Background: The C4ISR Integration Task Force (ITF) issued its report on November 30, 1996.¹ The ITF was created in 1995 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to "define and develop better means and processes to ensure C4I capabilities most effectively meet the needs of our warfighters." Although other efforts are examining C4ISR integration and interoperability, the ITF was formed to address these issues from a broader perspective. The ITF's goals were to (1) set an aim for the C4ISR functional area by creating a defense-wide C4ISR "Strategic Vision and Guiding Principles," and (2) improve the "processes (architectures, requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition) that impact C4ISR capabilities needed by the warfighters and decision makers."

C4ISR Vision: The Integration Task Force developed a C4ISR vision for the 21st century, based on concepts identified in Joint Vision 2010 and C4I for the Warrior: "Warriors, and those who support them, generate, use,

and share the knowledge necessary to survive and succeed on any mission.''

C4ISR Guiding Principles: In order to achieve this vision, C4ISR capabilities generally need to be effective, affordable, and adaptable. In addition, the C4ISR capabilities and processes should be inherently joined and coalition-capable; interoperable; tightly coupled to requirements; secure and available to authorized users; robust and survivable; doctrinally agile; widely available and timely; able to share knowledge that can be tailored to the need; cognizant of the reality of chaos and able to deal with uncertainty; self-aware and self-healing; able to share language; able to keep pace with evolving technology; mobile and continuous; adaptable and adaptive; conformable to standards; easy to use, effective, and fast; innovative; and based on learning, collaboration, and empowerment.

ITF's Recommendations: The summary below focuses on the ITF's 13 major recommendations, which are organized into five categories. These recommendations and associated strategies, as well as action offices, time lines, and targets where appropriate, are discussed in detail of Chapter 5 of the ITF's report.

• 1.	Manage and guide: A common strategic direction needs to be established to guide C4ISR.

• • Develop and maintain a common defense-wide C4ISR strategic plan;
  •  Implement a common framework for architecture development for all C4ISR activities;
  •  Issue updated and integrated C4ISR-related compatibility, interoperability, integration, and security policy directives; and
  •  Emphasize integrated C4ISR management, and determine the feasibility of implementing a systems integration management-type process.

• 2.	Identify joint and defense-wide needs: C4ISR requirements must "reflect the emerging needs of the Unified Command and Joint Task Force . . . Commanders, . . . be flexible enough to accommodate uncertainty," and be fully integrated.

• •  Increase integration by implementing a standardized, mission-oriented approach to requirements definition using the collaborative Joint Mission Area Assessments and Joint Mission Needs Analyses;
  •  Create a top-down integrated, nested set of requirements; and
  •  Apply improved assessment practices (i.e., streamline the existing

• Assessment of Alternatives) and implement a simplified, interactive, standardized process for analysis.

• 3.

  Align programs and resources: The entire DOD portfolio of investments should be assessed and managed from a joint and defense-wide perspective. In addition the "[s]trategic management of C4ISR needs to rely increasingly on incentives for achieving strategic goals... and on measures of performance which serve as management controls."

• •  Strengthen linkages between the Joint Strategic Planning System and other defense-wide requirements processes, and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System processes at all levels; and
  •  Align defense resources with joint priorities and requirements.

• 4.	Expedite the delivery of C4ISR capabilities: DOD has not applied its new way of doing business (as evidenced by the advanced concept technology demonstrations, Advanced Warfighting Experiments, etc.) "uniformly across the C4ISR arena and has not taken advantage of their potential."

• •  Consider evolutionary acquisition and other non-traditional acquisition methods for C4ISR; and
  •  Create a comprehensive management process (i.e., a C4ISR Integrated System Support) to organize ongoing defense-wide C4ISR activities, thereby creating a unified approach to C4ISR system development.

• 5.	Share knowledge/provide a common infrastructure: DOD is not fully capitalizing on its investment of information resources and human capital.

• •  Create a defense-wide C4ISR knowledge base/warehouse with integrated tool sets; and
  •  Educate, train, retrain, and certify the work force.

Conclusions: In general, the recommendations provided by the Integration Task Force would lead to incremental improvements throughout the DOD. These recommendations are intended to work together to strengthen C4ISR roles and improve the efficacy of C4ISR processes and capabilities.

