



REDISTRICTING AND DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

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Redistricting Experience

2

- **Since late 1980s consulted to redistricting authorities or was an expert witness in court cases in 15 states, most recently:**
 - Successful challenge of Virginia's congressional districts as racial gerrymander
 - Unsuccessful challenge of Maryland's congressional districts as partisan gerrymander
- **Co-PI of award-winning Public Mapping Project to promote public engagement and transparency in redistricting**
 - Produced DistrictBuilder online mapping tool
- **Currently leading team to produce accurate precinct boundaries tiling the entire country**
- **Authored many scholarly redistricting publications**



3

TWO LEGAL QUESTIONS

- 1) Equal Population
- 2) Voting Rights Compliance

Investigate these questions
through a Georgia case study


Population Equality

Equal Population

5

- Congressional districts must generally have de minimus equal total population deviations of 1 or 9 persons.
 - If a compelling state interest exists, a 1% population deviation is allowed (*Tennant v Jefferson County Commission* 2012)
- State legislative districts may have a wider 10% deviation
- Other state and federal laws may apply

2010 Total Population in Georgia 2010 VTDs (VTDs)



Reimagining Equal Population

7

If States and Courts understand the affect of differential privacy on total population counts, then the strict equal population requirement for congressional districts likely relaxes.

Will synthetic data point estimates satisfy equal population standards?

Are confidence intervals needed?

Recommendation: Once epsilon has been chosen, publish official confidence intervals (or approximations) of population counts

Voting Rights

The Voting Rights Act § 2

9

The *Gingles* Test Three Prongs

Thornberg v Gingles 478 U.S. 30 (1986)

1. Can a reasonably compact district with 50% or greater minority voting-age population (VAP) be drawn?
2. Is there the presence of racially polarized voting, where sufficient numbers of Whites vote against the minority community's preferred candidate of choice to deny the minority community an opportunity to elect their candidate?
3. The Totality of the Circumstances

Gingles Test First Prong: Drawing a 50%+ Minority VAP District


Georgia Statewide Counts

11


| | Synthetic | Truth | Difference |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| Total Population | 9,687,653 | 9,687,653 | 0 |
| Non-Hispanic White VAP | 4,242,496 | 4,242,514 | -18 |
| Black VAP | 2,141,665 | 2,140,789 | +876 |
| Hispanic VAP | 538,732 | 539,002 | -270 |

Statewide synthetic total population is constrained to equal the truth, but statewide sub-population totals are not similarly constrained


2010 Total Population in Georgia 2010 VTDs (VTDs)




2010 Black Voting-Age Population (Single Race + Any Combination) in Georgia 2010 Precincts



2010 Black Voting-Age Population (Single Race + Any Combination) in Georgia 2010 Precincts



2010 Black Voting-Age Population (Single Race + Any Combination) in Georgia 2010 Precincts



Shifting Blacks from Homogenous Black Communities to Homogeneous White Communities

16

Synthetic Data Are (Loosely) Bounded

Black VAP, Synthetic minus Truth

Precincts with Black VAP $\geq 1,000$: -9,526

Precincts with Black VAP $< 1,000$: +10,402

(Recall, 876 Black VAP added statewide)

Could affect *Gingles* test first prong in that it may be more difficult to draw a 50%+ Black VAP district.

Recommendations

17

Recommendation #1: Spend less of the privacy budget on total population and VAP by race and ethnicity cells

Recommendation #2: Publish official confidence intervals of counts and race and ethnicity proportions for graduated population sizes.

Recommendation #3: Apply negative spatial correlation to differential privacy algorithm to mitigate random chance of positively correlated groupings of population deviations.

Gingles Test Second Prong: Racially Polarized Voting

Ecological Inference

19


Secret ballot laws protect the confidentiality of individual voters

Aggregate election results reported within precincts


When precinct boundaries are known, precinct boundaries can be spatially joined to census geography, so that census population counts can be aggregated within precincts

Estimate individual voting propensities by race from these aggregate data. In the crudest form, a simple correlation

Typical Ecological Inference Analysis - 2010 Georgia Precincts Statewide



Typical Ecological Inference Analysis - 2010 Georgia Precincts Statewide



Ecological Inference

22

Simple Goodman's Regression

$$\text{TwoParty Vote}_{\text{Minority Preferred Candidate}} = \beta_1 \text{BVAP} + \beta_2 (1 - \text{BVAP})$$

