The FBI, working as part of the Dallas Joint Terrorism Task Force (a coalition of federal and local police) arrested four individuals who were planning to blow up a natural gas processing plant in 1997. The group believed large quantities of hydrogen sulfide would be released (Pressley, 1997; Verhove, 1997). Identification relied on an informant who was part of the group, which did not have a formal name, but one member was associated with the Ku Klux Klan.
In 1997, a man from Oregon named James Bell was arrested for advocating attacks on federal agents, specifically IRS personnel.1 When Bell was apprehended, he was found to have a significant quantity of sodium cyanide, although this seems to be a relatively minor aspect of what he was planning (AP, 1997). He was identified by an undercover IRS agent (Ryen, 1997) who infiltrated a far-right, sovereign citizen organization, the fake Multnomah County Common Law Court (which is not affiliated with the local or county courts) (Linzer and Rosenberg, 1997). Bell was arrested before he could carry out any attacks.
An Illinois-based white supremacist group called the New Order was arrested by the FBI in 1998, for planning to assassinate a lawyer from the Southern Poverty Law
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1 “Jim Bell,” Wikipedia website, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Bell.
Center (New York Times, 1998). The group also had aspirations to poison the water supplies of major cities.
In California, Charles Kiles and Kevin Patterson, from California—who were members of the San Joaquin militia—were arrested for plotting to use cyanide and explode propane tanks in 1999 (Chicago Tribune, 1999). Federal agents arrested two antigovernment militia members in connection with an alleged plan, after a nearly yearlong investigation by an FBI terrorism task force into a potential threat against the Suburban Propane facility in Elk Grove and other targets in the Sacramento area.
In 2004, Demetrius Van Crocker, from Tennessee, wanted to acquire sarin and said he made mustard agent (though there is no evidence he did) as part of a plot targeting government facilities (FBI, 2006). Crocker attempted to acquire the nerve agent and C4 explosives from an undercover FBI agent. A concerned citizen took his “extremist rants” and plans “to build a dirty bomb to blow up a state or federal courthouse” (FBI, 2006) seriously enough to call the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, which in turn called the FBI. “We thought there might be something to it,” said Special Agent Daryl Berry (FBI, 2006), who opened the case in September 2004 out of the FBI’s office in Jackson, Tennessee. That set in motion the undercover sting that resulted in the apprehension of Van Crocker.
Also in 2004, the FBI apprehended Myron Tereshchuk, who was being investigated as part of a separate extortion case using the internet (Washington Post, 2004). When law enforcement searched his home as part of the investigation, materials for making hand grenades and “items necessary for making [extracting] ricin,” along with “literature about poisons” were seized (DOJ, 2004). Ricin is a naturally occurring highly toxic protein (i.e., a biomacromolecule), and hence lies at the convergence of biology and chemistry, which complicates the understanding of how to categorize the threat; however, identification of the threat would involve the same government organizations. It is not clear that it can be inferred that he had the knowledge needed to know how to extract ricin. Given the specifics noted in the Department of Justice (DOJ) indictment, it is reasonable to infer that he may have had castor beans, which are readily accessible, and some equipment. Because he was not charged with possession of ricin, LE may not have been able to detect any significant amounts of the protein. Again, motives are not readily available. This case may be illustrative of serendipity, which is problematic as a strategy: there is no publicly available information indicating Tereshchuk was being investigated on suspicion of terrorism in general or chemical terrorism specifically.
In 2008, Jeffrey Detrixhe attempted to sell sodium cyanide to an FBI informant (DOJ, 2008; ABC News, 2008) in connection with a case being investigated in the context of illegal activities by a right-wing, white supremacist group. Detrixhe had acquired a 25-gallon drum containing 62 pounds of cyanide, which he allegedly offered to sell for $10,000, a thermal imager, and an assault rifle (DOJ, 2008). It is not clear that Detrixhe intended to do anything with the sodium cyanide himself; he was convicted of possession of a substance without a legitimate purpose. The intended recipient, “fat Bob,” was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, and Detrixhe acknowledged that “he had second thoughts about selling it [the sodium cyanide] because it would probably be used for a bad purpose” (DOJ, 2008). How Detrixhe acquired a large amount of sodium cyanide remains unanswered.
