

CRS Reports

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[Recent Developments in U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation](#)

[Cooperation](#), 10/13/2016, by Mary Beth Nikitin and Cory Welt

This article discusses the decree issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin to suspend “participation in a bilateral U.S.-Russia weapons plutonium disposal agreement (the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, or PMDA). Also discussed is the Russian suspension of “participation in a 2013 cooperative agreement on nuclear- and energy-related research” and termination of “a third from 2010 on exploring options for converting research reactors from weapons-usable fuel”.

[Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and](#)

[Agreements](#), 4/13/2016, by Amy F. Woolf, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin

This report takes a broad look at how arms control and nonproliferation tools have been utilized to implement U.S. national security strategy. First, it discusses the history of arms control legislation between the U.S. and states of the FSU. It then gives an overview of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that have been performed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Next, the report takes a look on the multilateral nonproliferation activities that have been developed in order to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the report discusses non-nuclear multilateral endeavors such as the chemical and biological weapons conventions.

[The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress](#), 6/13/2014, by Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf

This report discusses the evolution of the CTR program, including the programs developed by the DOD, DOE, State Department, and DHS. It then discusses legislative issues for CTR including: agency coordination, priority within the executive branch, measuring success and metrics, access and transparency, and international cooperation. The report then delves into specific CTR programs that work in: securing and eliminating nuclear weapons, securing and eliminating nuclear materials, securing borders and improving export controls, chemical weapons destruction, and cooperative biological engagement. Lastly, the report discusses program funding.

[Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union](#), 3/6/2012, by Amy F. Woolf

This report gives a brief overview of the DTRA CTR program, as well as related programs in DOE and the State Department. It then discusses legislative issues for CTR including: organization and coordination, access and transparency, liability protections and the Umbrella Agreement, certification, funding, and globalization and international cooperation.

[U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress](#), 1/11/2011, by Mary Beth Nikitin

“This report discusses key policy issues related to the agreement, including future nuclear energy cooperation with Russia, U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, nonproliferation cooperation, and Russian policies toward Iran. These issues were relevant to the debate when the agreement was being considered in the 111th and 110th Congresses.”

[2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty \(NPT\) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications](#), 5/3/2010, by Paul Kerr, Mary Beth Nikitin, Amy Woolf, and Jonathan Medalia

This report takes a look the past, present, and future of the NPT. The 1995, 2000, and 2005 NPT review conferences are discussed along with the issues surrounding the 2010 review conference. Issues were divided upon the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, nonproliferation and compliance, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Peaceful use and compliance, universality of the NPT, and the WMD-Free zone in the Middle East were also discussed. Lastly, possible outcomes and the potential impact of the 2010 review conference are presented along with a short section on NPT legislation in the 111th Congress.

[India and Iran: WMD Proliferation Activities](#), 11/8/2006, Sharon Squassoni

“Members of Congress have questioned whether India’s cooperation with Iran might affect U.S. and other efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. India’s long relationship with Iran and its support of Non-Aligned Movement positions on nonproliferation are obstacles to India’s taking a hard line on Iran, yet the Bush Administration has asserted that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation would bring India into the “nonproliferation mainstream.” India does not support a nuclear weapons option for Iran. However, its views of the Iranian threat and appropriate responses differ significantly from U.S. views. Entities in India and Iran appear to have engaged in very limited nuclear, chemical and missile-related transfers over the years, and some sanctions have

been imposed on Indian entities for transfers to Iran, the latest in July 2006.”

[Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options](#), 10/5/2006, by Sharon Squassoni

“This report analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR fund, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance. CTR programs cannot be precisely replicated in other countries. A common factor must be the willingness of such states to cooperate. Congress may wish to consider whether potentially expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs.”

[Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan](#), 2/17/2005, by Sharon Squassoni

“This paper describes why CTR programs developed for the FSU are considered models for assistance elsewhere and their potential application in India and Pakistan. The paper considers the types of assistance provided under CTR and potential constraints on U.S. assistance, including legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the NPT; the low level of cooperation and transparency; lack of incentives; and potentially competing objectives of threat reduction and nuclear deterrence.”

[Nuclear Terrorism, A Brief Review of Threats and Responses](#), 2/10/2005, by Jonathan Medalia

“The nations of greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan. Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, much HEU and weapons-grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security. Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear bomb from HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium. The fear regarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon. Terrorists might also obtain HEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel.”

[Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions](#), 10/5/2004, by Amy F. Woolf

“Many have suggested that the US provide threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to nations outside the former Soviet Union. Some propose expanding

assistance to contain proliferation; others support programs to stop terrorists from acquiring WMD. Some support assisting only those nations with WMD programs; others support assistance for any nation with WMD materials or knowledge. Some support assistance with the storage or elimination of weapons; others believe the US should “lock down” all WMD materials.”

[Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States](#), 4/10/2002, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf

“The infrastructure of the Soviet/Russian BW complex was more extensive than most analysts realized. Cooperative projects at some bio centers have helped open doors to others. U.S. participants report that biosafety, biosecurity, and dismantlement projects require complex negotiations, engineering, and management specific to each center. Consequently, we may need to offer a long-term commitment to complete the effort. The interpersonal and institutional relationships resulting from these cooperative efforts may play a powerful role in preventing FSU proliferation.”

[Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress](#), 3/6/2002, by Amy F. Woolf

This report studies the differing opinions concerning CTR issues including: pace of implementation, accountability, value to US security, scope of CTR, Russia’s financial commitment, and linkage to other US assistance.