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Characteristics and Features of Confucius Institutes

This chapter presents an overview of the characteristics and features of Confucius Institutes (CIs). As a result of its fact-finding activities, the committee acknowledges that the structure, management, and programming of CIs vary widely across institutions, and thus the committee could not develop an all-encompassing description of a CI’s structure and how it functions on U.S. institution of higher education campuses. Rather, the committee’s goal for this chapter is to provide a sense of how CIs operate in the United States.

DEFINITION

Section 1062 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, which called for the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct this consensus study, defines the term “Confucius Institute” as a “cultural institute directly or indirectly funded by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”¹ Later legislation expanded the definition of CI to a “cultural institute established as a partnership between a United States institution of higher education and a Chinese institution of higher education to promote and teach Chinese language and culture that is funded, directly or indirectly, by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”²

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¹ William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Public Law No. 116-283, 116th Congress, 2nd Session (January 1, 2021), Section 1062 (U.S. Congress, 2021).

² H.R. 4346 – Supreme Court Security Funding Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117-167, 117th Congress (August 9, 2022) (U.S. Congress, 2022).

For this report, the CI definition encompasses CIs established on U.S. campuses as early as 2004 with funding from the Office of Chinese Language Council International, part of China’s Ministry of Education. This funding organization was formerly known as Hanban, or CI Headquarters, and has since been renamed the Ministry of Education Center for Language Education and Cooperation (CLEC) (CRS, 2022; Peterson et al., 2022). CLEC’s Chinese International Education Foundation currently oversees and funds existing CIs (Peterson et al., 2022).³ The committee does not intend for this definition to capture Chinese language and culture partnerships funded through other nongovernmental funding channels, scientific and technological research partnerships and collaborations, or the Chinese Students and Scholars Association organization.

CURRENT LANDSCAPE

The committee identified 10 open CIs and 7 closing or paused CIs in the United States in March 2022 and is aware of 7 open CIs⁴ in the United States as of December 2022.⁵ Of the 7 open CIs, only 3 submitted data to the National Science Foundation’s Higher Education Research and Development Survey (HERD) for FY 2020 (see Table 2-1). The committee notes that only 1 institution hosting a CI is above the $50 million federal funding threshold for compliance with National Security Presidential Memorandum—33, or NSPM-33. Given that all institutions performing $150,000 or more of research and development per year are required to participate in the National Science Foundation’s HERD survey, it can be inferred that all but 1 of the 7 remaining institutions hosting CIs are below the $50 million federal funding threshold. Furthermore, the University of Utah and Alfred University are the only institutions hosting a CI and performing a sizable amount of DOD-funded research.

The committee discovered through the release of the National Association of Scholars’ report After Confucius Institutes: China’s Enduring Influence on American Higher Education in June 2022 that CIs at Bryant University, Medgar Evers College, and Presbyterian College had closed. The CI at St. Cloud State University closed in December 2021, and the CIs at Southern Utah University, the University of Akron, and the University of Toledo closed during summer 2022.⁶ The CI at Stanford University closed on October 31, 2022.⁷

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³ This report refers to Hanban throughout, given that it was the funding organization’s name when the CIs that the committee reviewed were established.

⁴ This includes the University of Utah’s CI, which is slated to close in June 2023.

⁵ See Appendix B, “Listing of Open, Closing, and Paused U.S. Confucius Institutes.”

⁶ See https://www.uakron.edu/im/news/ua-to-close-confucius-institute. A reviewer of this Consensus Study Report provided further informational comment regarding the closing of the CI at the University of Toledo.

⁷ Confirmation of the closing of the CI at Stanford University was provided to the study staff by email correspondence.

TABLE 2-1 Research and Development Expenditures for Remaining CIs for FY 2020

NOTE: NSF = National Science Foundation; R&D = research and development; USG = U.S. government.

SOURCE: National Science Foundation, HERD survey Table 25 (NSF, 2021).

