Summary

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable (NSTSR) was called for in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act¹ to bring together individuals from federal research agencies, intelligence, law enforcement, academic research, and business communities to explore critical issues related to protecting U.S. national and economic security while ensuring the open exchange of ideas and the international talent required for American leadership in science and technology (S&T).

Between November 2020 and May 2024, the NSTSR held a total of 14 meetings.² These included regional meetings around the United States where the NSTSR engaged with researchers, institutions, national laboratories, and industry representatives to gather information and perspectives on a range of issues pertaining to research security.³ Regional meetings were

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¹ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, P.L. 116-92, Section 1746(b).

² For NSTSR and regional meeting agendas from 2020 to 2024, see https://www.dropbox.com/home/NSTSR%20Capstone%20Workshop%20July%2016-17%2C%202024/NSTSR%20Meeting%20Agendas%202020-2024.

³ The U.S. government defines research security as “safeguarding the research enterprise against the misappropriation of research and development to the detriment of national or economic security, related violations of research integrity, and foreign government interference.” See Joint Committee on the Research Environment Subcommittee on Research Security, Guidance for Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) on National Security Strategy for United States Government-Supported Research and Development, January 2022, p. 24.

held at the University of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern University, Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Texas A&M University (see Appendix A for abbreviated agendas of NSTSR regional meetings). The NSTSR also convened a workshop on November 14 and 15, 2022, entitled Openness, International Engagement, and the Federally Funded Science and Technology Research Enterprise.⁴

Since the first meeting of the NSTSR in 2020, there have been numerous discussions around the topic of research security among policymakers and affected communities, and the policy landscape has continued to evolve. The NSTSR played a role in these discussions, and to capture what was learned and explore potential future directions before the NSTSR sunsets in late 2024, a Capstone Workshop was held on July 16 and 17, 2024. Discussions over the 2 days of the workshop included observations by participants about the nature of the challenge of research security in the United States, reflections on actions that the United States has taken on research security to date, and possible future directions.

Because it was a roundtable and not a consensus study committee, the NSTSR’s mandate did not include making consensus recommendations. The three co-chairs authored a paper with their personal conclusions and recommendations, which was provided to attendees in advance of the workshop and is included in Appendix F. In addition to the co-chairs’ paper, this volume provides a summary of the many viewpoints expressed by members of the NSTSR and other workshop participants. More detail on presenters’ views can be found in the slides from the workshop in Appendix D.

This proceedings was prepared by a rapporteur as a factual summary of the presentations and discussions that took place at the workshop. It does not necessarily represent the positions of the workshop participants as a whole, the planning committee, the NSTSR, or the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and should not be construed as reflecting any group consensus.

THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGE

Research plays a critical role in U.S. national and economic security. As was noted repeatedly by participants during the workshop, the challenge

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⁴ For Proceedings in Brief from the NSTSR workshop Openness, International Engagement, and the Federally Funded Science and Technology Research Enterprise, see https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/27091/openness-international-engagement-and-the-federally-funded-science-and-technology-research-enterprise.

facing the nation is how to implement policies and procedures ensuring that the national and economic security of the United States is adequately protected and enhanced by the right balance of research openness and research security. Maintaining the preeminence of the U.S. research system in an era where some countries engage in practices that take unfair advantage of open aspects of our research system in a non-reciprocal, non-transparent way has become a significant issue for the United States.

The People’s Republic of China raises the most significant challenge, according to many participants, because it has become a near-peer competitor in science, technology, and innovation, many of its scientists engage with American scientists, and its government has employed practices, including stealing intellectual property and espionage, that are not compatible with the values and practices that underpin the open aspects of the U.S. research ecosystem. Relations between the United States and Chinese governments have become highly adversarial across a range of issues, many noted. China has stated S&T ambitions to outcompete the United States and has developed a whole-of-system approach, devoting considerable resources to building a robust and high performing research ecosystem for advancing its national interests.

An important element of the challenge, according to many workshop participants, is that the United States no longer enjoys preeminence in either investments or in achievements in many important and strategic areas of research—a sentiment echoed by subject matter experts reflecting on their own fields of research during NSTSR’s regional meetings around the United States. A number of participants in the regional meetings suggested that with a thoughtful approach, the United States can preserve important aspects of its open research system that benefit the country while also ensuring that the system protects and enhances U.S. national and economic security.

COLLABORATING INTERNATIONALLY

U.S. values such as openness and scientific rigor are a strength, most participants observed, adding that it is important to fortify and uphold those values when conducting research, including international scientific collaboration. Collaborating internationally in research is crucial to advancing research, many participants said, but it is also necessary to be cognizant of others’ values when doing so, and caution should be applied when values relating to transparency, reciprocity, and accountability are not

shared. Some workshop participants pointed out that even our well-aligned allies have different policies than the United States regarding security and openness. One participant questioned assumptions about trust in scientific research activities, suggesting that not all collaborations can be built around an assumption of mutual trust.

APPROACHES TO RESEARCH SECURITY

An all-of-system approach is the best way to maintain both U.S. national security and preeminence in science and technology, many participants said, with some saying that the U.S. approach up to now has been tactical and has not appropriately considered the entire S&T system. Many noted that National Security Presidential Memorandum – 33⁵ provided an important platform from which to launch research security efforts in the United States, but that it is just a start.

Most participants called for a flexible, risk-based approach to allow the United States to leverage the gains in scientific research that arise from an open research environment with robust international collaboration, while at the same time protecting the most sensitive work. Many advocated for a risk management approach where both risks and benefits are evaluated and prioritized, considering not only the personnel involved in a particular proposed research project but also the specific topic of the research. Institutions will not all implement the same risk management approach, some participants noted, because different institutions have different risk profiles. For example, some universities perform classified work on their campuses, while other universities do not.

