Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief

Convened July 11, August 22, September 6 and 9, 2024

Impacts of the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit on Child Poverty
Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened an ad-hoc committee to examine the effects of the 2021 federal Child Tax Credit (CTC)¹ and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)² on child poverty. This study was mandated as a part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 P.L. 117-328.³ The committee was also tasked with exploring implementation and administration of these policies and participation in these programs among families in order to better understand how program implementation helped facilitate or reduce program access with a focus on child poverty reduction. To inform its deliberations, the committee held four public sessions.

During a July 2024 session, Insights from CPS ASEC and IRS Linked Data, speakers shared findings from existing work that uses the Census Bureau Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) linked data to examine the impacts of policies like the CTC and EITC on child poverty. The CPS ASEC is an annual survey in the United States that collects data on income, poverty, health insurance coverage, and other social and economic factors. It is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau in partnership with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). IRS linked data draws on data from IRS administrative records (including datasets related to tax returns, revenue collection, and taxpayer behavior) and may be linked to other public datasets from, for example, the Social Security Administration, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and state and local tax agencies.

In the August and September 2024 sessions, Perspectives on Administering the CTC and EITC and Policy Perspectives on the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit, speakers shared their expertise and perspectives regarding the administration of the CTC and the EITC.

INSIGHTS FROM CPS ASEC AND IRS LINKED DATA

Robert Moffitt, committee member, introduced the session, noting its focus on the difference in estimating the impact of the CTC and the EITC on child poverty when using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) “survey data” and aggregate totals reported by the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) using “administrative data.”

James Ziliak, University of Kentucky, and Maggie Jones, U.S. Census Bureau, discussed a paper they co-published that links survey data with administrative data to analyze the distribution and anti-poverty effects of the EITC (i.e.,

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the ways in which the EITC helps reduce poverty, particularly among low-income working families; Jones & Ziliak, 2022).

Ziliak explained that this study aimed to estimate how many people are lifted out of poverty (as measured by the Supplemental Poverty Measure) by utilizing a linked dataset of the CPS ASEC with IRS data from 2005 to 2016, including EITC recipient files, W-2 forms, and 1040 forms. Ziliak and Jones compared EITC payment distributions and anti-poverty effects derived from the IRS data to those estimated by public simulators, including the CPS ASEC and TAXSIM, a tax simulation model developed and maintained by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The actual IRS payments served as a benchmark for comparison. The analysis compared estimates created using CPS survey-reported data with estimates created from administrative records, such as earnings as reported on a W-2.

Ziliak identified three factors that cause differences between the actual IRS EITC payments and the simulated estimates from public data reported in the CPS: discrepancies in reported income, differences in identification of qualifying children, and discrepancies in reporting of self-employment status.

Ziliak and Jones described some key considerations when attempting to best replicate the anti-poverty effects of the EITC using CPS public data, including removing individuals with imputed earnings⁴ from the sample, removing Hispanic non-citizens from the sample due to low likelihood of being both EITC eligible and linked to tax records, and re-weighting the data using inverse probability weights.

Matt Unrath, U.S. Census Bureau, described work being undertaken to improve income and poverty measurement using linked CPS survey data and IRS administrative data. He explained that the goal of this work is to use linked survey and tax data to document the extent to which the project’s constructed tax units (e.g., tax-filing households) match or do not match the tax unit rosters observed on filed IRS Form 1040 returns. Unrath focused his presentation on the misalignment between survey households and tax filing units, and how this affects estimates of post-tax income. He described how the CPS does not ask respondents about their tax returns and rather uses a tax model to predict tax units based on survey data like age, family relationships, and income. This model often does not match the actual tax units observed on filed 1040 returns. For example, Unrath explained that tax units can include children not observed in the CPS ASEC, individuals can file with someone not observed in the CPS ASEC, or dependents may be claimed by different people than the model predicts. While aggregate distributions of tax unit types are similar between the model and IRS data, only 60 percent of CPS ASEC tax units exactly match their corresponding Form 1040 roster. This mismatch is likely worse for lower-income households, he said.

Unrath explained a goal was to “document how prevalent all of these potential issues are” but cautioned that correcting this misalignment is not straightforward. When a tax return includes people not in the survey, it is unclear how to assign tax benefits and determine poverty thresholds, he said. For example, a mother in the survey might claim another child on her taxes who was not in the survey, so it is unclear how to calculate her EITC and adjust the household unit. Unrath explained that correcting the misalignment of household rosters may also not significantly shift estimates of post-tax income.

