This chapter explains why airport operators require P2P carsharing companies to obtain airport permits and pay airport fees, summarizes recent (as of the second quarter of 2023) court decisions supporting the ability of airport operators to collect fees from these businesses, and describes strategies to be considered when determining the amount to be charged.
Airports should regulate P2P businesses for both financial (as described in Chapter 5) and operational reasons (as described in Chapter 8).
P2P companies derive revenues from access to the airport market. Even if P2P companies do not use airport facilities directly, they benefit from airport infrastructure and airport customers. It is generally agreed by the airport industry and supported by court decisions that P2P companies should pay for commercial access to the airport market, just as other commercial ground transportation providers, off-airport parking lot businesses, and off-airport hotel operators pay for such access (see Chapter 3).
Additionally, P2P companies compete with traditional rental car companies. As discussed in Chapter 5, rental car businesses are the second-largest source of non-aeronautical revenues. As shown in Figure 5-1, rental car revenues represent about 20 percent of total non-aeronautical revenues at U.S. airports (excluding CFCs), with the percentages varying based on the airport’s size or hub classification. Failure to charge similar fees to P2P companies doing business at the airport places traditional rental car businesses at a competitive disadvantage and potentially threatens a major source of airport revenues. Consequently, by charging fees to P2P companies, airports achieve two important goals: (1) increasing non-aeronautical revenues through charges to businesses that benefit from the presence of the airport and access to airline passengers and (2) maintaining existing rental car revenues by applying similar financial requirements to P2P companies and traditional rental car companies.
It is also important for airports to place operational requirements on P2P companies, although the nature of such requirements will vary from airport to airport. For example, at space-constrained or congested airports, it will likely be important to limit P2P operations to locations that will not exacerbate traffic or congestion. Airports also seek to ensure that P2P operations occur in safe locations and do not impinge on space dedicated to other uses (such as shuttles, taxicabs, and other ground transportation operations or public parking facilities having limited available space).
Furthermore, just as P2P and rental car businesses should be placed on similar footing financially, they should be placed on similar footing operationally. This does not mean that the operational requirements for rental car businesses and P2P businesses must be identical, but that P2P
businesses should not be given a perceived competitive advantage over traditional rental car businesses through more favorable operational requirements. If P2P carsharing businesses are given more favorable operational terms than traditional rental car businesses, airport operators might impose higher fees for that privilege.
As noted, airports should consider both financial and operational terms when regulating P2P companies and ensure that P2P businesses are not given a competitive advantage over their traditional rental car company competitors. This section discusses in more detail legal and regulatory strategies for achieving those goals.
The litigation involving airports and P2P programs is certainly the most visible and dramatic of the industry’s growing pains. But, despite what the cases in California and Massachusetts might suggest (see the next section), regulation of P2P operation at airports has generally been more collaborative. State legislation concerning P2P operations at airports and elsewhere is discussed in Chapter 6. As explained, airports have for the most part been successful in obtaining court orders confirming their right to regulate P2P carsharing businesses on commercially reasonable terms as well as in reaching settlements with these businesses, resulting in permits that place P2P carsharing businesses on similar footing with traditional rental car businesses. Although at the time this report was being prepared one P2P carsharing business was still in litigation with two airports (Dallas Fort Worth and San Francisco international airports), over the last several years that business has made a concerted effort to settle litigation and enter into permits with airports. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 6 and presented in Table 6-1, a growing number of jurisdictions have enacted or are considering legislation governing the regulation of P2P carsharing businesses. These judicial precedents and evolving legislation will likely minimize the need for future lawsuits and encourage P2P carsharing companies to continue to negotiate permits with airports.
When establishing the amount of fees to be charged P2P carsharing companies, it is recommended that airport staff consider where carsharing exchanges occur relative to where traditional rental car customers pick up and return vehicles.
