Persistence of Corruption

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What I Will Cover

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   - Involves private actors (businesses)
   - Usually not observable to public

Who Will Monitor the Monitors?

- How can law enforcement agencies contribute to the control of high-level (political) corruption if political actors are themselves corrupt?

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- Why is high-level corruption so persistent?

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- Strong evidence base that exposure and legal enforcement are effective

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- Transparency International's score for Italy rose from 42 in 2012 to 56 in 202, making it the world's third most improved country according to this source (after Armenia and Seychelles)

The Role of Law Enforcement

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- Judicial police worked closely with public prosecutors in Clean Hands investigations and arrests

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- Independent judiciary
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- Cooperation from Swiss banking officials (on the basis of 1990 changes in the Swiss penal code regarding money laundering)
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- Shift in international factors loosening vote loyalties
- Evidence base for all these claims is relatively weak

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- Anticorruption success seems related to the use of multiple policy and institutional instruments

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- Shutting down shell companies can occur via law enforcement in OECD countries

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- Clear scope for research that would be relevant to law enforcement agencies