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DOE Plan to Dilute and Dispose of Surplus Plutonium at New Mexico Site Technically Viable if Security, Execution, Other Challenges Are Addressed, Says New Report

News Release

Last update April 30, 2020

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) early-stage plan to dilute and dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico is technically viable, provided that the plan's implementation challenges and system vulnerabilities are resolved, says a new report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

In 2014, DOE produced early-stage plans to disposition diluted surplus plutonium transuranic (DSP-TRU) waste by diluting it at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, then transporting it to WIPP in New Mexico for disposal. This “dilute and dispose” plan is estimated to cost $18.2 billion over more than 30 years. Review of the Department of Energy’s Plans for Disposal of Surplus Plutonium in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant finds that nearly all of the plan’s individual processes and steps have been demonstrated successfully in the past by DOE. The plan utilizes shared equipment and resources from other DOE efforts, employs well-established transportation programs, and references previous successful emplacements of similar waste in WIPP.

Environmental Impacts and Transparency

The emplacement of DSP-TRU waste would fundamentally change the nature of WIPP, which raises social, environmental, and technical questions that translate to vulnerabilities if left unanswered. The report recommends DOE implement a new Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to consider the full environmental effect of NNSA’s plan on WIPP. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DOE, and New Mexico should also develop a mutual strategy for vetting the effects of the plan, in addition to re-instating the Environmental Evaluation Group, an independent technical group overseeing the protection of public health and the environment on behalf of New Mexico and its citizens.

DOE should take additional actions toward transparency, according to the committee that wrote the report, including publicizing the outcomes of safety analyses and cost estimates.

Security Planning

Security plans are still under development, the report says, and periodic reviews of the plan’s security arrangements by a team of independent technical experts should be required until its classified aspects are completed and implemented. DSP-TRU waste is not like other transuranic nuclear waste streams at WIPP, and standard operating procedures may not be adequate for its security. With sufficient mining expertise and resources, unauthorized actors could retrieve the waste undetected from WIPP. The report also recommends DOE periodically update its security assessments, given the long duration of the program.

Program Execution Challenges

The report identifies several program execution challenges for the dilute and dispose approach. While none threaten the plan’s technical viability and could be addressed through improved project plans and consistent funding from Congress, challenges such as scaling up current operations to a system that can generate, transport, and dispose of DSP-TRU waste on schedule, or maintaining infrastructure and a workforce that can last the 30-year span of the project, could lead to extended timelines and increased costs. The report notes that NNSA’s plan also spans multiple DOE sites, offices, and functions without clear cross-cutting leadership.

International Agreements

The report recommends DOE clarify its intent for International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and inspections prior to the placement of waste at WIPP. DOE’s dilute and dispose approach is not recognized in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) between the U.S. and Russia. International monitoring and verification are required under PMDA, but DOE’s plans to allow for them remain under development.

WIPP Capacity

Emplacing the full amount of DSP-TRU waste in WIPP will test its physical and statutory capacity. WIPP is the nation’s only operational deep geologic repository for nuclear waste, and the report says capacity at WIPP should be treated as a valuable and limited resource by DOE. The NNSA administrator, in consultation with the DOE assistant secretary for environmental management, should reserve capacity in WIPP for the full amount of DSP-TRU waste.

The study — undertaken by the Committee on Disposal of Surplus Plutonium at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant — was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Academies are private, nonprofit institutions that provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions related to science, technology, and medicine. They operate under an 1863 congressional charter to the National Academy of Sciences, signed by President Lincoln. 

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Contact:

Megan Lowry, Media Relations Officer
Office of News and Public Information
202-334-2138; e-mail news@nas.edu

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