Autonomous Ships
- Challenges and Risks
(based on experiences of autonomy)

S.O. Johnsen,
SINTEF & NTNU

Introduction

1) **Approach**
   - Learn from autonomy across the modes (what may be transferred?)

2) **Experiences/ focus in Norway**
   - ❖ Road (from 2009 – High Focus)
   - ❖ Sea (Pilot projects/ ROV/ - High focus)
   - Aviation – UAS (from 1960)
   - Metro systems (from 1980)

3) **Questions**
   - Challenges of reliability, risks, testing
   - how well are we dealing with the issues
   - suggest a way forward

Sea **Air** **Metro** **Road**



Approach

- Literature review – use, safety and security of unmanned systems (software systems/ eco system approach) – ref: Johnsen & Stålhane: "Safety, security and resilience of critical software ecosystems" (Esrel 2017)

- Interviews of users of autonomous systems (Hospitals, Metro in Copenhagen, Industrial pilot projects)

- Involvement in regulatory process (Road…) ref: https://www.sintef.no/projectweb/hfc/sarepta/publikasjonerreferanser/

- Review of research and innovation from the research database of the Norwegian research council –

Levels of Automation from SAE (2&3)

Automotive SAE Levels	Railways Grades of Automation	Aircraft Levels of Automation	Driver Resp.	Vehicle Resp.
L0 No automation ABS, stability control	GoA-0 Sight train operation	Level 1 – Raw data, no automation at all	All	Warns Protects
L1 Driver Assistance Park assist Cruise contro	GoA-1 Manual train operation Automated Train Protection	Level 2 - Assistance Flight director Auto-throttle	Drives	Guides Assists
L2 Partial Automation (longitudinal & lateral) Traffic jam assist	GoA-2 Semi-automatic train operation (STO) Automated Train Op (ATO)	Level 3 – Tactical use. Autopilot (CWS)	Monitors all time	Manage movement within limits
L3 Conditional Automation Highway traf. jam system	GoA-3 Driverless train operation (DTO) Automated train control (ATC) Some control by attendant: operating doors, emergencies	Level 4 – Strategic Flight management system	Ready to take back control	Drives itself but may give back control
L4 High Automation (specific use cases) Valet parking		Uninterruptible auto-pilot project (Boeing) Drones (unmanned)	May not take back control	Drives itself with graceful degradation
L5 Full Automation (all situations)	GoA-4 Unattended train operation (UTO) Automated Doors Platform screen doors		Not required	All time

Table 1: Comparison of automation levels in automotive, railways and aeronautics.

Autonomy – look at the whole system

The system (Power plant/Sensors/…)

External control



Interaction and communication with other actors

Industrial use– slowly emerging

Replacing dangerous, dirty operations

– moving from remote operation to more unmanned (low risks)

- Photography/Video - underwater surveys/ seismic
- Monitoring and surveying seaways/ borders /Ice monitoring/ oil spill management/ road transport/ farmland/
- Speedy delivery of critical supplies - (Blood in Rwanda from 2016)
- Inspection of equipment (to avoid dangerous work/ improve quality)- pipelines/power lines/ storage tanks/ Flame towers (oil and gas)
- Disaster support (overview/ find people/ deliver critical equipment/ fire-fighting (overview,)
- Illicit transportation (Smuggling)

Autonomous road transport safety?

St Olav: Automated Guided Vehicles (10 years experiences 24 AGV)

- No statistics – no serious accidents
- Large infrastructure costs, isolated, sensor does not see all
- Two persons in control center to handle deviations, problems

Google Cars (and autonomous buses) 30 years in the future?

- Few incidents – from 2,208,199 km (accident rate 1,36 /million km; that is 1/3 of accidents with drivers)
- New kind of accidents: “rage against the machine”,
- Human “take over time” varies:2 to 26 seconds –design challenges
- Software challenges – security/ testing / version control – agile dev.
- Risks: Probabilities reduced/ Consequences higher

Influence Infrastructure/training: Norway 3 fatalities pr. bill. km – USA 7,3 fatalities

Security and regulation

- **Key (security) vulnerabilities exists in autonomous cars**
  - Easy to attack, can control steering, brakes. Can erase evidence
  - Policy of responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities is needed
  - Need for CERTS – Computer emergency response teams that can handle and coordinate vulnerabilities in transport infrastructure /systems

- **Framework conditions such as regulation must improve**
  - Automation in control - i.e. software is in control/responsible, vendors liability not clear (Volvo, Mercedes Benz.. accept responsibility)
  - Operator (OEM) must have responsibility of totality (Totality“påse ansvar”)
  - Security of critical software must improve, need for regulation and incentives, minimum security standards, IEC61508; IEC62443; IACS Cybersecurity Certification Framework



Source: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/07/28/chinese-group-hacks-tesla-second-year-row/518430001/

Turning on the brakes remotely!!!