Another example of a potential threat being interdicted is the 2014 case of Ryan Chamberlain, from California, who had procured rosary peas and sodium cyanide (Dinzeo, 2016). FBI agents were made aware that Chamberlain was accused of working toward isolating a biological toxin, abrin. Abrin can be isolated from the bright red and black seeds, which are known as rosary peas or jequirity beans, of the invasive pantropical Abrus precatorius plant. He also had attempted to purchase abrin, ricin, and nicotine via an online black market seller (Business Insider, 2014). In addition to crushed rosary peas, Chamberlain was also found to possess explosive-making materials and had removed the serial number from a firearm. Reportedly, Chamberlain was apprehended before he developed a specific plot for an attack, where his desire was to create a toxic powder that could be widely dispersed to harm others. The motive behind Chamberlain’s intention to use abrin remains unclear. There have been some suggestions he thought the end times as suggested in the Biblical Book of Revelations was about to occur. The allegations regarding the scale of pursuit of chemical terrorism were further muddied when the U.S. district judge in the case noted it was “apparent that the U.S. Attorney’s Office never had any reliable basis for asserting that the FBI recovered between 1,000 and 2,000 lethal doses of abrin from Chamberlain’s apartment” (Dinzeo, 2016). The lack of clarity surrounding motive, what was actually pursued, and the extent of actual agent obtained makes this a difficult case from which to draw conclusions with any confidence.
The case against Jarrett William Smith, who pled guilty to two counts of “distributing information related to explosives, destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction” (DOJ, 2020), to possible right-wing extremist groups, is illustrative of the challenges of identifying domestic violent extremists with interest in chemical terrorism. While serving on active duty in the U.S. Army, Smith, between 2017–2019, became
self-radicalized (DSCA, 2019). The group Smith joined linked him to the Order of Nine Angles (O9A), which is a leaderless, decentralized network that espouses white supremacist, neo-Nazi, pro-jihadist ideas with a shared neo-Satanist ideology, and actively promotes violent terrorism (Koch, 2022). This group has been in the news recently in conjunction with another former soldier sentenced to 45 years in prison for “attempting to murder U.S. service members, providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists, and illegally transmitting national defense information,” passing operational deployment information to other members of the O9A (DOJ, 2023). Jarrett Smith was charged with Distributing Information Relating to Explosives, Destructive Devices, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 842(p) (CourtListener, 2019a).
To interdict the chemical threat posed by Smith, the FBI initially received information on comments Smith had posted on social media about his intent “to travel to Ukraine to fight with a violent, far-right military group” (DOJ, 2020). How the FBI was made aware of those comments has not been made public; in previous instances, representatives of Meta, the parent company of Facebook, have indicated they shared information with federal LE when intent to commit politically motivated violence was suspected (GAO, 2022). Additionally, a confidential informant provided further information that eventually led the FBI to act. This information included Smith’s offer of what he claimed were methods for producing chemical agents intended to injure or kill domestic elected officials. The charging complaint, specifically, provides a transcript of Smith’s statements that included instructions to generate chlorine and what was subsequently identified as napalm:2
Smith: If you want a quick and cheap gas grenade, a [combination of commonly available chemicals] will work. [Instructions for activating the device]. Blows in 8–15 seconds. One hell of a wallop and it leaves behind a cloud of toxic chlorine gas (CourtListener, 2019a).
Smith: Ok. I think I have an idea for you. You will need [various household chemicals and commonly available equipment]. You can keep all the materials separate until it’s time. Plus the randomness will aid you in the case of searches and the materials themselves usually aren’t considered suspicious (CourtListener, 2019b).
The FBI’s criminal complaint contains two additional instances of Smith suggesting the use of chemicals to commit violence. Smith repeatedly emphasized how accessible the starting materials were:
FBI Undercover Employee: I am reading and thinking but this looks really good. I like the fact that everything is stuff you find around the house.
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2 NB: Napalm is not a chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under international law it is considered an incendiary when used against military targets; under the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), use against civilian populations is prohibited. Similarly, under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD treaty), use of napalm as an incendiary defoliant is also prohibited.
Smith: That’s the best way to fight people. Making AK-47s out of expensive parts is cool, but imagine if you will if you were going to Walmart instead of a gun store to buy weapons (CourtListener, 2019b).
When arrested, Smith stated that his goal was “to cause ‘chaos,’” (CourtListener, 2019c) which is consonant with “accelerationism”–the acceleration of sociopolitical collapse via acts of violence and terrorism–goals of the O9A with which he claimed affiliation (Koch, 2022).
ABC News. 2008. “Ryan, Jason, Texas Man Accused of Trying to Sell Cyanide.” May 14, 2008. https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/FedCrimes/story?id=4856904&page=1.
