Workshop_in_brief
In March 2024, the National Academies hosted a public workshop, sponsored by the Office of Naval research, to assess the operational and medical needs of the U.S. Navy and how they might be met with developing science and technology. Speakers focused on innovations to address health and safety challenges among divers and submariners, including decompression sickness, oxygen toxicity, fatigue, contaminated water, extreme temperatures, and long deployments.
14 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-72322-1
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/27878
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Emerging Science and Technology to Address Naval Undersea Medicine Needs: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine conducted a classified study that examined U.S. Naval Forces' capabilities to maintain operational effectiveness in the face of an adversary's efforts to deny and degrade mission-critical data. This abbreviated version of the report includes the information available for the public.
14 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-29491-6
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/26493
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2022. Enhancing Operational Effectiveness of U.S. Naval Forces in Highly Degraded Environments: Autonomy and Artificial Intelligence in Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Abbreviated Version of Full Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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At the request of then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine appointed an expert committee to study the extent to which state-of-the-art data science, data analytics, networking, communications, and architecture approaches could be potentially applied to broader U.S. Naval Forces' "decision space" needs to ensure that the speed and flexibility of the Navy's decision-making process is better than that of its potential adversaries. The Department of the Navy has determined that the full report prepared by the Committee on Maintaining Operational Effectiveness for U.S. Naval Forces in Highly Degraded Environments—Phase 1 is subject to Department of Defense (DoD) Distribution Statement D: Release Restricted to DoD and DoD Contractors. This abbreviated report provides additional information on the full report and the committee that prepared it. Copies of the full report will be available to authorized individuals in DoD from the National Academies' Naval Studies Board. Other requests for the report should be submitted to the Department of the Navy.
6 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-49217-3
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/25434
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2020. Leveraging Commercial and Other Innovation for Future U.S. Navy Data Warfare Needs: Abbreviated Version of Full Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine appointed an expert committee to study ways to defend forward-deployed U.S. Navy platforms from potential enemy missile and rocket attacks over the next 15 years. The Department of the Navy has determined that the final report prepared by the committee is classified in its entirety under Executive Order 13526 and therefore cannot be made available to the public. This abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.
8 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-46781-0
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/24942
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Defending Forward-Deployed U.S. Navy Platforms from Potential Enemy Missile and Rocket Attacks: Abbreviated Version of a Classified Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Summary
At the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine appointed an expert committee to assess the potential of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) in enhancing future U.S. naval operations. The Department of the Navy has determined that the final report prepared by the committee is restricted in its entirety under exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC § 552 (b) (3)), via 10 USC § 130 and therefore cannot be made available to the public. This abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.
7 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-38148-7
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/21862
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Mainstreaming Unmanned Undersea Vehicles into Future U.S. Naval Operations: Abbreviated Version of a Restricted Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Summary
In order to conduct operations successfully and defend its capabilities against all warfighting domains, many have warned the Department of Defense (DoD) of the severity of the cyber threat and called for greater attention to defending against potential cyber attacks. For several years, many within and outside DoD have called for even greater attention to addressing threats to cyberspace.
At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council appointed an expert committee to review the U.S. Navy's cyber defense capabilities. The Department of the Navy has determined that the final report prepared by the committee is classified in its entirety under Executive Order 13526 and therefore cannot be made available to the public. A Review of U.S. Navy Cyber Defense Capabilities is the abbreviated report and provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.
12 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-36768-9
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/21663
National Research Council. 2015. A Review of U.S. Navy Cyber Defense Capabilities: Abbreviated Version of a Classified Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Forty years ago the Naval Studies Board was created at the request of then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. As stated in his request to the National Academy of Sciences, he thought it important for the Navy to have an outside resource to which it could turn "for independent and outside counsel on any area of its responsibilities involving the interplay of scientific and technical matters with other national issues." Admiral Zumwalt, together with Under Secretary of the Navy Honorable David S. Potter and President of the National Academy of Sciences Dr. Philip Handler, recognized the importance of not only continuing but also focusing and strengthening the relationship that had existed between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of the Navy since the Academy's creation in 1863.
