Appendix B

List of Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1. Responsibility for the MDV mission is distributed across the government, demanding a high level of interagency coordination. However, the interagency process to assess long-term MDV trends and technology needs is largely informal and does not appear to occur on a regular schedule. As a result, there is no meaningful strategic planning process that produces long-term (10- to 20-year) MDV problem-sets and capability needs to guide the whole R&D community.

Recommendation 1. The NSC should ensure that there is an enduring, interagency planning process with a consistent periodicity to characterize potential future MDV challenges, assess the adequacy of current MDV capabilities to address these challenges, develop strategic guidance for R&D planning, and advocate for funding. The process should involve the following:

1. Conducting regular updates to the Nuclear Defense Research and Development Strategic Plan (every four years), which should contain success metrics and timelines.
2. Establishing an external advisory board to recommend priorities for nonproliferation and arms control MDV R&D. The board should be composed of experts who collectively have familiarity with the government agencies involved in MDV, as well as the national laboratories, academia, industry, and MDV user communities. The board planning

1. horizon should be 10–20+ years. A possible draft charter is provided in Appendix 1.¹

Finding 2. NNSA has taken significant steps since the release of the 2014 DSB report to ensure that key MDV capabilities are sustained, especially within the DOE complex, with the development of a new Nonproliferation Stewardship Program (NSP) and the establishment of test beds.

1. The NSP recognizes the need for an intentional and systematic approach to maintaining arms control and nonproliferation capabilities within the DOE complex. Sustaining and continuously improving this program will be critical to its success.
2. The test beds are a cost-effective, innovative use of the DOE/NNSA complex to provide research facilities to the nonproliferation and arms control RDT&E community. The vision, communication, and access to the test beds have potential for improvement.

Recommendation 2. The nonproliferation stewardship and test bed programs should be expanded where appropriate and maintained as a vigorous part of the DNN R&D portfolio.

1. The NSP annual assessment of capabilities should look forward at least 10 years, be endorsed by the NNSA Administrator, and include input from laboratory/site/plant leaders on key metrics and their assessments.
2. NNSA should better develop and communicate the vision and objectives of the test beds, and assess opportunities for expanding access to all relevant parties including academic, commercial, and international partners.
3. DNN R&D should evaluate whether external review or red-teaming would enhance the test beds’ effectiveness.
4. Test beds should take advantage of experience from DOE/SC user facilities best practices.

Finding 3. The DNN R&D university consortia have focused a select subset of universities, faculty, and students on the MDV mission space. These consortia ensure five-year funding to the university programs to develop the next generation of experts for the MDV enterprise and have supported hundreds of undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral students.

1. The consortia are increasingly engaging forward-looking disciplinary needs of the MDV enterprise beyond nuclear engineering, such as data sciences.

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¹ The DoS International Security Advisory Board and President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board may serve as possible models.

2. The committee believes the consortia are a positive element of MDV sustainment and capability development; however, without benchmarks associated with their metrics, it is difficult to assess whether or not the consortia are successfully meeting MDV enterprise needs.
3. The national laboratories are expected to bear the significant majority of the cost to oversee the integration of student internships, provide training/oversight for students working in nuclear laboratories or with laboratory equipment, and provide staff to mentor students during their time at the laboratory.

Recommendation 3. DNN R&D should continue to fund and seek continuous improvement of the university consortia. In particular, DNN R&D should do the following:

1. Incorporate best practices, including the development of benchmarks similar to other relevant university consortia programs, such as those run by NSF or DoD.
2. Ensure that there is a long-term plan for sustaining and evolving the workforce pipeline and research contributions, including how many and what consortia, in balance with other academic engagement.
3. Strengthen the connectivity between the national laboratories and the consortia by more fully involving laboratory researchers in planning and review meetings and providing funding to laboratory researchers to be fully engaged as mentors.
4. Continue to be responsive to changes in the disciplinary needs of the MDV enterprise.

