Nearly every industry in the U.S. relies on the “steel backbone” of the country — its rail network. Freight trains transport raw materials like lumber, ore, and sand; intermediate goods such as paper pulp, chemicals, and metal; and finished products including toilet paper, toys, and food

High-profile derailments in recent years, notably in East Palestine, Ohio, have raised concerns, including about whether safety in the industry is being sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency. In response to a request from Congress, a new National Academies report assesses the challenges that arise from operating longer freight trains, including derailments, blocked highway-rail grade crossings, and Amtrak delays.

We spoke with the chair of the committee that wrote the report, Debra Miller, chair of the Kansas Turnpike Authority, about the report’s findings and recommendations.

The train derailment in East Palestine raised a lot of concerns about the safety of longer trains. Are longer trains more dangerous? How does the length of trains play into safety challenges?

Miller: Railroads have been operating long unit trains — uniform cars loaded the same way, all going from a single origin to a single destination — since the 1940s with minimal problems and limited safety concerns. That uniformity makes it relatively simple to manage the forces that moving trains experience. But driven by cost and efficiency considerations, railroads have been operating increasingly longer manifest trains over the last several years. Manifest trains, unlike unit trains, haul freight in many different types of railcars with different weights and sizes, from and to different places in a single journey. This lack of uniformity requires strategic positioning of different cars and more careful handling, which can all need to change over the course of a single trip because the makeup of the train continues to change as it picks up and drops off cars.

So we did not find that long trains are always more dangerous or that train size should be regulated. We did conclude, however, that there are heightened operational challenges and risks from increasing the length of manifest trains — and that these risks need to be recognized and addressed in a systematic way.

Longer manifest trains with poorly positioned cars and locomotives have an increased risk of derailment. So, this change toward operating more long manifest trains has resulted in increased incidents and impacts on the public.

Can you talk about some of the operational changes the freight rail industry specifically has implemented in recent years, and how those have contributed to the current policy concerns?

Miller: Probably the most important operational change is the use of distributed power — putting locomotives in multiple locations in a train. Improvements to locomotive “dynamic brakes” have also improved train control on grades to save fuel and improve braking effectiveness and efficiency. So previously, there were these more-physical limits to operating long manifest trains.

Alongside these technological changes, more recent changes in operating philosophy have led to the common use of longer manifest trains. To a varying degree, each of the major railroads has aimed to increase operating efficiency and reduce labor and fuel costs by operating long trains. To give you a sense of the scale — between 2011 and 2021 alone, the number of railroad workers decreased by 28%.

Train makeup — the way cars and locomotives are arranged in a train — is key to minimizing safety risks associated with long manifest trains. Each railroad has its own train makeup rules, and a different process for implementing them. To some extent this is necessary because train makeup must be tailored to the specific line on which each train operates.

Each railroad also has different processes for implementing their rules, and yard and train crews are the ones that are ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with the appropriate train makeup protocols. Sometimes, crews are assisted by computer systems that automatically flag problems. There are a couple somewhat dated industry standards for putting trains together in the U.S., but the degree to which an individual railroad’s train makeup practices are consistent with this guidance, and how faithfully the railroads follow their own train makeup procedures, is unclear.

These derailment trends, and concerns raised in FRA safety advisories, suggest that either more effective rules or more consistent compliance, or both, are needed.

Your report recommends that the Federal Railroad Administration strengthen its requirements, to have railroad companies more comprehensively address operational changes for longer trains in their risk reduction programs. Why is this important? What types of revisions would be most effective?

Miller: Considering the possible safety consequences stemming from long manifest trains, our report found that the Federal Railroad Administration’s current requirements for how railroad companies identify and reduce those risks are inadequate. We recommend that FRA require railroads to identify, analyze, and address the risks that arise from all major operational changes, including the use of long manifest trains. FRA should also request the resources needed from Congress to hire and train a team of auditors to critically assess all elements of each railroad’s risk reduction program and work with FRA inspectors in the field to ensure the recommendations are implemented.

For this to be effective, FRA will also need the authorization to hire more train auditors, and those auditors will need to be well trained and given the latitude to do much more than a check-the-box review. It is important that the auditors have the knowledge and ability to assess the effectiveness of the elements of the risk reduction programs. FRA inspectors must also be involved to ensure that the recommendations are implemented.

Your report also calls on Congress to empower regulatory agencies like the Federal Railroad Administration. What’s the state of regulation in the railroad industry right now? And do you think that has contributed to the current state of affairs?

Miller: In the areas we studied, we concluded that regulatory adjustments need to be made. We found that there is insufficient transparency in railroads’ risk reduction programs and that the regulatory rules for these programs are not as rigorous as they are for other transportation industries such as aviation and pipelines. The report details how this needs to be addressed. 

There are also regulatory gaps related to passenger rail service. Although Congress granted Amtrak the right of dispatching preference over host railroads’ freight trains, Amtrak continues to experience delays caused by freight trains resulting from dispatching decisions made by host railroads.

Blocked railroad crossings are another place where there is a regulatory gap. Railroad operations that cause trains, moving or stopped, to occupy or block highway-rail grade crossings are no longer subject to state or local oversight because of recent court rulings, so only the federal government has oversight authority over blocked crossings. However, currently no federal agency has the mandate to regulate crossing blockages, which means that railroads can act with impunity — without regard to impacts on the affected communities. Further, the operation of longer trains makes it more difficult for railroads to avoid blocking crossings for several reasons outlined in the report.

The federal government has long recognized its responsibility for ensuring safety at highway-rail grade crossings through funding infrastructure improvements and requiring states to develop grade crossing safety plans. However, Congress has not specified authority to enforce blocked crossings. The committee’s recommendations seek to rectify this.

Related Resources

• Report Release Webinar

• Long Freight Trains: Ensuring Safe Operations, Mitigating Adverse Impacts