





Dual use of artif cial-intelligence-powered drug discovery

An international security conference explored how artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for drug discovery could be misused for de novo design of biochemical weapons. A thought experiment evolved into a computational proof.

Fabio Urbina, Filippa Lentzos, Cédric Invernizzi and Sean Ekins

he Swiss Federal Institute for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) Protection —Spiez Laboratory convenes the convergence conference series¹ set up by the Swiss government to identify developments in chemistry, biology and enabling technologies that may have implications for the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Meeting every two years, the conferences bring together an international group of scientific and disarmament experts to explore the current state of the art in the chemical and biological fields and their trajectories, to think through potential security implications and to consider how these implications can most effectively be managed internationally. The meeting convenes for three days of discussion on the possibilities of harm, should the intent be there, from cutting-edge





Fig. 1| A t-SNE plot visualization of the LD $_{50}$ dataset and top 2,000 MegaSyn AI-generated and predicted toxic molecules illustrating VX. Many of the molecules generated are predicted to be more toxic in vivo in the animal model than VX (histogram at right shows cut-off for VX LD $_{50}$). The 2D chemical structure of VX is shown on the right.

published computational machine learning models for toxicity prediction in different

be used to help derive compounds for the treatment of neurological diseases (details



Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, Nature Machine Intelligence (2022)



What was missing?

- Spiez reviewed and approved before we submitted
- Editor and reviewers censored it
- Cut out details even after we self censored it

- Publication took 5 months
- Publication was accidental released before authors were told



Professional interest in 2022 and beyond

- White House OSTP/NSC March
- Invited to participate in Rutgers seminar on ethics of mitigating global catastrophic biological risks April
- Discussion with MIT CSAIL AI risk group April
- Talk at Australia Group, Paris June
- Invitation to speak at OPCW-IUPAC workshop on AI applications in Chemistry, The Hague June
- Invitation to present to DTRA Aug
- Talk at ACS meeting Aug
- Talk to PNNL Aug
- Spiez Convergence conference Sept
- Talk at AAPS meeting Oct
- FBI telephone call
- Multiple companies, institutes, US Gov orgs. reached out to discuss collaborations, business ideas
- Travelled to Brazil in 2023 as part of a US Government (State dept) sponsored initiative
- Lectures, interviews, e.g. Dept Homeland Security, Natl academies, EPFL, ...



A small sample of global media interest

The Register

The Verge

Science – In the Pipeline

The Economist

FINANCIAL TIMES

Swiss National Broadcaster SRF

TA media

Radiolab (NPR)

Le Temps

Scientific American

C&ENews

National Geographic

Washington Post

Scientific American

Wired

Forbes

BBC



IN THE PIPELINE | AI AND MACHINE LEARNING

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Deliberately Optimizing for Harm

Access & Citations


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Web of Science

CrossRef

Online attention

Article Accesses



This article is in the 99th percentile (ranked 92nd) of the 456,081 tracked articles of a similar age in all journals and the 97th percentile (ranked 1st) of the 47 tracked articles of a similar age in Nature Machine Intelligence






So we should be vigilant about potential misuse of these technologies, but at the same time we shouldn't imagine that this will be enough.



Media Attention



COLLABORATIONS
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Artificial intelligence gets scarier and scarier

Reverse engineering of algorithms is the new danger and it's a real threat

Podcasts




The Lawfare Podcast: Sean Ekins and Filippa Lentzos on a Teachable Moment for Dual-Use



























Policy Documents











Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences

Mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research









10 Recommendations for generative Al: Preventing Al from creating chemical threats

- 1. Learn from The Hague Ethical Guidelines
- 2. Engage numerous AI ethics institutes or other experts to provide guidance
- 3. Increase ethical training for computing students and raise awareness
- 4. Increase training of scientists in companies to recognize potential for dual use of generative Al
- 5. Keep a human in the loop
- 6. Waitlist restriction (e.g. like GPT-3 was initially) to limit access
- 7. Use a public facing API to control access and how models are used
- 8. Federated learning use encrypted data to train model without decrypting data
- 9. Disclosure of potential for dual use in publications to encourage recognition of this potential and visibility
- 10. Regulation of software and applications in industry/academia: limit access to tools, knowledge and expertise + Self regulation, anyone?

Urbina, Lentzos, Invernizzi, Ekins, J Chem Inf Model. 2023 Feb 13;63(3):691-694



Key take-home points

- Publishing led to increased engagement on dual use, but should it have even happened?
- Need for oversight of in silico research that could be used for dual use models
- Especially in the design of biological, chemical agents or other toxins
- Need for Benefit- risk assessment before you start Ask yourself Should the work even be done?
- Need for Risk mitigation plan How to share and communicate the data related to biological / chemical toxins (or not)

- Would any restrictions on Al be used as a broader attack on science
- Current administration attacks on science may be more dangerous than anything that AI could do?
- P.S. More ethics training?

