UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEMIC FEATURES NEEDED TO CONTROL HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION AND HOW THE POLICE CAN HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT

PROF. DR. ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI and team European Center for Anticorruption and State-building (ERCAS) Berlin <u>www.againstcorruption.eu</u> Soon all on <u>www.corruptionrisk.org</u> Defining corruption as the norm of publicprivate separation in the exercise of public authority

Joseph Nye 1967 - Behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a <u>public role</u> because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains (<u>trespassing public-private separation</u> for profit)

Individual corruption is abuse of <u>public</u> office for undue '<u>private</u> economic gain' (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 75)

UNCAC 2004 establishes the good governance basic norms – transparency, responsiveness, consultation, impartiality of government = ETHICAL UNIVERSALISM

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi - Corruption is systematic abuse of authority to divert *public* resources meant for <u>universal</u> use for the benefit of <u>particular</u> *private* interests

### Understanding systematic corruption

Author	Continuum "bad" extreme	Continuum "good" extreme
Anne Krueger (1974) on rent seeking societies	Government restrictions	No government restrictions – more integrity and merit
Mungiu-Pippidi (2006; 2015b) on control of corruption	Particularism (favoritism and corruption)	Ethical universalism
North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) on social order and violence	Limited access order	Open access order
Bo Rothstein & Teorell (2008) on quality of government	Favoritism	Impartiality
Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2012) on prosperity	Extractive institutions	Inclusive institutions



Continuum between corruption as exception to corruption as norm




# Corruption systemic or exceptional = context

# How does your country case look like?




### The different outcomes of context A versus context B = measurable as patterns of social allocation

<u>Control of corruption</u> is the capacity of a society to prevent ruling elites from channelling social allocation on the basis of particular interests, rather than market (price) or citizenship (equal treatment)




#### Source: againstcorruption.eu Fazekas and Barrett




- Companies lose/win surprisingly when government changes
- Hungary and UK

Context A. A clear perpetrator. The state capture model (the grabbing hand Schleifer and Vishny model). Norm has to be enforced



Context B. Della Porta and Vanucci model (no private-public separation, interests are fused, corrupt networks are vertically integrated Norm has to be built



## HOW DO SOCIETIES CONTROL CORRUPTION AND ENFORCE PUBLIC INTEGRITY? OPPORTUNITIES VERFSUS CONSTRAINTS MODEL

### **Resources/opportunities**

- Fiscal transparency

- Administrative (power discretion)
  - Natural resources

### **Constraints**

- Autonomous judiciary and law enforcement

- Free press
- Enlightened citizens

Political economy of police use in anticorruption – the strategy matrix to provide for the problem of endogeneity

	Corruption Norm	Corruption Exception
Government wants change	<ol> <li>Police overhaul reform in cooperation with civil society (Monterrey, Georgia)</li> <li>Anticorruption entrusted to autonomous agency with police directly subordinated</li> </ol>	Integrity reforms at organization level Transparency
Government wants status quo	Police no use in real anticorruption, but can do selective enforcement, repression of opponents	Specialized units within police (UNCAC), capacity building and training for new challenges (e.g. digital crime and corruption)

# Cases according to GCB

- Brazil, Kosovo, Jordan, Slovak Republic are countries with top level corruption still systemic but good police performance
- All other examples are very developed states where political corruption persists (Spain, Portugal, France...)
- In most countries however police and government are equally part of bad governance. Still, windows of opportunity might exist- Moldova, Armenia...they fix box A

### Always moderately helpful: transparency reforms




Decreases opportunities for corruption (fiscal, administrative, natural resources)

**Increases constraints** (enables citizens,



journalists, horizontal accountability agencies)

### No catch up on good governance Control of Corruption World Governance Indicator World Bank Ten Years Trends by continents




**Source**: World Bank World Governance Indicators (2008-2018) **Scale**: Transformed to a 0 - 10 scale, with 10 implying the highest control of corruption.

### The world is flat...

#### or worse when control of corruption is concerned

Control of Corruption World Governance Indicator World Bank Ten Years Trends by income group



## Contextualization is key to more successful reforms – corruptionrisk.org forecast

	STAGNANT AT HIGH CORRUPTION	ACHIEVER	BACKSLIDER
DONOR	This country has not changed and it's not about to. Change your strategies and get a better theory of change (use IPI to see why)	Understand why this country is on the upward and support positive trends and domestic actors who promote change	More harm than benefit if you push classic anticorruption (ACA), go for targeted sanctions and support the endangered integrity warriors & free press
CIVIL SOCIETY	You need to develop more and achieve far broader interest representation and empowerment; create political vehicles, think-tanks, alliances with business, church, unions	Check europam.eu for public accountability tools but only place them where enabling contexts exist; Create political vehicles, think-tanks, digital commons	Coalitions, legal representation, get external support, move media to external servers

### WE MEASURE TO TRACE CHANGE AND ASSESS IMPACT OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS

www.integrity-index.org

(control of corruption context by actionable components)

- www.europam.eu (quantified public accountability legislation up to 2020)
- www.opentender.eu with risk indicators) (47 mil tenders scrapped in open format
- www.againstcorruption.eu
  - Good governance forecast based on 10 years' trends+
  - Transparency T-index data de jure and de facto data for 128 countries

The most updated book version from Cambridge University e-book of *Europe's Burden*.





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Transitions to Good Governance

CIC



Success stories 10 cases



Governance + across Borders

> Policy failure stories 127 cases