

# Nongovernmental Reports

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[A Social Science Perspective on International Science Engagement](#), 10/14/2015, FAS

This article discusses the importance of cultural awareness during science and security engagements. According to the author, “cultural awareness may lead to more meaningful and, in turn, sustainable outcomes” when working to “to reduce chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats across” a specific region.

[Nunn-Lugar, R.I.P.](#), 1/27/2015, By Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center  
This article discusses the apparent “death” of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in the Russian Federation. “These programs are now deemed unnecessary and inappropriate by Russian President Vladimir Putin and by majorities in both houses of the U.S. Congress. Russia is no longer a supplicant, and the U.S. Congress is no longer feeling generous.”

[Repairing the Diplomatic Threat Reduction Enterprise](#), 12/25/2014, By Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center  
“Documenting the ugly particulars of how capabilities for diplomatic means of threat reduction have been degraded is a precondition for renewal. What is the extent of understaffing, mal-deployment and under-resourcing, and how might these be improved? Clarifying these deficiencies will come to naught unless sympathetic Members of Congress are as tenacious in fighting for remedies as supporters of the nuclear enterprise. Otherwise, threats will grow regardless of how much is invested in strategic modernization programs.”

[Placing Global Biosecurity Engagement Programs under the Umbrella of Global Health Security](#), 5/2014, FAS  
“This issue brief analyzes information derived from experts to provide: (1) a proposed strategy to support integration of biosecurity within global health security, and (2) a working framework that outlines specific objectives to utilize when designing engagement projects to improve upon global biosecurity. “

[Threat Reduction in South Asia](#), 6/14/2012, By Zavar Haider Abidi of the Stimson Center “Stimson Center's Visiting Fellow Zavar Haider Abidi examines the

nature of the conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan. He evaluates both countries' personnel strength, weapons systems, force posture, and projected procurements and advances in military technologies. Concluding that India's conventional military superiority vis a vis Pakistan seriously threatens the latter's security, Abidi proposes a series of measures for the two countries to implement to reduce the conventional military threat.”

#### [Cooperative Threat Reduction: Reducing Biological Risks in East](#)

[Africa](#), 3/9/2011, By Kevin Wickel of the Stimson Center

“In order to implement a successful long-term approach to confront the threat of bioterrorism in East Africa, it will be important for the USG to strike an appropriate balance between US national security concerns and the priorities of recipient governments. Fortunately, the two are not exclusive. If resources are allocated strategically, the CTR program's expansion can complement other agencies' initiatives in the region, and the bioterrorism threat will be effectively addressed, while humanitarian interests and international public health are also served.”

#### [North Korean Rollback?](#), 10/20/2010, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center

“First, "Cooperative Threat Reduction" can go well beyond addressing the immediate tasks of weapons and fissile materials. If applied comprehensively, it can also facilitate larger foreign policy goals related to economic development and rule of law. Second, without high-level attention to getting the job done, these endeavors can fall prey to pernicious bureaucratic behavior and interagency processes. Third, whereas weapons can be dismantled and materials put under lock-and-key, the people whose expertise contributed to those weapons cannot. These three lessons are all interrelated and need to be part of the transparent and sustainable disarmament of North Korea.”

#### [The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction](#), 4/2010, Paul Bernstein and Jason Wood of Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University

“This Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) case study examines the origins of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. This case study recounts initial attempts to aid the former Soviet Union, describes the events leading to the passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and reviews early efforts by the Senators to facilitate implementation of the program.” (HSDL Summary)

[Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s](#), 11/2008, Jonathan Tucker of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

“In addition to providing a detailed historical narrative of the cases, this paper describes the current U.S. system of dual-use export controls, indicates how it has changed since the 1980s, and identifies continuing gaps and weaknesses. The paper concludes with some recommendations to prevent the future trafficking of CW precursors.”

[Issue Brief: Cooperative Threat Reduction and Pakistan](#), 08/04/2008, Sharad Joshi and Togzhan Kassenova of Monterey Institute for International Studies. This issue brief juxtaposes conditions in the FSU and Pakistan and examines the prospects of CTR-type assistance for Pakistan.

