Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were alarming reports of inadequate control of nuclear weapons and nuclear material in the successor states. In response, the U.S. Congress enacted the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar initiative. One object of the initiative was to assist Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in reducing the likelihood of proliferation from these countries of materials, equipment, and technology related to weapons of mass destruction. As suggested by the title of the legislation, the primary concern was containment of the nuclear threat, although concerns over biological and chemical agents also were to be addressed.¹

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) developed the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to implement the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and the CTR program soon involved many organizations in both the United States and the four target countries of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan.

In the meantime, the National Research Council (NRC) had taken an active role in helping mobilize support in the United States for international programs

that would assist in preserving the base of important research activities in the successor states while also reducing the incentives for weapons scientists to accept financial offers for transferring weapons know-how to nations of proliferation concern.² In addition, in 1992 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) launched a study of alternative approaches for disposing of plutonium stocks, which were rapidly increasing with the dismantlement of weapons in the United States and Russia pursuant to reductions called for in arms control agreements.³ Recognizing these and other capabilities of the NRC and its associated institutions, in mid-1993 the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives recommended that DOD engage the NRC to examine the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar initiative.

As a result, in the spring of 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense requested that the NRC undertake an assessment of the effectiveness of CTR programs to support the efforts of the four countries in the fields of (a) export control, including control of dual-use technologies, and (b) nuclear materials protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A).

This assessment was carried out in parallel with another NRC study of the effectiveness of the early activities of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, which the Office of the Secretary of Defense had also requested in the spring of 1995. An NRC publication, Assessment of the International Science and Technology Center, presents the findings and conclusions of that study.⁴

DOD provided financial support for this study from funds it had available under the CTR program. However, from the outset of the CTR program, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has been the lead agency for MPC&A activities and the U.S. Department of State has coordinated government-wide export control activities; funds for these efforts were appropriated to DOD and then transferred to the other departments. Beginning in fiscal year 1996, funds for MPC&A

and export control activities were included, respectively, in the budgets of the Departments of Energy and State.

With the strong support of all concerned agencies, the present study has addressed a broad range of relevant U.S. Government efforts, regardless of funding sources. The assessment of MPC&A cooperation has concentrated primarily on the activities of DOE, but it has also taken into account the roles of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and DOD. The assessment of export control cooperation has included consideration of many activities of the U.S. Department of Commerce, particularly its special role with regard to dual-use technologies; the programs of DOE, with emphasis on nuclear-related controls; the activities of the U.S. Customs Service and State Department; and the supporting efforts of DOD.

Looking to the future, the sources of funding for these activities are important; and the study offers suggestions concerning future funding approaches.

As noted above, the legislation authorizing the CTR program was originally enacted in the fall of 1991, and DOD began funding program activities shortly thereafter. From the beginning, the executive branch considered MPC&A and export control to be important aspects of the program, and limited efforts in these two fields began in 1992. However, it was not until 1994 that major U.S. investments in MPC&A cooperation began. Similarly, the cooperative program in export control began slowly and gradually increased in size and scope; even now many activities are still in their early stages. Thus, the U.S. agencies anticipate continued involvement with these new programs for at least the next several years and perhaps longer.

While the study takes note of the earliest activities of the U.S. Government in the two program areas, principal attention is given to accomplishments during 1995 and the first half of 1996. As to the future, the study assumes that until the end of the century or longer the U.S. and counterpart governments will show considerable interest in pursuing bilateral programs that help reduce the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; enhance the stature of the countries of the region as responsible international trading partners; and prevent theft and smuggling of items of concern. Thus, the recommendations are directed to actions that should be taken promptly, but they recognize that implementation may take several years or even longer.

In addition to the aforementioned reports on the science centers and plutonium disposition, the NRC has undertaken a number of studies in recent years

that provide important background for the assessment of MPC&A and export control activities in the successor states.