AP (The Associated Press). 1997. “Bell Gets 11 Months in Prison, 3 Years Supervised Release, Fine.” December 12, 1997. https://cryptome.org/jdb/jimbell7.htm.
Business Insider. 2014. “California Consultant Was Arrested for Trying to Buy Toxins Online.” https://www.businessinsider.com/r-arrested-california-consultant-sought-toxins-online-fbi-2014-07.
Chicago Tribune. 1999. “FBI: Militia Plotted to Bomb Propane Tanks.” Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1999-12-05-9912050342-story.html.
CourtListener. 2019a. “Indictment Filed against Defendant Jarrett William Smith as to Counts 1–3,” U.S. District Court, D. Kansas. September 25, 2019. p.1, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16246401/united-states-v-smith.
CourtListener. 2019b. United States v. Smith (5:19-cr-40091), District Court, D. Kansas. September 23, 2019, p.5. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16246401/united-states-v-smith.
CourtListener. 2019c. United States v. Smith (5:19-cr-40091), District Court, D. Kansas. September 23, 2019, p.7. https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16246401/united-states-v-smith.
Dinzeo, M. 2016. “San Fran PR Man Pleads Guilty to Poison Charge.” Courthouse News Service, February 16, 2016. https://www.courthousenews.com/san-fran-pr-man-pleadsguilty-to-poison-charge.
DOJ (U.S. Department of Justice). 2004. “Wi-Fi Hacker Pleads Guilty to Attempted $17,000,000 Extortion.” United States Department of Justice website, June 8, 2004. https://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2004/tereshchukPlea.htm.
DOJ. 2008. “Man Sentenced to Nearly Six Years in Federal Prison for Possessing Cyanide.” U.S. Department of Justice website, United States Attorney Richard B. Roper, Northern District of Texas, December 17, 2008. https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/txn/Pre0ssRel08/detrixhe_sen_pr.html.
DOJ. 2020. “Former Fort Riley Soldier Sentenced for Distributing Info on Napalm, IEDs.” August 19, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/usao-ks/pr/former-fort-riley-soldier-sentenced-distributing-info-napalm-ieds.
DOJ.2023. “Former U.S. Army Soldier Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for At tempting to Murder Fellow Service Members in Deadly Ambush.” March 3, 2023. https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-us-army-soldier-sentenced-45-years-prison-attempting-murder-fellow-service.
DSCA (Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency). 2019. “Center for Development of Security Excellence (CDSE) Case Study: Self-Radicalization.” https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/casestudies/case-study-smith.pdf.
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation). 2006. “Domestic Terrorism Tips Lead to Sting, Prison for Plotter.” The FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation website, November 2006. https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2006/november/terror_112906.
GAO. 2022. “Capitol Attack: Federal Agencies’ Use of Open Source Data and Related Threat Products Prior to January 6, 2021,” GAO-22-105963, May 02, 2022, p. 20. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105963.
Koch, A. 2022. “The ONA Network and the Transnationalization of Neo-Nazi-Satanism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.2024944.
Linzer, L., and D. Rosenberg. 1997. Vigilante Justice: Militias and “Common Law Courts” Wage War Against the Government. Anti-Defamation League. https://adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/adl-report-1997-vigilante-justice.pdf.
New York Times. 1998. “Supremacists Had Hit List, F.B.I. Agent Says.” The New York Times website, March 7, 1998. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/us/supremacists-had-hit-list-fbi-agent-says.html.
Pressley, S.A. 1997. “Group Planned Massacre and Big Robbery, FBI Says.” The Washington Post webpage, April 25, 1997. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/04/25/group-planned-massacre-and-big-robbery-fbi-says/8d864957-b2cf-4c39-be2a-10361b6c31de.
Ryen, J. V. 1997. Digital Files from Court Reporter Julaine V. Ryen. Tacoma, WA: Western District of Washington. https://cryptome.org/usa-v-jdb-01.htm.
Verhovek, S. H. 1997. “U.S. Officials Link Klan Faction to 1 of 4 People Held in Texas Bomb Plot.” The New York Times website, April 25, 1997. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/25/us/us-officials-link-klan-faction-to-1-of-4-people-held-in-texas-bomb-plot.html.
Washington Post. 2004. “Ricin and Grenades Found at MD Home.” September 29, 2004 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2004/09/30/ricin-and-grenades-found-at-md-home-in-extortion-probe/c08045be-fe71-4439-a789-d9d45f3c988f.