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TECHNICAL MDV CAPABILITIES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

MDV FOR THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

Finding 7

Fuel cycle MDV technologies must evolve to keep pace with the expanding universe of nuclear activities, in terms of both emerging technologies and growth in the number of nuclear activities.

1. IAEA resources have remained constant for a number of years despite increasing MDV demands, implying future MDV may be less comprehensive and less frequent unless more efficient and effective MDV techniques are developed.
2. Current MDV technologies and methods were developed to detect traditional uranium-fueled reactors, gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, and reprocessing facilities. MDV technologies for emerging reactor designs, alternative enrichment techniques, alternative fuels, and small scale, non-traditional approaches to reprocessing need development support.
3. Current MDV paradigms focus on validating declarations, deterring illicit material diversions, and detecting unknown, undeclared activities. Expanding the MDV paradigm to include motivation and early capability development may enhance opportunities to dissuade and/or counter proliferation behavior and encourage responsible, peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology.

Recommendation 7

NNSA should prioritize R&D efforts that (a) enhance efficiency, ease of use/deployment, and sustainability of safeguards tools and technologies; (b) address MDV for advanced reactors, nontraditional and emerging enrichment techniques, and small and/or non-traditional reprocessing

technologies; and (c) enhance capabilities to monitor and detect early capability development that could be a potential proliferation threat.

Finding 8

Understanding and modeling source term mechanisms, the environmental fate, and atmospheric/aquatic transport of proliferation effluents are key to identifying when and where to sample and gaining insight into proliferation activities from analyzed samples. New analytic approaches that concurrently consider results from multiple sampler locations coupled with atmospheric and aquatic transport models can improve the identification of potential source locations.

Recommendation 8

DNN R&D, in coordination with interagency partners, should continue to support R&D to improve understanding of and develop more accurate models for source terms, environmental fate, and atmospheric/aquatic transport. Field tests should be conducted to assess limitations of the models. These efforts will enhance MDV capabilities for both the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear test explosions and should include the following:

1. Developing models of effluent release processes and mechanisms from both fuel cycle processes (including new and emerging reactor and fuel cycle technologies) and underground nuclear explosions.
2. Developing linked mesoscale and microscale models for atmospheric and aquatic modeling of effluents of interest.
3. Clarifying the effect of temperature, humidity, UV light, and other pertinent environmental factors on effluent species to determine the nature and rate of physical and chemical changes.
4. Developing integrated analytic processes to analyze environmental sampling results from all relevant sampling locations as a network, coupling their temporally resolved results with atmospheric and aquatic transport models can improve plume source location capability.

Finding 9

To enable the application of wide-area environmental sampling (WAES) as a proliferation and nuclear explosion MDV tool, additional work is needed to characterize known sources of radionuclides and regional background variations.

Recommendation 9

DNN R&D, in collaboration with interagency and international partners, should support R&D to characterize known sources of radionuclides of interest and regional background variations to enhance MDV capabilities for both the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear test explosions.

MDV FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST EXPLOSIONS

Finding 10

Capabilities for global detection of nuclear explosions have improved since the 2012 National Academies report on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In particular, (1) diverse International Monitoring System (IMS) monitoring networks are approaching the CTBT entry-into-force requirements; (2) extensive analyses of the signals for the underground explosions at the North Korean test site have introduced new source characterization capabilities such as source discrimination with regional waves, full moment tensor analysis of seismic wave radiation, and fusion of seismic and satellite-based ground deformation measurements; and (3) advanced data analytics are being explored in R&D programs for their potential to improve detection capabilities. However, improving detection sensitivity remains a key challenge, as does improving the yield estimate accuracy for low-yield tests everywhere. In addition, improved transport models for radionuclide back-tracking are needed for high confidence in identification of seismic detections as nuclear explosion sources.

Recommendation 10

NNSA and the Department of Defense should expand support for R&D to improve nuclear explosion detection sensitivity and confidence, as well as yield estimate accuracy. These efforts should include the following:

1. R&D to improve the accuracy of yield estimates from remote measurements for uncalibrated regions of interest and for low-yield explosions at known test sites.
2. R&D to improve detection sensitivity and confidence by developing higher resolution computational transport models (see also Recommendation 8), exploiting all available data sources (including open sources), and fusing radionuclide monitoring observations with source origin data from seismology or other MDV technologies.