Finding 4. Challenges persist in transitioning low-TRL MDV R&D to operational systems and tools. R&D and operational organizations are limited in their ability to support prototype development and operational test and evaluation in facilities with access to real processes, data, and/or materials. Classification issues, facility access, conduct of operations and safety procedures, and lack of pertinent facilities and materials often make technology maturation complicated, slow, and expensive. These challenges exist for multiple MDV focus areas:

1. NNSA/NPAC Office of International Safeguards (OINS) works closely with the IAEA to address IAEA capability needs and mature technologies to the necessary level for IAEA implementation.
2. NNSA/NPAC Office of Nuclear Verification plays a key role in the mid-TRL development of arms control technologies. However, there appears to be a lack of formalized communication and coordination between arms control operators (DoD) and technology providers (NNSA). This gap is partially a result of DTRA/RD pivoting away from MDV efforts.

3. Coordination between NNSA/DNN R&D and NNSA/NPAC to identify nonproliferation and arms control MDV technologies priorities and transition low-TRL R&D to higher TRLs could be improved.
4. AFTAC faces challenges in transitioning R&D conducted by interagency partners to operational systems and tools for its nuclear explosion monitoring mission. Unlike for international safeguards and arms control MDV, an organization with the mandate, funding, and knowledge to mature MDV technologies for implementation by AFTAC is not evident.

Recommendation 4. MDV R&D organizations and operational end users should take steps to address the challenges in transitioning technologies.

1. Needs of operational users should be taken into consideration for projects, especially those at TRL 3 or higher. Operational users should maintain close communications and coordination with the technology providers throughout the technology development and transition process. Connecting operators and developers earlier in the technology development process will ensure that requirements are better communicated and allow for more agile and responsive development if requirements are still uncertain. As the TRL progresses, the operators should provide increasingly specific technical and operational requirements. NNSA should broaden access to key facilities, processes, and materials via streamlined conduct of operations procedures, through the test beds or otherwise.
2. NNSA/DNN Deputy Administrator should institutionalize a process for close communication between DNN R&D and NPAC (both OINS and ONV) to facilitate selection of high-priority innovative ideas and transition of promising safeguards and arms control technologies.
3. To continue DoD’s historic and unique responsibilities in arms control and counterproliferation activities, it should appoint a relevant internal organization to help establish requirements for NNSA arms control technology development and testing activities, especially but not solely as they mature (TRL 3 and above). The organization selected should have real-world knowledge about nuclear weapons storage and deployment conditions in the United States and elsewhere and should be well-versed in the experiences and lessons-learned from the DTRA/On-Site Inspection and Building Capacity Directorate inspection teams.

Finding 5. MDV innovation emerges from work funded by DNN R&D but also through national laboratory LDRD projects, academia, and the private sector. Rather than consistently funding early-TRL projects in support of MDV priorities, DNN R&D is reliant on the laboratories to support and

foster early work before committing resources for ongoing support. This approach risks gaps in availability of innovative solutions to high-priority MDV missions.

Recommendation 5. The MDV R&D enterprise should look for ways to sustainably drive the innovation pipeline for high-priority MDV objectives, while also maintaining channels to identify and build on basic research developed through national laboratory LDRD.

1. DNN R&D should consider how to allow greater participation in its innovation portfolio, including from the national laboratories, academia, and industry.
2. DNN R&D should ensure that its university consortia have agility to incorporate new research directions and technologies that may emerge after a consortium is established. DNN R&D should also track how consortia R&D investments are transferred to the national laboratories and industry for further development.
3. DNN R&D and other parts of the MDV R&D enterprise should use the best practices of other government agencies to optimize the use of prize challenges and solicit innovative ideas from researchers outside the traditional MDV mission space, including the use of surrogate datasets.

Finding 6. DNN R&D and the national laboratories have limited engagement with commercial industry, especially in the emerging technologies areas of open-source and data sciences, where data collection and algorithm development are evolving at a rapid pace and have the potential to benefit the MDV mission space.

