RESPONSE TO REVIEW BY REVIEWER

TITLE OF REPORT:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMENT</th>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reviewer A</strong></td>
<td><strong>A-1.</strong> p. x (Preface), lines 139-144; p. 62, lines 1540; p. 74, line 1808; p. 82, line 1993; p. 91, line 2167 (already phrased appropriately—no change); p. 99, lines 2339-2340. We appreciate the reviewer’s attention to this detail. We have added text to the Preface to clarify how the questions were shared with the panelists and the manner in which the panelists were asked to consider the questions. The questions were intended as guides—to give a general sense of framing for each panel—rather than as a list of questions the panelists were expected to answer in full. Emphasis was placed on the expertise and experiences of each panelist. With such a broad topic and broad ranges of expertise in each panel, the committee felt the panelists would benefit from a general sense of their (committee’s) interests as they prepared their (panelists’) opening remarks—such was the purpose of the questions and brief text of this nature was added at the start of each panel chapter (e.g. p. 61, 73, etc.).**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A-2-4. No response needed.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A-5. We appreciate the reviewer’s clear understanding of the sensitivities of discussion of disaster resilience in an area such as the Gulf Coast. Although no change to text was made with respect to this comment, we provide some amplification here that will find a home in the final, consensus report of the committee.</strong></td>
<td><strong>A-5. The presentation seems balanced and fair. Indeed, the matter-of-fact tone must have been very difficult to attain given the emotional content of much of the material. There seems to be no mention of what was seen at the time of Katrina as massive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A-2-4. Positive/explanatory comment.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A-5. The presentation seems balanced and fair. Indeed, the matter-of-fact tone must have been very difficult to attain given the emotional content of much of the material. There seems to be no mention of what was seen at the time of Katrina as massive</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
government failures both on the part of local and national government. But absent a confrontational meeting with governmental officials, which clearly was not the aim of this workshop, such controversial matters would have had no place at the workshop or in the report thereof. The title seems fine.

A-6. I was surprised to see so few social scientists among the Committee member or among the panelists. (Exceptions are Pam Jenkins, Professor of Criminal Justice and Women’s Studies at the University of New Orleans who served as a commentator during the New Orleans bus tour and Tom Lansford, Professor of Political Science at University of Southern Mississippi, Gulf Coast, who was one of the representatives of nonprofit organizations who met with the Committee at the Knight Nonprofit Center.) Sociologists in particular have made a careful study of disasters and might well have had a seat at the table. Perhaps they will in the other workshops.

A-7. I could not help making some smaller comments on the report as I read through it. Please see the attached manuscript with my comments incorporated as “sticky notes.” Some of these might suggest changes in the report while others question the meaning of some statements and so might be useful to the committee as it considers the material offered to them by panelists.

With this recognition in mind, the committee developed the meeting and workshop with the intent not to bypass important issues but to be sensitive to the manner in which they were broached; they thus attempted to express in advance to the field trip and panel participants that the purpose of the visit to the Gulf Coast was not to re-examine all that went wrong during Katrina. The committee rather indicated to the panelists that the meeting could use Katrina (or other disasters such as the Macondo oil spill) as an experience base through which to view the present and future for disaster resilience—weight on a prospective, as opposed to completely retrospective, view. The committee tried to guide the discussions about increasing Gulf Coast resilience to future disasters along the lines of constructive phrases such as “actions being taken”, “challenges encountered”, “successes measured”, and “key issues being considered.” Implicit in these discussions, the committee anticipated, would be ‘lessons learned’—but from a constructive conversational tone as opposed to one oriented toward placing blame. The committee was continually impressed with the way in which the panelists and field hosts responded—they were universally constructive and not confrontational in all of the conversations.

A-6. page ix-x, lines 133-138; page 11, line 459; Appendixes A and C (added missing speaker/panelist and committee biographies). We appreciate this comment and provide clarification specific to this reviewer’s concern. We expand upon the theme of this comment in the cover letter in response to the broader concerns expressed by the monitor.