The Advanced Battlespace Information System Task Force was created by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering and the Joint Staff

director for C4 Systems "to explore how emerging information and technologies could be used to provide the warfighter with significant new capabilities" identified in Joint Vision 2010. The focus of the task force's study was force operations (specifically the concepts of dominant maneuver, precision management, and full-dimensional protection identified in Joint Vision 2010), with the C4I portion of the system of systems as the focal point. The task force released its report in May 1996.²

Background: The Advanced Battlespace Information System is a set of systems "that forms an underlying grid of flexible, shared, and assured information services and provides advanced capabilities in support of new command and control and force employment concepts." The vision for the Advanced Battlespace Information System is that it will provide a "knowledge-based C4I system environment that facilitates revolutionary operational capability by enabling warfighters to rapidly acquire and use all available information."

Advanced Battlespace Information System Capability Framework: The task force identified an Advanced Battlespace Information System capability framework composed of three tiers—effective force employment, battlespace awareness, and a common information grid—arranged and supported from the bottom up with the information grid providing the infrastructure and services.

New Force Employment Concepts: The doctrine of information superiority espoused in Joint Vision 2010 will enable commanders to "control and shape the pace and phasing of battle by rapidly integrating and synchronizing dispersed forces to mass effects at the right place and time." In short, the ability to shape the battlefield through information superiority will allow for coordination of force elements to achieve overwhelming effect and attack priority targets. This capability is enhanced by battlefield visualization.

New Command and Control Concepts: The new force employment concepts described above require "a flexible, agile, distributed command structure, with a capability for continual proactive planning and empowered execution." Currently, command and control structures reflect a rigid hierarchy and division of functional areas. New command and control organizations need to be adaptive, and the planning processes need

to be dynamic. The Advanced Battlespace Information System architecture supports a decentralized approach that enables distributed empowerment since information superiority allows for "distributing decision making while maintaining coherence across the force."

Mapping Operational Capabilities to Technology Developments: A methodology for mapping operational capabilities to key needed technology developments was developed by the task force, and 32 key functional capabilities were identified for future operations to support desired operational capabilities. This mapping is symmetrical, and the task force "found that in most cases, the same functional capability supported multiple operational capabilities, and typically one operational capability depended on multiple functional capabilities."

Advanced Battlespace Information System Technology Roadmap: The Advanced Battlespace Information System is dependent on advanced information technologies and "a sustained, concerted effort is needed to focus research and operational demonstrations in critical areas" from the near term (1997-2000) through the long term (through 2010). The task force created a technology roadmap that depicts continued developments in current and enabling technologies and fully supporting demonstrations.

Implementation Strategy: The task force noted that "fielding [Advanced Battlespace Information System] capabilities requires incremental insertion, adaptation, and assimilation of new operational concepts and technologies" that are guided "by a single long-term vision and a broad community of participants." The implementation process is "evolutionary and iterative."

Initial Steps Toward the Vision: The task force found that the Advanced Battlespace Information System has "produced substantive near-term benefits." The Advanced Battlespace Information System has "served as a catalyst that stimulated the examination of architectural elements that can be incorporated into a Joint Staff operational architecture to support Joint Vision 2010," and results have been incorporated into defense-wide science and technology planning.

The Joint Chief of Staffs, in collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service science and technology executives, identified 10 high-priority, joint warfighting capability objectives, which are

updated annually to focus the defense science and technology program. In 1998, the joint warfighting capability objectives are information superiority (which uses C4ISR "to acquire and assimilate information needed to dominate and neutralize adversary forces and effectively employ friendly forces" with near-real-time awareness using a robust C4 network); precision force; combat identification; joint theater missile defense; military operations in urban terrain; joint readiness and logistics and sustainment of strategic systems; force protection/dominant maneuver; electronic combat; chemical/biological warfare defense and protection; countering weapons of mass destruction; and combating terrorism.³ The joint warfighting capability objectives were augmented this year to be more responsive to the issues identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review. They support the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010.

In November 1997, DOD's Inspector General issued an audit report titled Implementation of the DOD Joint Technical Architecture.⁴ The audit found that DOD does not have "an integrated or coordinated approach to implementing the Joint Technical Architecture."

Background: The Joint Technical Architecture (JTA), which was issued in 1996, "is a minimum set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of parts to ensure that a conformant system satisfies a specified set of requirements." In short, the Joint Technical Architecture provides minimum standards (which are performance based and primarily commercial) and guidelines for interoperability of all DOD C3I (and C4I) systems, which will be periodically updated and eventually include "all DOD systems that produce, use, or exchange information electronically." The Joint Technical Architecture will be implemented through the Common Operating Environment, which "provides a standard set of common software services, such as data management, communications and graphics through standard application program interfaces." The objective of the Inspector General audit, which was conducted from December 1996 through June 1997, was "to assess DOD programs in implementing information processing standards as a means of achieving systems interoperability."