To commemorate this special anniversary, Naval Studies Board 40th Anniversary provides an overview of the history, mission, and accomplishments of the Board. In the coming years, the Naval Studies Board will continue to serve as a source of independent, long-range, scientific and technical planning advice for the nation's naval forces. It will also work to ensure that the relationships between the operational, science, engineering, and technical communities remain as strong and productive as ever to ensure that progress continues in areas most critical to meeting future naval forces' needs.
28 pages
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8 x 10
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-32767-9
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/19543
National Research Council. 2014. Naval Studies Board 40th Anniversary: 1974-2014. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Summary
At the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations, the National Research Council appointed an expert committee to examine U.S. Naval Forces' capabilities for responding to the potential exploitation of small vessels by adversaries. The Department of the Navy determined that the report prepared by the committee is classified in its entirety under Executive Order 13526 and therefore cannot be made available to the public. This abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.
10 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-21601-X
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/13187
National Research Council. 2013. U.S. Naval Forces' Capabilities for Responding to Small Vessel Threats: Abbreviated Version of a Classified Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Interim
A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surprise—both operationally and technically related—facing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting.
The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises.
Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.
43 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-26911-3
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/18270
National Research Council. 2013. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised.
Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.
202 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-27837-6
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-27838-4
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/14672
National Research Council. 2013. Responding to Capability Surprise: A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Symposium_in_brief
1192 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-29811-3
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/11536
National Research Council. 2005. Twenty-Fifth Symposium on Naval Hydrodynamics. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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The Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives set forth to provide an assessment of the feasibility, practicality, and affordability of U.S. boost-phase missile defense compared with that of the U.S. non-boost missile defense when countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces of the United States and its allies and defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
To provide a context for this analysis of present and proposed U.S. boost-phase and non-boost missile defense concepts and systems, the committee considered the following to be the missions for ballistic missile defense (BMD): protecting of the U.S. homeland against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or conventional ballistic missile attacks; protection of U.S. forces, including military bases, logistics, command and control facilities, and deployed forces, including military bases, logistics, and command and control facilities. They also considered deployed forces themselves in theaters of operation against ballistic missile attacks armed with WMD or conventional munitions, and protection of U.S. allies, partners, and host nations against ballistic-missile-delivered WMD and conventional weapons.
Consistent with U.S. policy and the congressional tasking, the committee conducted its analysis on the basis that it is not a mission of U.S. BMD systems to defend against large-scale deliberate nuclear attacks by Russia or China. Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives suggests that great care should be taken by the U.S. in ensuring that negotiations on space agreements not adversely impact missile defense effectiveness. This report also explains in further detail the findings of the committee, makes recommendations, and sets guidelines for the future of ballistic missile defense research.
296 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-21610-9
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-21611-7
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/13189
National Research Council. 2012. Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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For the past decade, the U.S. Marine Corps and its sister services have been engaged in what has been termed "hybrid warfare," which ranges from active combat to civilian support. Hybrid warfare typically occurs in environments where all modes of war are employed, such as conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, disruptive technologies, and criminality to destabilize an existing order.
In August 2010, the National Research Council established the Committee on Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders to produce Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders. This report examines the operational environment, existing abilities, and gap to include data, technology, skill sets, training, and measures of effectiveness for small unit leaders in conducting enhanced company operations (ECOs) in hybrid engagement, complex environments. Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders also determines how to understand the decision making calculus and indicators of adversaries.
Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders recommends operational and technical approaches for improving the decision making abilities of small unit leaders, including any acquisition and experimentation efforts that can be undertaken by the Marine Corps and/or by other stakeholders aimed specifically at improving the decision making of small unit leaders. This report recommends ways to ease the burden on small unit leaders and to better prepare the small unit leader for success. Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders also indentifies a responsible organization to ensure that training and education programs are properly developed, staffed, operated, evaluated, and expanded.
