The findings and recommendations in this chapter address the Congressional objectives for the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, as reiterated in the recent program reauthorization and in the subsequent Small Business Administration (SBA) Policy Directive that guides program implementation at all agencies. Section 1c of the Directive lists the program goals as follows:
The statutory purpose of the SBIR Program is to strengthen the role of innovative small business concerns (SBCs) in Federally-funded research or research and development (R/R&D). Specific goals are to:
(1) Stimulate technological innovation;
(2) use small business to meet Federal R/R&D needs;
(3) foster and encourage participation by socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses (SDBs; also called minority-owned small businesses [MOSBs] elsewhere in the report), and by women-owned small businesses (WOSBs), in technological innovation; and
(4) increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal R/R&D, thereby increasing competition, productivity and economic growth.1
This chapter reviews the extent to which each of these program goals is being addressed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We also address some aspects of program management. However,
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1 Small Business Administration, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program Policy Directive, February 24, 2014.
prior to this analysis, we describe how the limited outcomes data available at NASA limited the scope of the assessment.
In assessing the NASA SBIR program, we found that quantitative data on the program outcomes was limited. Outcomes data for agency SBIR programs come from the funded companies and the funding agency. While there are major challenges in gathering and evaluating this data—described in Chapter 5 (Quantitative Outcomes)—most SBIR agencies have made significant efforts to acquire the quantitative data that permits evaluation and subsequently, in the ideal, more effective management of the program. The other four agencies studied by the Academies2 in recent years—Department of Defense (DoD), National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science Foundation (NSF), and Department of Energy (DoE)—have made efforts, with varying degree and success, to acquire relevant outcomes data and to use those data to develop internal assessments of the program. Until recently, this was not the case at NASA.
There are three paths for collection of company data: (1) utilization of a reporting system such as the Company Commercialization Record (CCR) database at DoD, where companies are required to report on outcomes from previous projects; (2) surveys of past awardees for the same purpose; and (3) contracts analysis which for agencies that acquire the end product of SBIR awards can indicate which technologies were further utilized within the agency.
The DoD’s CCR database requires all companies to update outcomes for all previous SBIR awards (at DoD and elsewhere) every time they seek new funding. NSF and DoE track outcomes; NIH has done so sporadically. For both types of data acquisition, the goal is to determine, on a systematic basis, what happened after SBIR funding was provided. DoD (including in particular some departments such as Navy) has also made a substantial effort to identify SBIR Phase III contracts within DoD by analyzing data from the Federal Data Procurement System (FPDS) database.
Since 2012, NASA has started to collect data via an agency database where companies are encouraged but not required to update their information; NASA staff tell us that there are no program-related sanctions imposed on those failing to provide this information.
The new NASA tracking system appears to be well-designed to capture important elements of the use of SBIR technologies within NASA.3 This is potentially valuable as these elements are not as effectively captured by the DoD
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2 Effective July 1, 2015, the institution is called the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. References in this report to the National Research Council or NRC are used in an historic context identifying programs prior to July 1.
3 See discussion of the NASA SBIR Electronic Handbook in Chapter 3 (Initiatives).
CCR. It is, however, still too early to determine whether the data collected will be sufficiently comprehensive to permit effective evaluation and analysis.
Qualitative information, including “success stories,” supplements quantitative data. NASA does collect case studies of success stories, but most are company-provided with limited agency corroboration. It is therefore difficult to determine which cases reflect important accomplishments from the agency point of view.
The committee’s findings are based on a complement of quantitative and qualitative tools including a survey, case studies of award recipients, agency data, public workshops, and agency meetings. The methodology is described in Chapter 1 and Appendix A of this report. In reviewing the findings below, it is important to note that the Academies’ 2011 Survey—hereafter referred to as the 2011 Survey—was sent to every principal investigator (PI) who won a Phase II award from NASA, FY1998-2007 (not the registered company points of contact [POC] for each company.4 Each PI was asked to complete a maximum of two questionnaires, which as a result excludes some awards from the survey. The preliminary population was developed by taking the original set of SBIR Phase II awards made by NASA during the study period and eliminating on a random basis awards to PIs who received more than two awards (to limit the burden on respondents). The resulting preliminary population was 1,131 awards. PIs for 641 of these awards were determined to be not contactable at the SBIR company listed in the NASA awards database. The remaining 490 awards constitute the effective population for this study. From the effective population, we received 179 responses. As a result, the response rate in relation to the preliminary population was 15.8 percent and in relation to the effective population response was 36.5 percent.
