and any other exercises that have nuclear forensic analysis as a component of the exercises.
 
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
   
(1) the congressional defense committees; and
   
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
 
SEC. 3133. REVIEW OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ACTIVITIES.
 
(a) In General.—The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an arrangement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct a review of the defense environmental cleanup activities of the Office of Environmental Management of the Department of Energy.
 
(b) Elements.—The review conducted under subsection (a) shall include—
   
(1) an assessment of—
       
(A) project management practices with respect to the activities described in subsection (a);
       
(B) the outcomes of such activities; and
       
(C) the appropriateness of the level of engagement and oversight of the Office of Environmental Management with respect to such activities; and
   
(2) recommendations with respect to actions to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of such activities.
 
 
######
 
 
Nuclear forensics analyses (sec. 3132)
 
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 3120) that would require the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to seek to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences for an independent assessment of nuclear forensic analyses conducted by the Federal Government.
 
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
 
The Senate recedes with a technical amendment.
 
Review of defense environmental cleanup activities (sec. 3133)
 
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 3122) that would require the Secretary of Energy to coordinate with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on a review of the cleanup activities in the Office of Environmental Management.
 
The House bill contained no similar provision.
 
The House recedes with an amendment to include recommendations in the assessment that would enhance effectiveness and efficiency within the program.
 
 
######
 
 
Clarification of roles and authorities of National Nuclear Security Administration
 
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 3111) that would clarify the roles and authorities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through a series of amendments to the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. Ch. 41) and the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. Ch. 42). The provision would also make several technical corrections to the Atomic Energy Defense Act and remove the cap imposed on the number of full-time equivalent federal employees at the NNSA by section 3241A of the NNSA Act (50 U.S.C. 2441a).
 
The House bill contained no similar provision.
 
The Senate recedes.
 
The conferees note that similar legislation was considered in the course of the drafting of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239). The statement of managers accompanying that Act noted that there was “widespread recognition that the current system for governance, management, and oversight of the nuclear security enterprise is broken.” The same statement noted similar conclusions made by the 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and several other bipartisan or nonpartisan organizations. Additional studies and commissions have agreed in the years since.
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 also created a bipartisan advisory commission to provide “actionable recommendations that directly address the host of systemic problems identified by previous studies and by the conferees,” later known as the Augustine-Mies Panel. In 2014, this panel recommended a sweeping series of major changes at NNSA and the Department of Energy more broadly, including renaming the Department to be the “Department of Energy and Nuclear Security,” more fully integrating the NNSA into the Department, elevating the NNSA Administrator to the level of Deputy Secretary, and other actions to address deep-rooted cultural problems. The conferees note that a lack of consensus among the Department and the many congressional committees of jurisdiction prevented most of the major recommendations from being implemented, while others have languished in the bureaucracy or have been implemented without sufficient efforts to measure success. The conferees appreciate the work of the ongoing joint National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) and National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) panel created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) to assess the NNSA’s and the Department’s progress in implementing prior recommendations, and note that the panel’s most recent interim report concludes that activities to implement prior reform recommendations have not been “rooted in an adequate foundation of strategic thinking.”
 
The conferees note that the Augustine-Mies Panel concluded that, if “significant progress [was] not made within the next two years,” the “only remaining course of action—and a clearly inferior one—is to remove [NNSA] from what is now the Department of Energy and establish it as an autonomous, independent organization.”
 
The conferees note that almost 4 years have elapsed since the Augustine-Mies Panel made its recommendations, and almost 6 years have elapsed since the 2013 statement of managers described the nuclear security enterprise as “broken.” While disagreement remains with some of the specific conclusions of the panel, the conferees have not witnessed significant progress—only “changes on the margins,” as anticipated by the 2013 conferees. Continued cost overruns on major projects, critical capital acquisition decisions mired in dispute, ongoing safety and security concerns, and delayed infrastructure modernization projects indicate that significant progress has not been made.
 