[Preliminary Findings: Ensuring Security in an Unpredictable World: The Urgent Need for National Security Reform](#), 07/2008, Project on National Security Reform

“Chapter I provides an overview of today’s national security challenges and tells the story of the need for national security reform” Chapter II provides a system-wide assessment of the problems that make the existing approach to national security unsuitable for current and future challenges. Chapter III uses a framework of system imperatives regarding the type of system required to present a synthesis of the critical findings of the project’s working groups.”

[Case Studies: Volume 1](#), 2008, Project on National Security Reform

The CSWG accordingly commissioned a diverse range of “major” and “mini” case studies to examine significant national security issues and incidents that involved multiple USG agencies and departments. This retrospective analysis seeks to discern the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. national security process, so as to better inform efforts to reform the current system.

[Manufacturing Possibility: Expanding Resources to Meet Global Challenges, Promote Economic Development, Support Innovation, and Prevent Proliferation](#), 04/2008, Brian Finlay & Elizabeth Turpen of the Stimson Center

“Since the advent of the cooperative nonproliferation programs (CNP) in 1992, the efforts dedicated to addressing the human dimension of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat have been the least funded and most undervalued leg of the nonproliferation triad of weapons, materials, and

expertise. This report highlights the potentially pivotal role of the private sector in helping to translate world-class weapons expertise into marketable research and successful business enterprise. As many states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) become more stable, there is a unique window of opportunity for spurring business investment in the interest of both economic development and nonproliferation goals.”

[Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention](#), 2008, Article by International Union of Pure and Applied Chemists in “Pure and Applied Chemistry”

“This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of an international workshop that was organized jointly by IUPAC and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and held in Zagreb, Croatia, from 22 to 25 April 2007. It was held to assist with preparation for the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It discusses technical challenges to the implementation of the CWC, protection against the effects of chemical weapons, opportunities in the field of international cooperation, and outreach.”

**Explorations in Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation, 2008, G. Balachandra**

“Challenges include the real Indian concern that the U.S. overlays genuine concerns with exaggerated scenarios to pursue hidden objectives, US domestic laws and current policies that do not allow for genuine dialogue between the two countries for a mutually satisfying resolution of the concerns, and the secrecy concerning some of these issues on part of India. The CTR programs of relevance to India include: Defense and Military, Emergency Response Support Equipment, Export Control, Guard Force Equipment and Training, Material Control and Accounting, Personnel Reliability Program, Security Assessment, Training and Logistics, Site Security Enhancements, and Weapons Transportation safety Enhancement.”

[The Nexus of Globalization and Next-Generation Nonproliferation: Tapping the Power of Market-Based Solutions](#), 11/1/2007, Ken Luongo and Isabelle Williams published in “Nonproliferation Review”

“Although globalization has created opportunities for nuclear and biological proliferation dangers to take root and grow, it also has opened the door to new solutions. Original ideas and approaches are needed to develop a stronger, more flexible next-generation nonproliferation strategy that accounts for the

increasingly important integration of economic, political, and technological issues. The foundation of this strategy should focus on tapping the power of market-based mechanisms, understanding how commercially driven decisions affect proliferation threats, establishing new partnerships, and forging cohesion among the current nonproliferation mechanisms. The implementation of such a strategy will require forceful leadership, a cultural shift from both policymakers and the range of stakeholders, and consensus building within the international community.”

[Non-State Actors and Nonproliferation: The NGO Role in Implementing UNSCR 1540](#), 8/6/2007, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center

“The cooperative nonproliferation programs of the US Government and Global Partnership are a vastly underappreciated and underutilized toolkit for implementation of 1540. Without mutual agreement regarding the underlying threat or risk, the assistance rendered is not sufficiently valued by the recipient state to sustain the measures put in place. Most importantly and inextricably linked to mutual agreement, the third overarching lesson is that sustainability of nonproliferation assistance requires folding traditional development objectives of long-term institution and capacity-building into our nonproliferation approach. Lastly, "whole of government" responses are not available or even readily attainable to address complex, multifaceted issues such as the 1540 mandate.”