The committee is fully in agreement that social sciences are integral to understanding and discussing disaster resilience. The committee has been employing a broad interpretation of ‘social sciences’ to include sociology, anthropology, communications,
behavioral science, psychology, economics, political science, philosophy, human geography, and so forth. However, the reviewer is correct—and the committee fully agrees—that sociologists (in the strict sense) at academic institutions have done a great deal of work in this area and that their research should be incorporated in the committee’s work. The committee addressed the need for input from the social sciences and sociologists in several ways in the Gulf Coast workshop, and has done so for the study as a whole. The main actions are reviewed here and in the cover letter:

1) Several committee members, and particularly the committee chair, work very closely with sociologists in the Gulf Coast region on disaster resilience research. In addition to Pam Jenkins, three other faculty members from three Louisiana universities—sociologists in the strictest sense—were invited to speak with the committee (one as a keynote speaker, the others as participants in the Gulf Coast meeting), but were unavailable at the time of our meeting. We queried the keynote speaker and Pam Jenkins for suggestions regarding individuals with whom the committee ought to speak during their visit and they emphasized the names of several practitioners (within the Gulf Coast community) whom the committee should prioritize. Several of these individuals (including the primary contact in the Vietnamese community who allowed us access to the community members; and Mary Claire Landry) were secured specifically as a result of consultation with these sociologists.

2) In addition to professional connections through research collaborations between the committee members and other university sociologists as mentioned in (1), the committee is obligated in its statement of task to be familiar with the “state of knowledge” about resilience. In partial fulfillment of this task, the committee has developed an enormous academic research bibliography (for all social sciences, public health, and physical
and engineering sciences) for each of three workshop locations (Gulf Coast, Iowa, California). The sociological literature in these bibliographic collections is rich and will be a part of the committee’s considerations in its writing.

3) The committee was very sensitive to the constraints of time (2-day workshop in the Gulf Coast) and to the external perception often expressed to them that academic research is divorced from practical requirements and applications to increase resilience, particularly in local communities. Because information gathering through the academic literature and interactions with academic colleagues is readily done by committee members outside the confines of a 2-day workshop, the committee placed weight in their meeting planning on hearing from a balance of academic researchers, private sector individuals, government officials, and practitioners (in emergency management and urban planning, in non-profits or other grassroots organizations).

4) Incorporating a specific panel on “Social Capital” was a pointed effort on the committee’s part to access the range of societal issues inherent in discussion of resilience. The panel looked very broadly at social science topics—socioeconomic issues, education, community planning, the role of non-governmental organizations (faith-based groups, non-profits of other types), vulnerable populations—in this panel discussion. The large panel in Gulfport on the field day was also almost exclusively oriented toward discussion of societal and socioeconomic issues related to community disaster resilience.

5) The committee has included sociologists from academic institutions in each of its other workshops (in Iowa and California).

Although difficult to address in the text of the workshop summary points 1, 2, 3, and 5, above, we have examined the text in the Preface and main body of the summary and have attempted
to enhance the presentation of the importance of the social science perspective (reference to the pages and lines noted above.) We have also added the missing bibliographies from panelists and committee in the Appendix so that the broader “social science” perspectives represented by panelists such as Craig Colten, Alice Graham, John Hosey, Natalie Jayroe, Pam Jenkins, Mary Clare Landry, Tom Lansford, and Reilly Morse, and committee members Susan Cutter, Monica Schoch-Spana, Meredith Li-Vollmer, Susan Scrimshaw, Howard Kunreuther, Patrick Crawford, and Ellis Stanley, Sr. are in evidence.

A-7. Editorial comments addressed in response to review version of report—no track changes except in cases as noted below where meaning has been clarified or a response to a non-editorial comment provided.
p. 18, line 619-621. Added clarifying text.
p. 21, footnote. Added definition of the 100-year floodplain Figures, general: all figures have been replaced with high-resolution versions for the purposes of the final version of the report.
p. 26—added footnote. The reviewer’s comments on p. 27 and 30 of the PDF document are valid, but require interpretation or analysis of the work of Allison Plyer and colleagues at the Brookings Institution (New Orleans Index at Five) that is beyond the possibility of the workshop summary format. We have added URL references to the original documents (the Index and related reports from Brookings) to allow the reader to delve into more detail as desired (footnote on p. 26).
p. 69, line 1695-97. Provided clarifying text after reviewing transcript.
p. 96, line 2282. Provided clarifying text after reviewing transcript.
**Reviewer B**

B-1. Reviewer combined comments to B1 and B5 in a single description. The full comments are listed under B5.

