

# Building Systems Overlooked. Under Secured.

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**3 Key Points for Today:** 

- 1. Vulnerabilities and Breaches Reside Outside and Beyond IT's Ethernet Networks
- 2. These Breaches are often the Points of Entry – Not the Point of Attack or Exploit!
- 3. Contracts Trump Standards When Managing 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Building System Suppliers





# **Common Operational Technology (OT)**



- Director of Facilities
- Building System Suppliers
- Systems IT Cannot Monitor or Manage
- 55 Considerations for Products they Do Not Know
- Manual Configurations
- Back Doors to the Network
- Default Passwords
- A Single User Account
- Privileged Users
- Firmware downloads sites
- Cyber Vulnerabilities



#### a.k.a

- "Building Systems" (before connecting to the Internet.)
- "Building IoT"
- "Smart Buildings"

#### Key Watch Words:

- Improvements
- Enhancements
- Efficiencies



# Communication

#### Hardened, Secured or Unsecured?

- Serial
- IP
- Analog-to-Digital Converters
- Sensors
- Radio
- LoRaWAN
- Ethernet
- a.k.a
- "Building Systems" (before connecting to the Internet.)
- "Building IoT"
- "Smart Buildings"





# Where Improvements are Needed





# Who Keeps the Bad Guys Out?





**OT Lacks:** 

- Interoperability with IT
- Security-Design Consideration
- Network Security for
  "Out-of-Band" Devices and Components



Ethernet vs. Serial Data Streams

> Out of Band Plague IT's Ethernet Systems with Malware





Vulnerabilities and Breaches Occur Outside and Beyond Your Ethernet Networks





### Attacks Starting Outside IT or "Out of Ethernet Band"





# More Clear View with 2019 & 2020 Research Reports



Links to Research Available Upon Request

A Clearer Understanding of Building Systems and Cybersecurity. Approximately 60% of successful cyber attacks on U.S. public companies found their initial point of entry through building systems, as reported by The Harvard Business Review.<sup>1</sup> The top 3 points of entry for successful cyber attacks perpetrated by nation states on 1,400 publicly-traded U.S. companies were: VoIP telephone systems; Video Surveillance Systems; and, Business Machines<sup>1</sup>







# Part of the Soft Underbelly of OT





### **Outside IT or "Out of Band"**





## **NIST Strikes Out – No Standard for IoT**

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NIST Strikes Out Swinging at Building Systems. NIST issued an Internal Report, 8228, stating they could not issue a cybersecurity standard for IoT systems and devices. (This includes Building Systems, sometimes referred to as legacy IoT). Instead of a standard, NIST issued as more than 50 considerations that must be applied to each type of IoT system and device. The reason given, by NIST, is there is a lack of interoperability between the platforms and tools used by substantially all IT departments to monitor and manage network-connected systems, and way too many IoT devices and systems require configurations performed manually or from non-IT platforms.

Other standards explicitly exclude all or certain non-Ethernet communications.





These Breaches are the Point of Entry – Not the Point of Attack or Exploit!





## **Standards Are Good - Contracts Are Better**

|   | Supply Contract   |                   |
|---|---|-------------------|
| A contract between  |   |                   |
|   |   |                   |
|   |   |                   |
| and   |   |                   |
|   |   |                   |
| for   |   |                   |
|   |   |                   |
|   | Contents  | Page              |
|   | Part C1: Agreements and contract data   | 1                 |
|   | Form of Offer and Acceptance  | 1                 |
|   | Contract Data provided by the Purchaser   | 4                 |
|   | Contract Data provided by the Supplier<br>Part C2: Pricing Data   | 9                 |
|   | Part C3: Scope of Work  | 14                |
|   | Conditions of Contract (available separately)   |                   |
| Notes about this contract a                                   | reprinted in boxes like this one. They are not part of the contract.  |                   |
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| current without the permissio<br>andon E14 4JD. Telephone + 4 | 8 20 7957 6999, Fax + 44 20 7536 4101   |                   |



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Use Contracts to Secure the Systems Installed by Your Suppliers



# **Specify the Security You Deserve**





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**Encourage (and perhaps help) your suppliers prepare** to harden and/or secure what they sell and install



# Make It Easy for Suppliers' To Improve

#### **Let Your Suppliers Know**



Allow 6 Month Advance Notice Consider a Cost-Sharing Program



# **Potential Requirements for Each Supplier**

### **Terms You Should Require:**

- A Specific Cybersecurity Controls
- 20 15-Minute Sessions of Orientation and Coaching on Each Control Delivered to Technicians
- Tone-at-the-Top Meeting with Senior Management
- Mutual Agreement on Contract Language

### Optional Terms:

- Guidance on Solutions:
  - Software-Defined Networks
  - Perimeter-Defined Networks
  - Encrypted Wireless Mesh Networks
  - Other
- Period Cybersecurity Meetings
- Software Platform for Tracking OT Devices & Systems
- Fixed-Fee Pricing (includes securing systems provided)

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**Contracts Trump Standards** When Managing 3<sup>rd</sup> Party System Suppliers









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Links to Research Available Upon Request



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