NEW Finding 10-2

The space environment is rapidly becoming more crowded and contested due in part to the surge in commercial activities and the increasing vulnerability of space-based systems to both unintended and intended interference or attack.

NEW Recommendation 10-2

NSC and OSTP should facilitate a forward-looking policy review of space-based MDV to identify and prioritize required capabilities. NNSA and DoD should consider how to leverage emerging

capabilities to ensure that future space-based MDV capabilities are forward-looking and responsive to the evolving space environment. In particular:

1. NNSA and DoD/Air Force should explore how to increase resiliency of space-based MDV systems to interference or physical attack.
2. NNSA and DoD should modernize the data processing systems associated with space-based MDV capabilities to take advantage of emerging data analytic technologies.
3. NNSA and DoD should explore opportunities to leverage commercial space capabilities to support space-based MDV operations and RDT&E.
4. NNSA should reduce the demonstration and validation timeline of new space-based capabilities, potentially by leveraging commercial space capabilities.

Finding 11

A fully functioning IMS and broader CTBT verification regime is beneficial to U.S. nuclear explosion MDV efforts.

1. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) data are being leveraged, and U.S. support for the CTBTO is being sustained despite non-ratification of the CTBT.
2. International participation in analysis of IMS data is active and there is broad international agreement on the following research needs to improve CTBTO capabilities: atmospheric fate and transport, fusing data streams (e.g., radionuclide and seismic data), characterizing increasing background radiation, filling the data gaps that occur when countries intentionally shut down their sensor network or stop reporting data, and developing an effective on-site inspection capability.

Recommendation 11

The United States should continue to support CTBTO IMS construction, technology refreshment, and improved IMS capabilities because a fully functioning IMS is beneficial to the United States.

MDV FOR ARMS CONTROL

Finding 12

NNSA has maintained a modest portfolio of work in MDV tools for arms control, some of it focused on warhead confirmation measurement completed collaboratively between the Offices of Defense Programs (DP) and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). Recently, the need has

increased for MDV technologies for non-strategic and non-deployed warheads in potential new arms control treaties, and significant technical challenges remain.

1. Warhead confirmation techniques that can be practically deployed, authenticated, and certified, especially with trusted information barriers, are not yet mature and would benefit from test beds in order to compare strengths and weaknesses in standard and real-world conditions.
2. Joint U.S.-U.K. R&D has significantly advanced the ability to detect the passage of plutonium through a portal. However, a comprehensive technical solution to portal monitoring is needed that can detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) and high explosives in addition to plutonium.
3. The next arms control treaties or agreements may need techniques that rely on warhead identifiers or tags, advanced seals, and possibly new warhead confirmation techniques, especially those that could be used in limited access areas like storage sites. New innovative solutions for such scenarios are still needed.
4. Development of methods to manage access to sensitive facilities and data is needed and must involve the operators of the facilities to be inspected.
5. The proliferation of dual-capable conventional/nuclear delivery systems presents MDV technology challenges that demand attention.

Recommendation 12

DNN’s program for arms control MDV should be a sustained, core element of its program at all TRLs regardless of the international environment to ensure that the research community is generating and maturing technologies that could be deployed when needed. Collaboration between DP and DNN may be the best way to accomplish some of these efforts.

1. NNSA should establish a U.S. experimental test bed for warhead verification that is accessible to the academic, laboratory, industrial, and international community to safely conduct experiments on real and surrogate materials; help mature technologies; and be subject to red team and white team testing for authentication, certification, managed access, and vulnerability analyses.

2. The NNSA Baseline, Advanced, and Stretch R&D approaches offer a good starting point for investments. However, the Advanced and Stretch research topics will likely take longer to mature. Therefore, the Advanced and Stretch scenarios should be supported in parallel, not in series, with the Baseline work whenever possible.
3. NNSA, in collaboration with DTRA and other interagency partners, should participate in or initiate projects to develop ideas and tools to distinguish conventional and nuclear versions of dual-capable systems for potential future arms control agreements.

Finding 13

Through participation in various international efforts, researchers have had opportunities to develop and test MDV techniques and ideas for weapons dismantlement (including warhead confirmation) without revealing sensitive information with other nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states.