The absence of usable quantitative outcomes data from NASA limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this assessment. Although the 2011 Survey provides quantitative data on NASA outcomes agency-wide, the number of responses is too limited to permit definitive conclusions.5 Similarly, although the limited data provided by NASA and that provided by DoD on NASA projects recorded in the DoD Company Commercialization Record database are helpful, neither is comprehensive.
Given the size of the survey population and response rates and overall potential sources of survey bias, the following findings and recommendations rely more heavily on company case studies, discussions with agency staff, and other documentation than we would have preferred. The committee’s findings are accordingly qualified.
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4 Because there is a time lag in commercialization for new technologies, the survey did not include more recent awards than 2007. See Box A-1 for a discussion of this commercialization lag.
5 See Appendix A for details on survey methodology.
Although more and better data would improve the grounding for these findings, it is our judgment that the NASA SBIR program is encouraging the expansion of technical knowledge. And although the limited data available from the 2011 Survey indicates limited infusion of SBIR technologies into NASA Mission Directorates for awards made in FY1998-2007, the program has since then become increasingly aligned with NASA Mission Directorate needs. NASA SBIR projects commercialize at a level similar to that of comparable SBIR programs at DoD, although the small size of the NASA market limits the scale of commercialization. However, with regard to the third program objective, we conclude that the NASA SBIR program is not adequately fostering and encouraging participation by women and minorities and socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses.
It is our view that SBIR works best when the agency’s leadership recognizes the strategic potential of the SBIR program and leverages it to help realize NASA’s mission needs. Although in large measure the results of the NASA SBIR program appear to be positive, NASA has not developed a coherent place for SBIR as a valued part of its strategic plans for addressing its mission. It is telling that there is no section on SBIR in the 2014 NASA Strategic Plan, and only a handful of mentions in passing.6 While other agencies have in recent years come to see that SBIR can, if utilized well, provide substantial value to the agency, it is hard to escape the conclusion that NASA has not fully embraced the possibility of treating SBIR as an opportunity (rather than a tax on its extramural research budget).
Moreover, we believe that the NASA SBIR program could be reconfigured to address a series of further opportunities: These include pilot initiatives to harness fast moving innovative small companies, to support the commercialization of space (e.g., the commercial use of space satellite navigation systems), and to integrate better with the Department of Defense, the closest analogous agency that also has mission needs in Space. Seizing these opportunities requires that NASA generate data and metrics that can guide and enhance the SBIR program’s performance.
The findings are organized in terms of the four legislative objectives of the SBIR program plus findings on the management of the program. The summary below provides a guide to the more detailed description to follow.
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6 NASA, Strategic Plan 2014. Accessed on August 14, 2015, at https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/FY2014_NASA_SP_508c.pdf.
Each agency has its own priorities for the SBIR program. At NASA, the overwhelming emphasis has been on the adoption of SBIR-funded technologies for use within the agency in support of its mission. This mission support overlaps to a substantial degree with the commercialization objective of the SBIR program: projects adopted for use within NASA are also provided with downstream NASA or other federal contracts and are therefore, in our view, successfully commercialized.
However, the focus on agency mission has important implications for the extent of commercialization. At NIH and NSF, commercial success is achieved in most cases outside the agency and hence is measured in terms of standard economic outputs such as sales, revenues, and company growth. At DoD, the acquisitions market is large enough that companies can become successful by serving that market alone: defense contractors can grow to become very large, and contracts in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars are possible.