Implementation of the Joint Architecture: Due to the minimal planning guidance provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Technical Architecture implementation plans submitted by 17 major DOD components do not reflect a coordinated or integrated DOD approach to implementation. As such, it is unlikely that DOD's interoperability goals will be met effectively or efficiently. The Joint Technical Architecture was jointly implemented by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I in August 1996.

Component Implementation Plans: Only half of the DOD components responded to the implementation guidance and, overall, the responses received by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I were "incomplete and inaccurate." In fact, when viewed as a whole, the responses "did not represent a uniform structure and a coordinated implementation strategy ... [and] generally did not identify the component's priority for JTA implementation, estimated cost, or implementation schedule." The Inspector General believed that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I's lack of an overall DOD perspective in the definition of the integration guidelines was a "serious omission" in the guidance to the components. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I did not clearly specify who should submit implementation plans. Finally, problems regarding oversight and integration were identified. For example, as of June 1997, there was no formal process to "receive, track, evaluate, or provide feedback on the Component JTA implementation plans" (although a review team is being formed).

Factors Affecting Implementation: The Inspector General identified three factors that could enhance the Joint Technical Architecture implementation process. First, the Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment "provides a standard platform that mission area applications can be designed to access through standardized application program interfaces . . . [allowing] software developers to concentrate on building mission area applications instead of building duplicative system support service software." Secondly, the DOD can build on the Army implementation experience, including the development of the Army Technical Architecture, which serves as the basis for the Joint Technical Architecture. Finally, the DOD Total Asset Visibility Implementation Plan's establishment of "clusters of capability rather than phasing combat support systems one at a time into the Global Combat Support System . . . could establish a model for cross-Service and cross-functional coordination, which is essential for effective and efficient JTA implementation." Several factors were also identified that could impede the implementation process. First, although the Defense Principal Staff Assistants have

been given oversight responsibility, their role in implementing the Joint Technical Architecture is not defined. Another factor is the DOD mandate for use of COTS technology, which may not be complementary to the Joint Technical Architecture since "all commercial products may not be built to the standards specified in the JTA" (additionally, there is not a clear method by which to certify commercial software products as Joint Technical Architecture compliant). Finally, although an integrated architecture—consisting of technical, operational, and systems components—is very important, the focus to date has been on the technical architecture. In addition, other factors, such as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, affect the implementation of the Joint Technical Architecture.

Information Technology Management Reforms: The Inspector General's report reviewed the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which requires the DOD "to establish a process to select, manage, and evaluate the results of information technology investments" and to designate a chief information officer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I is the primary chief information officer for the DOD. In addition, the DOD also established the Chief Information Officer Council to advise on matters related to information technology and coordinate the implementation of the mandates of the 1996 Act.

Conclusion: The Joint Technical Architecture is the key initiative to achieving DOD's goal of interoperability. The Inspector General's review of the DOD component implementation plans indicates "that the JTA is being implemented in an environment that is not consistent with attaining interoperable information processing systems in an integrated and coordinated manner." According to the Inspector General's report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense needs to assume responsibility for establishing "a framework of strategic planning, policy and guidance to support those plans." Additionally, no mechanism has been identified to provide the guidance and oversight to the components that is needed to ensure efficient and coordinated implementation of the Joint Technical Architecture.

Recommendations: The Inspector General provided four recommendations to the co-chairs of the DOD Architecture Coordination Council (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, and the Director of the Joint Staff C4 Systems Directorate):

•  Develop a methodology for cross-service and cross-functional coordination of DOD component Joint Technical Architecture implementation plans.

•  Develop a methodology to measure and track the progress and success of the Joint Technical Architecture implementation.
•  Disseminate information that could enhance or impede implementation of the Joint Technical Architecture.
•  Establish review mechanisms to periodically assess joint interoperability levels.

Management Comments: In short, the stakeholders generally concurred with the findings and conclusions of the Inspector General's report with comments, some of which were incorporated in the Inspector General's final report for accuracy and clarification. In addition, they also fully concurred with the recommendations.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I and the Joint Staff C4 Systems Directorate co-sponsored the C4ISR mission assessment to address potential C4ISR issues as they relate to the support of DOD's evolving operational concepts and future force and weapons mixes. The resulting "C4ISR Mission Assessment" document provided input to the Quadrennial Defense Review's Modernization Panel. The "C4ISR Mission Assessment" was composed of a number of focused analyses on architecture; C3; communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; mission analysis; and Concept of Operations-Enabled, "which were closely coupled to provide an integrated set of assessments and recommendations across the breadth of the C4ISR domain." A formal C4ISR mission assessment report was never published. The "C4ISR Mission Assessment" document provides a summary of the Communications Mix analysis.