Unrath went on to share that the U.S. Census Bureau is working to improve these estimates by using an array of administrative data linked to U.S. Census Bureau surveys to correct measures of income and poverty. Moreover, instead of relying on survey income, he said, they plan to use the actual reported income on the Form 1040 to construct estimates of tax liabilities. Using this process, they are aiming to release corrected estimates for tax years 2018 to 2021.

Bruce Meyer, University of Chicago, discussed the importance of linked administrative data in analyzing the labor supply effects of the CTC and EITC (Corinth et al., 2022; Meyer et al., 2022). He began by sharing several reasons why analyses that rely on CPS survey data of the CTC and EITC can be inaccurate and why linked data is an important input:

1. Survey data often misrepresents baseline incomes and misimputes tax credits like the CTC and EITC.

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Specifically, surveys tend to underreport baseline incomes which leads to mischaracterizing the impact of tax credits and other programs. In addition, children are frequently missed in surveys for single-parent families, leading to misimputation of the CTC and EITC, Meyer said.

2. The misclassification of families, particularly complex families, poses a significant challenge for accurate data collection. He explained that CPS families frequently include adults who claim children as dependents who do not live in their household, and children in the household are frequently claimed as dependents by adults who are not in their household. This misclassification is particularly relevant to single mothers and single fathers who are EITC recipients, Meyer said.

Meyer believes that there is a long history of discrepancy between the IRS and CPS data (Meyer et al., 2015). He explained that both issues are difficult to address with only survey data, pointing again to the importance of linked administrative data. Meyer explained that making corrections to baseline income is very important to evaluate the effects of EITC and CTC. He shared how he and his colleagues have used an extensive set of administrative income data linked to the CPS (what they call the “CID”—Comprehensive Income Dataset project) to simulate the effects of the 2021 expanded CTC. They ran simulations both without accounting for any employment response and with a range of possible employment responses, aiming to evaluate how much using higher-quality data influences those calculations. Meyer stated that when administrative data is used in place of survey data for income and program participation, there is a substantial reduction in the poverty rate. While the differences between survey and administrative data are not substantial for the EITC and CTC, they are much larger for programs such as Disability Insurance, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and housing benefits, he reported.

Meyer concluded by emphasizing the need to incorporate administrative data when assessing poverty and the impacts of programs like the EITC and CTC, while highlighting the significant issues of misclassification of families and underreporting of income in surveys. He argued that methodological improvements, including incorporating administrative data, are crucial for accurately assessing the effects of policies like the expanded CTC.

PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTERING THE CHILD TAX CREDIT AND EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

Robert Doar, American Enterprise Institute, shared insights from his experience as Commissioner of Social Services in New York City and Commissioner of the State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance in New York state. He shared that while he believes that progress has been made in alleviating child poverty, there is still a need to improve economic mobility for children in low-income households. Doar suggested that key elements for upward mobility are developing social bonds, social connections, social interactions, and human capital development (Akerlof, 1978; Chetty et al., 2024).

Doar described the importance of a system that includes regular human contact with individuals who are struggling, arguing that direct cash payments alone may not be sufficient to improve the upward mobility of families experiencing poverty. He emphasized the importance of local social services departments and their interactions with individuals seeking aid. Doar explained that these interactions provide opportunities to identify other issues that could be affecting families, such as substance abuse, domestic violence, child neglect, or mental health issues.

Doar also argued that cash transfers need to be tied to employment (Corinth et al., 2022), stating: “I think it’s fairly clear that cash transfers—without any connection to employment—discourage employment, and lead people to remain out of the workforce and out of those human interactions, which I think are beneficial to them and to their children.”

Finally, Doar highlighted the importance of program integrity, specifically regarding error rates and eligibility verification. He acknowledged the high take-up rates for programs like SNAP and Medicaid but also pointed out that efforts to make the process easy for individuals to enroll and re-enroll automatically can lead to errors and payments to ineligible individuals. Doar noted that the IRS prioritizes rapid payment over thorough verification,

which contributes to the issue, and recommended using administrative data rather than survey data to determine eligibility and participation rates. He emphasized the need for states to be able to do back-end checks to verify eligibility. Doar argued that efforts to enroll as many people as possible have led to the discontinuation of procedures and processes that ensured that only eligible people received benefits.

