Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief

Openness, International Engagement,
and the Federally Funded Science and
Technology Research Enterprise

Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief

On November 14 and 15, 2022, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) convened a two-day workshop under the auspices of the National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable. The Roundtable is tasked to provide a neutral venue where individuals from the national intelligence and law enforcement communities can meet with representatives from industry and the academic research communities to discuss current threats, benefits, and potential risks related to the research enterprise. The Roundtable was created partly in response to growing concerns about “foreign governments acquiring information and materials from foreign students and faculty studying and working in U.S. institutions and from U.S. faculty engaged in collaborative research activities[…].”¹

As part of the Roundtable’s fact-gathering activities, the workshop provided an opportunity to assess the state of the U.S. research enterprise in a time of increasing global competition. The workshop also featured discussion of the challenges confronting researchers as they seek to ensure the vitality of research and innovation in America, foster increased international scientific research cooperation, and simultaneously counter illicit foreign interference that threatens the country’s security interests. The workshop was convened in a context in which some foreign nations have sought to exploit the openness of the research enterprise in inappropriate ways in order to advance national security or economic objectives. This situation has led to a discussion of whether the traditional open approach to fundamental (or basic) research taken by the United States needs to be reconsidered. The workshop focused on universities and federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), which together performed 52 percent of U.S.–sponsored basic research in 2019 and to which many advanced applications, emerging technologies, and innovation can be traced.² The workshop was not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of current risks to the research enterprise and possible responses. In particular, the workshop did not cover efforts by some foreign countries to obtain illegal access to proprietary or classified research.

A short summary of the presentations and discussions appears below, organized by workshop session and

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¹ From the Roundtable Statement of Task.

² The other main performers of basic research are businesses, federal laboratories, and non-profit organizations. See National Science Board, National Science Foundation. 2022. Science and Engineering Indicators 2022: The State of U.S. Science and Engineering. NSB-2022-1. Alexandria, VA. Table RD-3. Available at https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20221.

attributed to the speaker who made each point. Highlights of a keynote address by former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz are also included.³

THE VALUE OF OPEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH

This session focused on the current state of the science and technology enterprise in the U.S., with discussion exploring both benefits of open international engagement and risks of that engagement.

• The workshop was motivated by the recognition that protecting vitality of our science and technology research enterprise is essential to the nation’s security, its economic competitiveness, and our societal well-being (Michael McQuade, Carnegie Mellon, workshop co-chair).
• Empirical evidence demonstrates the importance of international collaboration to U.S. research progress and the critical importance of contributions by foreign-born researchers to the U.S. science and technology (S&T) enterprise and the U.S. economy (Tobin Smith, American Association of Universities).
• Due to the globalization of research and to significant advances in research capabilities in other countries, the United States is no longer the undisputed leader in all S&T fields. More fine-grained analytics are needed to help accurately assess competitiveness at a detailed level (Smith).
• Increasingly, different countries have or will have complementary research capabilities, making collaboration necessary to achieve the best science in many areas (Smith).
• Based on national income accounting and other data, foreign STEM talent can be estimated to generate more than 1.7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. By using an event tree framework to estimate losses and compare them with the benefits associated with different groups of talent (e.g., doctoral students, STEM workers), STPI found that every group of foreign STEM talent makes positive contributions to the U.S. economy (Kevin Crane and Abby Goldman, Science and Technology Policy Institute).

INTERNATIONAL STEM TALENT AND U.S. RESEARCH COMPETITIVENESS

This session examined the importance of maintaining a strong STEM workforce for the U.S. economy and national security, and how new policies aimed at protecting national security might impact this workforce.

• Current data indicate that domestic STEM talent is not growing rapidly enough to meet the projected needs of the U.S. academic research enterprise and of the skilled technical workforce. Short- and long-term initiatives are needed to tap into the potential of the entire population (Victor McCrary, University of the District of Columbia).
• For the present and for the foreseeable future, the contributions of foreign and foreign-born researchers will remain critical to the success and competitiveness of the U.S. research enterprise, as will increasing participation in STEM fields by underrepresented groups in the United States. Specific initiatives are needed to overcome the financial barriers to graduate education faced by American students while supporting the recruitment and retention of the foreign talent (Arthur Bienenstock, Stanford University).
• Policies in other countries to welcome international students have resulted in some of this talent choosing to study in Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, rather than the United States (Esther Brimmer, NAFSA Association of International Educators).
• Through “witting engagement” (i.e., careful and aware engagement) and the use of guidelines, training, and security procedures to segment research locations and research computing, it is possible to employ foreign talent, protect research integrity, and advance U.S. interests (Patricia Falcone, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory).

BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATIONS

This session featured discussion of current and past experience with international collaboration to draw

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³ The full agenda, speaker biographies, and some presentations are available at https://www.nationalacademies.org/event/08-29-2022/openness-international-engagement-and-the-federally-funded-science-and-technology-research-enterprise-a-workshop.

lessons on how this collaboration can be structured in ways that address potential research security risks while preserving the benefits of openness and collaboration.

