Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) conduct an independent review of the adequacy of U.S. strategies to prevent, counter, and respond to chemical terrorism.

STUDY TASK, SCOPE, AND METHOD

Given the breadth of the study’s task, the committee took a high-level view and focused on identifying the most important technical, policy, and resource gaps with respect to strategies for identifying, preventing, countering, and responding to chemical threats, and budgeting to address these needs. While acknowledging the potential rise of terrorist threats from state actors over the past decade, the report focuses on chemical threats originating from nonstate actors with or without state involvement (e.g., knowledge or the capability to share and other forms of support to enable chemical terrorism). The committee decided to combine preventing and countering in their strategy assessment. Considerations of long-term health and environmental effects were beyond the scope of the charge. To carry out its work, the committee systematically evaluated key strategic documents listed in chapter 3, that range from national-level to agency-level strategies.

In the United States, there has not been a chemical terrorist event that has had consequences approaching those observed outside of the country. Generally, U.S. response organizations have been effective in identifying and thwarting chemical threats, although, there have been a few notable cases where law enforcement did not identify a threat before an attack was executed. Additionally, the 2018 Skripal poisonings in the United Kingdom illustrate a new turning point in actors, intent, and methods in the chemical threat: from that of terrorist-initiated to use by a combination of a state actor, targeted assassination, and nontraditional agent.

COMPLEX CHEMICAL THREAT LANDSCAPE

Incidents of chemical terrorism and attempted terrorism have involved one hundred different perpetrators motivated by different ideologies (see Figure S-1). For the period between 1990–2017, the geographic distribution of countries where chemical terrorism

incidents have occurred is extensive, with 47 countries involved over this period and actual uses of chemical agents as weapons occurring in 34 of these cases. They have also utilized an array of chemical agents encompassing many commonly available (often referred to as “low-end”) agents and several toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), as well as toxic industrial materials (TIMs). They have also used some chemical agents that have traditionally been developed in the military context (e.g., the nerve agent, sarin) and have included a variety of delivery methods, such as explosive devices, aerosol, and other methods (see Figure S-2).

ASSESSING STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFYING CHEMICAL THREATS

The total number of chemicals that constitute or could constitute WMD terrorism threats is vast and continually expanding. Over two hundred million chemicals have been synthesized or isolated, and another is identified every 3–4 seconds (CAS, n.d.). Technological advances such as cheminformatics, artificial intelligence, machine learning, additive manufacturing, nanotechnology, and microscale chemical reactors further facilitate the discovery of new and novel chemical threat agents available for potential beneficial or nefarious use. Thus, it is impossible to identify and prevent or counter every threat.

Federal agencies that spoke with the committee acknowledged that, overall, terrorists seeking to perpetrate chemical attacks tend to opportunistically misuse traditional classes of chemicals, primarily TICs and TIMs. The majority of publicly reported domestic plots did not come to fruition between the 1970s and mid-2010s for several reasons. However, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of terror attacks involving chemicals is not a direct indication that the United States, in particular, the intelligence community (IC), was or was not successful in identifying a threat.

RECOMMENDATION 2-3: The intelligence community (IC) should continue to monitor interest in emerging technologies and delivery systems, such as drug

delivery systems, and trends by terrorist groups to innovate and improvise using chemical agents. This may look significantly different than the applications of advanced materials chemistry by great power states.

To assess the United States’ capability to identify chemical threats, the committee reviewed recent strategies. The committee considered that a successful strategy to identify chemical terrorism threats is one that focuses on robust information-sharing regarding the following:

1. Chemicals that may be used in an attack—both known chemical weapon agents and lesser-known emerging agents;
2. Threat actors who may use or pursue chemicals for use in weapons of mass destruction terrorism (WMDT) attacks; and
3. Entities that may support or sponsor chemical attacks or terrorism.

This report concludes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), partner law enforcement, and IC have been effective in identifying and interdicting the majority of domestic terrorist attacks involving chemical materials, which have typically employed conventional TICS rather than traditional chemical warfare agents. While the FBI has been effective, approaches to identifying chemical threats could be strengthened by using a multi-lens approach from several different agencies that emphasizes augmented communication and coordination between local and state enforcement and the IC. In addition, this area would greatly benefit from increased coordination between the IC and technical experts—particularly those with specific knowledge of terrorist motivation and psychology. Finally, it is unclear if the tactical readiness to implement the reviewed strategies is occurring at the necessary pace to respond to an act of chemical terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION 4-3 (Abbreviated): Existing IC programs should actively seek and incorporate new approaches to identify existing chemical threats (traditional and improvised) and potential emerging threats by terrorist groups. In developing new approaches, program managers should develop strategies that look beyond the traditional terrorism suspects and that augment and leverage skill sets of the U.S. Government (USG) agencies. The threat assessments should be updated reflecting the current times and demographics.

