WASHINGTON — Two new reports from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine review the adequacy of U.S. strategies to prevent, counter, and respond to the threat of nuclear and chemical terrorism and highlight the strengths and limitations of U.S. efforts to prevent and counter threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly in a changing terrorism threat landscape. The reports provide recommendations for government leadership and interagency partners to better coordinate and communicate across counterterrorism efforts and to support prevention, countermeasure, response, and recovery programs. 

Authorized through a congressional mandate in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, the National Academies reports examine the adequacy of U.S. strategies and capabilities for addressing state-sponsored and nonstate actors acquiring or misusing technologies and materials (including dual-use), and whether terrorist organizations can gain access to the critical expertise needed to carry out WMD attacks.

Both reports highlight the need for the U.S. to look beyond a focus on international terrorist organizations, as the lines among domestic, foreign, nonstate, and state-supported terrorist groups have become increasingly blurred. Facilities storing nuclear materials or toxic industrial chemicals will remain potential targets for terrorism and insider threats, and the potential radicalization of individuals at those facilities requires the strengthening of insider threat programs.

Nuclear Threats

Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction concludes that overall, U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism will need renewed focus and increased investments to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape. Efforts to manage this risk should be expanded in a way that can be sustained by the many federal agencies that each have unique competencies and capabilities. The report recommends that the U.S. government reenergize the post 9/11 effort to combat terrorism through ongoing deep collaboration and coordination across the nuclear security community, with relevant domestic agencies, and with international partners.

The committee that wrote the report does not foresee an imminent terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon; however, several factors point to an increasing risk of such an attack. The trends of the past years show that domestic and international terrorist organizations are becoming more closely linked and difficult to differentiate. With added global interest in and expansion of the civil nuclear sector, as well as the decline of U.S. leadership in the civil nuclear space, the potential for these organizations to access nuclear material is increasing. In addition, preventing smuggled materials from entering the U.S. is challenged by ongoing supply chain security and border management issues.

“For decades the U.S. has played an indispensable role in mobilizing and sustaining global efforts to advance nuclear security,” said Stephen Flynn, professor of political science and founding director of the Global Resilience Institute at Northeastern University, and co-chair of the committee that wrote the nuclear threats report. “The U.S. must continue to lead, build trust, and strengthen the post- 9/11 domestic and international programs that have played an invaluable role in successfully managing the nuclear terrorism threat to date.”

The report recommends that federal agencies evaluate whether the national security community has sufficient resources to manage and respond to the nuclear terrorism risk given that federal policy and funding have recently moved toward a greater focus on “great power competition” with Russia and China, which are increasingly challenging long-standing U.S.-led security arrangements in Europe and Asia.

In addition, federal agencies should determine whether national anti-government and terrorist groups operating in the U.S. should be included on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The committee noted that as terrorist organizations are becoming more transnational, the distinction between foreign and domestic has blurred in some cases. Adding the domestic groups to the registry of foreign terrorists with which they have ties would make it illegal to join or financially support these domestic terrorist groups.

The report calls for a governmentwide effort, in partnership with the civil nuclear sector, to strengthen U.S. leadership in civil nuclear energy commerce and enhance global standards for safety, security, and materials control, including leading an international effort to enhance security in transportation and cargo. The report also provides recommendations for federal agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to work closely with leaders at the state and local levels to reinvigorate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities.

The report highlights how climate change mitigation efforts have intersected with different aspects of nuclear security. As the U.S. and other countries adapt to meet goals around carbon neutrality, nuclear material is likely become more dispersed, requiring more expansive international security measures.

Chemical Threats

To date, domestic and foreign terrorist groups have caused more harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons, according to Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition. While the shift in the global threat landscape has led to a focus on great power competition, care should be taken to ensure that existing capabilities and attention on countering terrorism are maintained. 

The total number of chemicals that constitute or could constitute WMD terrorism threats is vast and continually expanding, the report says. “It is impossible to identify and prevent or counter every threat,” said Timothy Shepodd, a senior manager of mission engineering sciences at Sandia National Laboratories, and co-chair of the committee that wrote the chemical threats report. “But our report recommends that the intelligence community should continue to closely monitor trends among terrorist groups to ensure we are keeping up with those that are innovating with use of chemical agents.”

The U.S. has well-defined authority and organizational constructs for emergency response, including large-scale and chemical terrorism response. The extensive multiagency response capabilities are complexly governed, coordinated, and connected; however, a mass casualty, multipoint, or cross-jurisdiction incident could have an impact beyond current capabilities. The report identifies opportunities for improvements, but in the context of a national strategy focused on great power competition, it is difficult to recommend dramatic investments or changes. The report emphasizes that approaches to identifying chemical threats could be strengthened by working on communication and coordination between local and state enforcement and the intelligence community.

The committee recognized that the budgets at several agencies are inadequate to address the breadth of possible chemical threats, even for agencies for which WMD are a top priority. The report provides eight budget recommendations that should be aligned with evolving priorities and enable updates on risk assessments.

The majority of chemical incidents in the U.S. are not from terrorism, but from chemical releases due to transportation and other accidents or naturally occurring events. These incidents have created a robust emergency responder community with expertise to respond to most chemical incidents. Still, improvements are needed to integrate first responder input, include greater access to intelligence about incidents, and better interagency communication and coordination. The report recommends doing more to replace hazardous chemicals in industrial and academic settings with safer alternatives, as part of an overall strategy to reduce access to raw materials that could be used in chemical terrorism. Efforts to counter insider threats in the chemical domain should also be incorporated into broader strategies related to WMD.

Given the critical role of U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program in maintaining security measures within the chemical industry, the committee called upon Congress to reauthorize the program, which expired at the end of July 2023, and to consider long-term reauthorization.

The studies — undertaken by the Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Nuclear Threats and Chemical Threats — were sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine are private, nonprofit institutions that provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions related to science, engineering, and medicine. They operate under an 1863 congressional charter to the National Academy of Sciences, signed by President Lincoln.

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