At NASA, however, contracts within the agency for SBIR-funded technologies tend to be relatively small. There is rarely a need for thousands of a particular item; it is more common for a technology requirement to be for a particular instrument or a component for a larger system of which, at best, a
small number will be built. For example, the market for the SBIR-funded batteries that are designed to power the Mars Rover is limited. Indeed, NASA’s own newsletter notes the need to find outside markets: “NASA technology needs are more likely to be met if they can be engineered to overlap significantly with commercial or Department of Defense (DoD) needs.”7 Of course, even tightly targeted mission-oriented projects can and do produce technologies with sometimes significant non-NASA market potential. Most notably, a NASA SBIR contract to develop technology for autonomous rendezvous and docking of space vehicles to service satellites was later adapted to track and compensate for eye movements in now commonplace laser surgery for vision correction.8
In the main, however, it appears that many NASA SBIR companies are affected by the small size of the NASA marketplace and sometimes very long lags as technology matures and large scale programs evolve toward completion. In some ways, they also suffer from the NASA SBIR program’s focus on NASA’s specialized needs.
Such companies would seldom be able to grow rapidly and become substantial commercial entities with hundreds of employees—as has happened to a number of SBIR companies working primarily within DoD. The market within NASA is not large enough to support this kind of development. Discussions with companies and agency staff as well as survey responses indicate that small companies, whose mission is to work on space technologies for NASA, typically remain small in size and hence are unlikely to generate huge commercial outcomes from their projects. (NASA SBIR companies averaged 10 employees at the time of the surveyed award, and 15 at the time of the 2011 Survey). More research is required to determine the scale and impact of this phenomenon.
That said, there remains a distinction between projects that generated sales or further investment and resources, especially from within NASA, and those that did not. In some cases, spinoffs from the technologies led to contracts and successes outside NASA. Some company case studies reveal that the NASA contracts base was not sufficient to support the company’s vision and that they had successfully gone outside NASA into the commercial marketplace or DoD (a number of companies working within NASA also acquire contracts from DoD).
Within this broad context, we make the following findings:
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7 NASA, The Concept, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 2012, p.3.
8 This technology has been cited in the White House Tibbitts Awards. See https://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/tibbetts_2013_book_print_version.pdf.
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9 NASA does not maintain data on commercialization rates across the study period (the 2011 Survey covered awards made in FY 1998-2007 inclusive). The data in this section are drawn from the 2011 Survey, which generated 179 responses from Phase II SBIR awardees. Unless otherwise noted, all percentage responses are therefore percentages of those 179 responses, which is 36.5 percent of the effective population of awards and 15.8 percent of the preliminary population of awards. See Appendix A for a description of the survey methodology.
15 2011 Survey, Question 33.
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17 See Table 5-5. Although these survey data cover Phase II awards made from FY1998 to FY 2007 and firm growth can vary according to length of time since award was made, data from firms with older awards may also be biased toward surviving firms.
18 See Table 5-5. N=170 respondents. See also Tables 3-4 and 3-5 in National Research Council, SBIR at the Department of Defense, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2014.
20 As this question was asked only of the small number of companies who would have proceeded even absent funding, these numbers should be treated with caution; they are indicative only. N=12. See 2011 Survey, Questions 25 and 26.
NASA’s current mission is to “Drive advances in science, technology, aeronautics, and space exploration to enhance knowledge, education, innovation, economic vitality, and stewardship of Earth.”21
In general, the NASA SBIR program has focused on developing technologies that can meet the agency’s own mission needs. Discussions with agency staff indicate that the agency’s primary metric for program success is the deployment of SBIR-funded technologies on NASA missions.
Case studies and NASA success stories show that SBIR has provided important support for some missions. The question is whether this is happening at a sufficient rate. NASA has not provided comprehensive quantitative data against which to measure success on this core metric. NASA has not effectively tracked Phase III contracts stemming from SBIR awards or systematically tracked the utilization of SBIR-funded technologies at NASA Field Centers or on NASA missions. However, the new tracking database does lay the groundwork for such tracking in the future, and this is a positive step that has the potential to aid future assessments of the program.
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21 NASA Strategic Plan FY2014, p. 2.
have been for NASA. This means that an average of about 20 percent of reported project sales were to NASA or NASA primes.23
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24 See Table 5-7. N=116 respondents.
