



Overview of the Evidence on Sponsor Influence

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Disclosure

- No funding for this presentation
- Remuneration paid to Univ of CO for service as Senior Research Integrity Editor, Cochrane
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Influence





Illustration by torris williams

Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions



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WILEY




What is bias and how can we study it?


- “A **bias** is a systematic error, or deviation from the truth, in results.”
 - Over or underestimate of true intervention effect



1.1 Number of studies with favorable efficacy results



Do the results of drug studies differ by sponsor?



25 included papers with 2923 included studies

Drug-industry sponsors compared to others (govt, nonprofits)

Studies with **statistically significant efficacy results** about 30% higher among industry sponsored studies compared to non-industry sponsored studies

No difference in risk of bias

Do effect sizes of nutrition study results differ by sponsor?



Open access




Figure 3 Effect size, cardiovascular disease: industry sponsorship versus no industry sponsorship, HR.


Do the conclusions of reviews on secondhand smoke differ by sponsor?

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Odds Ratio (95% CI)</u>
Quality	1.5 (<0.1-67.5)
Not PR vs PR	1.3 (0.3-5.4)
TI vs non-TI	88.4 (16.4-476.5)
Topic	
Lung cancer vs. multiple	1.6 (0.2-10.3)
Heart disease vs. multiple	1.6 (0.2-14.7)
Year of publication	1.1 (0.9-1.3)

Barnes and Bero 1998, JAMA

In nutrition research, is
industry funding and / or
author conflicts of
interest associated with
results or conclusions
that favor the sponsor?

Yes! *Conclusions and
Results*



Funding bias



Conclusions




Results: statistical
significance



Results: Effect sizes

The Cycle of Bias




Odierna, et al 2013

Methods



The Cycle of Bias



Odierna, et al 2013

TABLE 1—Characteristics of Studies That Explored the Influence of Industry Sponsorship on Research Agendas: 1986–2017

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

The Influence of Industry Sponsorship on the Research Agenda: A Scoping Review

Alice Fabbri, MD, PhD, Alexandra Lai, BPharm, Quinn Grundy, RN, PhD, and Lisa Anne Bero, PhD

Industry agendas not aligned with public health questions / prevention.

Characteristic	No. (%)
Total	36
Type of study	
Cross-sectional	19 (52.8)
Content analysis	7 (19.4)
Survey	6 (16.7)
Qualitative	3 (8.3)
Systematic review	1 (2.8)
Level of evidence ^a	
1	4 (11.1)
2	1 (2.8)
3	2 (5.6)
4	29 (80.5)
5	0 (0.0)
Industry type	
Medically related	19 (52.8)
Tobacco	4 (11.1)
Food	3 (8.3)
Plant or animal biotechnology	3 (8.3)
Chemical	1 (2.8)
Alcohol	1 (2.8)
Mining	1 (2.8)
Not specified	4 (11.1)
Funding source of the study	
Not for profit	21 (58.3)
Mixed	1 (2.8)
None	4 (11.1)
No statement	10 (27.8)

^a1 indicates the highest level of evidence and 5 the lowest; assessed using "The Oxford 2011 Levels of Evidence" from the Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine.¹²

Influencing the research agenda - nutrition



V
S



46%

12%

Fabbri, et al. 2018

Influencing the research agenda - tobacco




VS





Barnes D & Bero L (1996) Industry-funded research and conflict of interest: an analysis of research sponsored by the tobacco industry through the Center for Indoor Air Research. *J Health Polit Policy Law* 21, 515–542.

The Cycle of Bias



Odierna, et al 2013



To avoid bias, the mouse was blinded when self-reporting outcomes

Methods

Table 3 | Conflict of interest in formula trials published between 2015 and 2020

	Independent funding (n=19)*	Formula donated by formula industry but no other industry support reported (n=7)	Formula industry funding reported (n=91)	Total
At least one author reported a conflict of interest related to formula industry	2/16 (13)	4/7 (57)	81/89 (91)	87/112 (78)
At least one author affiliated to formula industry	0/19	2/7 (29)	73/91 (80)	75/117 (64)
Formula industry sponsor involved in statistical analysis or trial reporting	—	1/6 (17)	59/75 (79)	60/81 (74)

Values are No of trials/total No of trials (%).

