

DOD Inspector General Audits

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[DOD Initiatives for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction](#), 3/30/2007, DOD Inspector General

“DOD needs to coordinate the work of the 40 offices involved with combating weapons of mass destruction, clearly identify the use of more than \$917 million budgeted in FY 2004 for 31 programs, consistently report on whether it accomplished the goals for combating weapons of mass destruction programs or explain why not, and propose legislation that provides for coordination with each Federal agency involved in combating weapons of mass destruction.”

[Cooperative Threat Reduction: Management Structure of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program](#), 2/5/2004, DOD Inspector General

“The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics did not fulfill his responsibilities for managing the implementation and execution of CTR Projects. Although he established a position to oversee CTR implementation in July 2003, he needs to determine the appropriate staffing level for that office, fill those positions, and determine what management information is needed to fulfill the roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements for CTR.”

[Cooperative Threat Reduction Construction Projects](#), 12/18/2003, DOD Inspector General

“DOD could have better managed the risks associated with recent troubled projects (solid rocket fuel, liquid fuel, and chem disposal facilities) had it negotiated implementing agreements that better defined Russia’s requirements, thus making Russia more responsible. Management controls over the CTR Program were not adequate to ensure that facilities constructed to aid Russia in the storage and destruction of WMD were used for their intended purpose.”

[Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility Project](#), 9/11/2003, DOD Inspector General

“Negotiating an agreement with Russia on the disposal of solid rocket motors should ensure that DOD and Russia understand their respective commitments. DTRA could improve its management of CTR projects by including a risk mitigation strategy in written acquisition plans, implementing a milestone

decision review and program baseline process, and ensuring that project managers maintain documentation of their actions. DTRA has taken several steps to reduce DOD risks in the execution of ongoing and future projects.”

[Statement of Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Auditing on U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Programs](#), 3/4/2003, DOD Inspector General

Congressional testimony summarizing prior reports on the problems with DTRA’s solid and liquid rocket fuel disposal programs.

[Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project](#), 9/30/2002, DOD Inspector General

“DTRA could reduce program risks by requiring a commitment from Russia to provide the weapon systems, provide adequate transparency rights to DOD, and remedies. Deciding the future of the facility could save more than \$197,000 a month. DTRA could request that Russia use the proceeds from the sale of heptyl for CTR. The DTRA director could have more assurance that Russia will provide weapons systems for disposal by performing more complete inspections and identifying other potential uses for weapons to be disposed of.”

[Management Costs Associated With the Defense Enterprise Fund](#), 12/31/2001, DOD Inspector General

“As a lessons learned, had statutory authority allowed DOD to incorporate cost principles for Federal grants into the grant agreement, the grants officer could have determined that management costs and expenses totaling at least \$2.2 million to be unallocable, unallowable, or unreasonable.”

[Cooperative Threat Reduction Program](#), 3/9/2001, DOD Inspector General

“The CTR Directorate program funds to facilitate the removal of WMD by enhancing the value of salvageable materials and developing commercial by-products. As a result, Russia and Ukraine could generate revenue of about \$72.8 million without agreements on how the revenue should be used (finding A). The CTR Directorate did not establish adequate performance goals for the CTR Program. As a result, DTRA could not demonstrate that the CTR Directorate was executing the CTR Program efficiently and effectively or identifying opportunities to improve program effectiveness (finding B).”

[Defense Enterprise Fund](#), 8/15/2000, DOD Inspector General

“The CTR Program Office could not effectively evaluate the status of the Defense

Enterprise Fund or plan for the expiration of the grant agreement, and was not able to achieve planned objectives for self-sufficiency. We recommend that the Director use a standard review methodology and document the results of semi-annual progress review; establish measurable performance; update the long-range plan for self-sufficiency to reflect the current economic condition of the FSU; and develop an exit strategy for liquidating or selling the fund.”

[Evaluation of the Defense Nuclear Agency’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Office](#), 10/12/1995, by DOD Inspector General

“Management should take action to better define the relative CTR roles and responsibilities between the Defense Nuclear Agency and the CTR Office within the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. We recommend the Director of DNA draft the CTR charter for both offices.”