Study Background: The objectives of the Communications Mix study were to examine the adequacy of DOD's communications capabilities; develop alternative investment strategies; assess performance, cost, and risk of alternatives; and recommend an investment strategy, but not specific system designs. The study was limited to an operational scenario consisting of two major conventional theater wars allowing for a pre-positioned posture. It focused on the communications needed to support the operations of the deployed warfighter in three main areas: theater forward communications, tactical wide-area networking, and theater reach-back. The study team reviewed communications requirements data collected from past studies and developed a C4ISR Mission Assessment communications requirements information flow model. Observations derived from the model clearly indicated that information management is critically needed to contain the growth of communications requirements.

As a baseline, the study team examined current and projected spending articulated in the Future Years Defense Plan FY98-03. Of the $257 billion total C4ISR funding projected for this period, approximately $36.8 billion is allocated for communications (excluding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-funded communications). The systems examined by the study—satellite communications, tactical radios, tactical wide area networks, and long-haul systems, such as the Defense Information Systems Network—account for $16.1 billion, or 44%, of DOD's communications spending over the period.

Assessment: The Communications Mix study assessed the identified systems to determine the ability of DOD's current and programmed communications systems to meet projected future requirements. As such, it was determined that today's "communications systems supporting the deployed warfighter are currently able to support only a fraction of projected future data rate requirements. In broad terms, the magnitude of the shortfall ranges from a factor of four . . . at the upper echelons to a factor of fifty . . . at the tactical radio level." Therefore, communications capabilities must be "increased dramatically" to support projected requirements. The study also considered alternatives to address the shortfalls identified in communications capabilities.

Recommendations: The "C4ISR Mission Assessment" recommended the following changes to the current communications portfolio to address the deficiencies identified in the areas of tactical radios, joint tactical wide area networks, joint network and services management, military satellite and fiber communications, commercial leases, and unmanned aerial vehicles communications relays:

•  "Accelerate the procurement of the next generation wide-band military satellite system to address the shortfall in available capacity for theater reach-back and intra-theater long haul communications."
•  "Accelerate and coordinate service programs for upgrades to the communications switching and trunking systems supporting the deployed tactical terrestrial [WAN]."
•  "Develop and procure a Joint Tactical Network and Services Management capability and develop the necessary concept-of-operations and procedures for dynamically monitoring and managing communications assets."
•  "Consolidate the Services' multiband, multi-mode radio ... programs and develop a family of programmable, modular digital radios based on a common modular radio architecture."
•  "Procure two squadrons of five . . . UAV communications relay

• aircraft each to provide early entry and surge communications relay capability."
•  "Initiate R&D to provide high-data rate protected communications services with a combination of satellites and UAV relays."
•  "Initiate demonstration programs to assess the utility of emerging commercial mobile subscriber services and technology to augment or replace the existing UHF satellite communications systems."

In addition, specific recommendations for deployed warfighter communications were also made in each area. The actions recommended by the C4ISR Mission Assessment study team would add an estimated $5 billion to the Future Years Defense Plan. Finally, five investment options were provided to decision makers for "program actions that provide increasing levels of capability at increasing levels of investment."

In 1995, the Defense Science Board established the task force on C4ISR Integration at the request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology as part of DOD's attempt to accelerate the development of C4ISR integration and architecture efforts. The task force was charged with providing advice to the chair of the Integration Task Force (ITF) on all aspects of C4ISR as well as preparing separate reports of its judgments on C4ISR issues. The task force released its report in February 1997.⁵

Background: After meeting with the Integration Task Force to hear about its process, organization, and results to date, the Defense Science Board task force formulated a set of recommendations to be considered by the Integration Task Force and submitted two letter reports. The Defense Science Board task force found that DOD's "ITF efforts were overly broad and complex" and that it was difficult to accomplish the tasks defined by the ITF because of the "fractionated and 'stovepiped' nature of the C4ISR stakeholder community, particularly in regard to programmatic and fiscal responsibilities." The task force also concluded that the Integration

Task Force's recommendations spoke to a ''generalized Pentagon process" that would not "result in a leveraged process in achieving important new levels of C4ISR integration."

The Defense Science Board task force was concerned about the lack of a process for combining the services' C4ISR equipment and procedures. Although DOD created various joint committees to address the related issues, the task force did not believe they were "adequate to deal with the joint C4ISR problem." It concluded that "the fundamental responsibility" belonged to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (CINCs). As such, the task force identified two needs—"improving the joint process for determining what a joint force commander needs in order to operate effectively, and the creation of a joint system engineering organization"—that are described below.