[The Human Dimension is Key to Controlling Proliferation of WMD](#), 4/2007, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center, published in “APS News”

“The maverick, innovative approaches in the early years of threat reduction that yielded rapid progress have long since given way to turf battles between agencies, insufficient high-level attention to lay the foundation for more intensive and expeditious cooperation, and congressional and bureaucratic propensities for muddling through, despite the continued risk of loose materials and unemployed weaponeers. Cooperative Threat Reduction is more than a group of programs to address supply-side concerns in the proliferation equation. If applied appropriately, Cooperative Threat Reduction can also address the demand-side aspects of the equation.”

[25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror, A Guide for Policymakers](#), 1/ 2007, Brian Finlay & Elizabeth Turpen of the Stimson Center

“The DOD should reevaluate its individual “country plans” to better integrate

these with other DOD activities, as well as wider US Government objectives and programs; The CTR Directorate should establish a formal program whereby scientific detailees from other agencies augment any existing staffing shortfalls. In addition, there is a particular need for new permanent staff within the CTR Directorate with expertise in acquisition; DOD should move beyond the CTR Integrating Contract (CTRIC) model and make use of the various contract mechanisms that are available, including direct contracts with other US Government entities or with host nation firms, award/fee contracts, fixed-fee contracts, and incentive fees to address changing threats and opportunities on the ground; The White House and Congress should ensure that political commitments are followed up with the appropriate budgetary allocations to avoid a mismatch between promises and expectations within the host country; Congress should lift the legislated ceiling on annual maximum allowable increases on CTR budget line items; The DTRA public affairs office should assume a more proactive stance in hailing the successes of the CTR programs on Capitol Hill and to the media directly.“

[Cooperation on Bioinitiatives in Russia and the NIS, Towards as True Partnership](#), 9/2006, Partnership for Global Security

“The U.S. and Russia, together with European and other international partners should aim to broaden their cooperation wherever possible, and promote the value of programs designed to enhance biological security to other regions of the world. Additional funding and support should be provided to address new bioproliferation prevention opportunities in, and beyond, the FSU. Effective engagement with at-risk biological facilities and scientists remains essential, and requires understanding of the U.S. bioproliferation programs’ goals and the specific interests of bio-institutes. Russia should work to finalize an implementation agreement with the U.S. to facilitate biosecurity activities.”

[Cooperative Threat Reduction: Moving Beyond State Intent](#), 3/2006, Elizabeth Turpen of Stimson Center

“Operating in the space between ground-truth and the arms control commitments of a collapsed WMD-armed empire, CTR evolved into a robust, resilient and adaptable toolkit. CTR is not merely a set of programmes to manage supply-side risks; it should be viewed as the framework for ‘shaping the outcome’ through reciprocal commitments and incentives in pursuit of risk reduction. Furthermore, where state-centric arms control regimes lack the wherewithal to address concerns beyond a state’s intent, CTR can help bridge

the gap. While there is no single silver bullet in the realm of non-proliferation, a robust international commitment to CTR provides a powerful means to “realistically improve the traditional regimes on the one hand and avoid the dangers of pure unilateralism or ad hoc measures on the other.”

[The Future of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Charles Thornton of CSIS,](#)  
12/7/2005

This is a slide presentation to the South Korean Delegation at the Washington Seminar on Cooperative Threat Reduction. “Are we currently in a position to initiate major new policy? No. Dramatic changes in policy made only during formative moments. Therefore, the expansion of Threat Reduction must be evolutionary. There is too much focus on the transferability of specific projects as designed to be implemented in the FSU. It is better to focus on the transferability of the Nunn-Lugar principles as conceived in early post-Cold War era. One should remember the policy of incremental possibilities [BEACHHEAD PRINCIPLE]: Keep doors open, Adjust policies as needed, Build trust, and Hope.”