B-2-4. Comments of positive or clarifying nature.

B-5. a. I believe that the workshop does not adequately cover three important issues. These issues should be covered in the future. The first issue is a more adequate review of demographic changes in the city of New Orleans. The second issue is the impact on cities such as Baton Rouge, Houston, and Atlanta to which Katrina victims evacuated. The third issue is the strategy of evacuation itself.

b. The report provides statistical information on the demographic changes in the city. It does not cover the sociological changes. For example, New Orleans lost a third of its population. However, those losses were not evenly distributed among the different sociological groups in the city. Many of the poorest residents did not come back.

c. The committee visited Musician Village. This project was started in recognition that most of the musicians of the city would not be able to come back to New Orleans without help. Losing these people would change the cultural landscape of the city. Thus something had to be done. No similar effort was made to bring back a sociologically representative sector of the evacuated population. The question is “Should resiliency planning seek to restore a representative population to a disaster area in addition to restoring the infrastructure.”

d. The second question involves cities to which Katrina victim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B-1. See response to B5.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-2-4. No response needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-5. The committee appreciates the reviewer’s detailed understanding of the situation in the Gulf Coast related specifically to Katrina and its aftermath. Although many of the comments raised require more analysis than the workshop panelists provided, we welcome the comments and the way in which they might be incorporated in the committee’s final report. We outline below some of these points in specific response to the reviewer’s interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Preface, p. ix, lines 119-123. clarification and amplification is provided here: The committee cited these three issues, together with several others, as deserving of additional attention in some way in the committee’s final report. The committee will be addressing the issue of demographics in a larger sense—through the comparative lens offered by the committee having had three public meetings in very different (in all senses—including demographics) parts of the country. The strategy of evacuation (only one part of the disaster cycle, clearly, but an important one) will also be addressed in a similar way—the committee will be able to provide some comparative analyses between the three United States regions in terms of their response strategies to disaster (emergency management and planning, which includes evacuation.) The second point raised by the reviewer is important and speaks to the time and resource limitations within which the committee operates—they have a very broad study charge and need to deliver the final consensus report in a strict timeframe. At the start of the study, the committee discussed the way in which they would plan their three public meetings (those meetings following the Washington, DC, kickoff meeting in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
evacuated. Much of the population that left New Orleans temporarily or permanently went to Baton Rouge, Houston, and Atlanta. “What have we learned from the Katrina evacuation that would help these cities cope with such an influx in the future?” The committee should talk to people in these cities.

e. The third question is evacuation policy itself. Prior to Katrina, New Orleans never had a mandatory evacuation. Evacuations were voluntary and plans were made for those who did not choose to evacuate. People returned within days and restoration began. One reason why the city lost one third of its population is that the restoration took too long and people stayed where they had gone.

f. The Katrina evacuation was a disaster for several reasons. Mandatory evacuation took most of the people who might have helped in restoring the city quicker out of the city. The people left were not able to help themselves. The committee properly discusses the need to keep more critical workers in place. “Should total evacuation be discouraged? Should the plan be to have as many people ride out the storm as possible?”

g. In some cities, evacuation is impossible. When Hurricane Rita hit Houston, they tried to evacuate and found that they could not. Since then they have tried to ride out hurricanes, even though they know that critical infrastructure would be lost. There are other cities that are too big to evacuate like Miami. “What should be the evacuation strategy for communities relative to the hazards they face?

September 2010). They realized they could easily spend all three meetings in three different locations only in the Gulf Coast—and discussed the possibility of holding a meeting in Houston and/or one in Florida, so as to get somewhat away from the New Orleans, Katrina-focused mindset. However, the committee realized that their analysis would then be limited to issues of the Gulf Coast and would be criticized as such, so they decided upon three very geographically, demographically, socioeconomically different parts of the country, each of which faces different kinds of hazards and disasters. In order to try to make the point that the Gulf Coast meeting was not just an analysis of New Orleans and Katrina (to avoid the “Katrina fatigue” syndrome about which the committee was wary), they developed the field trip, which included an important swath of Mississippi (the “forgotten” areas), and attempted to invite representatives to the workshop day from Houston, Florida, and Mississippi. They were successful with the latter two, but not with Houston. A detailed analysis of the populations in the cities mentioned by the reviewer will probably not be possible within the confines of the national scope of the study, but the topic is important and existing references (amongst them NRC reports) that address the topic will be referenced in the committee’s report. We have attempted to add some clarifying language in the Preface to the reasoning behind the committee’s selection of the three public meeting locations and the Gulf Coast meeting within that broader context.