β_1 = Black Vote for Minority Preferred Candidate

β_2 = Non-Black Vote for Minority Preferred Candidate

Two-Stage Goodman's Regression (controls for differential turnout rates)

$$\text{Turnout as Percentage of VAP} = \beta_1 \text{BVAP} + \beta_2 (1 - \text{BVAP})$$

$$\text{Candidate's Vote as Percentage of VAP} = \beta_3 \text{BVAP} + \beta_4 (1 - \text{BVAP})$$

β_3 / β_1 = Black Vote for Minority Preferred Candidate

β_4 / β_2 = Non-Black Vote for Minority Preferred Candidate

RxC Bayesian method proposed by Gary King and co-authors

2010 Governor Statewide

| 2010 Governor Statewide | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------|---|
| Goodman's Regression | | | | | | |
| | <u>Support for Candidate of Choice</u> | | | <u>Standard Error</u> | | |
| | <i>Truth</i> | <i>Synthetic</i> | <i>Difference (Synthetic - Truth)</i> | <i>Truth</i> | <i>Synthetic</i> | <i>Difference (Synthetic - Truth)</i> |
| Black | 1.0419 | 1.0443 | 0.0023 | 0.0056 | 0.0058 | 0.0002 |
| Non-Black | 0.2017 | 0.1981 | -0.0036 | 0.0030 | 0.0031 | 0.0001 |
| Two-Stage Goodman's Regression | | | | | | |
| | <u>Support for Candidate of Choice</u> | | | <u>Standard Error</u> | | |
| | <i>Truth</i> | <i>Synthetic</i> | <i>Difference (Synthetic - Truth)</i> | <i>Truth</i> | <i>Synthetic</i> | <i>Difference (Synthetic - Truth)</i> |
| Black | 1.0861 | 1.0879 | 0.0018 | | | |
| Non-Black | 0.1872 | 0.1826 | -0.0046 | | | |
| <u>RxC EI</u> | | | | | | |
| | <u>Support for Candidate of Choice</u> | | | <u>Standard Error</u> | | |
| | <i>Truth</i> | <i>Synthetic</i> | <i>Difference (Synthetic - Truth)</i> | <i>Truth</i> | <i>Synthetic</i> | <i>Difference (Synthetic - Truth)</i> |
| Black | 0.9510 | 0.9414 | -0.0096 | 0.0148 | 0.0156 | 0.0009 |
| Non-Hispanic White | 0.1929 | 0.1967 | 0.0038 | 0.0015 | 0.0042 | 0.0026 |
| Other | 0.5884 | 0.5616 | -0.0268 | 0.0789 | 0.0403 | -0.0386 |

2010 Congressional District 12

| 2010 CD12 | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------|-----------------------------------|
| Goodman's Regression | | | | | | |
| | Support for Candidate of Choice | | | Standard Error | | |
| | Truth | Synthetic | Difference (Synthetic - Truth) | Truth | Synthetic | Difference (Synthetic - Truth) |
| Black | 1.0302 | 1.0503 | 0.0201 | 0.0143 | 0.0149 | 0.0007 |
| Non-Black | 0.2411 | 0.2250 | -0.0161 | 0.0102 | 0.0106 | 0.0004 |
| Two-Stage Goodman's Regression | | | | | | |
| | Support for Candidate of Choice | | | | | |
| | Truth | Synthetic | Difference (Synthetic - Truth) | | | |
| Black | 1.0516 | 1.0640 | 0.0123 | | | |
| Non-Black | 0.2167 | 0.2043 | -0.0123 | | | |
| RxC EI | | | | | | |
| | Support for Candidate of Choice | | | Standard Error | | |
| | Truth | Synthetic | Difference (Synthetic - Truth) | Truth | Synthetic | Difference (Synthetic - Truth) |
| Black | 0.9589 | 0.9503 | -0.0086 | 0.0205 | 0.0232 | 0.0026 |
| Non-Hispanic White | 0.2440 | 0.2245 | -0.0194 | 0.0172 | 0.0208 | 0.0036 |
| Other | 0.6156 | 0.6757 | 0.0601 | 0.3046 | 0.2325 | -0.0721 |

Recommendations

25

Estimates are sensitive to the application of the differential privacy algorithm in the two cases examined.

More complex model specifications tend to be more sensitive to addition of measurement error.

Recommendation #1: Run multiple model specifications to diagnose potential problems

Recommendation #2: If expected simulation variance is known (or an estimate provided), apply multiple imputation methods to check sensitivity of results



26

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