Joint Process: The Defense Science Board task force envisioned a "more formal joint process on the front end of the programming and budgeting cycle that gives joint force commanders stronger influence on decisions regarding what increased (or decreased) capabilities are needed for them to carry out their assigned missions." The task force, therefore, recommended customer-based, output-oriented planning and programming in which the joint operational customer has a formal role in "formulating joint operational concepts and . . . architectures, as well as ensuring appropriate input to resource allocation priorities to produce effective joint operational forces." It also defined different roles for DOD's three C4ISR integration communities—the Joint World (e.g., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the military departments and agencies. In addition, the joint customer would play a leading role in motivating a shift of resources from support infrastructure to operational, or forcing, capabilities. The task force was concerned that more than half the defense budget was allocated for support infrastructure, allowing for a "critical imbalance."

The task force recommended expanding the joint role in the planning and budgeting process by "insuring that the joint elements of the Department fulfills [sic] their responsibilities and that the joint operational needs become paramount from the outset." As such, the role of the CINCs needs to "become a more integral and required part of the process." They should be treated as the customers and the process "should evaluate results based on satisfying customer's needs." Joint planning and programming should focus more on "providing the right set of a capabilities for the CINCs to carry out their operational missions." In addition, the CINCs would have substantial influence on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff input to Defense Plans and the services' plan of the month process based on their input "on gaps in their capability to meet assigned mission needs."

Finally, the task force found that there is no effective process for providing guidance for joint operational doctrine and architectures as they relate to the development of the connectivity required for an effective joint force C4ISR integration, which could compromise the "ability to respond rapidly with effective joint forces." As such, a process would be required "to develop joint operational doctrine with enough specificity to guide joint operational architectures," which, in turn, must be specific enough to guide the system and technical architectures. They stated that ''doctrine and architectures must fill the twin needs of adaptability to CINC unique needs and structuring deployable capabilities to fit a variety of CINC needs." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Staff and U.S. Atlantic Command should share the lead for developing joint operational doctrine and architectures, and the "key implementing principle must be that the CINC's part of the front end process become an essential prerequisite to the follow-on planning and budgeting."

Joint Systems Engineering Organization: As mentioned above, the task force found that there is a "need for a 'military engineering organization to support CJCS and the CINCs in their role in joint C4ISR."' It also identified eight functions for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs in order to carry out their responsibilities for the design of the joint operational architecture. The task force further defined the organization of and resources for a military systems engineering capability for C4ISR integration. The estimated cost of such a capability was approximately $50 million per year. In addition to the creation of such an organization "to support the CINCs in their evolving responsibility for the operational design of joint C4ISR," the task force recommended "that the CJCS use the new structure that was established to provide joint operational architectures and joint system engineering to Joint Theater and Air and Missile Defense as a pilot program for the broader C4ISR area, with focus on the refining [of] the responsibilities and missions of warfighting CINCs."

Other Issues: Several other issues were identified by the task force regarding DOD's management of C4ISR integration:

•  Intelligence support to military operations. The task force recommended that DOD "work with the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] and the broader Intelligence Community to develop new ways of providing information support for operational commanders which effectively and efficiently integrate the rich array of assets available within the United States."
•  Vulnerability, security, and protection. The task force recommended that the DOD "should closely evaluate whether the separation of intelli-

• gence and operations within warfighting elements continues to serve the nation well."
•  Acquisition of C4ISR capabilities. The task force identified two "unique characteristics of C4ISR systems relevant to the acquisition process. First, the inherently joint aspects of C4ISR are critical to the overall utility of C4ISR .... The second key characteristic is the pace of technological change in the field of information systems that form the basis for much of C4ISR," which is "totally incompatible with normal DOD procurement practices." As such, DOD needed "to push harder on acquisition reform.''

In February 1997, the Defense Science Board task force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield (May-June 1996) released its report extending the 1995 work on the same topic.⁶ It should be noted that this follow-up study was conducted and the report drafted on the eve of the Bosnian elections in September 1996.

Background: The 1996 task force was directed to "review the progress towards the implementation of recommendations made" in 1995 and "to determine any improvements which would enhance the flow of intelligence and other information for Operation Joint Endeavor," with an emphasis on other C4SIR improvements that could be quickly applied to support coalition forces as well as future operations after the restructuring and redeployment of forces, especially ground forces, in December 1996. It should be noted that all of the recommendations resulting from the 1995 study, which addressed policy, technological, and organizational deficiencies that would affected the safety of U.S. forces, were accepted by the DOD and Central Intelligence Agency, and "approximately $150 million followed to begin making rapid improvements centered primarily around Air Force and Navy missions."

