Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (2006)
Chapter: Appendix B Specific Recommendations from Two Previous National Research Council Reports Concerning Indigenization of MPC&A
B
Specific Recommendations from Two Previous National Research Council Reports Concerning Indigenization of MPC&A
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS: ASSESSING U.S. EFFORTS TO HELP CONTAIN NUCLEAR AND OTHER DANGEROUS MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, 19971
Indigenize MPC&A Capabilities
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Continue to emphasize the importance of materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) as a nonproliferation imperative at the highest political levels in the former Soviet Union.
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Prior to initiating MPC&A projects at specific facilities, obtain assurances at both the ministry and the institute levels that the upgrade programs will be sustained after improvements have been made. Financial incentives, such as support for related research activities, should be considered as a means of stimulating long-term commitments.
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Involve institute personnel to the fullest extent possible in determining how to use available funds for upgrades.
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Give greater emphasis to near-term training of local specialists.
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Reward those institutes that are making good progress in upgrading MPC&A systems by giving them preference for participation in other U.S.-financed cooperative programs.
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Encourage the establishment of new income streams that can provide adequate financial support for MPC&A programs in the long term, such as ear-marking for MPC&A programs a portion of the revenues from Russian sales of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
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Rely increasingly on domestically produced and locally available equipment for physical protection, detection, analysis, and related MPC&A tasks.
PROTECTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS IN RUSSIA, 19992
Indigenize MPC&A Capabilities
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Increase the percentage of available U.S. funding that is directed to financing activities of Russian organizations, with a steadily declining percentage directed to supporting U.S. participants in the program.
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Expand efforts to utilize Russian equipment and services whenever possible and to encourage Russian enterprises and institutes to increase capabilities to provide high-quality equipment and associated warranties and services.
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Use Russian specialists from institutes with well-developed MPC&A capabilities to replace some U.S. members of teams at Russian institutions with less developed capabilities.
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Rely increasingly on Russian specialists to replace U.S. specialists in presenting MPC&A training programs at Obninsk and other training sites.
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Encourage Moscow Engineering Physics Institute to increase student participation (and its income resulting from tuition payments) in its security-oriented courses by offering an industrial security as well as an MPC&A specialization.
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Give greater attention, in both training and implementation activities, to developing personal commitments on the part of Russian managers, specialists, and guard forces to fulfill their responsibilities for ensuring the proper functioning of MPC&A systems.
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Increase opportunities for Russian input in establishing priorities at specific sites and in preparing statements of work for individual projects.