While not all of these institutions shared the reasoning behind their CI closures, Bryant University President Ross Gittell stated in a 2021 letter to the community that the CI closure was the result of “changes that are taking place in China and regarding U.S.-China relations…” (Bryant University, 2021; NBC 10, 2021). Presbyterian College attributed its closure to staffing issues because of the COVID-19 pandemic (Peterson et al., 2022). Meanwhile, the University of Akron cited the restrictions on DOD funding found in Section 1062 of the FY 2021 NDAA, from which this report originated: “The University of Akron has developed a broad research partnership with the Department of Defense and with other funding agencies and organizations at different levels of the federal and state government. In order to meet the requirements of the NDAA, The University of Akron has decided to close its Confucius Institute…” (University of Akron News, 2021).⁸ Valparaiso University, which closed its CI in March 2022, mentions the NDAA provision in its closure announcement as well (Padilla, 2021).

From the information-gathering activities the American Institutes for Research (AIR) conducted in support of this study,⁹ the committee discovered that the provision in the FY 2019 NDAA served as the “deciding factor for some

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⁸ The University of Akron had more than $10 million dollars of federal research and development (R&D) expenditures in FY 2020, inclusive of $2,779,000 of DOD R&D expenditures (NSF HERD data for FY 2020, Table 25) (NSF, 2021).

⁹ See Appendix E, “Information-Gathering Sessions with U.S. Colleges and Universities That Are Current or Former Hosts of Confucius Institutes.”

institutions to close their CI[s]” (Kaleem et al., 2022).¹⁰ One institution interviewed by AIR decided to close its CI “instead of applying for a waiver because they wanted to ensure that their federal funding was not jeopardized” (Kaleem et al., 2022). This is similar to the reasoning publicly cited by the University of Minnesota and the University of Rhode Island when announcing the closure of their respective CIs in February 2019 and the University of Maryland when announcing the closure of its CI in January 2020 (Bullard, 2020; Sabrowsky, 2019; Thennarasu, 2019).

The National Association of Scholars delves deeper into the reasons for closure of 104 U.S. CIs in its report After Confucius Institutes: China’s Enduring Influence on American Higher Education (Peterson et al., 2022). The publicly stated reasons for closure collected by the National Association of Scholars were analyzed by National Academies staff (Appendix D). Institutional responses to U.S. public policy changes tended to be the most cited reason for closure, followed by a misalignment of the campus CI with institutional values or goals, and state or institutional budgetary reasons. The committee notes that further research is needed both to verify publicly stated reasons for closure and to understand how universities may have restructured or rebranded CI-like programs and partnerships going forward.

The 2018 audit that Tufts University conducted of its CI provides valuable insight into why or how closure and renewal decisions were made. The goals of the audit were to assess the benefits and concerns associated with the CI’s operation, to recommend whether to renew the CI or not, and to recommend changes to the CI agreement(s) and governance if the CI was indeed to continue (Tufts, 2019). The audit committee sought to ensure that the evaluation was comprehensive and included the following:

• A review of CI-related documentation including draft and final contracts, workplans, annual reports, budgets, correspondence, and books and materials;
• A review of external literature, studies, and reports on CIs including many of the same documents utilized by the committee in service of this report;
• Interviews with CI staff and Tufts faculty and staff involved with negotiating CI agreements;
• Discussions with Tufts government relations advisors and Massachusetts congressional delegation staff; and
• Input collected from the community via open forums on their experience with and perspectives on the CI (Tufts, 2019).

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¹⁰ One respondent interviewed by AIR shared that the decision to close their institution’s CI came directly from the university president, while another respondent stated that the decision was made by university leadership.

Tufts’ audit found that the university engaged in “significant due diligence” prior to agreeing to establish a CI and in its negotiations with Hanban (Tufts, 2019). The audit also found that Tufts’ CI-related agreements and practices aligned with external best practices for CIs; that the CI contributed to the teaching of Chinese language and culture at Tufts; that the CI had not exercised undue foreign influence on the university, faculty, staff, or students; and that the presence of a CI on campus raised reputational and ethical concerns. The audit committee noted that “the arguments both for renewal and non-renewal are strong” and ultimately decided to renew the CI for a 2-year period after adopting measures to fortify Tufts’ governance of the CI (Tufts, 2019, 2021). However, Tufts announced in March 2021 that it would not renew the CI at the conclusion of the 2-year period in September 2021 (Tufts, 2021).