RECOMMENDATION 4-4: The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should review current identification approaches to determine whether shifts in emphasis are required as a result of expanded and augmented VEOs and terrorist capability resulting from the potential migration of chemical agents, other materials, technology, and expertise from state actors to VEOs.

which involves denying attainment of benefits so that the actor is dissuaded from attempting the action in the first place. These include facility security improvements under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)¹ program and a variety of response capabilities that would mitigate the harm caused by a chemical attack.

Upon reviewing existing strategy documents, the committee found references to deterrence by punishment in a nonspecific context. For example, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (p.3) reiterates the declaratory policy that

The overall document explicitly cites terrorists as a source of potential risk in context of acquisition and use of WMD, but they are not explicitly called out in context of deterrence.

Strategies addressing nonstate actors appear to be focused predominantly on other forms of deterrence, which could involve threatening to punish potential states, nonstate institutions, and even individuals who might support terrorists acquiring WMD (including chemical weapons). The committee found no explicit declaratory statement of direct deterrence by punishment directed toward terrorists who used chemical weapons, in contrast to both the nuclear and biological domains.

There are substantial advantages to an explicit communication of the direct deterrence proposition (e.g., that the United States will take certain measures if terrorists utilize chemical weapons that would not otherwise be taken). Careful consideration should be given to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing counter-WMD terrorism strategies.

RECOMMENDATION 5-1: The National Security Council should give careful consideration to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing Chemical WMDT strategies.

Reducing Material Availability and Chemical Substitution

Chemicals are on a spectrum from extremely accessible (e.g., commercially available household chemicals), relatively accessible (e.g., many so-called TICs present in chemical plants and manufacturing facilities), to extremely inaccessible (e.g. organophosphate nerve agents and many of their key precursor chemicals). In theory, any chemical can be produced from readily available precursor chemicals. However, in practice, the technical barriers to producing certain chemicals are high. In some cases, for example nerve agent synthesis, the technical barriers are extremely high. Regu-

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¹ At the time of writing this report, the statutory authority for the CFATS program (6 CFR Part 27) expired and has yet to be reauthorized.

latory efforts to reduce material availability include the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Management Program Regulation, which aims to “reduce the likelihood of accidental releases at chemical facilities, and to improve emergency response activities when those releases occur.” (Final Amendments to the Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule, 2018). DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) established CFATS, which once played an important role in regulating material availability.

Another key avenue by which the risk of chemical terrorism can be reduced is to replace existing processes and materials with less toxic alternatives, often referred to as inherently safer technology. This obviously reduces the potential consequences of a chemical terrorist attack by making toxic materials less prevalent or by eliminating their use entirely. Overall, theft and use of the materials in commerce will become more difficult and less attractive. The likelihood of a chemical facility becoming a target for sabotage will also decrease. Occupational and environmental safety concerns have long driven industry to seek substitution as a strategy to mitigate hazards, and both Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and EPA have for decades encouraged and recognized innovative approaches for substitution. However, despite ongoing industry practice and some initiatives that previously operated under DHS’s CFATS program, the strategy documents reviewed by the committee do not cite chemical substitution as a key part of an overall chemical security strategy.

RECOMMENDATION 5-3: Substitution of safer alternative chemicals for hazardous chemicals in industrial and academic settings should be included as part of the overall strategy to impede acquisition of raw materials for chemical terrorism. The planning and development of these strategies should be spearheaded by DHS’s Chemical Information Sharing and Analysis Center under a reauthorized CFATS program and should continue to be conducted in conjunction with regulatory agencies, specifically, the EPA, OSHA, and representatives from industry and academic research environments.

Addressing Insider Threats

In certain sectors—often related to the materials consumed or produced therein—the threat lies not only in the theft of information and the disruption of an organization’s functions, but also in the possibility that sabotage by insiders could have extremely detrimental consequences for broader public health and safety. The accidental release of more than 40 tons of highly toxic methyl isocyanate from the Union Carbide insecticide plant in Bhopal, India in 1984 is an example of the scale of harm that could result from an accident occurring at a chemical facility (Broughton, 2005, Eckerman, 2005).

Despite this significance, strategic documents surveyed did not explicitly mention insider threat in the chemical terrorism context. While CFATS included some practical efforts to counter insider threats within the chemical industry, the scope of these efforts appears to be limited. The committee did not find evidence of a similar program at the level of CFATS, either directed towards government facilities or

within academic research institutions. Nonetheless, government and academic institutions are subject to research security requirements, including reliability programs or controlled access to chemicals via security clearances, which do have an active insider threat identification scope. The severe consequence of an insider at a chemical facility conducting or assisting an attack warrants explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies as a way to counter insider threats at any facility containing significant quantities of toxic chemicals.

