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Improving the Assessment of Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles

Completed

The methods to make fuel for nuclear power reactors can also be applied to make nuclear weapons. Nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can thus potentially lead to proliferation of nuclear weapon programs. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration requested the National Academies to examine the methods and limitations of technical analysis of proliferation risk of nuclear fuel cycles so as to advise nonproliferation policy makers and decision-makers.

Description

An ad hoc committee will conduct a study and prepare a report for the Department of Energy (DOE) regarding potential research and development (R&D) directions for improving the assessment of the host state proliferation risk of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The study will:

1. Identify key proliferation policy questions capable of being answered by a technical assessment of the host state proliferation risk posed by a given nuclear fuel cycle, and discuss the utility of these questions for informing international nonproliferation policy decisions;

2. Assess the utility for decision-makers of existing and historical methodologies and metrics used by DOE and others (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency) for assessing proliferation risk, both for considering the deployment of these facilities domestically as well as the implications of deployment outside the United States;

3. Assess the potential for adapting risk assessment methodologies developed in other contexts (such as safety and security) to host state proliferation risk assessments--including both qualitative and quantitative approaches--their benefits, limitations, and the challenges associated with adapting these methodologies to proliferation risk assessment;

4. Identify R&D and other opportunities for improving the utility for decision-makers of current and potential new approaches to the assessment of proliferation risk; and

5. Identify and assess options for effectively communicating proliferation risk information to government and industry decision-makers, as well as the public and the NGO community both within the United States and internationally.

This study will not address the risk associated with the physical security of the facility or materials against attack, theft, or diversion of nuclear materials. The study may examine policy options but will not make specific policy recommendations.

Contributors

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Committee Membership Roster Comments

Note (03-07-2012): There has been a change in committee membership with the appointment of William Tobey.

Sponsors

Department of Energy

National Nuclear Security Administration

Staff

Jennifer Heimberg

Lead

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