Of the CIs that remain open, the CI of the State of Washington (CIWA) at Pacific Lutheran University (PLU) posts its Certificate of Authorization from the Chinese International Education Foundation and Five Party Agreement (Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] between U.S. institutions and Chinese institutions) on its website.¹¹ In addition, CIWA’s website notes that “all CIWA-supported programs are entirely designed and/or supervised by directors at PLU and SPS [Seattle Public Schools] in coordination with colleges or universities, K–12 educational institutions, community groups or individual partners across Washington state” (CIWA, 2022).¹² The CI at Wesleyan College similarly links to an open letter from the university president and an implementation agreement (MOU between Wesleyan College and Guangzhou University) on its website.¹³ The former document emphasizes that “nothing in our contract ‘leads to academic self-censorship of topics the Chinese government considers taboo,’” “Wesleyan College does not hesitate to discuss and teach about the topics that are considered taboo on many university campuses in China,” and that the CI is of value to the institution and its surrounding community (Fowler, 2018). The CI at Troy University shares an email address for the public to use to obtain a copy of its annual report.¹⁴ None of the other open CIs or the University of Utah’s CI, which is closing in June 2023, proffers notable documents or language.

While this report focuses solely on CIs in the United States, it is important to acknowledge that CIs continue to operate in more than 100 countries worldwide (Dig Mandarin, 2021). CIs in some of these nations, including Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the UK, are encountering similar issues as those in the United States as their respective relationships with China deteriorate and as they further contemplate the academic freedom and national

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¹¹ See https://www.plu.edu/confucius-institute/agreements/.

¹² Available at https://www.plu.edu/confucius-institute/.

¹³ Available at https://www.wesleyancollege.edu/about/confucius-institute.cfm.

¹⁴ Available at https://www.troy.edu/student-life-resources/arts-culture/confucius-institute/about.html.

security implications of hosting foreign-funded entities on university campuses (Today Online, 2022a). In the UK, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak stated prior to his election that he would close all 30 remaining CIs in the UK, since the university-based institutes promote Chinese soft power (Today Online, 2022b; Wilson, 2022). This comes immediately after the September 2022 report released by the Henry Jackson Society, a trans-Atlantic, UK-based think tank, which presents the following series of recommendations regarding CIs in the UK:

• The UK government should introduce legislation to remove CIs from UK universities;
• There must be an immediate investigation regarding the legality of CIs’ staff recruitment practices;
• The UK government should add an amendment to the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill that demands academic partnerships with foreign powers preserve the freedom of speech and comply with equality legislation;
• The UK government should provide £5 million in funding for UK universities to allocate to China studies and bolstering knowledge regarding China’s presence in the UK; and
• The UK government should work with other countries that speak Mandarin, especially Taiwan, to develop new Chinese culture and language programmes (Dunning and Kwong, 2022).

ATTRIBUTES

The committee made the following observations during its exploration of CIs at U.S. institutions of higher education:

• CIs are sponsored by the government of the People’s Republic of China, which does not protect and promote the core values of U.S. higher education, including the open exchange of ideas and free expression of thought in instruction and scientific research (ChinaFile, 2013).
• The government of the People’s Republic of China influences the values, mission, and operational decisions of CIs by being the source of funding; approving the selection of the CI associate/assistant director, and sometimes directly selecting other personnel such as faculty, staff, and instructors; and sometimes maintaining control over operational decisions such as selecting curriculum, texts, programming, and event participants.
• The majority of CIs in the United States are based at colleges and universities (GAO, 2019). CIs are embedded in the life of a campus, as they are physically on, adjacent to, or near their host campuses. CIs welcome students and community members to their curricular and cocurricular