Tatiana Homonoff, New York University, focused on administrative burden and take-up of tax-administered benefits—specifically the EITC and CTC. She emphasized that incomplete take-up of social safety net benefits need to be an important concern among policymakers. Homonoff explained that although the EITC has “relatively high” take-up, there are still around five million individuals every year who are eligible but do not claim the benefit.

Homonoff highlighted that a large and growing portion of social benefits in the United States are administered through the tax code, which she believes has an impact on take-up. She identified several barriers to claiming the CTC and EITC: First, tax filing itself posts a major obstacle, as its complexity and time demands deter eligible individuals from accessing benefits. Many who qualify for the EITC fail to claim it simply because they do not file a tax return. Second, Homonoff outlined three types of administrative burdens that hinder participation: the effort required to find program information and determine eligibility, the demands of complying with application and verification processes, and the psychological toll of stress or stigma associated with program interactions. She emphasized that these administrative burdens can reduce participation in programs like the EITC and CTC (Currie, 2006; Herd & Moynihan, 2019). To address these challenges, Homonoff proposed strategies for simplifying eligibility criteria and streamlining processes such as using checklists, conducting outreach, and providing free tax preparation services. She also noted that expanding eligibility can boost participation not only among newly eligible individuals but also among those who were already eligible but had not previously applied, a phenomenon known as the “woodwork effect”—people “coming out of the woodwork” to access benefits (Anders & Rafkin, 2024; Sacarny et al., 2022).

Homonoff acknowledged that there are trade-offs to consider when designing programs such as the EITC and CTC, including whether to prioritize work incentives versus ensuring resources reach families. She also noted that while assistance from caseworkers can be beneficial, the requirements to interact with caseworkers can be burdensome and depress participation. Additionally, when simplifying program access, there are potential tradeoffs with program integrity and improper payments, but often small changes to the processes, like providing pre-populated returns and access to assisted tax preparation, can make a difference in take-up.

Steve Holt, a consultant on issues related to EITC design and implementation, posed a question to the committee: Is the IRS an appropriate administrator of social benefits? He explained that the repeated expansions of the EITC since 1975 have caused it to become one of the largest antipoverty programs in the country and explained that in his opinion, the IRS is an appropriate administrator of social benefits because it already has the infrastructure and expertise.

Holt addressed the issue of compliance with the EITC, noting that it has a lower voluntary compliance rate (72%) than the overall tax system (82%), but still has strong voluntary compliance among the claiming population. He explained that EITC over-claims represent a small percentage (about 3%) of the total tax gap (difference between tax liabilities and taxes that are paid), which is significantly smaller than, for example, the tax gap resulting from individual underreporting of business income (10%). Holt described many different types of non-compliance, from intentional misconduct to honest confusion and mistakes (due to complexity of rules making it hard for people to know whether they qualify) and noted that the IRS has several mechanisms to reduce overpayments. He also argued that there is some degree of underpayment arising from people willfully choosing not to participate in the tax system, often due to misinformation, or the belief that it is better to hide their money from the IRS (Holt, 2016; Holt et al., 2020).

Holt suggested opportunities for improving administration of the EITC. First, he argued that a periodic payment system for the EITC would be more beneficial than the status quo. Holt explained that the tax system operates

annually, which can be problematic when delivering benefits designed to meet ongoing monthly expenses. Because expenses such as rent, food, utilities, summer camp fees, and emergency expenses occur throughout the year, not just annually, administering benefits periodically would better time them to expenses. He noted that in 2021, the IRS quickly (in just three months) implemented a periodic payment program for the expanded CTC. Second, human interaction is important when dealing with the tax system; Holt suggested that tax preparers can act as social service caseworkers for some individuals, guiding them through the tax system.

Sharon Parrott, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, discussed the importance of full refundability of the CTC—meaning that taxpayers with low incomes would receive the full credit as a refund, regardless of their income level or tax liability—to maximize anti-poverty impacts and reduce the differences in child poverty rates by subpopulations. She explained that the lack of full refundability disproportionately affects Black, Native American, and Hispanic children, and shared that in 2022 when full refundability of the CTC expired, nearly half of Black children, four in 10 Native American children, and more than one in three Hispanic children received less than the full credit due to their families’ low incomes (Cox et al., 2023).