[The Six Party Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea,](#)  
12/2005, Center for Strategic and International Studies

“These programs would serve the interests of the United States as well as North. CTR could play an important role in the Beijing Six-Party Talks as well as any follow-on negotiations to deal with Pyongyang’s WMD. Moreover, they should be multilateral and closely involve countries such as South Korea and China who have very little previous experience with CTR. Practical steps need to be taken in the near-term to adequately prepare for the effective use of these measures starting with the Six-Party Talks These steps range from capacity-building in China and South Korea to preparing training courses for individuals likely to be working on the ground in the North. Moreover, the United States, by virtue of its past experience, technical capabilities and national interests, should play a leadership role.”

[The Race to Secure Russia's Loose Nukes, Progress Since Sept 11,](#) 9/2005, Brian Finlay of the Stimson Center and Andrew Grotto of the Center for American Progress

“The primary reasons for the failure to accelerate progress include intransigence on the part of the Russian government has complicated the full and effective implementation of these programs. Its stubbornness over allowing U.S.



personnel sufficient access to sensitive sites to verify that cooperation has been especially disruptive. Poor leadership and an uneven commitment by the United States are also to blame. There is no clear, senior-level leadership in the United States responsible for coordinating and advancing American nuclear threat reduction objectives. The programs continue to suffer from insufficient and inconsistent budgetary support. And the United States has not done enough to address Russian sensitivities, especially with respect to which party bears liability in the event that an accident or sabotage occurs in the course of threat reduction work.“

[An Ounce of Prevention](#), 3/2005, Ken Luongo and William Hoehn for the March/April Issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

“At a time when cooperative threat reduction desperately needs to expand, its programs are instead at risk. The threat reduction agenda now faces a potential crisis driven by mounting unsolved problems and lingering policy disputes. If new agreements are not reached and greater flexibility is not introduced soon, major elements of the agenda could be derailed.“

[Next Generation Threat Reduction, Bioterrorism's Challenges and Solutions](#), 1/25/2005, New Defense Agenda

“Develop a stronger framework for sustained collaboration between the G-8 (Global Partnership/CTR Kananaskis Agreement), the European Union (ISTC/STCU) and the United States (Bio Industries Initiative); Encourage ethical codes of conduct for scientists working in sensitive bio-technologies sectors; Implement bio-safety and bio-security standards in order to increase the likelihood of competitive international engagement of Russia in bio-technologies and pharmaceutical sectors; Implement regional programmes to secure pathogens and consolidate dangerous pathogen collections; Increase partnership opportunities with bio-industries to keep scientists with bio-defence expertise well paid and engaged in research that is peaceful but also market-oriented, to reduce the risk of intellectual flight to nations of concern.“

[Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era](#), 9/2004, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University This broad report discusses the role of CTR in terms of overall national strategy and its past efforts. It then gives priorities for CTR to expand into the future, including techniques for CTR involvement in India and Pakistan, and the possibility for North Korea and Iran.



[Eight Points on Cooperative Threat Reduction: A View from Russia](#), 8/2004,  
Alexander Pikayev of Russian Academy of Sciences

This brief paper gives a Russian history and overview of CTR. Concerning expansion, the author asks “whether the shift away from the former USSR might result in diversion of still inadequate resources from unfinished business in Russia. And second, whether the mechanisms established in the context of post-Soviet developments could work under very different circumstances at all.”

[Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction: Opportunities and Issues](#), 8/2004,  
Kenneth N. Luongo, RANSAC

These slides discuss the G-8 Global Partnership and its impact on the scope of CTR. It also discusses the challenges when expanding CTR, such as taking care not to overextend threat reduction activities or undermine its benefits and political support by applying the model to contexts where its success is unrealistic

[Internationalizing and Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs](#),  
8/2004, Maurizio Martellini of Landau Network-Centro Volta Italy

This brief paper discusses the viability of differing approaches to greater CTR internationalization, such as a clause in the Nonproliferation Treaty, bilateral agreements, or a dedicated treaty.

[The Role of the EU in International Non-proliferation and Disarmament Assistance](#), 10/2004, Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace  
Research Institute

This report discusses the scope of international assistance, EU approaches to the coordination of CTR, how EU projects are selected, and improving EU non-proliferation and disarmament assistance.

