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The Work of the National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable

Co-chairs Richard Meserve (formerly of the Carnegie Institution), John Gannon (formerly of the National Intelligence Council), and Maria Zuber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) summarized the 4 years of work of the National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable (NSTSR), drawing upon a paper that they drafted.¹

Meserve began by discussing the challenges to open science and fundamental research, highlighting that the encouragement of open, international involvement in basic science is important and powerful. Foreign-born workers are an essential ingredient to the U.S. research enterprise. Nineteen percent of workers in U.S. STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields at the bachelor’s degree level are foreign born, and more than half in some critical fields such as computer science and mathematics at the doctorate level are foreign born.² Meserve acknowledged concerns that foreign researchers could develop skills that could be used to the detriment of the United States. However, many foreign students who come to the United States for training remain. Stay rates are 88 percent after 5 years and 81 percent after 10 years for science and engineering doctorate recip-

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¹ See Appendix F for the paper submitted to the Capstone Workshop by NSTSR Co-Chairs John C. Gannon, Richard A. Meserve, and Maria T. Zuber. This paper was circulated to workshop participants prior to the workshop.

² NSB, NSF (National Science Board, National Science Foundation). 2024. Science and Engineering Indicators 2024: The State of U.S. Science and Engineering. NSB-2024-3. Alexandria, VA. https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20243/talent-u-s-and-global-stem-education-and-labor-force.

ients with Chinese citizenship at graduation.³ This “brain drain” to the United States gives us strength, as native U.S.-born talent is not available in sufficient numbers to meet needs. Discouraging foreign involvement in U.S. science is counterproductive, Meserve said.

Meserve added that, over the last 4 years, great progress has been made in meeting the challenge of achieving research security while also preserving openness. He identified additional items for consideration for the future:

1. A rigorous, risk-informed approach is key. While Meserve recognized the need for more scrutiny in critical areas, “a strengthened process is needed to weigh both the threat to our economic and national security arising from openness and the risk to research competitiveness by constraining openness.”
2. Restrictions should be imposed on the application of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI). There has been a proliferation of restrictions imposed by federal agencies to control the public release of information. CUI designations should be limited to instances where a substantial threat to national and economic security exists and the risks from openness can be convincingly shown to exceed the benefits of collaboration. At the very least, the CUI designation should be revisited by the government with the objective of limiting its scope, achieving consistency in application, and providing clear guidance on how to handle sensitive information. In cases where a restriction is applied, researchers and the federal funding agency should allow open research to proceed if the researcher and the funding agency reach agreement on measures to mitigate risk, such as agreement to restrict dissemination of information relating to limited aspects of the work.
3. It is important to take special care to reassure foreign-born researchers that they are welcome and valued. Foreign-born researchers

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³ NSB, NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2024.

1. are essential contributors to our science and technology (S&T) enterprise. The U.S. government should respond forcefully to continuing cases of discrimination and harassment, including alleged harassment of traveling students and faculty at U.S. borders.
2. The close working relationship between government and the research community in developing the National Security Presidential Memorandum – 33 (NSPM-33) should serve as a model for future engagement between the communities.⁴
3. The success of our S&T system is dependent on providing necessary resources. We should not feel that we have responded to the international challenge to our system unless we devote the necessary resources to strengthen U.S. capability.

Gannon summarized the evolution of collaboration between academia and law enforcement during the roundtable’s tenure, saying that the United States has made progress toward better collaboration between law enforcement and the scientific community on achieving research security. But we continue to need help from the rest of government and, in some cases, the rest of the world. He said that China is a major threat both in counterintelligence and in scientific research, Russia is a formidable (but distant) second, and Iran and North Korea have also worked against us in significant ways. There is a growing awareness of the foreign threat to research security, especially from China. Research agencies have increased their defenses, and universities “on their own or in cooperation with NSPM-33, have developed strong risk management processes” that need to be strengthened and extended across the research enterprise, according to Gannon.

The NSTSR learned how regional collaboration between universities could be achieved to beneficial effect, according to Gannon. The Federal

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⁴ The White House. 2021. “Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy.” National Security Presidential Memorandum – 33 (NSPM-33), January 14, 2021.

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is not just putting demands on researchers but are also working with universities to improve delivery of intelligence on threats and to build capabilities to strengthen universities’ ability to achieve research security against foreign interference. During the course of its convenings, the NSTSR heard that the research community is willing to accept guidance on research security. However, Gannon said that the research community still wants more explanation on threats and actions required by the federal government, which he asserted was a healthy sign and exhibits the need for continued communication and deeper collaboration.