Recommendation 6. NNSA, in coordination with the national laboratories, should engage industry to fast-track new data science methods (e.g., algorithms for sparse datasets) into NNSA-relevant testing and potentially into deployment.

1. NNSA should learn how other government agencies have done this successfully (even for classified operations).
2. NNSA should invest in technology scouting to be familiar with developments in the commercial sector that could be applicable to the MDV mission.

Finding 7. Fuel cycle MDV technologies must evolve to keep pace with the expanding universe of nuclear activities, in terms of both emerging technologies and growth in the number of nuclear activities.

1. IAEA resources have remained constant for a number of years despite increasing MDV demands, implying future MDV may be less

1. comprehensive and less frequent unless more efficient and effective MDV techniques are developed.
2. Current MDV technologies and methods were developed to detect traditional uranium-fueled reactors, gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, and reprocessing facilities. MDV technologies for emerging reactor designs, alternative enrichment techniques, alternative fuels, and small scale, non-traditional approaches to reprocessing need development support.
3. Current MDV paradigms focus on validating declarations, deterring illicit material diversions, and detecting unknown, undeclared activities. Expanding the MDV paradigm to include motivation and early capability development may enhance opportunities to dissuade and/or counter proliferation behavior and encourage responsible, peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology.

Recommendation 7. NNSA should prioritize R&D efforts that (a) enhance efficiency, ease of use/deployment, and sustainability of safeguards tools and technologies; (b) address MDV for advanced reactors, non-traditional and emerging enrichment techniques, and small and/or non-traditional reprocessing technologies; and (c) enhance capabilities to monitor and detect early capability development that could be a potential proliferation threat.

Finding 8. Understanding and modeling source term mechanisms, the environmental fate, and atmospheric/aquatic transport of proliferation effluents are key to identifying when and where to sample and gaining insight into proliferation activities from analyzed samples. New analytic approaches that concurrently consider results from multiple sampler locations coupled with atmospheric and aquatic transport models can improve the identification of potential source locations.

Recommendation 8. DNN R&D, in coordination with interagency partners, should continue to support R&D to improve understanding of and develop more accurate models for source terms, environmental fate, and atmospheric/aquatic transport. Field tests should be conducted to assess limitations of the models. These efforts will enhance MDV capabilities for both the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear test explosions (see Section 3.3 below) and should include the following:

1. Developing models of effluent release processes and mechanisms from both fuel cycle processes (including new and emerging reactor and fuel cycle technologies) and underground nuclear explosions.
2. Developing linked mesoscale and microscale models for atmospheric and aquatic modeling of effluents of interest.

3. Clarifying the effect of temperature, humidity, UV light, and other pertinent environmental factors on effluent species to determine the nature and rate of physical and chemical changes.
4. Developing integrated analytic processes to analyze environmental sampling results from all relevant sampling locations as a network, coupling their temporally resolved results with atmospheric and aquatic transport models can improve plume source location capability.

Finding 9. To enable the application of WAES as a proliferation and nuclear explosion MDV tool, additional work is needed to characterize known sources of radionuclides and regional background variations.

Recommendation 9. DNN R&D, in collaboration with interagency and international partners, should support R&D to characterize known sources of radionuclides of interest and regional background variations to enhance MDV capabilities for both the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear test explosions (see Section 3.3).

Finding 10. Capabilities for global detection of nuclear explosions have improved since the 2012 National Academies CTBT report. In particular, (1) diverse IMS monitoring networks are approaching the CTBT entry-into-force requirements; (2) extensive analyses of the signals for the underground explosions at the North Korean test site have introduced new source characterization capabilities such as source discrimination with regional waves, full moment tensor analysis of seismic wave radiation, and fusion of seismic and satellite-based ground deformation measurements; and (3) advanced data analytics are being explored in R&D programs for their potential to improve detection capabilities. However, improving detection sensitivity remains a key challenge, as does improving the yield estimate accuracy for uncalibrated test sites and low-yield tests everywhere. In addition, improved transport models for RN back-tracking are needed for high confidence in identification of seismic detections as nuclear explosion sources.