130 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-21605-2
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-21606-0
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/13188
National Research Council. 2012. Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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In response to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the National Research Council appointed a committee operating under the auspices of the Naval Studies Board to study the national security implications of climate change for U.S. naval forces. In conducting this study, the committee found that even the most moderate current trends in climate, if continued, will present new national security challenges for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. While the timing, degree, and consequences of future climate change impacts remain uncertain, many changes are already underway in regions around the world, such as in the Arctic, and call for action by U.S. naval leadership in response.
The terms of reference (TOR) directed that the study be based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios and other peer-reviewed assessment. Therefore, the committee did not address the science of climate change or challenge the scenarios on which the committee's findings and recommendations are based. National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces addresses both the near- and long-term implications for U.S. naval forces in each of the four areas of the TOR, and provides corresponding findings and recommendations. This report and its conclusions are organized around six discussion areas—all presented within the context of a changing climate.
190 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-15425-1
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-15426-X
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/12914
National Research Council. 2011. National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Letter
The leaders of the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps have recognized the potential impact of climate change on naval forces' missions and have positioned their organizations to make adaptive changes. This report is the first component of a study to assess the implications of climate change for the U.S. Naval Services. Specifically, this report highlights issues that could have potential near-term impacts, impose a need for near-term awareness, or require near-term planning to ensure that longer-term naval capabilities are protected. The final report of this study will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential implications of climate change not covered in this letter report.
21 pages
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8.5 x 11
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ISBN Ebook: 0-309-15308-5
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/12897
National Research Council. 2010. National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces: Letter Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the growing threat to information and cybersecurity from lone actors, groups of like-minded actors, nation-states, and malicious insiders, information assurance is an area of significant and growing importance and concern. Because of the forward positioning of both the Navy's afloat and the Marine Corps expeditionary forces, IA issues for naval forces are exacerbated, and are tightly linked to operational success. Broad-based IA success is viewed by the NRC's Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces as providing a central underpinning to the DOD's network-centric operational concept and the Department of the Navy's (DON's) FORCEnet operational vision. Accordingly, this report provides a view and analysis of information assurance in the context of naval 'mission assurance'.
198 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-13663-6
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-13664-4
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/12609
National Research Council. 2010. Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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The U.S. military forces currently face a nontraditional threat from insurgents and terrorists who primarily employ improvised explosive devices, and have shown a cycle of adaptation of less than 12 months to responses by U.S. forces to counter these attacks. This constantly evolving threat requires U.S. military forces to adapt and respond more rapidly with modified tactics, technologies, and/or equipment.
In response to this need for new technologies, the Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) was established in 2006 to develop technologies that can mature in 6 to 18 months for purposes of counterterrorism. Although RRTO appears to be successfully fulfilling its mission, the agency seeks to understand and address barriers to and opportunities for meeting future counterterrorism needs—including the need to accelerate the transition of technologies for counterterrorism with an eye to countering emerging and anticipated threats. This book reviews RRTO approaches and provides a set of recommendations for potential improvements to help meet these needs for rapid technology development.
106 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-13668-7
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-13669-5
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/12612
National Research Council. 2009. Experimentation and Rapid Prototyping in Support of Counterterrorism. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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To offer security in the maritime domain, governments around the world need the capabilities to directly confront common threats like piracy, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration. No single navy or nation can do this alone.
Recognizing this new international security landscape, the former Chief of Naval Operations called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security, initially branded the "1,000-ship Navy." This concept envisions U.S. naval forces partnering with multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.
This new book from the National Research Council examines the technical and operational implications of the "1,000-ship Navy," as they apply to four levels of cooperative efforts:
242 pages
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6 x 9
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paperback
ISBN Paperback: 0-309-11261-3
ISBN Ebook: 0-309-11262-1
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17226/12029
National Research Council. 2008. Maritime Security Partnerships. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
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