Parrott described work that models the impact of two versions of a CTC change—one that mirrors the American Rescue Plan (ARP) expansion and one that mirrors that expansion but does not make the credit fully refundable. She explained that implementing all the changes in the 2024 ARP without making it fully refundable would lift “about 300,000” children above the poverty line, and full refundability would lift another 2.3 million children above the poverty line.⁵ Moreover, she emphasized that full refundability makes the credit easier to administer, easier to provide on a monthly basis, and easier for families to understand.

Parrott also discussed the employment effects of making the CTC fully refundable. She argued that estimates of employment effects are often overstated and that credible estimates of employment effects are small compared to poverty impacts. She explained that studies from 2021 found no statistically significant employment loss (Ananat et al., 2022; Enriques et al., 2023; Hamilton et al., 2022; Karpman et al., 2022; Pac & Berger, 2024; Pilkauskas et al., 2022) and suggested that it is important to consider the positive impacts of reducing child poverty, such as positive effects on children’s health, education, and future earnings (Aizer et al., 2024; Ananat & Garfinkel, 2024; Bailey et al., 2020; Bitler & Figinski, 2024; Page, 2024). She noted that for those concerned about likely modest impacts on employment, a fully refundable CTC could be paired with policies that make work more feasible for parents with low incomes. Furthermore, she noted any reduction in parental labor supply need not automatically be considered negative, as it could indicate more time spent with children. Parrott argued for “combining a decent income floor beneath children with work-supporting policies, like ensuring that parents have access to affordable childcare and paid family leave.”

Kyle Pomerleau, American Enterprise Institute, discussed the importance of the CTC and the EITC in reducing poverty. Drawing on Brill et al. (2021), Pomerleau made three main points in his talk. First, “child tax benefits can reduce poverty by increasing household resources.” He explained that these benefits have a direct impact on poverty reduction. For example, in 2021, it was estimated that these child-related benefits reduced child poverty by about 34 percent. Pomerleau noted, however, that the extent to which credits reduce poverty depends on their size, structure, and administration.

Second, Pomerleau argued that the structure of these benefits matters for work incentives. The way child tax benefits are structured might have a large impact on people’s motivation to work. For example, he said, benefits that gradually increase as people earn more can encourage work, while those that decrease as income rises might discourage it. It is a balancing act to design these benefits in a way that provides strong incentives for employment while still offering crucial support to families, Pomerleau added.

Third, Pomerleau explained that any changes to the CTC need to account for the role it plays in the current tax

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code. The CTC is a key component of how the tax code adjusts for family size, ensuring that households with similar incomes but different numbers of children are treated fairly. He said, any changes to the CTC need to be evaluated in light of its impact on poverty reduction, work incentives, and overall fairness within the tax code.

Pomerleau also suggested that while the CTC and EITC are promising ways to reduce poverty and child poverty in the United States, designers of tax credits need to consider their budgetary implications. He stated that large expansions of programs would require “either raising taxes or substantially increasing government borrowing, depending on the structure of the financing.” Pomerleau explained that an increase in borrowing, or deficit financing, could negatively impact the policy’s ability to reduce poverty and could have other negative impacts on the economy.

Matt Weidinger, American Enterprise Institute, spoke about how promoting and requiring work are important features of the CTC (Weidinger, 2024a) and expressed concern over the removal of work requirements in the 2021 CTC expansion.

Weidinger noted that the 2021 expansion of the CTC, which made the credit fully refundable, removed these work incentives. He suggested that removing work requirements can lead to reduced work effort, particularly among lower-income parents (Corinth et al., 2022; Schanzenbach & Strain, 2023). Weidinger also suggested that moving away from full-time work can make it harder for families to escape poverty and that offering work-free benefits while others pay higher taxes may not be sustainable.

Weidinger stressed the importance of considering the cost of any changes to the CTC. He pointed out that the 2021 expansion was intended to be temporary. Weidinger noted that the United States is adding close to a trillion dollars in debt every year just on interest, which is more than the federal government already spends on children’s programs (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2024; Weidinger, 2024b). Furthermore, he speculated that any expansion of the CTC that adds to deficits could contribute to inflation and higher interest rates, which could disproportionately affect poor families. Weidinger urged consideration of the potential harms created by these costs and what the offsets might be.