26 See also the discussion in Chapter 7 (Insights).
27 For example, see the Honeybee case study in Appendix E (Case Studies).
As noted under Finding IV, this may have a negative effect on NASA support of technologies that do not have potential for infusion into NASA programs in the short term.
NASA has not effectively addressed the mandate to foster the participation of women and other under-served populations. Current outcomes and activities by NASA are not sufficient to meet the SBIR program objective of fostering and encouraging the participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation.
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28 See Figure 6-7.
29 See Figure 6-7.
30 See Figure 6-9.
31 See Figure 6-5.
32 See Figure 6-18.
33 See Figure 6-18.
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35 See Figure 6-12.
36 Tables 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, and 6-9.
37 See 2011 Survey, Question 19, and section on “Minority Company Ownership” in Chapter 6 (Participation of Women and Minorities).
38 Tables 6-1 and 6-4 (N=177 respondents).
Further analysis of the Survey data indicates that there were two Black PIs in the overall responding population, and four Hispanic PIs.39
NASA undertakes many scientific missions, its outreach to the public focuses on scientific accomplishments, and it retains a strong educational mission (indeed, for a time the SBIR program was located within NASA’s education directorate.) Evidence suggests that the NASA SBIR program is providing support for the development of new technologies related to NASA’s missions and enhancing science and technology more broadly, as is summarized in the following items A-C.
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39 See Table 6-3 and section on “Minority Principal Investigators” in Chapter 6 (Participation of Women and Minorities).
40 See Chapter 2 (Program Management).
41 See Appendix E (Case Studies).
advisory, while final decisions are made by Mission Directorates based on their needs and priorities.43
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43 Discussions with NASA SBIR managers. See section on “Selection” in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
44 See Table 5-13; N=177. These figures are similar to those reported for DoD. See National Research Council, SBIR at the Department of Defense, Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2014, Chapter 3, University connections.
45 See Table 5-14 and Appendix D (List of Universities). These numbers are close to those reported for the DoD SBIR program. See National Research Council, SBIR at the Department of Defense, 2014 op. cit.
46 See Tables 5-15 and 5-16.
47 See Table 5-11.
The case studies and 2011 Survey show that the NASA SBIR program supports for the foundation and growth of innovative companies.
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48 See Table 5-10 (N=64 responding companies).
49 See Table 5-12, (N=129 respondents).
50 See Table 5-12.
51 See Appendix E (Case Studies).
52 See section on “Quantitative Survey Evidence that NASA Stimulated Technological Innovation” in Chapter 5 (Quantitative Outcomes) and 2011 Survey Question 6 (N=73 companies). Survey question refers to SBIR program overall, not necessarily just NASA.
53 See section on “Quantitative Survey Evidence that NASA Stimulated Technological Innovation” in Chapter 5 (Quantitative Outcomes), sections on “Company Formation and Very Early-Stage Funding” and “Funding Otherwise Unfundable Projects” in Chapter 7 (Insights), and Appendix E (Case Studies).
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55 See Appendix E (Case Studies).
56 See Table 5-20.
57 The evidence here echoes previous studies by the Academies, which discussed the question of multiple SBIR awards to companies. The 2009 report concluded that multiple awards to companies was not a significant problem. See National Research Council, An Assessment of the Small Business Innovation Research Program, The National Academies Press: Washington DC, 2008.
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59 See Table 5-18 (N=72 responding companies). Question 9 of the 2011 Survey asked “What percentage of the company’s revenues during its most recent completed fiscal year was Federal SBIR funding (Phase I and/or Phase II)?”
60 See Table 5-18 (N=72 responding companies).
61 See Table 5-19 (N=154 respondents).
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62 See Chapter 5 (Quantitative Outcomes).
63 See Chapter 2: (Program Management).
limit of 10 submissions per solicitation does provide some practical limitation on a small number of companies.66
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66 See Chapter 4 (SBIR Awards).
67 See Chapter 2 (Program Management).
68 See section on “Funding Gaps” in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
69 See section on “Funding Gaps” in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
70 See section on “Access to Program Staff During Solicitation Period” in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
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71 See Chapter 3 (Initiatives).