• events and activities and often sponsor speakers and visitors, and CI staff participate in campus academic and social life.
  • A broad range of U.S. colleges and universities host or have hosted CIs, from major public and private R1 institutions¹⁵ with significant language resources to under-resourced, primarily undergraduate institutions and minority-serving institutions that may depend more on the CI’s funding and resources to offer instruction in Chinese language and culture to support their student programming operations.
  • CIs at U.S. institutions of higher education are often managed by a board of directors (GAO, 2019). All U.S. institutions appoint their respective CI director, and many individuals appointed to this role have been long-standing members of the faculty and staff of the institution.
• The structure, operations, and management of CIs in the United States varies from institution to institution.
• Each U.S. institution hosting a CI has a corresponding Chinese institution with which it partners and often signs an MOU (CRS, 2022).
• Many CIs hosted at U.S. institutions provide Chinese language instruction and resources to K–12 schools in their region.
  • From an economic development and workforce perspective, state and local governments need young U.S. citizens who are trained in Chinese language and culture and speak Mandarin.
• In some instances, there is a lack of transparency regarding CIs’ structure and operations. This can include not providing full, regular disclosure of activities, priorities, and objectives; funding sources and amounts; and bases and processes for decision-making. In addition, many institutions hosting CIs do not post contracts and MOUs publicly and accessibly, and some CIs do not participate in shared university governance processes or structures, which can vary across campuses.

CONTRACTS

Each U.S. institution hosting a CI signs a contract with Hanban to formally establish the institute and to detail funding and other stipulations. Most agreements between U.S. institutions of higher education and Hanban are valid for a 5-year period. In addition, U.S. institutions may establish MOUs or implementation agreements with their respective Chinese partner institutions (GAO, 2019). These MOUs often delineate additional information regarding the structure, management, and activities of the CI.

Many institutions revised their contracts with Hanban, upon renewal or otherwise, after receiving feedback and implementable practices from the U.S.

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¹⁵ R1 institutions denote universities that offer doctoral degrees and have very high research activity according to the Carnegie Classification System. Additional information is available at https://carnegieclassifications.acenet.edu/classification_descriptions/basic.php.

Department of Education, the American Council on Education, and other higher education associations (Mitchell, 2018). These revisions included affirming the primacy of U.S. law and institutional policies over Chinese law for all CI activities taking place in the United States and removing or revising the original contract’s confidentiality language or clauses (GAO, 2019; Mitchell, 2018). For example, Tufts University made changes to its original draft agreement with Hanban following discussions with the National Association of College and University Attorneys to ensure that its CI “complied with Tufts policies, including, without limitation, policies on academic freedom,” adding that these revisions included provisions that the CI “be required to comply with Tufts policies and regulations, and that any violation of Tufts policies could result in termination by Tufts of the CI…” (Tufts, 2019).

The Government Accountability Office and the National Association of Scholars have further explored agreements between U.S. institutions of higher education and Hanban (GAO, 2019; Peterson et al., 2022). In addition, the National Association of Scholars maintains a publicly available repository of collected agreements.¹⁶

RELATIONSHIP OF CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES WITH U.S. CAMPUSES

The structure, operations, and management of CIs in the United States varies from institution to institution (GAO, 2019). In general, a CI has a director or directors, designated CI teachers, and a board of directors. CIs tend to be physically on, adjacent to, or near campus. Some CIs at U.S. institutions are part of an academic department or administrative office, while others are situated elsewhere in the university (GAO, 2019; Kaleem et al., 2022).

The extent to which CIs were integrated into campus life differed by host institution. Some CIs were in prime, widely accessible spaces on campus such as the library, while others were housed in more remote corners (Kaleem et al., 2022). Regardless of where CIs were physically situated, many held cultural events and celebrations open to the campus and the local community.

RELATIONSHIP OF PAIRED CHINESE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION WITH U.S. CAMPUSES

The relationship between a U.S. host institution and its Chinese partner institution also varies from institution to institution. Some U.S. institutions intentionally chose their Chinese partner institution, sometimes owing to preexisting relationships, collaborations, or exchanges (Kaleem et al., 2022). For other U.S.

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¹⁶ See https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ozgY69PokmXJMWWO-uBy0DaJ021804iv?usp=sharing.

institutions, Hanban assigned Chinese partner institutions without corresponding U.S. institutions having much, if any, say in the matter (GAO, 2019).

U.S. host institutions approached relationships with their respective Chinese partner institutions in a variety of ways. Contractually, some but not all U.S. host institutions signed supplemental MOUs with their Chinese partner institutions (Kaleem et al., 2022). Some U.S. host institutions saw this partnership, whether formal or informal, as a catalyst, and they leveraged and built upon such relationships with additional language, cultural, and research collaborations. Other U.S. host institutions did not engage extensively with their partner institution beyond matters strictly related to the CI.

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