Patched the vulnerabilities within two weeks

Unmanned metro - from 1980 – no incidents

Rail/Metro

- 48 lines in 32 cities, 674km
- Mainly isolated from others
- Unmanned but operated from control centers

- No known accidents/ incidents
- Poor/ No reporting of incidents
- Based on experiences – probabilities low/ consequences?

Manned & Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

Manned aviation (highly automated but human-in-the-loop)

- "Ultra high safety" – None IATA accidents 2012 & 2017
- More automation but need “Human In the Loop” – when automation cannot cope
- New accidents due to automation - Boeing Max

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

- From large "industrial drones" (DoD):
  - DoD UAS: **50-100** incidents for each 100,000 flight hours vs DoD pilot - 1 incident pr 100,000 flight hours
  - DoD – UAS: Poor Human Factors design of control systems

- **MTBF** – 1,000 hours between failures - **100 times more** than in aviation

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety and security

Distribution of 1000 failures/accidents (safety)

- Power plant (411) failure; Ground Control system (273); Navigation system (146)
- Electronics (67); Mainframe (54); Payload (53)

Type of accidents

- Loss of control; UAS Crash/ fall down- and consequences of impact
- Collision with regular flights; Ignition of gas ; New types of accidents

Security issues

- Take over control - GPS spoofing (Iran landed USA drone) , Backdoor (Boeing 787)
- Drone Crash/Collision (hacking/DoS)
- Loss of communication – lock out user/ manipulate video control
- Loss of data (pictures, video) – (data may be stored elsewhere - China…)
- Halt/Impact regular air transport
- Illicit transportation /Smuggling (across borders/ to prisons)
- Drone attacks cheaper – critical infrastructure (i.e. As in Saudi-Arabia 2019)

UAS Risks as Likelihood and Consequences

Likelihood - Higher (dependent on operation and procedures)

- +Immature technology – MTBF (100 times) higher than manned aviation
- New issues, Need more data related to safety , immature security
- -Replace operations with higher likelihood of accidents / Dangerous operations

Consequences – Lower

- -Replacing dangerous, dirty work - Removing exposure of human pilots/actors
- -More resilient design – parachute; UAS 16 motors –(less single point of failure)
- ?Risk of fire (Batteries – Need ATEX certification)
- ?Less weight and impact consequences (but dependent on weight/ height/speed ...) falling drone: – 1% risk of fatality (250 gr) – 50% risk of fatality (600 gr)
- ?New consequences

Depends on Operational Design Domain- (ODD) – what/where/how

Autonomous shipping

Three testing areas in Norway (six in the rest of the world)

- Yara Birkeland from 2020: 75 meters; 150- containers(removing ~ 40.000 trucs/ year) – gradually implementing autonomy – 20,21,22
- Pilots: “Plaske”/AutoFerry – unmanned ferry in Trondheim from 2020;
- Security immature - suggested certification schemes
- Likelihood reduced/ consequences increased

Likelihood of accidents - probabilities



Likelihood of accidents - risks



From: Wróbel, K., Montewka, J., & Kujala, P. (2017). Towards the assessment of potential impact of unmanned vessels on maritime transportation safety. *Reliability Engineering & System Safety*, *165*, 155-169.



Existing UAS Research in Norway

Increasing research - funded (+30% each year)

Areas of focus

- Maritime/offshore research – Ice monitoring/ UAS heavy load transport/ Remote operations of fish farms
- Technology improvements – Better motors/ batteries; Better control systems (Air traffic)
- Improvements of use (Inspection Power lines/ Bridges; control buildings)

Missing areas

- Improved safety (improved MTBF); Security; Resilience
- Human Factors issues in interfaces / Meaningful human control
- Best practices of procedures, risk assessment, local rules, and regulations
- Societal and ethical issues

Conclusions – suggested way forward

Main challenges and benefits

- Immature technology– need to be industrialized / tested/ secure
- May reduce human exposure in dangerous operations

More knowledge/ research needed

- Security immature - should be speeded up – agile development/Scrum
- Certification schemes to raise quality, human factors issues, safety, security- such as IEC62443; Safety Case focus
- More pilot projects in critical areas to speed up learning and development
- Data gathering, analysis and learning from operations and incidents
- Meaningful human control – design of interaction and control centres based on Human Factors research from Aviation
- Expert group of regulators, industry users, operators and developers should work together to speed up development of systems, regulation and best practices (i.e. risk assessments) to reach high level of safety, reliability, resilience and security