b. The reviewer’s point is well received. The committee was interested in demographic issues not only in New Orleans, but along the Mississippi coast and did receive some sense of these issues on the field trip and in the panel discussions. For example, in the discussions with Charles Allen, III and Tracy Nelson in the Holy Cross Neighborhood (p. 39, lines 1044 and lines 1053; in New Orleans East—p. 45-46) and in discussions with Bill
Stallworth regarding the population of Biloxi, Mississippi (starting on p. 84). Issues of demographics, as mentioned in 5a, above, will be part of the larger consensus report.

c. The reviewer raises an excellent point. This is a broad issue that the committee also experienced at its meeting (field trip and workshop) in Iowa and will no doubt be brought into the committee’s final report. Biloxi, Mississippi, and Cedar Rapids, Iowa, are perhaps good examples of the way in which the representative populations have been targeted in a positive way (to return to their cities after a disaster.)

d. Another excellent point. We refer to the response in 5a, above, as well as to the committee chair’s specific research with the Katrina diaspora (e.g. a journal article by Cutter et al, 2006 “The Long Road Home: Race, Class and Recovery from Hurricane Katrina”). The topic will undoubtedly be covered in the committee’s final report. Reference will likely also be made to the NRC (2007) report “Tools and Methods for Estimating Populations at Risk from Natural Disasters and Complex Humanitarian Crises” in which the Katrina diaspora was a specific topic discussed.

e. The reviewer amplifies succinctly and well the point raised in 5a. We refer to our response in 5a.

f. Again, an excellent point. The committee will be addressing in its final analysis (and through comparison among the cities it will have visited) evacuation policies and approaches as part of the disaster cycle and as a contribution to overall community resilience. Two of the committee members, Ellis Stanley and Patrick Crawford, have direct experience with emergency management at the government and policy levels and will be able
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reviewer C</th>
<th>to speak directly to this topic in the final report.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-1. Introductory comments generally positive or of clarifying nature.</td>
<td>g. Please see response to 5f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2. p 34 line 961 has a typo or syntax error.</td>
<td>C-1. No response needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3. p 59 line 1481 why are people w/ special needs easier to evacuate? What specifically makes this so?</td>
<td>C-2. Addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4. p 68 line 1685 typo--&quot; or over time&quot; rather than &quot;or other time&quot;?</td>
<td>C-3. <strong>p. 61, line 1518.</strong> The reviewer is correct—the context is not clear and the sentence has been removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5. p 74 paragraph beginning with line 1813 It is not clear what the New Orleans water employees were doing in other jurisdictions, were they working for New Orleans? How? What were they doing? This is not clear.</td>
<td>C-4. Addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-6. p 74 line 1820 How did the agency keep in contact w/ those who had abandoned homes?</td>
<td>C-5. <strong>p. 76, line 1856.</strong> added “…to continue working for New Orleans from surrounding jurisdictions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-7. p 81 line 1861 What professional organizations? do you mean the unions? Which specific &quot;professional&quot; organizations? Were they associations? Not clear.</td>
<td>C-6. No change to text. Ms. St. Martin indicated that the Water and Sewerage Board ‘sought’ to maintain contact; she did not elaborate in her statement as to the mechanisms used but one might presume that telephone and tax records associated with water and sewerage services were a reference for this effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-8. p 77 paragraph beginning with line 1888. There are two</td>
<td>C-7. <strong>p. 78, lines 1902-1905.</strong> Provided better clarification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-8. <strong>p. 79, line 1931.</strong> Added clarifying text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-9. <strong>p. 81, line 1973.</strong> Because the disaster itself was rather extended—well beyond the timing of the actual hurricane when the levees had been breached—we offer clarifying language “in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ideas in this paragraph that don't seem to go together. Needs clarification.

C-9. p 79 line 1930 how did Verizon bring in people? Was it during the disaster or in the aftermath? The timing of this seems important.