Weidinger also highlighted the importance of preventing incentives for error or fraud in the design of any CTC expansion. He referenced high error rates in the EITC and noted that the monthly payments in 2021 led to reconciliation rules that allowed some families to receive two CTC payments (Government Accountability Office, 2024; Weidinger, 2021). Weidinger also noted that some pandemic programs had “lax rules” that created opportunities for fraud (Weidinger & Simon, 2024). He urged reconsideration of policies and incentives that might promote error or misunderstanding. Weidinger also noted that high phase-in rates can incentivize individuals to falsify earnings that qualify them for the benefit.

Finally, Weidinger discussed how the CTC cannot be viewed in isolation from other programs in the social safety net. He said that there are many other programs, including SNAP and free or reduced-price school meal programs that also provide support to families with low incomes, some of whom are not working. Weidinger argued that consideration be given to how to best empower parents to make decisions about when and how they access benefits. He suggested that allowing parents to concentrate benefits in a shorter period, instead of collecting smaller benefits over longer periods may allow parents to better decide how to use taxpayer funds to suit their families’ needs (Stevens & Weidinger, 2021).

Jessica Fulton, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, spoke about the importance of considering differential impacts on subpopulations when designing the EITC and CTC. Fulton explained that factors that determine eligibility for, and the value of, both the EITC and the CTC can “disadvantage certain racial groups.”

Black, Hispanic, and Native American children are not only more likely to live in poverty than White children but are also more likely to have family earnings that fall significantly below the poverty line as compared to White children (see, e.g., Annie E. Casey Foundation, n.d.; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2023). Additionally, Fulton reported that Black workers face higher rates of unemployment (Ajilore, 2022), discrimination (Pager & Sheperd, 2008), and job instability (Lachanski, 2025). She explained that although the EITC and CTC aim to support low- to moderate-income families, their structure and design that relies on

factors like income and family composition and living arrangements (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, n.d.), can result in unequal benefits across racial groups, creating barriers to accessing the full benefits of the credits (Cahill & Gale, 2022).

Fulton said that variations in family structure, such as single-parent households, and income volatility among Black families can complicated tax filing in a manner that impacts accuracy of advance payments (Tax Policy Center, n.d.). She explained, “Parents who don’t live together have to figure out how to make the decision about who should claim a given child, which could affect whether they file in error and are penalized when tax time comes. This also varies by race. Nearly half of all Black children lived with just one parent in 2023, compared with 20 percent of White children.”

Fulton argued for “being thoughtful about how race affects the factors that determine eligibility and benefit amounts.” She explained, “It does not mean favoring one racial group over another but rather recognizing how race shapes economic circumstances.”

Pamela Herd and Donald Moynihan, University of Michigan, discussed their work in examining administrative burden of the CTC and EITC. Herd described three types of challenges individuals may experience when applying for and receiving these tax benefits: learning about the availability of benefits and eligibility; complying with rules for applying and reporting; and dealing with the psychological costs, such as stress, anxiety, or stigma, people experience navigating these processes of receiving benefits (Herd & Moynihan, 2023a).

Herd pointed out that the tax system has become a major avenue for delivering social welfare benefits, particularly for low-income populations. This shift includes a decline in cash benefits and an increase in tax credits like the EITC and CTC. The tax system also delivers benefits to higher income people, such as through employer-based health insurance, she said. However, despite using the same system, low-income populations experience more burden than high-income populations (for example EITC beneficiaries are far more likely to be audited than higher income taxpayers; Herd & Moynihan, 2023b). Herd and Moynihan argued that administering benefits through the tax system offers advantages, such as reduced compliance costs, fewer forms, and assistance from third parties, as compared to through the traditional social welfare bureaucracy. Also, they argued that expansion of the CTC during the pandemic saw a significant reduction in burdens through automated enrollment, where greater than 90 percent of people received the benefit without needing to do anything (Herd & Moynihan, 2023b), though there was still a fraction of people who were disconnected from the tax system who were not able to claim the benefit.

Herd discussed the administrative burden associated with the EITC and CTC. These include: some low-income individuals may not file taxes and are unaware of their eligibility for the CTC and EITC (Herd & Moynihan, 2023b); the EITC process is complex, leading to mistakes and high audit rates (Guyton et al., 2018); and those with the lowest incomes were less likely to report receiving the CTC (Herd & Moynihan, 2023b).

Herd and Moynihan suggested that when the EITC and CTC are designed to improve access and delivery we also need to be mindful of burdens on the benefit recipient/tax filer when designing policy; focus on improving benefit delivery through the IRS and state tax agencies, taking into account complexity for low-income populations; expand automated enrollment for the CTC; and connect people with the tax system through outreach and free tax filing assistance.