The conferees expect that the joint NAS/NAPA panel will conclude its work in 2020. Rather than allowing the panel’s reports and recommendations to languish along with over two decades of studies and commissions on this subject, the conferees believe that, at that time, the appropriate committees must work with the Department and the NNSA to consider major reforms to the governance of the nuclear security enterprise, but stress that a return to previous, failed models of organization and management are unlikely to be an acceptable option.
 
Finally, the conferees also note that a significant recommendation of the Augustine-Mies Panel was to “solidify Cabinet Secretary ownership of the mission” of the NNSA. As long as the NNSA remains part of the Department of Energy under the current construct of the NNSA Act, the conferees expect appropriate levels of engagement by the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator for Nuclear Security with the committees of jurisdiction on priority atomic energy defense programs to ensure that the NNSA meets the military requirements set by the Department of Defense while making efficient and responsible use of taxpayer dollars.
 
######
 
***********************************************************************************************************************************************************
HRpt 115-874 - To accompany H.R. 5515 – To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2019 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
Conference Committee
(7/25/18)
-- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
 
 
######
 
SEC. 2805. UPDATES AND MODIFICATIONS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORM 1391, UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA, AND MILITARY INSTALLATION MASTER PLANS.
 
(a) Flood Risk Disclosure for Military Construction.—
   
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall modify Department of Defense Form 1391 to require, with respect to any proposed major or minor military construction project requiring congressional notification or approval—
       
(A) disclosure whether a proposed project will be sited within or partially within a 100-year floodplain, according to the most recent available Federal Emergency Management Agency flood hazard data; and
       
(B) if the proposed project will be sited within or partially within a 100-year floodplain, the specific risk mitigation plan.
   
(2) DELINEATION OF FLOODPLAIN.—To the extent that Federal Emergency Management Agency flood hazard data are not available for a proposed major or minor military construction site, the Secretary concerned shall establish a process for delineating the 100-year floodplain using risk analysis that is consistent with the standards used to inform Federal flood risk assessments.
   
(3) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—For proposed projects that are to be sited within or partially within a 100-year floodplain, the Secretary concerned shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report with the following:
       
(A) An assessment of flood vulnerability for the proposed project.
       
(B) Any information concerning alternative construction sites that were considered, and an explanation of why those sites do not satisfy mission requirements.
       
(C) A description of planned flood mitigation measures.
   
(4) MINIMUM FLOOD MITIGATION REQUIREMENTS.—When mitigating the flood risk of a major or minor military construction project within or partially within the 100-year floodplain, the Secretary concerned shall require any mitigation plan to assume an additional—
       
(A) 2 feet above the base flood elevation for non-mission critical buildings, as determined by the Secretary; and
       
(B) 3 feet above the base flood elevation for mission-critical buildings, as determined by the Secretary.
 
(b) Disclosure Requirements for Department of Defense Form 1391.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall amend Department of Defense Form 1391 to require, for each requested military construction project—
   
(1) disclosure whether the project was included in the prior year’s future-years defense program submitted to Congress pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code; and
   
(2) inclusion of an energy study or life cycle analysis.
 
(c) Incorporation of Changing Environmental Condition Projections in Military Construction Designs and Modifications.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall amend section 3-5.6.2.3 of United Facilities Criteria (UFC) 2-100-01 and UFC 2-100-02 (or any similar successor regulations) to provide that in order to anticipate changing environmental conditions during the design life of existing or planned new facilities and infrastructure, projections from reliable and authorized sources such as the Census Bureau (for population projections), the National Academies of Sciences (for land use change projections and climate projections), the U.S. Geological Survey (for land use change projections), and the U.S. Global Change Research Office and National Climate Assessment (for climate projections) shall be considered and incorporated into military construction designs and modifications.
 