C-10. p. 82 line 2006 should caps be used for Office of Neighborhoods?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-10. <strong>p. 85, line 2051.</strong> Change implemented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reviewer D

D-1 Line 256: Need a reference for these facts - Wages in the city have risen 14 percent since 2005 and today are nearly at the national average. The economy has been diversifying and has added more jobs that require high levels of education. A greater percentage of students attend schools that meet state standards of quality than before Katrina.

D-2 Line 282: Need reference - Many building lots in the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, for example, remain empty, and the population of the Lower Ninth has dropped from more than 17,000 before Katrina to 4,000 at most.

D-3 Line 338: Title “Social Capital”, I sort of know what this is supposed to mean, but is it a standardly accepted term?

D-4 Line 416: “The ability to prepare/plan for, absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events.” I find this double wording with slash very awkward, I think it should simply read prepare and plan.

D-5 Line 554: “Almost exactly 40 years later, Hurricane Katrina hit the city with winds of less than 90 miles per hour. The city had a much more formidable hurricane protection levee system, and the population of the city had fallen from 627,000 residents in 1965 to 484,000 residents. Yet a staggering number of homes were seriously flooded or destroyed, and the storm caused 1,200 deaths.” Do these facts need a reference?

D-6 Line 591: “forecasting” I would add the adjective storm.

Reviewer D, general comment: Taking note of the reviewer’s correct sense of the need for references, we have examined the entire report and responded appropriately (including the specific notes raised by this reviewer).

D-1. The text in the “Overview” is considered in the same sense as might be written in a standard consensus report “Summary.” The information encapsulates text that is described and referenced in detail later in the report. No references are added to the Overview for this reason (because they have been added, as per Reviewer D’s request) in the main body of the Workshop Summary.

D-2. See response to D-1.

D-3. p. 6, line 355-56. Added clarifying text.

D-4. p. 1, line 253 and 10, line 43. ‘and’ has been added to the definition, replacing the ‘/’.

D-5. p. 16, line 568, 572, 574. References added.


D-7. p. 17, line 612-13. Change made to clarify (added word ‘impetus’); see also response to reviewer A.

D-8. p. 18, lines 634. Reference added.


D-7 Line 597: provided for” Wrong verb—maybe “allowed for” or did it require?

D-8 Line 613: “The city planning office noted that this slab on-grade housing was a mistake after the hurricane of 1947.” Would love a reference for this statement.

D-9 Line: 620: “narrow” Add “high ground of”

D-10 Line 632: “the neighborhoods of Lakeview and Gentilly” Not shown on map in Figure 2-1. Map shown is very poor, either need a series of maps to show growth of city, or a new specially created map for this report.

D-11 Line: 641: From map 2-1 it appears that Jefferson Parish is not on any lake but on the river

D-12 Line 685: First paragraph, I missed this talk (arrived just as speakers were finishing)—but this section does not explain exactly why evacuation and shelter planning went so well in 1965 and so poorly in 2005, sure there were city leadership/governance issues

D-13 Line 702: OK, why did the evacuation fail and 1000 people die, largely in their homes


D-16 Line 821: Need better quality picture

D-17 Line 824: Need better quality picture

which contains maps of the city and entire field trip.

D-11. p. 20, line 661. The parish boundary (Jefferson) extends in Figure 2-1 to the uppermost left-hand corner of the map area, bordering on the lake. We have also added reference to Appendix D in figure caption. The USACE refers to the “Jefferson Parish lakefront levee”, for example; this name has been added to the text.

D-12. p. 21, lines 673-674. Added references. The reviewer is probably correct—failures at multiple levels in 2005 versus 1965. The speaker did not touch upon all of these issues in his talk; the added references do address some of those different failures and differences.

D-13. This is a question that many people have been asking and analyzing since Katrina occurred. The answers lie at many levels, only some of which the speaker addressed (see also response to D-12). The committee will be addressing matters of this broad level of importance in its report.

D-14-15. p. 26—footnote with this reference has been added (see also response to Reviewer A).

D-16, 17. High resolution images have replaced draft copies throughout document.

D-18. p. 26, line 858. The presenter did not provide this level of analysis, but the same information is provided in the New Orleans Index at Five document; reference has been added again.

D-18 Line 836: I would like a bit more analysis—for example, does a larger % of population vote in local, state, or national elections.