• Large-scale international collaborations historically enable mutually beneficial research advances in fields that require large capital facilities and infrastructure. Requiring care and patience to implement successfully, they play an increasingly important role in research on critical shared and/or global challenges (e.g., pandemic diseases, global health, climate science, food safety, etc.) (James Crowe, Vanderbilt University).
• Large global research undertakings such as CERN have valuable experience with respect to scientific collaboration across the geopolitical spectrum. They have long-established processes, procedures, and restrictions designed to ensure research integrity and adherence to global norms. Their experience can inform efforts to navigate new constraints on global collaboration (Patricia McBride, CERN).
• Challenges to international collaboration related to health care, with application to other fields, include different countries’ attitudes toward security, discrimination, and use of data; constraints arising from government/industry partnerships; health system financing and administration; bureaucracies; priorities about health; and national rules and regulations on patient data and protection (Lee Hood, Institute for Systems Biology).

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF RESEARCH SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF OPEN SCIENCE, INCLUDING GENERATING COMMUNITY BUY-IN AND MANAGING RISK

Two sessions explored the potential costs and benefits of policies and approaches to protecting national security in research—both recently implemented and under discussion—and the implications for U.S. research institutions and individual researchers.

• National Security Decision Directive 189, first issued by the Reagan Administration in 1985, continues to serve as the basic policy for controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering information produced by federally funded fundamental research. It states that to the maximum extent possible fundamental research should remain unrestricted⁴ (Kathryn Moler, Stanford University, and Smith).
• Priority should be given to identifying and avoiding high-consequence, high-probability risks. Most research should be open/unclassified; activities that are intended to yield or are judged to have a strong likelihood of yielding results that require classification should be identified clearly by funding agencies before soliciting or approving proposals. Building trust between and within the national security and academic communities is essential (Joseph Bankoff, Georgia Institute of Technology).
• Some policies and practices aimed at managing security risks within the research enterprise impose significant costs on research institutions such as additional personnel needed to ensure compliance and information technology expenses (Robert Hardy and Kristen West, Council on Government Relations).
• Some policies and practices aimed at managing security risks can also result in other hidden burdens and opportunity costs. Lack of clarity can impose an emotional toll on researchers. Foregone opportunities to collaborate and learn from others slow the acceleration of discovery that accompanies the free and open exchange of ideas and people (Moler).
• To mitigate these burdens, all regulatory measures taken to protect the U.S. research environments should be clear, consistent, and limited to what is necessary to ensure research integrity, avoid conflict of commitment, and protect intellectual property and specific national security capabilities. The costs of compliance are always higher than assumed and should not be so onerous that they diminish research engagement (Hardy and West, Council on Government Relations).
• Federal funding agencies could contribute to mitigating the cost of compliance by adopting common requirements, creating and using common

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⁴ NSDD 189 defines fundamental research as basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community. It establishes classification as the preferred approach for controlling information generated during federally funded fundamental research when it is determined that controls are necessary.

• data bases, standardizing procedures, providing initial and refresher training, and monitoring compliance (Robert Hardy, COGR).
• Long-standing institutional practices in managing the risks and challenges of foreign engagement are relevant to contemporary challenges. In addition, many of the country’s largest research institutions have developed evidence-based processes to manage the challenges of foreign collaboration in the current context. Such existing practices should be studied and perhaps developed into a single template recognized by federal funders and adapted by other institutions (Kevin Gamache, Texas A&M; Richard Lester, MIT).
• Compliance costs, including security compliance, may be particularly onerous for smaller and emerging research universities. In particular, computer security requirements constitute an unfunded mandate that can limit the amount of research computing available to support faculty projects at such institutions, creating a barrier to the development of research programs. Arrangements such as regionally based consortia, might advance the development of best practices and common capabilities, particularly among smaller institutions (Keith McIntosh, University of Richmond).

FOSTERING COOPERATION AMONG THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITIES TO ADVANCE RESEARCH CAPABILITIES AND PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS

This session discussed the importance of increased mutual understanding among the S&T research community, national security community, and law enforcement so that the U.S. can address threats to national security and enjoy the benefits of openness and international collaboration in research.

• Ongoing dialogue among the scientific research, national security, and law enforcement communities must be robust. The Roundtable is one venue for that dialogue, but much work is still needed to ensure that these stakeholders achieve a better understanding of each other’s purpose, governing principles and operating assumptions to provide maximum vitality to the U.S. science and technology enterprise while managing the real threats posed by illicit actions (Bankoff).
• In continuing efforts to address the challenges inherent in promoting S&T research while managing risks to national security and economic competitiveness, it is important to confront the significant information gaps, in which knowledge that is obvious to one group of stakeholders—e.g., researchers, administrators, security professionals, or U.S. regulators—can appear quite different to other stakeholders. Engagement and inclusion among the relevant stakeholders will make understanding and compliance easier (Alison Schweir, U.S. Department of State).
• The research community can and should do more to demonstrate how private sector firms and the general public benefit from science and from U.S. participation in collaborative undertakings, and should communicate the potential costs of reducing that participation with respect to the ability to shape projects, access equipment, and garner commercial benefit (Mary Sue Coleman, University of Michigan).
• Similarly, the security community should clearly communicate its responsibilities to protect Americans and others residing in the U.S. from threats by a very small, but malicious group of people. Vigilance is needed to narrow down investigations to core problem areas and cases and to define problematic technologies as narrowly as possible (Bruce Held, retired CIA, DOE).
• The workshop was designed to address issues in the academic and FFRDC research communities. However, research in critical areas is also conducted by U.S. private companies which are multinational in nature. A workshop focused on similar questions in this part of the U.S. research ecosystem might be valuable (Moniz).