(d) Inclusion of Consideration of Energy and Climate Resiliency Efforts in Master Plans for Major Military Installations.—Section 2864 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
   
(1) in subsection (a)(2)—
       
(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and” at the end;
       
(B) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; and”; and
       
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
   
“(E) energy and climate resiliency efforts.”; and
   
(2) in subsection (d), by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
   
“(3) The term ‘energy and climate resiliency’ means anticipation, preparation for, and adaptation to utility disruptions and changing environmental conditions and the ability to withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from utility disruptions while ensuring the sustainment of mission-critical operations.”.
 
(e) Definition of Military Installation Resilience.—Section 101(e) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
   
“(8) MILITARY INSTALLATION RESILIENCE.—The term ‘military installation resilience’ means the capability of a military installation to avoid, prepare for, minimize the effect of, adapt to, and recover from extreme weather events, or from anticipated or unanticipated changes in environmental conditions, that do, or have the potential to, adversely affect the military installation or essential transportation, logistical, or other necessary resources outside of the military installation that are necessary in order to maintain, improve, or rapidly reestablish installation mission assurance and mission-essential functions.”.
 
(f) Adjustment and Diversification Assistance for Responding to Threats to the Resilience of a Military Installation.—Section 2391(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
   
(1) by striking “, or (E) by the closure” and inserting “, (E) by threats to military installation resilience, or (F) by the closure”;
   
(2) by striking “(A), (B), (C), or (E)” and inserting “(A), (B), (C), or (F)”; and
   
(3) by striking “action described in clause (D), if the Secretary determines that the encroachment of the civilian community” and inserting “action described in clause (D) or (E), if the Secretary determines that either the encroachment of the civilian community or threats to military installation resilience”.
 
 
######
 
 
“Sec. 4807. Cost-benefit analyses for competition of management and operating contracts.”.
 
 
(c) Termination of Superseded Provision.—Section 3121(e)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 126 Stat. 2175), as most recently amended by section 3135 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1207), is further amended by striking “2020” and inserting “2018”.
 
SEC. 3132. NUCLEAR FORENSICS ANALYSES.
 
(a) Independent Assessment.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall seek to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences for an independent assessment of nuclear forensic analyses conducted by the Federal Government.
 
(b) Elements.—The assessment conducted by the National Academy of Sciences under subsection (a) shall, at minimum, include the following:
   
(1) An assessment of a representative sample of nuclear forensic analyses from across the Federal departments and agencies, with particular emphasis on the validity, quality, value, cost effectiveness, gaps, and timeliness of such analyses.
   
(2) An assessment of the methodologies used by nuclear forensics analyses from across the Federal departments and agencies, including the scientific rigor of such methodologies.
   
(3) Recommendations for improving nuclear forensics analyses conducted by the Federal Government, including any best practices or lessons learned that should be shared across the Federal departments and agencies.
 
(c) Submission.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing the assessment of the National Academy of Sciences under subsection (a).
 
(d) Briefing on Senior-level Involvement in Exercises.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the involvement of senior-level executive branch leadership in recent and planned nuclear terrorism preparedness or response exercises and any other exercises that have nuclear forensic analysis as a component of the exercises.
 
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
   
(1) the congressional defense committees; and
   
(2) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
 
SEC. 3133. REVIEW OF DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP ACTIVITIES.
 
(a) In General.—The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an arrangement with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct a review of the defense environmental cleanup activities of the Office of Environmental Management of the Department of Energy.
 
(b) Elements.—The review conducted under subsection (a) shall include—
   
(1) an assessment of—
       
(A) project management practices with respect to the activities described in subsection (a);
       
(B) the outcomes of such activities; and
       
(C) the appropriateness of the level of engagement and oversight of the Office of Environmental Management with respect to such activities; and
   
(2) recommendations with respect to actions to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of such activities.
 
 
######
 
 
Nuclear forensics analyses (sec. 3132)
 
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 3120) that would require the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to seek to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences for an independent assessment of nuclear forensic analyses conducted by the Federal Government.
 