D-19 Line 878: References for these $ amounts – “First, money remains a serious constraint. Hurricane Katrina and Rita combined caused an estimated $150 billion in damages across the Gulf Coast. The federal government spent an estimated $126 billion on the recovery effort, but much of that money went to such short-term measures as emergency rescue operations and short-term housing. Only about $45 billion of that money went to rebuilding. Private insurance provided about $30 billion for reconstruction, and philanthropies provided about $6 billion—three times as much as for any other event in history. Even with expenditures of that magnitude, a gap of about $70 billion remains”

D-20 Line 894: Need reference - In 2008 the share of college-educated workers in New Orleans remained unchanged from 2000 at about 23 percent, but this number grew nationally.

D-21 Line 904-916: Need reference

D-22 Line 1039: Explain implications for insurance—as I recall, many of these homes were handed down for generations in families, so they were owned free and clear, and without mortgage there is no requirement for flood insurance – “Pre-Katrina residents were primarily poor and working class African Americans with a high rate of home ownership.”

D-23 Line 1126: Perhaps comment that previously this bayou and its ecosystem had been cut off from neighborhoods because of high levee and flood walls, now there is stair access to this...
rebounding wildlife area—a net big improvement to quality of life and ecosystem and flood protection.

D-24 Line 1145: Hmm, can not figure out where this area is on Figure 2-1. Again, that figure is completely inadequate. Create a new figure with all place names and you might also show our field trip route on it to help orient readers.

D-25 Line 1179: How about a photo of the Vietnamese? I have a photo of several of them, particularly the several that did most of the talking—would you like to include it?

D-26 Line 1182: I heard this conversation completely differently. Their homes were damaged—so they fixed them enough so they could live in them. Their boats were damaged—other members of the Vietnamese community loaned them $ to get supplies and other members helped them repair their boats. Then they went back to fishing. They were pleased and in many cases somewhat surprised to get $ from the government and used that to repair their homes better. I heard the ultimate story of resilience and personal and community responsibility. Statements here paint them nearly with the same brush as everyone else. I felt this group was remarkable and a community we should hold up as an example for the entire nation.

D-27 Line 1200: They all express gratitude to be in the United States, truly a land of opportunity for them and a chance to leave their hardship and deprivation behind. Who else was grateful to the US on this tour—can’t recall anyone else, rest were complaining.

D-28 Line 1212: Personally traveled by boat, door to door, to be

D-30. p. 50, line 1291. Added phrase.

D-31. p. 51, line 1293. Added reference to maps in Appendix D.

D-32. No change to text. Rapporteur had audio recordings of the discussion.

D-33. No change to text (see reviewer’s suggestion to ignore, given subsequent paragraph).

D-34. p. 51, line 1300. Added call-out to Appendix D.

D-35. p. 52, line 1321. Added ‘today’.

D-36-37. Part of same comment. The information was not shared with the committee by Mayor Garcia. No change to text.

D-38. p. 53, lines 1344-1346. Suggested text has been added.

D-39. No change to text. Amplification is interpretive and more appropriate for the committee’s final report.

D-40. Note: currently seeking reference from Howard Kunreuther (and will confirm with him in Irvine next week). Highlighted in yellow to indicate the reference needs to be added.

D-41. p. 68, line 1669-1671. The sentences have been removed as suggested.

D-42. p. 68, line 1678. The sentences lacking context have been removed.
sure community members were all out safely.

D-29 Line 1222: First paragraph - Okay, some of this is capture here, again—I object to the early paragraphs that tend to paint this group with the same brush as those who mainly complained about the govt.

D-30 Line 1258: of about 10,000 residents before Katrina

D-31 Line 1259: Directly on the waterfront, was that the Gulf waterfront? I thought so

D-32 Line 1261: I thought mayor said storm surge was 40 feet at shoreline

D-33 Line 1262: In the quarter? Mile wide track between the shoreline and the railroad levee that separated the affluent part of town from the poor, largely African American part of town N? of the tracks that was largely spared of storm surge damage due to the railroad levee. Hmm, I see in next paragraph that I must have misunderstood—if so, just ignore this comment

D-34 Line 1266: Need a map, I think

D-35 Line 1290: add “today” after “waveland”.

D-36-37 Line 1296: what % of residents had flood insurance?

D-38 Line 1313: The information packets were geographically coded, so those in the highest risk areas received additional information about their high risk.