RECOMMENDATION 5-4: Counter-insider threat activities should be incorporated explicitly into broader counter WMD strategy. The DHS should develop a strategy to ameliorate insider threats explicitly for the chemical domain.

Other Prevent and Counter Activities

Some activities the USG is undertaking are not mentioned in the strategy documents reviewed, including: military capabilities to provide early warning of chemical terrorism plots; law enforcement capabilities to counter chemical threats tactically; integration with broader counterterrorism and counter-smuggling efforts; and involvement with other multilateral activities beyond the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The absence of such activities from the strategies could impact policy implementation, such as budgeting, program prioritization, and other consequences. Including these activities in existing strategies would bolster their effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION 5-5: Agencies should work to reconcile operational practice with policy by supplementing extant strategies to include current omitted effective activities and programs for countering chemical terrorism. This would ensure that effective practices are maintained, properly resourced, and reflected in comprehensive strategies.

Adequacy of Strategies to Respond to Chemical Terrorism

The vast majority of chemical incidents in the United States are not from terrorism, but are instead chemical releases from accidents, transportation incidents, or the results of natural phenomena, which over the period of 2012–2022 caused nearly one hundred recorded fatalities and almost two thousand injuries. When accidents occur, first responders have tools, training, and interagency agreements generally adequate for protecting the U.S. population, themselves, and the environment. The EPA is the primary agency coordinating response to such incidents, with support from several other agencies.

In this study, response to a chemical terrorism event is defined as the ability to minimize effects, sustain operations, and support follow-on actions. To assess the nation’s ability to respond to chemical terrorism, the committee reviewed the documents shown in chapter 6 and assessed response strategies for their ability to address the following questions:

1. Does the U.S. strategy adequately enable response capabilities (e.g., operations coordination, information-sharing, medical support, and others) that minimize potential impact to life, property, and the environment?
2. Is the strategy for responding to chemical terrorism, and the resources devoted to implement the strategy, aligned with the priorities of the United States (e.g., protecting the homeland, ensuring economic security, maintaining military strength) and aligned with the nation’s risk posture?
3. Does the strategy anticipate emerging threats by suggesting the scientific research and interagency relationships necessary to respond to future threats?

The committee concluded that the current set of U.S. strategies, operational plans, and other resources has helped establish a network of capable first responder communities prepared for various chemical incidents regardless of their cause. However, improvements are needed in the following areas: need for first responder input, access to intelligence, information flow, and interagency coordination.

Need for First Responder Input

A major component for creating a robust strategy is to ensure critical information is collected and included from the first responder community. CISA released the Aviation Safety Communique (SAFECOM) Nationwide Survey to collect data from organizations that use technology for public safety, including emergency communication centers, emergency management, law enforcement, emergency medical personnel, and fire and rescue professionals. These types of input from relevant stakeholders in the response community will also eventually shape the direction of risk assessments.

Access to Intelligence

One concern raised in agency briefings is that information that would be most beneficial to first responders sometimes cannot be transmitted due to classification status of the information. At the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, NCTC created a mobile app ACTknowledge, that shares unclassified counterterrorism reports, analysis, training resources, and alerts to users, however, as of January 2023 ACTknowledge was discontinued. Under National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Library of Medicine hosts the mobile app and web-based platform Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER), which is designed to provide first responders with quick access to critical information during hazardous material incidents and other emergencies, but WISER was also discontinued in February 2023. Other emergency management tools are still operational, like Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO) and Chemical Hazards Emergency Medical Management (CHEMM) (EPA, n.d.; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, n.d.). While the FBI is actively engaged in fostering communication with state and local first responders, including the National Guard, and industry, it is not clear that the outreach is comprehen-

sive or systematic. The risk is that an event could occur in an area where first responders would not be aware of, or in communication with FBI personnel or capability.

Top-Down and Bottom-Up Information Flow

All of the briefings received by the committee from various agencies demonstrated a clear understanding of looking upstream to current authorities, strategies, policies, and laws governing internal agency responsibilities. Less clear to the committee is how the requirements systematically flow downstream from higher-level policy to subsidiary organizations and finally to first responders. For example, roles and responsibilities of EPA and DHS/Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) officials as well as their chain of communication could lead to confusion at the local level; the result, a potentially slower response to a chemical incident or attack.

The main framework employed by DHS FEMA to coordinate and respond to emergency, natural disasters, or terrorist events is the National Incident Management System (NIMS), within which is the National Response Framework (NRF) with two documents related specifically to responding to chemical incidents: ESF#10 and the Oil/Chemical Incident Annex. The committee found that the NRF adequately addressed chemical terrorism, but that translating U.S. strategies and frameworks into operational practice for chemical terrorism response remains a challenge.

