

A Typology of Police Role in Anti-Corruption Efforts

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Police Role in Anti-Corruption → The Question



How can police **effectively contribute** to efforts to combat **high-level corruption**?

Police Role in Anti-Corruption → Preview



- Illustration of Fundamental Challenge
- Presentation of Typology of Police Role in Anti-Corruption Efforts
- Drill Down on Typology Components
- High-Level vs. Low-Level Corruption




Police Role in Corruption vs. Anti-Corruption

- Police are perceived to be **corrupt**
- Police corruption **undermines trust** in the police and police **legitimacy**
 - See **Workshop #4** Presentations!
 - **Janice Gallagher** noted corruption's erosion of trust informed by overall perceptions, not individual interactions
 - BUT **Ben Bradford** noted corruption's erosion of trust can be interrupted by improved effectiveness
- **Yet...** Police are often a default anti-corruption agent

An Illustration of Opposing Roles of Police From Malawi




Figure 14: Percentage of Contacts Leading to Request for Gratification



An Illustration of Opposing Roles of Police From Malawi



Figure 20: Citizens Assessments of Institutions Performance in Combating Corruption





An Illustration of Opposing Roles of Police

- **Anti-Corruption Bureau Perception:** “Malawi Police Service assists the Bureau through provision of security, conducting arrests and seizures” (Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau 2012)
- **Citizen Perception:**
 - 24% think police responsible for reporting and monitoring corruption in Malawi
 - 70% would take action against corruption if had information
 - 43% report to police
 - 33% submit formal complaint to district assembly
 - 19% submit complaint to chief

Police are part of the problem and the solution

→ Who watches the watchmen?

Police Role in Anti-Corruption → Reframed Question



How can police **effectively contribute** to efforts to combat **high-level corruption**?



How can we **empower the police** to contribute to anti-corruption efforts without **expanding opportunities for corruption** and **eroding trust and legitimacy**?




Motivation and Scope Conditions

- This typology pertains to **involving the police** in anti-corruption efforts targeting corruption **outside the police force** → *See framing paper for discussion on anti-corruption efforts to limit corruption **within the police force***
- **Modest Goals:** Reduction in corruption not total elimination or complete reform → Maybe **not** detectable in cross-national datasets!
- **Practical Goals:** Limited empirical evidence → Aimed to provide **possible tangible** interventions for future research and piloting
- Scope Conditions:
 - Primarily relevant to **Context 2** countries (framing paper distinction) where corruption is less systemic
 - Primarily relevant where there is **political will** to reform corruption



Typology of Police Role in Anti-Corruption



- **When it comes to police involvement in anti-corruption...**
 - **Reactive** > preventative (Fox 2022)
 - **Disabling circumstances** > enabling circumstances (framing paper)
 - Emphasize **bottom-up** approaches involving citizens, civil society
 - Design **multi-stakeholder** interventions



Prevention: Community Policing of Corruption

- From Rob Blair's Workshop #4 Presentation:
- Community Policing
 - Increased police proximity to communities
 - Increased community involvement in policing
 - Increased devolution of decision-making authority to officers
 - Effects are mixed, but typically does increase **crime reporting**
 - Maybe could prevent corruption by **increasing corruption reporting** or, more importantly, politicians' and bureaucrats' **perceptions of monitoring**



Detection: Multi-Stakeholders + Multiple Activities

- “Between 2010 and 2015, estimated **rates of bribery halved** in Ugandan health services.” (Peiffer, Armytage, Marquette, Gumisiriza 2020, p. 721)
- Health Monitoring Unit
 - “...seeks to mobilize Ugandan communities to report experience of bribes and tip-offs on drugs theft, **using radio announcements, a hotline and a 24-hour help centre**” (p. 728)
 - Doctors, pharmacists, public health officials, auditors, lawyers, policy analysts, ICT officials, **police officers**, support staff
 - Included filming of police takedowns
 - Controversial BUT effective
 - And **maybe** addresses the watching the watchmen issue?



Enforcement: Impartiality

- To reduce corruption, enforcement is as much about **deterrence** as about addressing acts of corruption
- Avoid targeted arrests, selective enforcement, inconsistently applied sanctions
 - Rule of law
 - Involvement of (impartial) **judiciary**

Police Role in Anti-Corruption → Reframed Question



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How can we **empower the police** to contribute to anti-corruption efforts without **expanding opportunities for corruption** and **eroding trust and legitimacy?**



Special Considerations for High-Level Corruption

- **Definition:** “A **systematic or well-organized** plan of action involving **high-level public officials** that causes **serious harm**, such as gross human rights violations.” (*Transparency International, as cited in framing paper*)
- **Well-organized** and **serious harm** are limiting criteria → Could interventions be designed to involve police in limiting high-level corruption?

Individual Whistleblowing → Malawi Corruption Hotline



Allegation that Salima District Council is awarding contracts to people who are not eligible and the assembly is not following proper procedures when awarding these contracts. Recently someone has been offered a contract to install a generator at the assembly without proper procedures being followed.

District Commissioner received K90million Assembly money for construction of the market but deposited it in his personal Bank Account

ESCOM Supervisor is also involved in the malpractice of demanding and receiving bribes to connect electricity to people.

Alleged corruption in the sale of boarded off government items at Ntcheu and Dedza government offices

Matron of District Health Office has awarded a contract to sew uniforms to for Nurses, Patient Attendants and labours to his wife without prior declaration of interest as per Internal Procurement requirement.

Final Thoughts



- Limited direct empirical evidence on role of police in anti-corruption → Need more **research**!
- **Political will** is a prerequisite
- “**Direct** interventions to build good governance by international actors had mostly poor results.” (Framing Paper, p. 13)
 - Good news or bad news for State Department? Emphasize capacity-building



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