

Gas Electric Coordination

National Academy of Science,
Engineering and Medicine


May 13, 2019

Brian Fitzpatrick – Sr. Lead Fuel
Supply Analyst


Key Statistics

Member companies	1,010+
Millions of people served	65
Peak load in megawatts	165,492
MW of generating capacity	180,086
Miles of transmission lines	84,042
2018 GWh of annual energy	806,546
Generation sources	1,379
Square miles of territory	243,417
States served	13 + DC


- 26% of load in Eastern Interconnection
- 20% of transmission assets in Eastern Interconnection




As of 1/2019






Queued Generation Fuel Mix (December 31, 2018)




PJM Natural Gas Generation Supply Sources



Total MWs of Gas-fired Generation (81,270 MWs)





- FERC Orders
 - Order 787 (2013)
 - Allows for the voluntary sharing of non-public operating information between interstate pipelines, public utilities and electric transmission operators
 - Order 809 (2016)
 - Adjustment of interstate gas pipeline nomination cycles to improve gas-electric coordination
 - Timely nomination deadline moved from 12:30pm Eastern time to 2:00pm Eastern time
 - Addition of 3rd intraday nomination cycle



Comprised of personnel from across Operations and Markets Divisions

4 primary staff

10 secondary support staff



Focused on understanding and evaluation of interstate pipeline and local distribution company conditions



Weekly calls with interstate pipeline gas operations personnel
(Primarily November through March)

Daily analysis of natural gas scheduled deliveries to generators
(Is the gas nomination sufficient to meet electric obligation?)

Daily assessment of pipeline operating conditions (OFO's, Critical Days, Ratable Take Requirements, Force Majeure)

Coordination of pipeline, generator and transmission maintenance outages (Primarily April through October)

Daily report(s) to PJM Dispatch on gas delivery risks which could impact generation

Critical Notifications

! Critical notifications from the following pipelines are currently unavailable:

Dominion Gas Transmission - last update

Equitrans, L.P. - last update

Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. - last update

Midwestern Gas Transmission - last update

Search (Pipeline, ID, Type, Subject)

Reset

472 records


Export: [CSV](#) [Excel](#)


Critical Notifications

Records Per Page: 15 (1 of 32)

Pipeline	ID	Type	Subject	Posted UTC	Effective UTC	End UTC
All						
TET	82018	Capacity Constraint	Te Pipeline Conditions For 2/25/2019	2/24/2019 21:46	2/25/2019 15:00	2/26/2019 15:00
NGPOA	39722	Force Majeure	Force Majeure - Segment 8 & Aa 5/6	2/24/2019 21:29	2/24/2019 21:29	12/31/2049 14:00
AGT	82017	Capacity Constraint	Agt Pipeline Conditions For 2/25/2019	2/24/2019 20:35	2/25/2019 14:00	2/26/2019 14:00
TGP	370575	Current Pipeline Conditions	Restrictions For 02-24-19 Id2	2/24/2019 20:29	2/24/2019 20:29	12/31/2049 14:00
ETNG	82015	Capacity Constraint	Etng Pipeline Conditions For 2/25/2019	2/24/2019 20:25	2/25/2019 14:00	2/26/2019 14:00
TGP	370574	Current Pipeline Conditions	Restrictions For 2-25-19 Timely Cycle	2/24/2019 19:32	2/24/2019 19:32	12/31/2049 14:00
TGP	370572	Current Pipeline Conditions	Restrictions For 02-24-19 Id1	2/24/2019 15:58	2/24/2019 15:58	12/31/2049 14:00
TGP	370570	Current Pipeline Conditions	Restrictions For 2-23-19 Id3	2/24/2019 00:52	2/24/2019 00:52	12/31/2049 14:00
TGP	370569	Current Pipeline Conditions	Restrictions For 02-23-19 Ec	2/24/2019 00:16	2/24/2019 00:16	12/31/2049 14:00
TET	81993	Capacity Constraint	Te Pipeline Conditions For 2/24/2019	2/23/2019 21:21	2/24/2019 15:00	2/25/2019 15:00
TGP	370568	Current Pipeline Conditions	Restrictions For 2-23-19 Id2	2/23/2019 20:24	2/23/2019 20:24	12/31/2049 14:00
ETNG	81990	Capacity Constraint	Etng Pipeline Conditions For 2/24/2019	2/23/2019 20:17	2/24/2019 14:00	2/25/2019 14:00

Gas Generator Risk Assessment Tool Process





Gas Electric Coordination Team 2014

- Assembled after 2013/2014 Polar Vortex
- Focused on coordination and collaboration with interstate pipelines and local distribution companies and fuel delivery risk assessment

Capacity Performance 2016-2021

- 5 year phase in
- Generators must perform when called on during Performance Assessment Interval
- Significant penalties can be assessed for non-performance

Market Timing Change April 2016

- PJM moved Day Ahead Award notification from 4:00pm to 1:30pm
- NAESB timely gas nomination deadline moved from 12:30pm to 2:00pm

Hourly Offers November 2017

- Allows generators to update their offers on an hourly basis if they choose to reflect changing market conditions

2019 Gas Electric Coordination Initiatives

PJM/Interstate Pipeline Tabletop Exercise – Spring 2019

- Pilot exercise
- Testing operational and communication protocols between PJM and Interstate Pipeline personnel under various system disruption scenarios

GridEx V – November 2019

- Including representatives from an Interstate Pipeline in this year's exercise

NPCC Tabletop Exercise November 2019

- Focus on New York/New England but with some impact on eastern PJM

Gas Electric Coordination Database

- Central repository for all gas generation related data
- Single tool to consolidate and enhance existing daily team processes

Contingency Planning

- Continue to identify/refine gas contingencies
- System restoration coordination with pipelines/Black Start Fuel Assurance

What's Keeping Us Up At Night?



