ACTING ISN DAS FOR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS PHIL DOLLIFF'S
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Welcome and Thank You

Good afternoon. My name is Phil Dolliff and I am the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) at the U.S. Department of State. In this capacity, I oversee State's nonproliferation programs, including our Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), Office of Export Control Cooperation (ECC), the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMDT), the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, as well as our Office of Strategic Communications and Outreach (SCO).

I want to thank the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for the opportunity to speak about this critically important topic and I want to thank everyone for taking time out of your busy schedules to be here today to discuss Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). I am very excited to be speaking about CTR and particularly the evolution of CTR at the Department of State over the past twenty years and where we see CTR going next. Today, CTR at the Department of State has evolved to address some of the world's most pressing foreign policy challenges.

Full disclosure -- I was the Director of the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of State for over 10 years, before taking on my current role as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary. So, the work of CTR is particularly close to my heart and I am excited for its continued growth as we move forward.

Three Generations of CTR

I want to start my remarks by describing what we see as three generations of CTR, in a State Department context.

As most of you are aware, Cooperative Threat Reduction began over 20 years ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn created a suite of programs at State, Energy, and Defense to prevent the risk that weapons of mass destruction and the equipment or expertise needed to make these weapons could fall into the wrong hands.

During what I like to call the first generation of CTR, operating in Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), State, Defense, and Energy meshed diplomacy, defense relationships, nonproliferation technical expertise, and the resources and authorities of each Department to successfully destroy nearly 3,000 tons of chemical weapons, secure 24 nuclear weapons storage sites, deactivate over 7,600 strategic nuclear warheads, and redirect thousands of former WMD scientists.

Recognizing that efforts to secure materials and expertise are not always successful, during this time the Department of State also established the Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS), which helped prevent the proliferation of WMD materials by strengthening national strategic trade control systems in countries that possess, produce, or supply strategic items, as well as in countries which such items are most likely to transit.

While our legacy programs in the Former Soviet Union states (FSU) remain a component of our threat reduction effort, the WMD threat has evolved substantially over these past two decades.

In the second generation of CTR, State's version of CTR evolved to address emerging WMD threats outside the FSU. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Amerithrax attacks and with the support and encouragement of the Congress, State's CTR efforts expanded to include new regions and emerging threats such as terrorist pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

For example, in the early 2000s, we recognized the proliferation threat associated with Iraq's and Libya's former WMD programs and worked closely with scientists in countries of concern to integrate them into the international scientific

community. We similarly started to improve the security of weaponizable chemicals in academic and industrial facilities in countries where we identified an overlap of growing technical expertise, dangerous materials, and the presence of Al Qaeda or its affiliates.

In this second generation, we also focused on developing new and expanded approaches to enhance the security of dangerous pathogens. To do so, we created the Biosecurity Engagement Program to focus on the nexus of dangerous pathogens, emerging bioscience capabilities, and terrorist groups to ensure that life science expertise is not misused but instead is leveraged to promote safe, secure, and sustainable science.

Mirroring our concern about dangerous pathogens, we also initiated an effort to build the capabilities of foreign partners who work at nuclear facilities to be able to promote employee reliability and trustworthiness programs as well as programs to detect terrorist insider threats.

The Third Generation

Brought on by a rapidly changing global environment with many new and diverse threats, we are now developing a third generation of CTR.

We are facing WMD threats that are growing in sophistication and severity.

The most significant threat to our country is posed by North Korea. Secretary Tillerson has underscored that, "With each successive detonation and missile test, North Korea pushes Northeast Asia and the world closer to instability and broader conflict" and that "the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack on Seoul, or Tokyo, is real." As a result, Secretary Tillerson has emphasized that, "In light of the growing threat, the time has come for all of us to put new pressure on North Korea to abandon its dangerous path."

We have seen too that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has repeatedly used banned chemical weapons, the most deadly of these attacks in 2013 killed more than 1,400 people in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta. Yet, despite joining the

Chemical Weapons and surrendering most of its chemical weapons, the Assad regime continued to use chlorine and, eventually, sarin in violation of its treaty and UN obligations. Assad's chemical weapons attack on his own people in April of this year was met by a targeted U.S. military strike on the Syrian airfield from where the chemical attack was launched.

We also remain deeply concerned about ISIS and chemical weapons. ISIS has repeatedly used sulfur mustard in chemical weapons attacks in Syria as well as in Iraq. Our government has condemned in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by any actor, and we are working to leverage all available tools to target those complicit in their development, proliferation, and use.