Enhancing Interagency Coordination

Coordination among the different organizations can be improved to ensure first responders receive the needed information.

With respect to addressing chemical attacks specifically, FEMA’s WMD Strategic Group Consequence Management Coordination Unit coordinates with other parts of FEMA through its Chemical Biological Radiation and Nuclear (CBRN) Office. The FBI has designated WMD coordinators in its fifty-six field offices with the idea that building strong working relationships in place encourages a smoother response to a chemical incident. They routinely host WMD workshops to train first responders in recognizing the use of WMD during the initial stages of an incident.

RECOMMENDATION 6-6: Considering the complexity of the chemical threat space and USG coordination required for an effective response to a chemical event, the committee recommends continuing a robust program of interagency exercises and trainings that practice communication and resource sharing.

Priorities in a Shifting Threat Landscape

This report evaluating U.S. strategies to address chemical terrorism comes at a time when the nation’s highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on VEOs to focusing more on the Great Power Competition (GPC). In the words of President Biden,

Despite the changes in DoD and national strategy, it is not apparent how operations have adjusted to the new strategies nor is it clear how the IC will address information gaps.

RECOMMENDATION 7-4 (Abbreviated): The IC and its offices throughout the departments with significant chemical terrorism roles and responsibilities (DoD, DHS, Department of Justice (DOJ)) should take steps to ensure that counter chemical weapons programs, whether state-based or by nonstate actors, are not technologically deterministic.

Chemical Terrorism Risks

If GPC intensifies, there are potential implications for chemical terrorism threats beyond a possible reduction of resources available to address the threats. The decisions that states make may wittingly or unwittingly lead to a dramatic increase in the sophistication of chemical terrorism, in terms of both the agent employed and/or the means by which it is delivered (see data from Figure S-2). States might also choose to engage in offensive chemical weapons activities (as some, notably Russia, are suspected to be doing today) and technology, materials, expertise, and/or chemical agents might be illicitly transferred or diverted to nonstate actors. In addition, there is the potential for what might be categorized as “state terrorism”—as some have alleged both Russia and North Korea have done with targeted attacks in recent years. In the opinion of the committee, these factors could lead to reduced resources for countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism (CWMDT) broadly, although the mechanisms, magnitude, and timing are currently poorly understood.

RECOMMENDATION 7-5: DoD should conduct risk and threat assessments to understand how best to direct resources to address risks of chemical terrorism events in an era of GPC-focused strategies.

At the time of writing this report, the committee learned that CFATS’s statutory authorization was allowed to expire. Therefore, the CISA cannot enforce compliance with the CFATS regulations at this time.

RECOMMENDATION 7-6: Congress should immediately reauthorize the CFATS program and consider long-term reauthorization.

Threat-Agnostic Approaches to Medical Countermeasures

If resources for counterterrorism decrease due to the shift towards GPC, then a burden will be placed on existing programs to use their resources more efficiently in countering chemical threats. Despite the potential loss of focus on chemical terrorism,

the growing trend toward more broadly extensible strategies being implemented by many agencies may help reduce risk. DoD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and Biomedical Advanced R&D Authority (BARDA) have prioritized five diagnostic toxidromes for chemical exposures (neurologic, pulmonary, respiratory, metabolic, vesicating), which bypasses the need to identify the specific agent. This has positioned BARDA to more readily develop and deploy effective chemical medical countermeasures across multiple sectors to “treat the injury, not the agent.” (Chemical Medical Countermeasure Overview, 2024)

RECOMMENDATION 7-7: Federal agencies should prioritize broadly applicable approaches beyond the specific mission sets represented by the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center (DEVCOM CBC), BARDA, and CISA, to all areas of the CWMDT enterprise to maximize the United States’ government capacity for appropriate response on time scales of relevance.

BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee heard from several briefers that budgets are inadequate to address the breadth of possible chemical threats, even for agencies for which WMD is the highest priority. The material reviewed by the committee showed insufficient detail to allow a robust assessment of budgets likely to be required to implement strategies effectively, particularly for offices whose missions cover both chemical and biological threats. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. To ensure a balance between different efforts as a result of risk assessments, as alluded to in section 1.1.2, a distinction between countering chemical and countering biological efforts is needed.

RECOMMENDATION 7-8: WMD budgets should be aligned with evolving strategic priorities.

RECOMMENDATION 7-9: Chemical WMDT budgets should incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

The committee recommends that chemical terrorism risk assessments (e.g., full risks, threats only, national-level, state-level, and others) be performed in the context of the latest strategies to align budget priorities with strategic priorities, and most clearly understand where and why the United States is accepting risk. Table S-1 shows the budget functions and resources the committee believes should be considered under budgetary constraints that may result from the national strategic shift to GPC. These factors include risk priorities that are expressed in budget requests.

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