Matt Notowidigdo, University of Chicago, presented his work on the administration of the CTC and EITC. He focused on barriers to access, the effects of labeling cash transfers, and the timing and frequency of benefit distribution.

Notowidigdo suggested that economists consider two types of errors when designing social programs (Kleven & Kopczuk, 2011): Type I errors are those where eligible individuals do not receive benefits, and Type II errors are those where ineligible individuals receive benefits. Policies aimed at reducing barriers to entry can decrease Type I errors but might increase Type II errors, creating a trade-off. This trade-off affects the targeting efficiency of a program, which is how well it includes eligible people and excludes ineligible people.

Notowidigdo discussed how labeling cash transfers can influence how people spend the money (Thaler, 1985). He explained, “[…] If you give a low-income household

an extra $100 in cash, about $10 of that ends up being spent on food, and if you give that same household an extra $100 in SNAP benefits, actually most of it ends up being spent on food” (Hastings & Shapiro, 2018). Similarly, Notowidigdo shared an example where cash transfers in Morocco labeled to encourage education led to more investment in children’s education (Benhassine et al., 2015), and the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Winter Fuel Payment⁶ resulted in a larger amount of spending on fuel (Beatty et al., 2014). For the CTC, emphasizing that it is for children may lead some households to spend it in ways that benefit children.

Notowidigdo pointed out that despite efforts to increase take-up, some programs do not reach individuals most in need. For example, interventions to encourage SNAP enrollment were more effective among those who were not the lowest income individuals, White, and English-speaking, highlighting the need to find interventions that can reach all populations (Finkelstein & Notowidigdo, 2019). While repeated reminders are helpful, they often reach the same types of people and do not address the underlying issues preventing take-up, he said. Simplifying the application process, perhaps through automatic enrollment, may improve universality in program distribution. Notowidigdo explained that the EITC works well for wage earners, but it may be more challenging for self-employed individuals due to difficulties verifying their income. He also suggested that the timing and frequency of benefit distribution can impact how recipients use the funds (Aladangady et al., 2023; Bond et al., 2022; Dobkin & Puller, 2007; Jones, 2010; Shapiro, 2005). He explained that more research is needed to better understand the optimal frequency of benefit distribution.

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DISCLAIMER This Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief was prepared by Jennifer Appleton Gootman and Maya Reddi as a factual summary of what occurred at the workshop. The statements made are those of the rapporteur or individual workshop participants and do not necessarily represent the views of all workshop participants; the committee; or the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

REVIEWERS To ensure that it meets institutional standards for quality and objectivity, this Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief was reviewed by Keith Barnes, Martha O’Bryan Center, and Adrienne DiTommaso, U.S. Census Bureau. We also thank staff member Catherine Wise for reading and providing helpful comments on this manuscript. Kirsten Sampson Snyder, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, served as the review coordinator.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS V. Joseph Hotz (Chair), University of Chicago; Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, Boston University; Marianne Bitler, University of California, Davis; Maria Cancian, Georgetown University; Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Independent Consultant; Lisa Gennetian, Duke University; Bradley Hardy, Georgetown University; Harry J. Holzer, Georgetown University; Katherine Michelmore, University of Michigan; Robert Moffitt, Johns Hopkins University; Angela Rachidi, American Enterprise Institute; Marjorie Raynee Sims, Ascend at the Aspen Institute; Jim Sullivan, University of Notre Dame; Christopher Wimer, Columbia University; Marci Ybarra, University of Wisconsin, Madison

SPONSORS This workshop was supported by contracts between the National Academy of Sciences and the Bainum Family Foundation (# 7608); Doris Duke Foundation (# 20212490); Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, the Russell Sage Foundation (# 2104-31166), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (# 75ACF121C00093); National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Presidents’ Circle Fund; National Academy of Engineering Independent Fund; National Academy of Sciences W. K. Kellogg Foundation Fund; National Academy of Sciences Cecil and Ida Green Fund; and National Academy of Sciences Independent Fund. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.

For additional information regarding these public meetings, visit: https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/federal-policy-impacts-on-child-poverty

SUGGESTED CITATION National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2025. Impacts of the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit on Child Poverty: Proceedings of a Workshop–in Brief. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/29107.

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