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The U.S. Research System’s Role in National and Economic Security

J. Michael McQuade (Carnegie Mellon University), moderator of the workshop’s second panel, opened the session by observing that it is important to stop to think about why we are taking action on research security: why science and technology (S&T) matters; what the research ecosystem has done for our country; and the role science and technology plays in bringing about a society that is secure and creates economic growth. McQuade expressed concern that the broader U.S. society does not understand the value of S&T, why expertise and investment in the creation of the future matters, and why we have our S&T system in the first place.

McQuade introduced Susan Gordon (former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence) and Patrick Gallagher (University of Pittsburgh), co-chairs of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine study Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage.¹

Gordon said that the study was originally titled “Protecting U.S. Technology in a Time of Openness,” but this was changed because the United States is no longer a leader in every technology. We must protect technology as well as advantage: first, it is important to have something worthy of protecting, and second, you must protect that advantage. Gordon observed that “we’ve come to a place where every technology is available to everyone, and the advantage will go to the person who puts it to clever use fastest.”

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¹ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/26647.

Protecting advantage with a platform like cloud computing or artificial intelligence is different than in other fields.

Gordon noted that much fundamental research is funded by the private sector, over which the federal government has almost no control until a technology is created and utilized, and then it is like “putting genies back in the bottle.” Government research funding has decreased as private-sector research funding has increased. However, research in the two sectors is very different. Government has big problems to solve, long-term horizons, and “deep pockets.” On the other hand, the private sector operates in commercially expedient ways. Even if the focus of research security actions is universities, it is important to see the whole ecosystem.

Gordon said that the great supply chain issue of our time is not microchips, but talent. The United States could harm its advantage if it decouples too much from China. We have an industrial base that is starved for talent, and foreign-born researchers could fill this void. If the United States adopts a strategy of coupling educational opportunities with an opportunity to work in industry, this would provide an advantage that some of our allies and partners do not have because of the size of their talent base.

Gallagher noted significant overlap between the National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable (NSTSR) co-chairs’ paper² and the Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage study.

For the study, the original charge for the committee was to look at research security with a list of specific technologies to consider. However, the committee broadened the focus by using specific technologies as case studies and including a focus on platform technologies, which are broadly shared and enabling. These platform technologies, for example, artificial intelligence, cloud computation, 5G telecommunications, and synthetic biology, can be adapted for varied uses and are exceedingly difficult to control effectively and appropriately. Gallagher said that in the past, tech-

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² See Chapter 2 for the NSTSR co-chairs’ presentation of their paper at the Capstone Workshop. The paper may be found in Appendix F.

nologies tended to be discrete and single-purpose and could be controlled based on that. However, security strategies the United States will need for the technological landscape today, where newer technologies have multiple uses, are “going to look very different than the entire control regime [for discrete technologies] that we’ve built.”

Gallagher said that the United States no longer enjoys sole supremacy in S&T. Many competitors that have “run the American play,” reverse-engineered our approach, and are seeing the fruits of their efforts. The U.S. approach is a product of the Cold War, but it is a mistake to see China as equivalent to Cold War Russia. There is a “frenemies” aspect of our engagement with China, and our codependency raises issues not present in the relationships with the Soviet Union and its allies. China is an economically integrated geopolitical adversary, and it does not adhere to what we consider proper international behavior. The National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189)³ discusses the advantages of open research, as does the Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage study, but this openness also implies an acceptance of a certain amount of risk. However, if the United States has less of an overwhelming advantage than we did when NSDD-189 was issued in the 1980s, how does that change the risk calculus? Gallagher suggested that we have not yet answered that, and that this fact is probably behind the increasing controls on research that we see coming from the U.S. government.

Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage calls for an exercise that will explicitly define the benefits of open science. Gallagher raised a series of questions related to this: What is an “open system”? What does it need to be open to? Who is allowed to be involved? At what point do restrictions have an impact on the open environment?

The report also calls for an all-of-government approach to solve the challenge of protecting our technological advantage. The study committee struggled with who would be responsible for coordinating a U.S. response across the science, research, development, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. Gallagher suggested that some of the actions on protecting U.S. technological advantage belong in Congress, such as immigration and talent, but that many are executive branch responsibilities that cut across multiple agencies.

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³ The White House. 1985. “National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information.” National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), September 21, 1985.

Gallagher suggested that the United States is playing all defense and no offense. Risk management has become a discussion only about controls on research. For example, in many cases increasing the support for research might be an effective strategy to address loss of U.S. technological advantage. The intelligence community has an important role to play in the U.S. approach and starts the discussion based on their perspective and concerns. However, the scientific community should also be brought into the discussion.

Gallagher said that talent is the most critical supply chain issue. While the United States has the world’s best training environment, particularly for Ph.D.’s, U.S. universities admit many more Ph.D. students than can find employment after graduation, and that foreign students in the United States should not simply be seen as a resource for increasing university productivity. We must adopt a strategy that integrates S&T training, mission, and talent. There are legitimate questions about the practice of training international talent in the United States, then exporting that talent back to its home country where the knowledge gained has the potential to be used against our interests.

DISCUSSION

McQuade opened the discussion by asking how we should engage with the private sector. Gordon said that a “fraught” political environment means that companies are backing off from engaging in discussions on security and S&T. She said there is a large amount of private investment in addressing issues related to U.S. national security disadvantages; however, the focus of this investment is on narrow problems. Further discussion centered on the possibility of increasing U.S. engagement in international standards-setting. Without this, the United States risks being less relevant on the world stage than other players, for example, the European Union.

There was discussion around the supply chain of talent, with Gallagher suggesting that talent is where advantage comes from. Gordon said that “it’s a big, scary world out there, but it is also an incredibly opportunistic world” and that what the United States would like to do is be able to operate everywhere securely. She suggested that this means getting government to say what actions it needs, along with industrial partners saying what factors should also be taken into consideration.

Gordon said that those concerned about issues of science and security should engage with incoming U.S. administrations to discuss these

issues and work toward more effective, whole-of-government action. She suggested a focus of such engagement should be the “triumvirate” of the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community. McQuade suggested that both the NSTSR and the Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage study argue for a risk-based strategy, adding that risk is not just about what leaks could occur but also includes lack of performance, lack of innovation, and lack of progress.

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