[Prospects of Threat Reduction Measures in South Asia](#), 7/2004, R. Rajaraman of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi “If the US wishes to cooperate with India on threat reduction it has to go beyond just non-proliferation and contribute towards reducing primary nuclear risks in the region. India, in particular, is not suffering from a financial crunch, is not a nuclear enemy of the US, and its scientists are a lesser proliferation risk. There may not be much motivation from either the US or India for CTR.”

[Conceptual Approaches to Threat Reduction Expansion: Context and Principles](#), 7/2004, Charles L. Thornton of the University of Maryland “The expansion of CTR must be evolutionary, not dramatic. There is too much focus on copying projects specifically designed for the FSU. It’s better to focus on its founding principles. A policy of incremental possibilities: keep doors open, adjust policies, build trust, and hope more doors open.”

[Adapting Cooperative Threat Reduction: Lessons from Iraq and Libya](#), 7/2004, Anne M. Harrington of the State Dept. Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction “The 9/11 Commission Report found the government not structured to respond. We need greater timeliness and flexibility for all the involved agencies. The shift in emphasis from state threats to terrorist threat means that we must address proliferation at the individual expert level. We need to process/integrate lessons already learned in Iraq and Libya to redefine and redesign CTR.”

[Forging Relationships, Preventing Proliferation: A Decade of Cooperative Threat Reduction in Central Asia](#), 7/2004, Emily Daughtry of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

“CTR engagement deepened the relationships between the United States and central Asia. Each new project reinforces these relationships—and as new threats emerge, the countries will be better positioned to address them. The CTR program has contributed to U.S. homeland, regional and global security. CTR has proven flexible enough to address unanticipated threats, and at the same time maintained its primary focus on the dangers of proliferation. It has done so at minimal expense while yielding important side benefits. In an era obsessed with the control and elimination of WMD, CTR may prove to be an effective alternative to the more costly, more problematic resort to U.S. military force.” New Applications for the Nunn-Lugar

[Cooperative Threat Reduction Program: Prospects and Opportunities](#), Charles Thornton, 3/20/2004

“What follows is a brief history of CTR and an analysis of its realization, followed by a discussion of CTR’s existing mechanics and an initial outlining of a general model. The essay concludes with several options for applying CTR programs in other contexts and the near-term possibilities of expanding the business model. Finally, it asks several open questions and offers a direction for the future evolution of this study.”

[Russian Government Restructuring and the Future of WMD CTR](#), 3/2004, Matthew Bouldin of RANSAC

“On March 9, 2004 Vladimir Putin issued Presidential Order No. 314 that restructured the Russian “organs of executive power”. There were two significant changes. First, the number of ministries was reduced by about half. Second, three levels of executive organs were created (ministries, federal services, and federal agencies). These decisions could have significant implications for U.S. –Russian weapons of mass destruction threat reduction cooperation and impact the G-8 Global Partnership program.”

[Reducing Threats at the Source: A European Perspective of Cooperative Threat Reduction](#), 2004, Ian Anthony of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

This report is too vast to summarize, but focuses on defining the threats CTR is to address, the necessity of overarching frameworks for agreements, and coordination of CTR across Europe and the G8.

[Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction](#), 6/2003, Ken Luongo and William Hoehn in the June 2003 issue of Arms Control Today

Suggested ideas for expansion include “Rapid response to WMD emergency circumstances. Undertaking a program to develop alternative employment opportunities for scientists and workers previously engaged in Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs. Providing export control development and nuclear MPC&A assistance to India and Pakistan. Resuming a dialogue on MPC&A cooperation with China and expanding cooperative U.S.-Sino WMD interdiction and anti-smuggling efforts. Assisting India in its commitment to eliminate its chemical weapons arsenal. Extending personnel reliability systems to Pakistan and India to effectively screen guard forces with access to warheads and sensitive materials. Contingency planning to assist dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons and disposal of related materials. ”

[Reshaping U.S.–Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade](#), 11/2002, RANSAC–Carnegie Endowment joint working group

“Much of the threat reduction agenda remains to be completed. Political support for threat reduction activities remains insufficient. Threat reduction lacks a coordinated strategy. Threat reduction’s future results may be less tangible. Financing for some key threat reduction activities is inadequate.