Key Findings and Recommendations: The 1996 task force found that the findings from the 1995 study were being implemented effectively and that there was a "dramatic improvement in information availability to the forces." In addition, the task force made recommendations in four major areas to extend the progress achieved since the 1995 study:

•  Information integration. The 1996 task force found a critical need to integrate combat and information power to better match information ca-

• pability with mission requirements and to provide more information and better connectivity.
•  Joint Broadcast System Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (Bosnian Command and Control Augmentation). The 1995 task force found that insufficient bandwidth and poor imagery quality were a problem for both U.S. and coalition operators, and the Bosnian Command and Control Augmentation was designed as a remedy to provide "relevant, timely information (specifically large data format information such as imagery and video)" to these operators. In this major area, the 1996 task force made specific recommendations on providing additional time and funding for the Bosnian Command and Control Augmentation, which is not an official advanced concept technology demonstration; providing greater information support that is required for brigade and battalion headquarters; and addressing information management challenges.
•  Leave-behind programs. The 1996 task force recommended that an interagency task force be established "to identify opportunities, develop specific items, and assist in deployment before redeployment phase."
•  Areas for other major recommendations. The 1996 task force also made recommendations in 11 other areas: C4ISR dynamic tasking capability (in short, providing tools and processes "to dynamically integrate tasking of national/theater [reconnaissance]/surveillance in C2 systems with timely feedback"; the task force found "that a failure to coordinate and integrate the use of superb ISR assets in direct support of the warfighter is a remaining barrier to achieving and exploiting information dominance"), human intelligence information management, countermine/demining, Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe, airborne video surveillance, tactical signal intelligence, commercial equipment, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, commercial satellite imagery, information warfare vulnerability, and total asset visibility. It also identified recommendations made in 1995 that required renewed attention, focusing on Bosnia theater radar/infrared imagery, controlled imagery base, ultra-high-frequency satellite communications, hard copy, linguists, and communications landing rights.

The 1996 task force also uncovered some "great ideas": the DOD and military were adapting to the changing environment, as evidenced in the shift of missions in Bosnia; important information applications were developed; there were signs of effective information integration; and there were innovative uses of information.

In 1996, the Defense Science Board summer study task force examined innovative tactics for improving the effectiveness of rapidly de-

ployable forces with regard to future warfighting capabilities. The Defense Science Board released its final report and two accompanying volumes of supporting materials and white papers in October 1996. ⁷

Background: The 1996 Defense Science Board task force was asked to identify how to make small and rapidly deployable forces more effective with the goal of accomplishing "missions heretofore only possible with much larger and massed forces." The task force considered the scenarios posited by the 1995 Defense Science Board summer study, which determined that, in the future, adversaries will have the motive and means (through advanced technologies) to achieve military superiority. As a result, it was determined that the United States must increase the effectiveness and decrease the vulnerabilities of rapidly deployed forces to enhance its "freedom of action to deal with this future."

New Expeditionary Force Concept: The task force defined goals for a new joint expeditionary force (or leading-edge strike force) that focus on massing fires rather than forces. This new force would be composed of "light and agile ground and air combat cells coupled to remote suites of sensors, weapons, and information processors." The size and composition of the combat cells would be determined by the nature of the mission. These forces would be distributed and disaggregated, empowered by unprecedented situational understanding (which is a higher level of knowledge than situational awareness), dependent on remote fires that are effective against a variety of targets, connected by a robust information infrastructure, and supported by precision logistics.

Operational Considerations: Two factors would remain constant in any operating environment, regardless of force size and composition: "dependence on remote elements and ground forces organized around agile combat cells." In general, remote strikes using air and naval forces would precede deployment of ground units. Then, an initial small intensive force would be inserted (this force could be either concentrated to coordinate security or distributed to increase survivability and enlarge territorial control, depending on the circumstances). To achieve dominant situational understanding, the task force envisions a multilayered sensor approach integrating surveillance and connectivity, which "would enable effective remote fires and militarily useful combat cell operation." In order to free more lift resources for combat operations, the task force recommends reducing the support functions deployed to theater operations. The C4ISR

infrastructure, which could be effectively deployed remotely through the information infrastructure, is identified as a candidate for reduction.

Analyses and Simulation: In order to examine its new expeditionary force concept, the task force sponsored several analyses and simulations, which are reviewed in Section IV of the final report.

Enabling Elements of Concept: The new expeditionary force concept depends on the synergies and the interdependency between the following functions/capabilities: remote fires; battle management, command and control; information infrastructure; situation understanding; protection and survivability of ground forces; and training. In discussing the importance of battle management, command and control, the task force breaks down C4ISR into two interdependent categories—the human function of command and the technical function of the C3ISR activities—and emphasizes the "need to maintain human relationships on [the] dispersed, digital battlefield."