Gannon advocated for a whole-of-government approach to research security, which he asserted is needed to counter a foreign threat that includes China’s immense capacity in cyber operations. We need a national S&T strategy that integrates science and security throughout the policy formulation and implementation process, including at the start. This is doable, but not yet achieved, according to Gannon, who encouraged NSTSR members individually and collectively to engage in the larger debate to influence the outcome for a more forceful defense of open science.

The major challenge from China is in its growing global competitiveness in scientific research, Gannon stated, and not in its illicit and disruptive interference with U.S. research. He added that, independent of the well-documented threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea entirely, broader foreign interference exists and will persist because of the interconnectedness of global research and development today and the erosion of the United States’ foreign leadership position that it once held. The United States must work collaboratively with our allies to restore and strengthen the U.S.-inspired rules in a compliance-based open resource system.

The NSTSR noted continuing concern about reports of security breaches in academia involving international collaboration, mostly related to disclosure failures, but Gannon contended that there were few reported cases of actual espionage involving U.S. universities. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,⁵ incidents of insider espionage collaboration with China have been few—never more than 10 over a period of 20 years. He added that a large majority of foreign students in our universities are there for educational purposes and not for illicit activities or

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⁵ Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2023. Survey of Chinese Espionage in the United States Since 2000. https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/survey-chinese-espionage-united-states-2000.

espionage, and that the FBI supports this judgement.⁶ The NSTSR heard from universities that universities must do more to reassure foreign students that their value is appreciated and their contributions are recognized.

Zuber provided an overview of the evolving response of research universities on research security issues. The NSTSR decided to focus on universities early in its work, because of the open nature of research in universities and because the U.S. government is a major funder of academic research and therefore has a measure of oversight over institutions. The NSTSR heard that significant progress has been made in containing the threat of foreign interference, protecting open science, defending international engagement, and embracing foreign talent. There has been an increase in awareness of the serious and growing threat, and there is little doubt in academia that some foreign countries have nefarious intentions, Zuber said. Research agencies have stepped up and sharpened their defenses, including by developing strong risk management processes and structured research security programs. She noted that it has been helpful for academia to learn from agencies about hundreds of examples of adjudicated cases of violations of research security, because these cases make it clear there is a problem. Among these cases, a small number have been espionage. “The challenge is to take action on the problem while not giving up the benefits of an open research system.”

Universities are subject to the theft of intellectual property and such theft can result in loss of patent revenue. Zuber emphasized that the “know-how” is very important: details about how to use a certain machine or how to conduct a lab experiment, can take months or even years to develop. The very real possibility of inadvertently welcoming nefarious actors into a lab where they can absorb that know-how is a challenge to our research model. Universities do not want bad actors on their campuses, and Zuber said universities should be able to count on the federal government to flag risks posed by individuals and not issue visas to those individuals. Vetting is

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⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2019. China: The Risk to Academia. https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-risk-to-academia-2019.pdf/view.

a challenge for universities because they are not investigative organizations. Smaller universities do not all have the resources and infrastructure necessary to comply with research security policies, which could present a barrier to participation in the research enterprise and works against broadening the S&T talent pool.

Universities are acting to comply with government regulations, the NSPM-33 guidance, and National Institutes of Health mandates to review lab notebooks,⁷ among other efforts. Efforts like digital curriculum vitae and increased diligence at universities and agencies are driving down noncompliance, both inadvertent and purposeful, Zuber said. But there has been a chilling effect for international students, and she has seen hesitance to apply for federal funding by some researchers over concerns about facing arrest if a form is incorrectly filled out inadvertently.

Zuber said that, even if we drive down noncompliance to research security mandates to zero, we will still have a “China problem.” If U.S. research security efforts thwart a small number of espionage cases, but in the process further increase the administrative burden for all researchers, this will make U.S. research less competitive. She said that “if we lock all the doors in our house but don’t invest in our research enterprise at the level that maintains our preeminence, then it’s hard to see America winning.”

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⁷ On January 1, 2024, NIH issued policy guidance requiring foreign subaward recipients to provide copies of all lab notebooks, data, and documentation to the U.S.-based grant awardee. For NIH’s Policy Guidance for Subaward/Consortium Written Agreements, see https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-23-182.html.