Financing is not the only impediment to threat reduction progress. Access to facilities and transparency of information are essential. The economic dimensions of threat reduction are not well understood. Reemployment programs for scientists require new strategies. The arms control–threat reduction relationship needs to be better defined.”

[Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia](#), 4/2002, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

This report summarizes part of a year-long study on the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. It recommends: the US and Russia deploy a joint disease monitoring; Russia should be paid for receiving U.S.-origin spent reactor fuel from other nations in exchange of a more detailed nuclear materials inventory; the US, EU and Russia cooperate more extensively on student exchanges, CTR programs are privatized to the extent possible.

[Viewpoint: Prisms and Paradigms](#), Spring 2002, Michael Krepon article in Nonproliferation Review

In this viewpoint, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center argues that in the era of asymmetric warfare, the United States must develop a new central organizing principle for its national security policy. He proposes cooperative threat reduction as a new strategic concept, urging that it be included with deterrence, diplomacy, and superior military capabilities as a central instrument of U.S. national security policy. The potential of cooperative threat reduction is far greater than is commonly understood, concludes Krepon, and can make a major contribution to addressing the dangerous world of asymmetric threats.

[Moving from MAD to Cooperative Threat Reduction](#), 12/2001, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center

“Cooperative threat reduction is more than an aggregation of government initiatives; it is the positive strategic concept we need to keep dangerous weapons and materials out of the hands of terrorists or their state sponsors. The US nuclear arsenal and missile defenses aren’t helpful against these challenges and updated concepts of deterrence will fail unless accompanied by cooperative threat reduction. Nuclear deterrence does not progressively reduce and eliminate dangerous weapons and materials; cooperative threat-reduction programs do. Our new strategic concept is ideally suited not just to deal with the demise of the Soviet Union, but also with the rise of asymmetric warfare.”

[Options for Increased U.S.-Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation and Projected Costs](#), 10/2001, RANSAC executive director Ken Luongo

The options assessed in this analysis are to “Expand Fissile Material and Warhead Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A), Improve Russian and FSU Border and Export Controls, Downsize Nuclear Cities and Prevent Proliferation via Brain Drain, Facilitate Fissile Material Disposition and Elimination, Promote Warhead and Fissile Material Stockpile Monitoring and Transparency”.

[Renewing the Partnership: Recommendation for Accelerated Efforts to Secure FSU Nuclear Material](#), 8/ 2000, Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Ken Luongo of RANSAC

“This report provides an assessment of the current MPC&A program and makes recommendations designed to accelerate and strengthen the effort, including steps toward the difficult goal of achieving sustainable security for nuclear material in the former Soviet Union over the long term.”

[Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes](#), 12/1999, Amy E. Smithson of the Stimson Center

“The report recommends at least doubling the amount of money going annually into collaborative research grants for biological weaponeers and at a minimum tripling the grant funds for chemical weapons scientists. Russia must clean house of the hardline holdovers from the Soviet days who want to perpetuate a weapons capability and their own personal influence. The ISTC should reduce the inordinate delays in the approval of research grants. Washington needs to create an overall architecture for brain drain programming, insulate these programs and other CTR efforts from politics, and repeal the blanket prohibition on use of U.S. funds for defense conversion.”

[Transforming the Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex: The Role of NGO's](#), 6/1999, RANSAC

“On June 22 and 23, 1999, RANSAC convened a meeting in Washington, D.C. titled, Transforming the Russian Nuclear Weapon Complex: The Role of Non-Governmental Institutions. This meeting brought together over fifty experts in the economic development, nonproliferation, and the energy and environmental fields to identify substantive ideas and activities that could be conducted on a second, nongovernmental track in support of U.S.- Russian government and

international efforts to downsize and redirect the Russian nuclear weapon complex and reduce the nuclear proliferation danger in Russia. The meeting resulted in a list of over 20 significant activities that could be developed or implemented by non-governmental organization.