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE NEED FOR CLARITY

In a workshop keynote, Ernest Moniz, the former Secretary of Energy as well as a distinguished MIT Professor, noted that while the current focus on China is both appropriate and helpful, the United States should neither overestimate China’s abilities nor underestimate

China’s determination to overtake the United States. He underscored the sustainable advantage created by the U.S. approach to scientific advancement based on openness and international collaboration, as compared to the Chinese Communist Party’s renewed penchant for control.

Moniz said that the U.S. needs to have confidence in the superiority of its S&T approach and avoid measures that are counterproductive. “We have taken a number of missteps,” Moniz said. Less welcoming immigration procedures make it more difficult for the US to attract and retain high-quality international students. An FBI meritless case was subsequently dismissed but gravely damaged the career of MIT Professor Gang Chen. “This is the kind of activity that drives a wedge between the academic and security communities, and it is not forgotten easily,” he said. This erodes trust, in turn precluding flexible relationships and damaging cooperation.

Given concerns about trust, Moniz called for clarity in the roles and responsibilities of government and U.S. academics. Government must be clear in establishing information restrictions early on and understand that academia’s research will be published. Academia is responsible for sustaining openness. Also, many scientific challenges require international solutions with no competitive value gained by “going it alone.” Scientist-to-scientist and lab-to-lab collaboration can sustain global cooperation amidst political and military competition.

DISCLAIMER This Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief was prepared by Paula Whitacre as a factual summary of what occurred at the workshop. The planning committee’s role was limited to planning the workshop. The statements made are those of the rapporteur or individual workshop participants and do not necessarily represent the views of all workshop participants; the planning committee; or the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

REVIEWERS To ensure that it meets institutional standards for quality and objectivity, this Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief was reviewed in draft form by Ruth David, Analytic Services Inc.; John Gannon, National Intelligence Council (retired); Richard A. Meserve, Carnegie Institution for Science (retired); David Rejeski, Environmental Law Institute; Staci Rijal, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and Maria Zuber, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process.

PLANNING COMMITTEE J. Michael McQuade (Co-Chair, Carnegie Mellon University, retired); Hannah L. Buxbaum (Co-Chair, Indiana University); Chaouki T. Abdallah (Georgia Institute of Technology); Arthur I. Bienenstock (Stanford University); Thomas Fingar (Stanford University); Edward B. Held (U.S. Department of Energy, retired); Thomas E. “Thom” Mason (Los Alamos National Laboratory); Padma Raghavan (Vanderbilt University); and John C. Yang (Asian Americans Advancing Justice).

STAFF Tom Arrison, Director, Board on Research Data and Information; Karla Hagan, Staff Director and Senior Program Officer, National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable; Steven Kendall, Senior Program Officer, Committee on Science, Technology, and Law; Sara Pietrzak, Senior Program Assistant, Federal Demonstration Partnership; Cole Donovan, Staff Director and Senior Program Officer, National Science, Technology, and Security Roundtable (until May 2023); and Dominic LoBuglio, Senior Program Assistant, Committee on Science, Technology, and Law (until March 2023).

ROUNDTABLE MEMBERS John Gannon (Co-Chair, National Intelligence Council, retired); Richard A. Meserve (NAE, Co-Chair, Carnegie Institution for Science, retired); Maria T. Zuber (NAS, Co-Chair, Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Chaouki T. Abdallah (Georgia Institute of Technology); Christopher P. Austin (Flagship Pioneering and Vesalius Therapeutics); John S. Binkley (U.S. Department of Energy)*; Thomas Fingar (Stanford University); Martin S. Flaherty (Fordham University); Edward Bruce Held (U.S. Department of Energy, retired); Lyric A. Jorgenson (National Institutes of Health)*; Rebecca Keiser (National Science Foundation)*; Michael S. Lauer (National Institutes of Health)*; Thomas E. “Thom” Mason (Los Alamos National Laboratory)*; J. Michael McQuade (Carnegie Mellon University); Kathryn Moler (NAS, Stanford University); Bindu Nair (U.S. Department of Defense)*; Michael New (National Aeronautics and Space Agency)*; Charles Romine (National Institute of Standards and Technology)*; Jeffrey J. Welser (International Business Machines)+.

* Denotes ex-officio member

+ Denotes consultant to the Roundtable

SPONSORS This Project has been funded in whole or in part with Federal funds from the National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, under Contract No. HHSN263201800029I; and by the U.S. Department of Defense under contract N00014-23-D-4001.

For additional information regarding the workshop, visit: www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/national-science-technology-and-security-roundtable.

SUGGESTED CITATION National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2023. Openness, International Engagement, and the Federally Funded Science and Technology Research Enterprise: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27091.

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