While the threats posed by the DPRK's nuclear threat, and Assad and ISIS's use of chemical weapons programs are of course markedly different, each have important similarities that inform our current approach and future thinking about CTR. Each of these programs leverages nimble and flexible approaches for acquiring and developing unconventional weapons, thereby undermining international norms against WMD while seeking to evade UN Security Council obligations.

In light of how adaptable and significant these threats are, the State Department has developed a suite of CTR tools with key characteristics that we believe are vital for meeting the WMD threats of today and the future. **Specifically, our programs must be**:

- Expeditionary: Capable of delivering nonproliferation impact wherever it is needed, including in countries suffering civil wars, revolutions, and insurgencies.
- Fast: Able to deliver programmatic impact to disrupt time-sensitive challenges or meet perishable opportunities.
- Flexible: Expert at partnering with a range of foreign partners, non-governmental organizations, and U.S. Government entities in whatever way will get the job done.
- Threat Driven: Informed by the most current information – whether that is an open-source report about CW use in Iraq, technical analysis from a

National Lab, or a situation report from a diplomat or soldier in the field – to focus programming to maximize impact.

Using CTR Programs to Advance First-Order Nonproliferation Priorities

I now want to talk in greater detail about how we are using our CTR programs to counter DPRK proliferation activities as well as our efforts to dismantle ISIS's chemical weapons capability and prevent its affiliates and other terrorist organizations from using chemical weapons abroad. I will also talk about how we are using our programs to support accountability for CW use in Syria. I will also talk about the importance of the Global Health Security Agenda, including the Agenda's emphasis on biosecurity as a preventive approach to promoting our national security, and our continued efforts to counter nuclear smuggling threats.

DPRK

The threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs is gravely serious, and one that warrants immediate and urgent attention. Since the Trump administration took office, North Korea has tested one nuclear device and conducted more than 15 ballistic missile launches. The regime's provocations and rhetoric have significantly escalated tensions between North Korea and America.

The President's strategy is to "put new pressure on North Korea to abandon its dangerous path." We remain willing to solve this issue through diplomacy under the right conditions. If the DPRK indicates an interest in serious engagement, we will explore that option, but with clear eyes about the DPRK's past track record of violating negotiated agreements. North Korea's recent provocations, however, show that now is not the time for dialogue.

Our Export Control and Border Security Program has long focused on enhancing strategic trade controls and export controls, especially in Southeast Asia. We are now also in the process of bringing to bear the resources of our Cooperative Threat Reduction office to address unique aspects of the North Korea threat.

To meet this objective, our programs are implementing efforts that focus on building partner capacity to detect and shut down financial and material flows to North Korea that support the regime's WMD programs.

We understand that UNSCRs do not implement themselves and therefore we have a variety of efforts to train governmental and other stakeholders on relevant DPRK-focused UNSCRs. We are also working to freeze activities that fund DPRK proliferation and enhance partner capabilities to prohibit DPRK nationals from traveling for sanctions evasion. We are training industry to conduct end-user checks to halt commercial activity supporting DPRK proliferation. We are also working to disrupt illicit shipping that uses "Flags of convenience" and false ship registries. These efforts involve engagement with law enforcement and other key government stakeholders to identify and disrupt the illegal movement of equipment and materials used to develop WMDs and missiles, as well as shipments of cargos, such as coal, that the DPRK uses to fund its UN-proscribed weapons program, and which are banned or limited by UN Security Council Resolutions.

While we have no illusions of the challenge ahead of us, we are doing all we can to contribute to this maximum pressure campaign.

Counter-WMD Terrorism Support To Defeat ISIS

Another unique challenge encountered in the third generation of CTR is the pursuit of chemical weapons capabilities by non-state actors.

As I noted earlier, we are deeply concerned about ISIS and reports of its use of chemical weapons on a scale never seen for a non-state actor on the battlefield.

As we work with our coalition partners to defeat ISIS, we help frontline forces counter possible CW attacks. For example, in support of the liberation of Mosul we provided elements of the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) with personal protective and decontamination equipment to counter ISIS' potential use of Chemical Weapons (CW). We are continuing to support frontline CTS forces' ability to counter CW attacks in combat operations. CTR also provides training to

first responders and civil defense forces to identify, disrupt, and respond to CW attacks.