*Independent funding means a funding source not related to the formula industry (n=17) or authors reported that the study did not have any formal funding (n=2). Denominators vary because of lack of reporting for some variables. Source of funding was not reported for eight studies, author conflict of interest was not reported for nine studies, and role of formula sponsor in statistical analysis or trial reporting was not reported for 17 studies.

Low risk of bias related to low COI:

RR 11.36 (1.74 to 73.93)

Cite this as: *BMJ* 2021;375:n2202

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n2202>

Who is setting the standards?

Legislating “Sound Science”: The Role of the Tobacco Industry

| Annamaria Baba, MPH, Daniel M. Cook, PhD, Thomas O. McGarity, JD, and Lisa A. Bero, PhD

In the late 1990s, in an effort to dispute the link between “research integrity,” and draft language for the new acts, the tobacco industry

to revise its Circular A-110, which provides guidance to fe

American Journal of Public Health | Supplement 1, 2005, Vol 95, No. S1

Promoting “Data Access and Quality”

- “to gain passage of federal law on criteria / standards for epidemiological studies”
 - “our plans must always include *developing the right criteria* that will favorably evaluate and be applicable to ETS [environmental tobacco smoke]”
 - “to legislate public access to epidemiological data used in support of federal laws and regulations”

Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-554)

Sec. 515. (a) In General.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, by not later than September 30, 2001, and with public and Federal agency involvement, issue guidelines under sections 3504(d)(1) and 3516 of title 44, United States Code, that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of

and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Fe

(b) Establish procedures for affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the guidelines issued under subsection (a); and
(c) Establish procedures for

Who were the sponsors?

Tobacco Industry

Fisheries and Forestry trade
organizations

Utilities and water companies

Mercury and methylene chloride
producers

National Rifle Association

Food manufacturers

- *“... in order for this strategy to succeed, the tobacco industry needs to take the necessary precautions to remain in the background of the public debate and ultimately develop epidemiological criteria to evaluate the quality of research data.”*

THE ACTION PLAN – Data Access and Data Quality

Demonstrate the public cares (a poll on issues of data access and rules of epidemiological studies)

Leverage / mobilize allied industries

Use scientists and technical conferences to focus on the issue (American Association for the Advancement of Science *“will offer considerable credibility to our overall effort”*)

Organize coalitions for other epidemiology issues (mercury, methylene chloride)

Educate / mobilize the business community

Conduct policy briefings

Brief the media

Leverage lobbyists

And about 20 years on.....

- Promotes open access to data, rigorous methodological standards, disclosure of conflicts of interest, and acknowledgement of bias
- “Science can help provide the evidence base for public policy”
- “The integrity of science needs to be clear and the integrity of scientists...unimpeachable.”
- “Industry ..has every right to have its voice heard”



**The Brussels declaration
on ethics & principles for
science & society policy-making**

A EuroScientist Exclusive – 17th February 2017

How does The Brussels Declaration fit with the “Action Plan”?

Launched at the American Association for the Advancement of Science

Editorial in *Nature*

Originated with ‘Sci-Com’

26 of 165 names on the Declaration were affiliated with tobacco or alcohol industries

Richard Horton, editor of Lancet, attended first meeting and was quoted as if offering an endorsement.... But had not seen later version or was aware of the Brussels Declaration



**The Brussels declaration
on ethics & principles for
science & society policy-making**

A EuroScientist Exclusive – 17th February 2017

Tips for spotting industry influence

Initiated by communications / PR firm

“bottoms up effort”

Lack of sponsorship disclosure

Nonfinancial interests are more influential than financial


“Vested interests can be beneficial”

“thought leaders,” “carefully selected influencers”

“More than XX scientists from YY countries....”

Scientists are “aloof” and “arrogant”

The Cycle of Bias



Odierna, et al 2013



“Research and scientific publication”
are part of the pharmaceutical
industry’s marketing strategy

“Publication Strategy” goal: to use
research "to disseminate the
information as widely as possible
through the world’s medical
literature”

Statements re sponsor involvement

Funding: This work was funded by Imperial Health Charity, grant FA1920_05. Imperial Health Charity had no role in considering the study design or in the collection, analysis, interpretation of data, writing of the report or decision to submit the article for publication. BH and RJB had full access to all data in the study and took responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analyses.

Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The Canadian Institutes of Health Research had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication.


Are sponsors involved or not?

200 industry funded trials of drugs

Type of industry involvement	N	%
Design of study	183	92
Data analysis	146	73
Reporting	173	87

29 (33%) of 80 authors of these trials said that the academic author had the “final say.”

The Cycle of Bias



Odierna, et al 2013

201 Tupper Road Phone: 201-540-2000
Morris Plains, NJ
07951



DISTRIBUTION

July 31, 1995

O. Brandicourt, M.D. (PD, Product Planning, Morris Plains, NJ USA)

Neurontin® Marketing Assessments

Enclosed is the final version of the Marketing Assessment for Neurontin® in neuropathic pain and spasticity.

The results of the recommended exploratory trials in neuropathic pain, if positive, will be publicized in medical congresses and published, but there is no intention to fully develop this indication at this point. No investment is recommended for spasticity.

The results of the recommended exploratory trials in neuropathic pain, if positive, will be publicized in medical congresses and published, but there is no

WL 07520

Division of Warner-Lambert Company

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No overt difference in the trial methodology or the patients, which could explain the difference in the results between 945-77 and 945-177, has been detected. The question was raised whether it would be possible to investigate the patient history (primary care physician records) to determine if patient alcoholism could have been involved or patient screening was adequately performed.

ACTION:

- The results of 945-177 will not be published, nor will the combined results of 945-77 plus 945-177 be published.
- The effort required to investigate the potential cause for the difference in results between 945-77 and 945-177 was deemed not feasible relative to the potential need for such explanation. It was decided not to pursue any further investigation to explain the difference.
- ◆ 945-78, the open-label extension of 945-77, which permits Neurontin doses to be increased as high as deemed necessary, will be completed by year end 1997.

II. Monotherapy F

- ◆ Based on the clinical results of 945-77 (efficacy and safety) and the results of 945-82, it is anticipated that the monotherapy claim should be sufficient to support the registration of Neurontin.
- ◆ 945-82 (inconclusive results — doses not statistically different) must be included in the dossier for safety data, but is not considered a pivotal trial.
- ◆ 945-177 will be included in the dossier for safety data separate from and combined with 945-77.
- ◆ After review and discussion of the registration alternatives, national vs. mutual recognition vs. centralized, it was determined that national filings would permit individual countries to obtain faster registration (in some cases) while maintaining the current national labeling (considered favorable in some countries).

ACTION:

- Based on these discussions it was decided to submit national applications in Europe.
- The clinical expert report will be prepared by Dr. David Chadwick.
- ◆ It is anticipated that the Neurontin monotherapy claim will be fairly broad and similar to the following:

"Neurontin is an anti-epileptic for monotherapy or add-on therapy in patients with partial seizures or partial seizures with secondary generalization, including patients with newly diagnosed seizures at doses of 900 mg to 3600 mg per day in divided doses (TID)."

- ◆ PD Italy and France will need to renegotiate pricing when monotherapy will be registered if the labeling is not indication and dose specific. Specific labeling, i.e., "900 mg per day is the usual maintenance dose for naïve patients," could eliminate the need for price negotiations.

V047122


19 trials


Publication bias = 7

Selective outcome = 4

Selective analysis = 11

- P-value of primary outcome (per protocol) in RR
- P-value of primary outcome in publication
- P-value in RR same as p-value in publication





“better late than never”

In collaboration with Tracey Woodruff and Nadia Gaber, UCSF

Breaking the cycle

Breaking the cycle: The Evidence

- Public prioritization of research agendas and funding
- Recognize industry funding and conflicts of interest as a source of bias and account for it
- Open data for all- Published protocols / registered reports
- Eliminate it – at a structural level
- Rethink funding and COI disclosures
- Independent publishers of research

Commercial influence in health: from transparency to independence



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Commercial interests, transparency, and independence: a call for submissions

BMJ 2019; 365 doi: <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i1706> (Published 16 April 2019)

Cite this as: BMJ 2019;365:i1706

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COMMERCIAL INFLUENCE IN HEALTH: FROM TRANSPARENCY TO INDEPENDENCE

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Joel Lexchin,^{1,2,3} Lisa A Bero,⁴ Courtney Davis,⁵ Marc-Andre Gagnon⁶