1. The U.S.-U.K., Quad,³ and IPNDV (International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification) programs have been productive venues for international exchange and testing of

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³ Established in 2015, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership is a collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states (United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden) to work on nuclear dismantlement approaches.

1. some MDV techniques. NNSA has not always supported laboratory participation in the IPNDV work at the level required for full participation.
2. There have not been persistent bilateral or multilateral R&D efforts on MDV techniques that involve Russia or China.

Recommendation 13

The United States should remain active in multilateral engagements and seek to increase bilateral engagements to jointly develop technologies for arms control and weapons dismantlement since success ultimately depends on a high level of confidence by both nuclear and non-nuclear states.

1. The United States should re-engage with Russia as soon as possible in joint technical experiments to develop high confidence, authenticatable and certifiable techniques applicable for future warhead MDV.
2. demonstrations to aid both technology maturation and provide transparency.
3. The United States should apply lessons from the U.K., IPNDV, and Quad partnerships to structure active engagements that include all members of the P5.⁴

LEVERAGING DATA FOR THE MDV MISSION

Finding 14

There has been a rapid expansion of commercial remote sensing capabilities over the past decade, both in the United States and abroad. A number of advances support improved MDV:

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⁴ The five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China.

1. Increased spatial resolution, down to approximately 30 cm, supports more definitive analysis and functional site characterization of existing facilities and the discovery of previously unknown sites.
2. Increased temporal resolution enables monitoring of change over time and increases analytic surety.
3. Increased spectral diversity enables better discrimination of sites, effluents, geology, and other objects of interest.

Finding 15

The amount of open-source data is growing rapidly, along with commercial/nongovernmental processing, exploitation, and dissemination of resulting information. Unauthenticated open-source data have value to MDV efforts, particularly if they are being processed and interpreted by trusted entities such as commercial partners or established academics.

Recommendation 14

Each organization in the MDV enterprise should consider open-source information/data as an important adjunct to national technical means (NTM) that can possibly corroborate or enhance NTM data sources, enable international information sharing at an unclassified level, and/or provide tipping and cueing information for tasking of NTM assets.

1. Operational groups should make sure that they have quick pathways to access useful open-source information when events occur.
2. DNN R&D should consider projects to authenticate open-source information independent of or in collaboration with the open-source information provider.
3. DNN R&D should also continue to explore the potential MDV tradespace between less frequent, higher physical resolution and more frequent, lower physical resolution to see if open-source assets can meaningfully improve monitoring persistence.

Finding 16

Advanced data analytics are rapidly emerging techniques with the potential to facilitate earlier proliferation detection and better decision making.

1. Advanced analytics is of interest to many, if not all, of the organizations that support the MDV mission (DOE/NNSA, DoD, intelligence community, national laboratories, military services, commercial industry, and academia).
2. NNSA/DNN R&D has embraced the importance of advanced data analytics to proliferation detection through its data science portfolio and, in particular, by establishing multi-laboratory projects and ventures.

Recommendation 15

Advanced analytics R&D efforts within NNSA should be supported with a sustained program and projects beyond the typical three-year life cycle to allow these efforts to evolve into technology development and deployment efforts that will be of interest to multiple programs and agencies.

Finding 17

Data availability, both labeled and unlabeled, will be the limiting factor in the use of advanced analytics to support the MDV mission. Currently methods are being built from rich U.S. test bed data.

1. To deal with sparse datasets, foundational AI/ML methods need to be developed including the creation and use of synthetic data to train algorithms.
2. Efficient and compliant means to incorporate unclassified information into classified datasets will be essential for maximum data curation and analysis.
3. As these methods move from basic research to practice, they will need to be tested and used in active global scenarios presenting the need for data sharing across organizations and federal departments.

Recommendation 16

The NSC [and OSTP⁵] should orchestrate an interagency program to build MDV data pipelines with multi-point data collection and curation, collaborating with international partners where feasible. The committee recommends that the NSC designate NNSA as the lead agency in this effort. This effort should include improving methods for using sparse datasets and physics-based modeling, and the ability to merge unclassified and classified data. Establishing a robust data pipeline will take time and, if started now, may result in being able to support the evolution of the data analytics research in five years.

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⁵ Additional data gathering has made clear that OSTP should be significantly involved in this process as well.