Threats to Fuel Sources

Transportation

Storms

Cyber Attacks

Physical Attacks

Droughts

Regulation

Hurricanes

Temperature
Extremes

natural gas



nuclear



wind



off-shore wind



hydro



methane



solar



PJM Fuel Sources

wood



storage



diesel



biomass




oil



coal



other



FOCUS

1. Define fuel security **considering risks in fuel delivery** to critical generators
2. Reaffirm the **value of markets to** achieving a cost-effective, fuel-secure fleet of resources
3. **Identify fuel security risks** with a primary focus on resilience
4. Establish **criteria to value fuel security** in PJM markets

APPROACH

- 1 Phase 1: Analysis**
Identify potential system vulnerabilities and develop criteria to address them
- 2 Phase 2: Modeling**
Model incorporation of vulnerabilities into PJM's markets
- 3 Phase 3: Ongoing Coordination**
Address specific security concerns identified by federal and state agencies

TIMING


May–November 2018
Analysis

May 2018 – December 2019
Phase 3 ongoing coordination


2019/2020
Phase 2 - Assess market design in 2019 and target solution filed with FERC early 2020






















Fuel Security vs. Capacity Performance

Fuel Security looks
at the whole system



Capacity Performance
looks at each unit
individually



Dispatch	Retirement	Winter Load	Non-Firm Gas	Refueling	Pipeline Disruption (med. impact)	Pipeline Disruption (high impact)	Forced Outages
Economic 	Announced 	Typical 50/50 134,976 MW 	62.5% Avail. 	Moderate 	Looped 1 	Looped 1 	Five Year Avg. 
Max. Emergency 	Escalated 1 	Extreme 95/5 147,721 MW 	0% Avail. 	Limited 	Looped 2 	Looped 2 	Modeled Outages 
	Escalated 2 				Single 1 	Single 1 	
					Single 2 	Single 2 	
300+ combinations							



Highlights from Fuel Security Analysis Phase I



There is NO immediate threat to the reliability of the PJM RTO.



- PJM is reliable in the announced retirements and escalated retirements cases under all typical winter load scenarios.
- PJM is reliable in the announced retirements cases under all extreme winter load scenarios.




- Scenarios to identify points at which an assumption or combination of assumptions begin to impact the ability to reliably serve customers.
- The stressed scenarios resulted in a loss of load under extreme but plausible conditions.

Contributing factors:

- The level of retirements and replacements
- The level of non-firm gas availability
- The ability to replenish oil supplies
- The location, magnitude and duration of pipeline disruption
- Pipeline configuration

Emergency Procedures Summary

Announced Retirement Summary



Emergency Procedures Summary

Escalated Retirement Models

				Pipeline Disruption																	
Winter Load	Retirement	Non-Firm Gas Avail.	Dispatch	None	Single 1		Single 2		Looped 1		Looped 2		None	Single 1		Single 2		Looped 1		Looped 2	
				None	Med.	High	Med.	High	Med.	High	Med.	High	None	Med.	High	Med.	High	Med.	High	Med.	High
Typical 50/50	Escalated 1	62.5%	Economic																		
		0%	Economic																		
	Escalated 2	62.5%	Economic																		
		0%	Economic																		
Extreme 95/5	Escalated 1	62.5%	Max Emer.																		
			Economic																	3	
		0%	Max Emer.	4	4	5	4	6	5	7	4	14	37	41	48	37	41	46	62	49	78
			Economic	9	10	11	9	10	9	13	9	22	43	44	56	42	46	47	63	53	83
	Escalated 2	62.5%	Max Emer.																		
			Economic																		
		0%	Max Emer.	4	3	5	4	4	4	4	3	4	11	12	13	13	14	14	15	14	22
			Economic	7	7	7	7	7	6	8	7	7	19	19	20	19	20	19	26	21	34
Moderate Refueling										Limited Refueling											

Normal Operations

Demand Response Deployed

Reserve Shortage

Voltage Reduction

Load Shed

- Normal Operations
- Demand Response Deployed
- Reserve Shortage
- Voltage Reduction
- Load Shed

Moderate Refueling

Limited Refueling

- [Fuel Security Analysis **PDF**](#)12.18.2018
- [Fuel Security Analysis - Technical Appendix **PDF**](#)1.2.2019
- [Fuel Security Analysis – Scenario Summaries **PDF**](#)(133MB)1.16.2019
- [Fuel Security Study - Presentation **PDF**](#)11.1.2018
- [Fuel Security: Analyzing Fuel Supply Resilience in the PJM Region **PDF**](#)11.1.2018
- [Fuel Security FAQs **XLS**](#)11.21.2018
- [Valuing Fuel Security **PDF**](#)4.30.2018

- Staying ahead of cyber and physical threats
 - Collaboration with federal agencies
 - Exercises and drills between gas and electric industries
- Fuel assurance during a system restoration event
 - Black start and critical generation
 - How much gas would be available?
 - Emergency order to raise priority of gas deliveries?
 - On-site fuel requirements
- Continuing to enhance coordination with pipelines
 - Control room to control room communications during emergencies