D-39 Line 1317: I too was struck by the widespread devastation
along drive to Gulfport and Biloxi—as well as by the relatively low rate of rebuilding. This should perhaps be an over-riding point of the field trip (one of the reasons we went on this long drive I believe.

D-40 Line 1495: Howard can provide a reference for “the cost of natural disasters has gone up “exponentially,” with losses for the first decade of the 21st century exceeding $800 billion.”

D-41 Line 1633: Not sure what he is referring to—his particular town in Connecticut. In CA building codes are all by local jurisdiction and are very strictly enforced in all communities I have lived in. Plans are intensely scrutinized, generally need calculations to demonstrate strength by a licensed engineer, and have frequent inspections. This is his personal anecdote, I do not think it should be a statement like fact because I just quoted anecdotes to contradict it.

D-42 Line 1641: No context—if 1-2 years before Traveller’s raised rates 50-70% because of increased risk, then a 35% reduction does not seem very meaningful.

D-43 Line 1676: “Hurricane Katrina was not a wind event “Which is all most hurricane insurance covers.

D-44 Line 1680: Contact Sathe to get access to this report—this guy is really smart and was making very important points—the insurance guy simply gave the party line.

D-45 Line 1691: Very important point—again, this guy got to the really key points

D-46 Line 1698: Sathe specifically suggested that homeowners

| Added bullet about healthier communities. |
| References, beginning p. 111. These have been significantly developed during the response to review process. |
receive a monthly insurance statement, like a utility bill, specifically spelling out what coverage they are getting to make them more aware.

D-47 Line 2186: Change “than” to “that”.

D-48 Line 2236: this statement makes no sense, it sounds like reducting the number of schools by 40% made them located closer to students. Mathematically impossible, has to do with new distribution of population—so that despite a 40% reduction in the number of schools, students only have a walk of 0.75 miles or less.

D-49 Line 2273: ironic, should be unhealthy populations—we learned that Louisiana is 49th in nation in health outcomes and Mississippi is 50th!!!

D-50 Line 2297: Perhaps, but Gulf Coast wins awards for the highest rates of chronic medical problems

D-51 Line 2323: And I heard that many had no idea what medications they were taking They were completely overwhelmed by renal failure, which is covered by medicare, regardless of age

D-52 Line 2332: Such as is common in countries with national health care plans, such as France. Today technology, not future.

D-53 Line 2451: Really? Below point seem so generic, they are almost apple pie and motherhood. The committee members were asked to provide bulleted summaries based on what was presented and discussed—was that input used? I think there were much more specific points.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2489</td>
<td>Second bullet - Individuals and communities would benefit by being more self-sufficient in the United States to achieve desired levels of resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2503</td>
<td>Headline “Creating a Culture of Resilience” - What about healthier communities to begin with?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2546</td>
<td>Title “References” - Woefully inadequate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Reviewer E**

E-1-3. Comments of positive nature.

E-4. a. Yes. Although in some chapters, such as Insurance and Real Estate, the Moderator and participants are identified in the body of the text rather than in a specific list. It may be helpful to the reader to have individuals participating in a particular section listed in tabular format for easier reference.

b. Positive comment.

E-5. a. Overall the report offers a worthwhile examination of the issues impacting the region. I believe it would be helpful to the reader to hear more detail from the representatives of Regional and National Agencies (i.e. FEMA, NDMS, DoD). This may help the reader better appreciate both capabilities and limitations of response/assistance available. And will clearly help frame further discussions wrt topics/capabilities that must be driven by local versus national assets.

b.-c. Positive comments.

E-6. Positive comment/reflection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-1-3. No response needed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-4. a. <strong>p. 62, lines 1538-1540; p. 73, line 1806; p. 82, lines 1993-94; p. 91, lines 2165-66; p. 99, lines 2337-38.</strong> The reviewer’s point is well received. We have added the list of panelists to the start of each panel chapter and made explicit reference to Appendixes B and C where the agenda and panelist biographies are located.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No response needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5. a. The comment is appreciated. The committee heard from the nine federal study sponsors at its first meeting in September 2010. Study sponsors have been actively engaged in contributing names and suggestions to the committee’s other meetings. The committee is also planning to hold a specific meeting with federal and state agencies involved in disaster resilience in California. These contributions/interactions will be clarified in the committee’s final report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.-c. No response needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6. No response needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>