72 National Research Council, An Assessment of the SBIR Program at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009, Chapter 5.
73 See section on “Technology Infusion Managers” in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
available about its effectiveness either in general or in particular with reference to SBIR.74
We have noted in Chapter 1 and in Appendix A that there are broad challenges in tracking commercialization, at both the company and project levels. Companies move in and out of the program, and tracking is harder once they have left. More generally, commercialization can come many years after an award and involve multiple awards plus considerable additional funding. All this makes it difficult to assert that any specific outcome “results from” an SBIR award. But there are also specific challenges with existing tracking tools.
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74 See section on “Technology Infusion Managers” in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
75 See section on “Electronic Handbook (EHB)” in Chapter 3 (Initiatives).
76 See Chapter 2: (Program Management) and Chapter 3 (Initatives).
provide strategic management for the program, beyond operational matters related to the processing of applications and awards.
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SBIR presents NASA with an important opportunity to advance its mission, work with fast moving innovative small companies, support the commercialization of space, and integrate better with related missions of other agencies. The following recommendations, which are organized in terms of four sets of leading actions needed to improve the SBIR program at NASA, can help improve outcomes. A detailed description follows the summary of key points below.
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79 See section on “SBIR Phase I: Applications and Awards” in Chapter 4 (Awards).
80 See section on “SBIR Phase I: Applications and Awards” in Chapter 4 (Awards).
The lack of comprehensive and granular outcomes data prevents development of quantitative analysis which would allow the agency to determine the extent to which is it meeting Congressional mandates and could also allow NASA to identify strengths and weaknesses of its SBIR program and to adjust it accordingly.
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81 See Finding VI-C.
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82 See Finding III-C.
83 See Finding II-A.
84 See Finding IV-C.
85 See methodology discussions in Chapter 1 (introduction) and Appendix A (Methodology).
86 See Finding III-C.
87 See Finding IV-D.
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88 See Finding VI-C.
89 See Finding VI-C.
90 See Finding II-B.
91 See Finding VI-D and the discussion in Chapter 2 (Program Management).
92 See Finding VI-C.
93 See Finding II-A.
Although caution should be employed when imposing new reporting burdens on the NASA SBIR program, implementation of an improved data collection and information management system would provide a cost- and time-effective basis on which to provide better reporting on the program. The annual report recommended below would provide much improved transparency and a coherent point of discussion for other stakeholders. This annual report would effectively replace the existing report to SBA, which is of limited utility for NASA or other stakeholders.
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94 See Finding VI-D.
95 See Finding VI-C.
96 See Finding VI-C.
NASA should immediately enhance efforts to address the Congressional mandate to foster the participation of under-represented populations in the SBIR program.97
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97 See Finding III-B.
99 See Finding III-C.
100 See Finding III-D.
101 See Finding III-B.
102 See Finding III-C.
to enhance commercialization and NASA uptake of SBIR technologies (see below).103
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103 See Finding III-B and III-D.
104 See Finding III-B.
105 See Finding III-D.
106 See Finding III-D
107 See Finding III-C.
108 See Finding III-B.
The NASA SBIR program has focused primarily on uptake within NASA, and has appropriately placed priority on agency utilization of SBIR-funded technologies. However, the agency has recognized that there are limits to the size and scale of commercialization within NASA; commercialization outside NASA remains an important objective for the program.
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109 See Finding VI-A and Finding VI-B.
110 See Finding VI-A.
111 See Finding VI-D.
112 See the discussion under “Reviewing the Evidence” in this chapter.
Recommendations in this section are designed to improve program operations in ways that should enhance the program’s ability to address some or all legislative objectives.
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113 See the discussion under “Study Findings.”
114 See Finding VI-A and Finding VI-D.
115 See Finding VI-D-4.
116 See Finding VI-D-4.
is not attracting sufficient applications and in particular sufficient high-quality applications.
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117 See Finding VI-D-4.
118 See Finding VI-D.
119 See Finding VI-D-1.
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120 See Finding VI-D-2.