First, with regard to MPC&A, in 1989 the NRC published the results of an analysis of material control and accounting in the DOE complex and made a number of recommendations for improving the security of nuclear material in the complex.⁵ In the study of the disposition of plutonium, special attention was given to the problems of ensuring safe and secure handling of plutonium from the dismantling of warheads through interim storage of excess materials to their ultimate disposition.⁶

In the area of export control the NRC has carried out four studies of U.S. policies during the past two decades. Each considered the balance of economic and national security interests in establishing trade policies. Each also addressed the role of the former Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and consequently gave considerable attention to trade involving the states of the FSU. These studies recognized the importance of controlling the diffusion of sensitive technologies to Third World countries, although proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was not the focus of the studies.⁷

The NRC has also sponsored many studies addressing how emerging technologies can support both economic interests and national security objectives. Most recently, it has carried out studies of the opportunities for DOD to utilize commercially available technologies to satisfy military requirements in selected fields.⁸ An earlier NRC study explicitly addressed the export control dimensions of new computer technologies.⁹ Also, a study carried out jointly with the Russian

Academy of Sciences considered confidence-building steps that would encourage an easing of west-east trade restrictions on dual-use technologies.¹⁰

The NRC also has a standing committee that provides advice to the U.S. Government on methods for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. With regard to biological weapons, NAS has a working group on controlling such weapons that has carried out many discussions with Russian counterparts on nonproliferation measures.¹¹

During the past several years, many U.S. congressional hearings, U.S. executive branch assessments, national and international conferences, and academic studies have been directed to proliferation problems that have roots in the FSU and the responses of the U.S. Government to these problems. A number of these analytical efforts have emphasized the importance of controlling nuclear material in Russia. Less attention has been given to nuclear-related issues in the other former Soviet states. The development of export control systems to help contain items of proliferation concern and the contribution of American specialists in this process have received only limited attention.¹²

The writings that emerged from these earlier efforts repeatedly underscored the serious inadequacies in protection of plutonium and highly enriched uranium throughout the nuclear complex of the FSU. Also, the reports emphasized the urgency of financing and launching American programs, in cooperation with counterpart organizations, that will lead to better containment of fissile material that is directly usable in nuclear weapons. They highlight the many administrative difficulties, particularly in Russia, that have inhibited faster implementation of bilateral programs. The most recent reports, however, note that many of these administrative barriers have been overcome and that the programs are now moving ahead more easily.¹³

Less research and documentation address export control issues. Most underscore the newness in the region of western approaches to export control; and they conclude that, in view of the extensive and often remote borders of the countries of the region, enforcement of export controls will indeed be a difficult task.¹⁴

In short, the previous studies provide a very useful, albeit incomplete, background of evidence and analysis of the seriousness of the problems being addressed by the cooperative programs in the fields of export control and MPC&A.¹⁵ However, they have not addressed in detail the effectiveness of U.S. cooperative programs, lessons learned from these programs, or steps that can be taken to increase the impact of the programs. This study seeks to fill those gaps.

During the summer of 1995, the chairman of the NRC appointed a 10-member interdisciplinary committee of specialists to carry out this study. The charge to the committee is set out in Appendix C. Biographies of committee members are attached as Appendix D.

In preparation for the committee's work, the project staff held discussions with governmental and nongovernmental specialists in the field. Many of these specialists were invited to meet with the committee. Moreover, early in the study many members of the committee participated in special briefings on developments in the FSU organized at several government agencies in Washington and at Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. Also, the staff compiled an extensive collection of relevant documents prepared by American and foreign organizations that provided important background for the committee's meetings. All documents used in preparing this report were unclassified, although selected committee members and staff had the benefit of several classified briefings.

During the first half of 1996, committee members traveled to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to gain firsthand impressions of developments in these

countries, particularly the impact of American programs of interest to the committee. These trips included consultations with local and American officials and specialists and visits to facilities that were of special relevance to U.S. efforts in the countries. Also, in Moscow small seminars were held with Russian specialists concerning (a) dual-use technologies currently in the development phase and (b) the interests of Russian industrialists with regard to the evolution of export controls in Russia.

In addition to the meetings in Washington, D.C. and New Mexico, the committee spent one week in July 1996 at the conference site of the National Academy of Sciences in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, to develop the framework for this report. The committee recognized the difficulties of writing a report on programs that are still unfolding in a region in flux and decided to concentrate on developments that took place prior to the summer of 1996. After the report had been reviewed according to NRC procedures, the committee approved the final draft in February 1997, cognizant of many recent events that were not adequately reflected in the report but nevertheless confident that the overall thrust of the report remained valid.

Throughout the entire process, many officials and other specialists in the United States and the FSU took time to provide very important information and insights for the committee. The Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, and the American embassies in Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty were extraordinarily helpful in arranging visits and consultations for the committee. Appendix B identifies the formal meetings and visits. Of no less significance were the many informal discussions also arranged through numerous channels in the United States and abroad.

The committee expresses its appreciation to the many individuals and institutions in the United States and abroad who assisted its efforts. It also is grateful for the exceptional assistance of the NRC staff. Any errors in this report are the committee's own.