Recommendation 10. NNSA and the Department of Defense should expand support for R&D to improve nuclear explosion detection sensitivity and confidence, as well as yield estimate accuracy. These efforts should include the following:

1. R&D to improve the accuracy of yield estimates from remote measurements for uncalibrated regions of interest and for low-yield explosions at known test sites.
2. R&D to improve detection sensitivity and confidence by developing higher resolution computational transport models (see also Recommendation 8), exploiting all available data sources (including open

1. sources²), and fusing RN monitoring observations with source origin data from seismology or other MDV technologies.

Finding 11. A fully functioning IMS and broader CTBT verification regime is beneficial to U.S. nuclear explosion MDV efforts.

1. CTBTO data are being leveraged, and U.S. support for the CTBTO is being sustained despite non-ratification of the CTBT.
2. International participation in analysis of IMS data is active and there is broad international agreement on the following research needs to improve CTBTO capabilities: atmospheric fate and transport, fusing data streams (e.g., RN and seismic data), characterizing increasing background radiation, filling the data gaps that occur when countries intentionally shut down their sensor network or stop reporting data, and developing an effective on-site inspection capability.³

Recommendation 11. The United States should continue to support CTBTO IMS construction, technology refreshment, and improved IMS capabilities because a fully functioning IMS is beneficial to the United States.

Finding 12. NNSA has maintained a modest portfolio of work in MDV tools for arms control, some of it focused on warhead confirmation measurement completed collaboratively between Defense Programs (DP) and DNN. Recently, the need has increased for MDV technologies for non-strategic and non-deployed warheads in potential new arms control treaties, and significant technical challenges remain.

1. Warhead confirmation techniques that can be practically deployed, authenticated, and certified, especially with trusted information barriers, are not yet mature and would benefit from test beds in order to compare strengths and weaknesses in standard and real-world conditions.
2. Joint U.S.-U.K. R&D has significantly advanced the ability to detect the passage of plutonium through a portal. However, a comprehensive technical solution to portal monitoring is needed that can detect HEU and high explosives in addition to plutonium.
3. The next arms control treaties or agreements may need techniques that rely on warhead identifiers or tags, advanced seals, and possibly new warhead confirmation techniques, especially those that could be used in limited access areas like storage sites. New innovative solutions for such scenarios are still needed.

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² For more information about the use of open-source data for nuclear test MDV, see Section 3.5.

³ For more information on CTBT on-site inspections, see Wogman et al. (2011).

4. Development of methods to manage access to sensitive facilities and data is needed and must involve the operators of the facilities to be inspected.
5. The proliferation of dual-capable conventional/nuclear delivery systems presents MDV technology challenges that demand attention.

Recommendation 12. DNN’s program for arms control MDV should be a sustained, core element of its program at all TRLs regardless of the current treaty enforcement or future treaty negotiation activity to ensure that the research community is generating and maturing technologies. Collaboration between DP and DNN may be the best way to accomplish some of these efforts.

1. NNSA should establish a U.S. experimental test bed for warhead verification that is accessible to the academic, laboratory, industrial, and international community to safely conduct experiments on real and surrogate materials; help mature technologies; and be subject to red team and white team testing for authentication, certification, managed access, and vulnerability analyses.
2. The NNSA Baseline, Advanced, and Stretch R&D approaches offer a good starting point for investments. However, the Advanced and Stretch research topics will likely take longer to mature. Therefore, the Advanced and Stretch scenarios should be supported in parallel, not in series, with the Baseline work whenever possible.
3. NNSA, in collaboration with DTRA and other interagency partners, should participate in or initiate projects to develop ideas and tools to distinguish conventional and nuclear versions of dual-capable systems for potential future arms control agreements.