In negotiating permits with P2P businesses, it is important for airports to keep in mind the competitive fairness principle, as well as operational constraints at a given airport. Again, for the reasons discussed, the financial and operational terms that apply to P2P permits should place P2P businesses on similar footing with their traditional rental car business competitors. To offer a simple example, it is suggested that if rental car companies pay a 10 percent gross receipts fee and transport customers by shuttle to a CONRAC, then P2P companies should also pay a 10 percent gross receipts fee and operate from a location accessed by shuttle. If a P2P company operates from a more desirable location, such as a parking lot closer to the terminal, then an airport operator might impose a higher gross receipts fee for that privilege. If the P2P company operates from a less desirable location—for example, rental car companies are in terminal, but P2P customers must take a shuttle—then the airport operator might impose a lower gross receipts fee. An airport may also choose to require P2P companies to pay rent for space at the airport (i.e., for designated parking or pickup spaces), fees associated with the use of shuttles and other common transportation, and other user fees. The financial and operational requirements will vary from airport to airport, but the goal remains the same: to place P2P companies and traditional rental car companies on similar footing, which will serve to maintain and increase non-aeronautical revenues and achieve fair competition.
There have been multiple lawsuits involving P2P carsharing businesses and airport owners, several of which have settled. The lawsuits and their status are summarized as follows:
a dispute after a 2015 serious but non-fatal crash. The injured party won $1.14 million in a bench trial, and the defendants sued Turo and Nautilus, Turo’s New Jersey insurer at the time, which paid $900,000 and $700,000, respectively.
There have been several reported court decisions concerning P2P companies—nearly all involving Turo—operating at airports without a permit. Each decision has occurred relatively early in the life cycle of the lawsuit and focused on discrete legal arguments and issues. Put together, these cases illustrate that courts are generally willing to rule that airports have the authority to regulate P2P companies’ operations pursuant to airports’ broad authority to regulate and collect fees for commercial activity.
Two courts—the Central District of California and the Superior Court of Massachusetts—issued preliminary injunctions prohibiting Turo’s operations at Los Angeles International Airport and Boston Logan International Airport, respectively, in 2020. Both injunctions were immediately appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the Massachusetts SJC. In 2021, the Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction for operations at Los Angeles International Airport, and the SJC upheld the injunction for Boston Logan International Airport.
The trial court preliminary injunction decisions are similar. In both venues, the courts focused on the likelihood of the airports succeeding on the merits of their aiding and abetting trespass claims against Turo, and Turo’s CDA defense. And in both decisions, the courts determined that Turo had actively encouraged its users to conduct airport operations even after it knew the airports required a permit for such operations and that the CDA did not apply.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction solely on the basis that, as a matter of California state law, the airport was required to demonstrate irreparable harm and had failed to do so because it could be compensated after the fact for any unlawful transactions. In Massachusetts, the SJC upheld the injunction, focusing mainly on Turo’s CDA defense. The SJC determined that the claims against Turo were based on Turo’s own language advertising Boston Logan International Airport as a desirable location for a pickup or drop-off, and that the airport was seeking to hold Turo liable for that language and Turo’s continued facilitation of airport transactions. Hence, the SJC determined that the CDA did not immunize Turo from the lawsuit.
Notwithstanding the differing results at the appellate level, both lawsuits resulted in a settlement wherein Turo paid the airport a penalty payment and entered into a permit authorizing airport transactions.
In a lawsuit between the San Francisco International Airport and Turo, a slightly different issue was presented. Los Angeles World Airports and Massport both relied on the airports’ general power to regulate commercial transactions as the basis for their claims against Turo. San Francisco International Airport took a slightly different approach, claiming, inter alia, that Turo was a rental car company under a California statute and was therefore required to pay CFCs for its airport operations. The San Francisco Superior Court issued a summary adjudication decision that Turo did qualify as a rental car company because it was in the business of enabling the public to rent motor vehicles. The court rejected Turo’s argument that, because the company itself does
not own or control the vehicles available for rent on its website, it was not “renting” the vehicles. On appeal, the California Appeals Court reversed that decision, agreeing with Turo’s urged interpretation of the term “rental car company.”
Notably, this decision was solely a determination of a California state law concerning CFCs. The decision does not curtail an airport’s ability to regulate P2P companies as commercial entities, even within California. It does, however, illustrate the risks in attempting to classify a P2P company as a rental car company. Though P2P companies will vigorously dispute that classification, airports can regulate P2P companies without classifying them as rental car companies.
As described in the section on regulatory and legal strategies, airport operators commonly require P2P carsharing businesses to pay a fee calculated as a percentage of their airport-related gross revenues plus any parking fees incurred by the hosts and by the customers for use of the designated airport parking facility. Generally, airports do not require P2P carsharing businesses to obtain or display permits or decals like those required of other commercial ground transportation businesses.
Each airport operator determines the appropriate percentage fee to charge P2P carsharing companies, considering, among other factors,