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
 
The Senate recedes with a technical amendment.
 
Review of defense environmental cleanup activities (sec. 3133)
 
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 3122) that would require the Secretary of Energy to coordinate with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on a review of the cleanup activities in the Office of Environmental Management.
 
The House bill contained no similar provision.
 
The House recedes with an amendment to include recommendations in the assessment that would enhance effectiveness and efficiency within the program.
 
 
######
 
Clarification of roles and authorities of National Nuclear Security Administration
 
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 3111) that would clarify the roles and authorities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through a series of amendments to the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. Ch. 41) and the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. Ch. 42). The provision would also make several technical corrections to the Atomic Energy Defense Act and remove the cap imposed on the number of full-time equivalent federal employees at the NNSA by section 3241A of the NNSA Act (50 U.S.C. 2441a).
 
The House bill contained no similar provision.
 
The Senate recedes.
 
The conferees note that similar legislation was considered in the course of the drafting of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239). The statement of managers accompanying that Act noted that there was “widespread recognition that the current system for governance, management, and oversight of the nuclear security enterprise is broken.” The same statement noted similar conclusions made by the 2009 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and several other bipartisan or nonpartisan organizations. Additional studies and commissions have agreed in the years since.
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 also created a bipartisan advisory commission to provide “actionable recommendations that directly address the host of systemic problems identified by previous studies and by the conferees,” later known as the Augustine-Mies Panel. In 2014, this panel recommended a sweeping series of major changes at NNSA and the Department of Energy more broadly, including renaming the Department to be the “Department of Energy and Nuclear Security,” more fully integrating the NNSA into the Department, elevating the NNSA Administrator to the level of Deputy Secretary, and other actions to address deep-rooted cultural problems. The conferees note that a lack of consensus among the Department and the many congressional committees of jurisdiction prevented most of the major recommendations from being implemented, while others have languished in the bureaucracy or have been implemented without sufficient efforts to measure success. The conferees appreciate the work of the ongoing joint National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) and National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) panel created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) to assess the NNSA’s and the Department’s progress in implementing prior recommendations, and note that the panel’s most recent interim report concludes that activities to implement prior reform recommendations have not been “rooted in an adequate foundation of strategic thinking.”
 
The conferees note that the Augustine-Mies Panel concluded that, if “significant progress [was] not made within the next two years,” the “only remaining course of action—and a clearly inferior one—is to remove [NNSA] from what is now the Department of Energy and establish it as an autonomous, independent organization.”
 
The conferees note that almost 4 years have elapsed since the Augustine-Mies Panel made its recommendations, and almost 6 years have elapsed since the 2013 statement of managers described the nuclear security enterprise as “broken.” While disagreement remains with some of the specific conclusions of the panel, the conferees have not witnessed significant progress—only “changes on the margins,” as anticipated by the 2013 conferees. Continued cost overruns on major projects, critical capital acquisition decisions mired in dispute, ongoing safety and security concerns, and delayed infrastructure modernization projects indicate that significant progress has not been made.
 
The conferees expect that the joint NAS/NAPA panel will conclude its work in 2020. Rather than allowing the panel’s reports and recommendations to languish along with over two decades of studies and commissions on this subject, the conferees believe that, at that time, the appropriate committees must work with the Department and the NNSA to consider major reforms to the governance of the nuclear security enterprise, but stress that a return to previous, failed models of organization and management are unlikely to be an acceptable option.
 
Finally, the conferees also note that a significant recommendation of the Augustine-Mies Panel was to “solidify Cabinet Secretary ownership of the mission” of the NNSA. As long as the NNSA remains part of the Department of Energy under the current construct of the NNSA Act, the conferees expect appropriate levels of engagement by the Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator for Nuclear Security with the committees of jurisdiction on priority atomic energy defense programs to ensure that the NNSA meets the military requirements set by the Department of Defense while making efficient and responsible use of taxpayer dollars.
 
######