For analyzing a proposed federally funded research project, the balance between preserving openness and protecting sensitive work can be achieved through a process of carefully identifying and categorizing sensitive information. Federal funding agencies shared their different approaches to categorizing and making decisions regarding sensitive projects during the workshop. These approaches vary according to varying federal agency missions, and the workshop included detailed presentations of the methodologies that are being applied by the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Energy, National Institutes of Health, and

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⁵ The White House. 2021. “Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy.” National Security Presidential Memorandum – 33 (NSPM-33), January 14, 2021.

National Science Foundation. However, though these approaches vary, many workshop participants cautioned that the U.S. government should nonetheless seek harmonization of federal science-funding agencies’ policies on research security to the maximum extent possible—a sentiment echoed by the academic community during NSTSR regional meetings around the country.

Some participants pointed out concerns from researchers about lack of clarity on what type of international collaboration is acceptable by federal agencies and what type is prohibited, a concern that the NSTSR heard from researchers and university research security leads at its regional meetings.

To aid with the exchange of information, productive relationships between the research community and the law enforcement and intelligence communities are key. Many have worked to develop such relationships, and the result has been increased understanding and trust between these communities, which can, in turn, foster the development of a mutually reinforcing system for achieving research security. Several participants emphasized that having individuals with technical and security expertise as a trusted part of the research system is key to being able to make security decisions on potential collaborative work on a case-by-case basis.

INVESTMENTS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND TALENT

A key theme highlighted by many participants is that achieving U.S. national security requires not only protective measures but also investment to boost open, fundamental scientific research. They felt that the United States can win the current nation-state competition by “running faster” in S&T, but only if it makes the needed investments. This includes investments in talent and developing a workforce sufficient to meet the needs of the U.S. S&T enterprise.

DISCUSSION OF NEXT STEPS FOR ACHIEVING RESEARCH SECURITY WHILE MAINTAINING U.S. PREEMINENCE

Several possible next steps in achieving research security while maintaining U.S. S&T preeminence were proposed, including the development of a comprehensive U.S. science, technology, and security strategy, and a strategy for the recruitment, retention, and development of talent. Some participants suggested that new legislation is needed to boost education in

STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), for example an updated National Defense Education Act.⁶

One participant expressed concern about a lack of societal understanding of the value S&T provides to the U.S. economy and national security and for why we have our S&T system in the first place, suggesting that there should be more efforts to educate the public about the importance of the U.S. S&T system to our prosperity and security and the critical roles that open scientific research, international collaboration, and talent recruitment play in U.S. success.

Some participants felt that U.S. global preeminence and leadership in S&T is diminishing and challenged by factors that are more important to address than countering malign actions by certain foreign actors. From this point of view, it would be a mistake to think that stopping bad actors is sufficient for restoring and maintaining U.S. preeminence. Many noted that increasing investments in S&T is crucial to ensure U.S. technological preeminence and outcompete foreign adversaries.

Many participants argued that investment in U.S. talent and research capabilities is necessary but not sufficient, and that to maintain preeminence, the United States must also avoid counterproductive measures that might stifle research and preclude participation in the S&T enterprise by smaller research institutions.

Several participants noted that working with international governments and institutions of partners, allies, and like-minded countries to address research security concerns will make the U.S. and global response to threats from foreign interference more effective. Vetting foreign individuals seeking to work or study in the United States was also discussed, with participants expressing different views on whether such vetting should be undertaken in the government or at research institutions.

Even without the People’s Republic of China, there would still be challenges to achieving research security, and many participants suggested that policies should not be adopted exclusively to counter China. The U.S. government recognizes threats to research security coming from other countries, identified in some government policies as “countries of concern,” including Russia, North Korea, and Iran.⁷ Several workshop participants

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⁶ See Chapter 9 for discussion of the National Defense Education Act at the Capstone Workshop.

⁷ For example, the CHIPS and Science Act indicates that “foreign countries of concern” related to malign foreign talent recruitment programs include the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. See P.L. 117-167, Section 10612(a)(1).

also cautioned to avoid overly focusing on any one particular country in efforts to achieve research security, citing that countries of concern in the future may include countries not currently on this list.

During the course of the NSTSR’s convenings, concerns were expressed by Chinese and Chinese American scholars about what seemed to be ethnic targeting by the U.S. government of Chinese and Chinese American researchers working in the United States. Many workshop participants cautioned against reinstating the Department of Justice’s China Initiative,⁸ as it was a policy that was not effective at addressing the problem of research security, was overly focused on China when threats now and in the future will also come from elsewhere, and unnecessarily stoked ethnic divisions in the United States.

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) was a topic of particular concern during the workshop and throughout the NSTSR’s convenings, with participants urging that CUI restrictions not be applied excessively, that the application of CUI be consistent across federal agencies, and that the creation of new categories of CUI be avoided.

Improved understanding of foreign threats to the U.S. research system would provide needed analysis and quantification of the problem, according to many participants. Issues identified as requiring a deeper understanding were: how often ethical violations due to foreign interference occur in open research, what the impacts of those ethical violations are, and the scale and impact of foreign interference in federally funded versus private-sector funded research and development (R&D). It was also seen as important to assess the costs and benefits of performing R&D in a restricted versus an open setting.

Many participants observed that it will be important to have a forum where academia, the private sector, federal research funding agencies, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement would be able to continue to come together for ongoing discussions to share information on research security threats and risks.

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⁸ See Chapters 7, 8, and 10 and the NSTSR co-chairs’ paper in Appendix F for more discussion of the Department of Justice’s China Initiative.

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