Off the battlefield, CTR and the law enforcement community have been working with Coalition partners to raise awareness of ISIS's procurement tactics. We are working to make it more difficult for ISIS to acquire chemical weapons-related materials, equipment, and expertise.

An important component of this effort is work that our chemical security and biological security programs are carrying out to make sure that legitimate laboratories and industrial facilities in Iraq have appropriate physical, personnel, and procedural security measures in place for dangerous materials.

A high priority for us, as well, is making sure that the ISIS CW threat is contained to, and subsequently defeated in, the Iraq-Syria theater.

To do so, we must intensify our efforts with all of our State threat reduction programs to improve the security of dangerous materials in key countries where ISIS affiliates are present and to enhance the export controls and border security measures that can detect and disrupt when ISIS operatives or WMD-related materials are moving across borders.

For instance, my CTR program continues to train law enforcement, security personnel, and emergency officials in a number of priority Middle Eastern and North African countries where risks posed by ISIS and its affiliates are highest to prevent, detect, and disrupt CW plots.

We are also working with priority partners in key regions to improve human reliability and insider threat detection capabilities at sensitive nuclear facilities.

Similarly, our Export Control and Border Security Program, which supports the broader CTR enterprise by helping partner governments build effective border security systems and national strategic trade control (STCs), is working throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia to improve border enforcement measures to combat diversion and illicit trafficking of WMD, dual-use goods, munitions, and related technologies as well as working to develop legal-regulatory

and institutional frameworks for managing legitimate cross-border transfers of these items.

Our EXBS program in particular has prioritized the threat posed by ISIS. For instance, EXBS now has a robust effort to support our Iraqi partners in enhancing the security of key border crossings and is also working with both Libya and Egypt to prevent the flow of fighters and materiel that would otherwise support ISIS operations.

Expeditionary Efforts

I noted at the outset that our programs are expeditionary in nature, and I want to talk about how this applies to our efforts related to ISIS.

Many of the countries where we are most active are highly volatile and security considerations often hinder our ability to meet with recipients, visit facilities, or conduct events. Our State nonproliferation programs overcome these constraints by identifying novel implementation approaches. In countries where the security environment constrains the movement of U.S. government personnel, the office leverages academic, not-for-profit, and local partners capable of advancing our threat reduction mission. We also use technology to deliver remote trainings and enhance physical security at foreign facilities. For example, in Iraq and in other challenging Middle Eastern environments, we have funded local partners to secure dangerous materials at labs proximate to ISIS controlled-territory.

Our programs' creative and flexible approaches to implementation have allowed us to address WMD terrorism threats in countries where the security situation precludes an official U.S. government presence. For instance, in Somalia, our programs are helping secure dangerous pathogens by conducting security assessments at human and animal health laboratories.

Syria Chemical Weapons Challenges

I also want to talk about how we leverage the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) to address first-order challenges such as the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

As background, the NDF, established in 1994, allows the U.S. government to respond rapidly to high priority nonproliferation and disarmament opportunities, which are unanticipated or unusually difficult. The NDF has the authority to undertake projects notwithstanding any other point of law.

Due to the unique legal restrictions associated with Syria, taking steps to hold the Syrian regime accountable for the development and use of chemical weapons is particularly important and challenging.

For this purpose, we rely on NDF and its unique authorities to execute projects in close consultation with the Congress to support verification and accountability measures.

The NDF, for instance, recently provided $10 million to support Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for investigation and verification activities within Syria, and NDF has previously provided financial and in-kind contributions to the UN and OPCW to support efforts that work to hold entities that use chemical weapons accountable for their development and use.

Global Health Security Agenda

It is the policy of the United States to advance the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), which is a multi-faceted, multi-country initiative intended to accelerate partner countries' measurable capabilities to achieve specific targets to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats (GHSA targets), whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidentally released.

GHSA advances an important vision – a world safe and secure from global health threats posed by infectious diseases.

Global health security is a shared responsibility that cannot be achieved by a single actor or sector of government. Its success depends upon collaboration among the health, security, environment, and agriculture sectors.

Through a partnership of over 60 nations, international organizations, and non-governmental stakeholders, GHSA is facilitating collaborative, capacity-building efforts to achieve specific and measurable targets around biological threats, while accelerating achievement of the core capacities required by the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, the World Organization of Animal Health's Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway, and other relevant global health security frameworks.

In my role as DAS for Nonproliferation Programs, I remain particularly concerned about the threat posed by bioterrorism. The Global Health Security Agenda – which has broad bipartisan support here at home and broad international support worldwide – includes a focus on the GHSA Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Package.