Recommendations: The task force offered three sets of recommendations for the Secretary of Defense and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs:

•  Establish a joint effort to explore and evolve this new force concept. The task force calls this its "try before buy" recommendation, and calls for testing and analysis as well as augmenting activities that are emerging within the services, such as the Army After Next initiative. This would be supported by redirected analysis and simulation activities, and an executor (or executive agent) would be selected to lead the effort and evolve the concepts.
•  Support critical and enabling systems and mechanisms by accelerating the development of the information infrastructure architectures. A joint warfighter, or operational, architecture should be developed that addresses operations concepts; processes and procedures for information generation, condition, fusing, and use; weapons, sensor, and platform functional characteristics; assignment of functions; and force structure. A joint technical information architecture should be mandated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I that addresses coherent data formats, protocols, message standards, interfaces and so on; enables open systems; and provides a "building code" for the information architecture. Finally, a joint information infrastructure systems architecture should be implemented by the services' C4I organizations that migrates legacy systems and integrates commercial systems. In addition, the task force calls for supporting both existing and candidate advanced concept technology

• demonstrations and advanced technology demonstrations important to the concept as well as initiating new ones.
•  Prepare to establish a Joint Expeditionary Task Force by 1998 to be the focal point for transitioning the concepts. This joint operational force would be established under the U.S. Atlantic Command and is envisioned to test the products (that is, the tactics and technologies) of these efforts described by the summer study task force.

Conclusions: The task force believes that there are several necessary conditions already in place for the new capabilities it envisions: there is a compelling strategic rationale; the enabling technologies are maturing rapidly; and there are efforts currently under way in the services to explore these new concepts. In addition, the task force believed that the concepts identified can be "refined, tested, modified, shaped, and evolved into field capabilities over the next 10-20 years." Finally, four complementary concept enablers were identified: fielding the robust information infrastructure; turning situational awareness into situational understanding by managing sensors and information in conceptual contexts; making remote fires work; and operating in a disperse posture.

In 1994, GAO issued a report on DOD's C4I system and operational interoperability as a follow-up to a 1987 report that identified problems in this area as related to C3 systems.⁸ At the time this report was released, the General Accounting Office determined that DOD's success in achieving interoperability during joint operations would be "highly dependent on the availability of a comprehensive, integrated, and useful C4I architecture."

Background: The General Accounting Office found that problems associated with interoperability were persistent, as identified by several reports issued by DOD and the Joint Staff. Cited was the DOD's joint tactical C3I architecture, which was a series of functional area documents published between 1988 and 1992 that "identified service missions, roles and responsibilities; command and control connectivity requirements; and support-

ing C3 systems and equipment." According to the General Accounting Office, DOD representatives did not consider this a useful planning document even though a number of system and operational interoperability problems were identified. Interoperability (system, technical, and operational) was also addressed in 1991 by a panel formed by the Joint Chiefs (see the Command and Control Functional Analysis and Consolidation Review Panel Report). In 1992, another Joint Staff team looked at interoperability as it related to C2 systems. A third report cited was DOD's 1992 report to Congress on the Persian Gulf War. In this report, DOD cited interoperability problems identified during the joint operations and the challenges that remain ahead.

C4I for the Warrior: This initiative, launched in 1992, intended "to (1) address joint force C4I interoperability issues and (2) provide a means for unifying the many heterogeneous service C4I programs." The General Accounting Office found that achieving this initiative would be a prolonged process due to its three concurrent—quick-fix, mid-term, and objective—phases. In addition, the General Accounting Office concluded that a comprehensive architecture remained to be developed, despite the DOD's joint tactical C3I architecture (see comments above). The General Accounting Office also found that the Joint Interoperability and Engineering Organization, which was responsible for the architecture, "lacked the authority to enforce compliance with interoperability standards." Finally, there was a continuing concern regarding effective interoperability enforcement despite DOD efforts to strengthen enforcement of C4I interoperability.

The General Accounting Office concluded that DOD had the means to strengthen C4I interoperability. In 1993, the Secretary of Defense directed that the U.S. Atlantic Command assume a new mission as a joint headquarters for U.S.-based forces, based on a recommendation from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The General Accounting Office concluded that the Command would be "ideally suited for additional responsibilities associated with C4I interoperability. Specifically, the Command could be assigned primary responsibility for assessing C4I requirements for the potential effect on joint force operations." The Command could also advise the Defense Information Systems Agency on the development of the joint C4I architecture as well as ensure "continuous C4I interoperability assessments through joint training exercises."

