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Stronger Aviation Safety Management and Collision Protections Needed Following Reagan National Midair Collision, Says New Report

News Release

Security
Critical Infrastructure and Technology
Civil Space
Air Transportation

By Solomon Self

Last update November 18, 2026

Busy Airport Scene at Reagan National Airport near Washington DC

WASHINGTON — Long-standing weaknesses in the systems responsible for identifying, assessing, and controlling hazards and risks to protect aircraft in the airspace surrounding Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) were not adequately identified and addressed by the Federal Aviation Administration and the U.S. Army before a January 2025 midair collision, says a new report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Some of those risks and hazards remain nearly two years since the accident. The report calls for stronger FAA and Army safety-management practices and improved protections against midair collisions, and calls on Congress to direct the FAA to conduct and publicly report a comprehensive safety and capacity assessment before authorizing any increases in flights permitted at DCA.

Requested by Congress following the midair collision on Jan. 29, 2025, between a commercial passenger aircraft and a U.S. Army helicopter that killed 67 people, the report builds on the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation of the collision. Many recommendations complement those of the NTSB, and others examine broader safety concerns that extend beyond the January 2025 incident.

“The collision revealed weaknesses in how aviation safety risks were identified, assessed, and managed both prior to and since the accident,” said James P. Bagian, former NASA astronaut, executive director of the Center for Risk Analysis Informed Decision Engineering at the University of Michigan, and chair of the committee that wrote the report. “Our report emphasizes that effective safety management cannot operate in an isolated and siloed manner that relies primarily on audits of compliance without addressing why a problem did or could arise to compromise safety. To be a highly functioning learning organization requires proactively seeking to understand how and why the aviation system can fail, identifying hazards and risks before they lead to accidents, prioritizing and taking the appropriate actions, transparent communication, and verifying that safety measures actually work. The goal is prevention.” 

Strengthening Aviation Safety Oversight and Preventing Future Collisions
The report finds that the FAA did not consistently use available safety information to identify emerging hazards; examine how underlying organizational, operational, and procedural conditions interacted to create safety risks; or determine whether corrective actions effectively reduced those risks. FAA’s responses often focused on correcting procedural noncompliance rather than understanding the broader system conditions that allowed hazards and risks to develop and persist.

To address these shortcomings, the report recommends that the FAA strengthen its safety-management practices, clarify helicopter-route guidance and air traffic control procedures, and more systematically evaluate risks associated with helicopter operations near commercial aircraft.

The Army’s safety processes did not provide a sufficiently complete and reliable picture of recurring hazards in the congested DCA environment. NTSB identified major limitations in the Army’s ability to collect, analyze, and act on operational safety information. The National Academies’ committee also examined the Army’s preflight risk assessment for the helicopter involved in the collision and found that it did not explicitly identify midair collision with civilian aircraft as a hazard. The report recommends that the U.S. Department of Defense establish standardized training and proficiency requirements for military aviators operating helicopters in the National Capital Region, and that the FAA and Army regularly coordinate to identify and address shared safety risks.

In addition, the report addresses significant gaps identified by NTSB in technologies intended to provide a final defense against midair collisions. Existing collision-avoidance systems have limitations at low altitudes, and many helicopters lack systems capable of providing pilots with maneuver guidance to avoid an impending collision. The report recommends prioritizing the use of available traffic-awareness and alerting technologies for general aviation aircraft while advancing the development and deployment of more effective collision-avoidance systems for helicopters and larger fixed-wing aircraft. These technologies would provide additional protection when airspace design, air traffic control procedures, and other safeguards fail to prevent a conflict.

Assessing Airport Capacity and Safety
DCA operates in highly constrained airspace shared by commercial aircraft, military and civilian helicopters, and other aviation activities. Changes in airline schedules, aircraft fleets, and air traffic patterns have increased operational complexity and placed additional demands on air traffic controllers and pilots, while existing safety assessments have not consistently accounted for the combined effects of these changes on controller and pilot workload and safety risks, the report says.

Safety assessments should consider not only the number of scheduled flights but also their concentration within shorter periods, aircraft types, interactions with helicopters and other airspace users, and resulting demands on air traffic controllers. The FAA should also establish a more integrated framework for regularly assessing how much traffic the airport’s runways, surrounding airspace, and air traffic control system can safely and reliably accommodate.

This is the first of two reports requested by Congress to examine aviation safety in the National Capital Region. The second report will examine additional issues, including available records of close-call incidents involving military aircraft, broader civil-military coordination, and aviation safety-management and oversight practices.

The study was undertaken by the Committee on Airspace Design, Civil-Military Coordination, and Operational Safety in the National Capital Region and sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation.

The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine are private, nonprofit institutions that provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions related to science, engineering, and medicine. They operate under an 1863 congressional charter to the National Academy of Sciences, signed by President Lincoln.

Contact:
Solomon Self, Media Relations Officer
Office of News and Public Information
202-334-2138; email news@nas.edu

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