Through this action package, countries around the world are working to meet internationally recognized and measurable targets for improving the security of dangerous pathogens so that these pathogens will never be exploited by terrorists or proliferant states.

I have taken a personal role in championing the GHSA and its Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Package in particular because this important framework provides an unparalleled framework for advancing shared health security goals around the world. And I am proud that we prioritize funding for this important work through our CTR program, which strengthens bio-risk management practices, enhances infectious disease detection and surveillance, and supports cooperative research and development worldwide to prevent terrorists from acquiring potentially dangerous biological agents.

Nuclear Smuggling

Some threats have remained constant since the initial creation of CTR twenty years ago and the Department remains steadfast in our efforts to counter them. The smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials is a great example. Our Office of WMD Terrorism (WMDT) leads diplomatic outreach to strengthen the Counter Nuclear Smuggling (CNS) capabilities of key, at-risk bilateral partners, in collaboration with other U.S. departments and agencies.

One of WMDT's main efforts involves developing and implementing bilateral CNS Joint Action Plans. These politically-binding frameworks include priority steps to prevent, detect, and respond to incidents of nuclear smuggling.

To advance the CNS goals and objectives outlined in the Joint Action Plans, WMDT conducts targeted bilateral and multilateral programmatic initiatives, often with U.S. interagency and international involvement.

These efforts include prevention and capacity building projects, dialogues, and workshops on CNS topics such as nuclear forensics and radiological and nuclear smuggling prosecutions.

Longstanding Joint Action Plan partners include Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, where WMDT has sponsored high priority projects to improve secure transport of spent radioactive sources, identify and secure orphan sources, and strengthen the prosecution of nuclear smugglers.

But even while we continue our longstanding partnerships with these original CTR partners, WMDT is also monitoring the changing security environment and broadening its efforts to include new partner countries. For example, WMDT engaged new partners in high-threat regions by concluding Joint Action Plans with Iraq in 2014 and Jordan in 2016 and tailors its efforts to most effectively address their unique needs.

WMDT continues to assess new vulnerabilities and works with key international partners to share threat assessments and leverage each other's resources to fill high-priority capability gaps, including through outreach to select peer countries such as our bilateral counter nuclear smuggling engagements with China and by partnering with the European Commission to co-host two international CNS

capacity building workshops involving nearly three dozen countries from around the globe.

Larger Interagency and ISN Picture

I would now like to discuss our partnerships across the government. We do not work alone. Our programs work closely with key offices at the Department of State, the interagency, and the White House. It is a point of pride for this Bureau to find ways to work collaboratively with our colleagues at the Department of Defense, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies. In addition to pursuing collaborative engagements in the interagency, we are always willing to provide diplomatic support to our U.S. government colleagues working in this field.

Another point of pride for the Department is coordination between our counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism offices. In today's dynamic security environment, it is critical that all three of these mission spaces are completely in sync. With rapidly advancing and changing threats, we cannot afford to have duplicative efforts or gaps in engagement and must instead work synergistically with our USG partners.

Conclusion

Recent months have presented us with new challenges in the realm of nonproliferation, and these global challenges demand new solutions. This is not a field where we can afford to remain static.

In the third generation of CTR, we must constantly explore new ideas and strategies to deal with evolving threats. We must ensure we are working closely across the interagency, across mission-spaces, and across regions. We must continue to identify novel approaches and find ways to overcome security, political, and other challenges. I would like to stress that CTR's evolution is not

complete. Our efforts must remain adaptable and we must continue to find new ways to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In particular, in this third generation, we envision three broad areas of focus:

- Rolling back ISIS's chemical weapons program and working to prevent and disrupt terrorists broadly from developing WMD by employing expeditionary and flexible CTR tools that threat-driven.
- Making it difficult for proliferant states such as the DPRK to advance their WMD ambitions by using CTR programs to thwart proliferation pathways.
- Building international institutions such as the Global Health Security Agenda that can advance preventative, sustainable, and effective measures to reduce WMD risks.

Lastly, to underscore how seriously we are taking these new threats and the importance of rapidly shifting to this third-generation of CTR, I want to note that we have shifted over $121 million within our State nonproliferation programs to address first-order nonproliferation challenges. We need to match our new, more effective approaches with resource investments that align funding to the highest priority threats.

Thank you for everyone's time and thank you again to the National Academy of Sciences. I look forward to interacting with the audience.