Recommendations: The General Accounting Office identified three areas to assist DOD's ability to achieve C4I interoperability:

•  The provision of guidelines for developing the joint C4I architecture, including time-driven goals.

•  The establishment of a joint program management office "with directive authority and funding control for C4I systems acquisitions."
•  The consideration of assigning responsibility to the U.S. Atlantic Command for C4I interoperability, as described above.

DOD Response: Although DOD generally agreed with the report's findings, it believed it had taken "adequate measures to deal with C4I system interoperability and saw no benefit in assigning additional responsibilities to the U.S. Atlantic Command."

In March 1998, the General Accounting Office completed its review of the certification process for interoperability of C4I systems and concluded that DOD stakeholders (CINCs, the services, and the DOD agencies) are generally not complying with the C4I certification requirement.⁹

Background: In 1992, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) established a certification process to ensure interoperability of C4I systems during joint operations as a result of interoperability problems experienced during the Persian Gulf War. This process tests and certifies existing, newly fielded, and modified systems for interoperability. New systems are generally denied approval for production if they have not been certified. Although a system may pass certification testing, it is possible that it has not been tested against all systems with which it may be interoperable. Finally, a waiver may be granted to drop certification requirements for "developmental efforts, demonstrations, exercises, or normal operations"; however, this is not a permanent waiver and typically is granted for 1 year. The Joint Staff's director for C4 systems is responsible for ensuring compliance, and the Defense Information Systems Agency's Test Command is the sole certifier of systems.

Findings: The GAO found that DOD's compliance with the certification requirement is inadequate:

•  Test Command analysis indicates that "a significant number of existing C4I systems had not been submitted for certification testing," and is

• unable to identify how many systems actually require certification (e.g., some systems are legacy systems or stand-alone systems). During FY1994-1997, only 149 systems were certified by the Test Command. ¹⁰
•  No newly developed systems of the C2 Initiatives Program were certified and, for the past 3 years, no advanced concept technology demonstrations were tested or certified. Finally, there is no consistency with regard to recertification of modified systems.
•  There are several reasons for inadequate compliance: lack of knowledge of the certification requirement by system managers (although some managers purposely did not submit their fielded or modified systems for testing); inadequate budgeting by the services for the testing and certification process; and production approval for some new systems without verification of the certification process.

The GAO also found weaknesses in DOD's certification process:

•  The Test Command does not have a way to focus its limited resources on certifying crucial systems because a "complete and accurate listing of C4I systems requiring certification and a plan to prioritize systems for testing" does not exist. For example, of the 42 existing C2 systems submitted by the services and determined to be crucial to military commanders by the Military Communications Electronics Board, 23 had not been tested or certified.
•  The Test Command does not advise the services about interoperability problems observed during joint exercises. During the four joint exercises held between 1996 and 1997, "the Test Command noted that 15 systems experienced 43 'significant interoperability problems'—defects that could result in loss of life, equipment, or supplies"—most of which were caused by system-specific software problems. If the services are not notified of these problems, "significant interoperability problems may arise in subsequent exercises and operations." It should be noted, however, that Test Command officials are looking at ways to formally track and follow up on these problems.
•  The Test Panel does not have a formal process for informing DOD stakeholders about expired waivers.

Recommendations: The General Accounting Office made the following recommendations:

•  To make sure that critical systems do not proceed into production without consideration given to the certification requirement, the Secretary of Defense should "require the acquisition authorities to adhere to the requirement that C4I systems are tested and certified for interoperability prior to the production and fielding decision unless an official waiver has been granted."
•  To improve the interoperability certification process, the Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Joint Chiefs, should direct the services to review the information in the Defense Integration Support Tool for verification and validation and compile a complete listing of all C4I systems that require certification. In addition, the Defense Information Systems Agency director should ensure that the status of a system's certification is incorporated into the Defense Integration Support Tool and that this database is "properly maintained to better monitor C4 systems for interoperability compliance."
•  The Secretary of Defense should request that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs direct the Joint Staff, in collaboration with the DOD stakeholders, to develop processes (1) to prioritize C4I systems for testing and certification and (2) to formally follow up on and report to the stakeholders interoperability problems identified during joint exercises and inform stakeholders of systems that require interoperability testing.
•  Finally, a system to monitor waivers should be established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In addition, the report provided an appendix that briefly reviews the DOD initiatives currently under way that address aspects of interoperability: the C4I for the warrior concept; the C4ISR Architecture Framework; the Defense Information Infrastructure strategy; and the Levels of Information Systems Interoperability initiative.

Response: DOD generally concurred with the General Accounting Office findings and was firmly committed to improving its interoperability certification process by taking action to implement the General Accounting Office's recommendations.