Finding 13. Through participation in various international efforts, researchers have had opportunities to develop and test MDV techniques and ideas for weapons dismantlement (including warhead confirmation) without revealing sensitive information with other nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.

1. The U.S.-U.K., Quad, and IPNDV programs have been productive venues for international exchange and testing of some MDV techniques. NNSA has not always supported laboratory participation in the IPNDV work at the level required for full participation.
2. There have not been persistent bilateral or multilateral R&D efforts on MDV techniques that involve Russia or China.

Recommendation 13. The United States should remain active in multilateral engagements and seek to increase bilateral engagements to jointly develop

technologies for arms control and weapons dismantlement since success ultimately depends on a high level of confidence by both nuclear and nonnuclear states.

1. The United States should re-engage with Russia as soon as possible in joint technical experiments to develop high confidence, authenticatable and certifiable techniques applicable for future warhead MDV.
2. NNSA should provide support to technology providers to participate in international demonstrations to aid both technology maturation and provide transparency.
3. The United States should apply lessons from the U.K., IPNDV, and Quad partnerships to structure active engagements that include all members of the P5.

Finding 14. There has been a rapid expansion of commercial remote sensing capabilities over the past decade, both in the United States and abroad. A number of advances support improved MDV:

1. Increased spatial resolution, down to approximately 30 cm, supports more definitive analysis and functional site characterization of existing facilities and the discovery of previously unknown sites.
2. Increased temporal resolution enables monitoring of change over time and increases analytic surety.
3. Increased spectral diversity enables better discrimination of sites, effluents, geology, and other objects of interest.

Finding 15. The amount of open-source data is growing rapidly, along with commercial/nongovernmental processing, exploitation, and dissemination of resulting information. Unauthenticated open-source data have value to MDV efforts, particularly if they are being processed and interpreted by trusted entities such as commercial partners or established academics.

Recommendation 14. Each organization in the MDV enterprise should consider open-source information/data as an important adjunct to NTM that can possibly corroborate or enhance NTM data sources, enable international information sharing at an unclassified level, and/or provide tipping and cueing information for tasking of NTM assets.

1. Operational groups should make sure that they have quick pathways to access useful open-source information when events occur.
2. DNN R&D should consider projects to authenticate open-source information independent of or in collaboration with the open-source information provider.
3. DNN R&D should also continue to explore the potential MDV trade-space between less frequent, higher physical resolution and more

1. frequent, lower physical resolution to see if open-source assets can meaningfully improve monitoring persistence.

Finding 16. Advanced data analytics are rapidly emerging techniques with the potential to facilitate earlier proliferation detection and better decision making.

1. Advanced analytics is of interest to many, if not all, of the organizations that support the MDV mission (DOE/NNSA, DoD, IC, national laboratories, military services, commercial industry, and academia).
2. NNSA/DNN R&D has embraced the importance of advanced data analytics to proliferation detection through its data science portfolio and, in particular, by establishing multi-laboratory projects and Ventures.

Recommendation 15. Advanced analytics R&D efforts within NNSA should be supported with a sustained program and projects beyond the typical three-year lifecycle to allow these efforts to evolve into technology development and deployment efforts that will be of interest to multiple programs and agencies.

Finding 17. Data availability, both labeled and unlabeled, will be the limiting factor in the use of advanced analytics to support the MDV mission. Currently methods are being built from rich U.S. test bed data.

1. To deal with sparse datasets, foundational AI/ML methods need to be developed including the creation and use of synthetic data to train algorithms.
2. Efficient and compliant means to incorporate unclassified information into classified datasets will be essential for maximum data curation and analysis.
3. As these methods move from basic research to practice, they will need to be tested and used in active global scenarios presenting the need for data sharing across organizations and federal departments.

Recommendation 16. The NSC should orchestrate an interagency program to build MDV data pipelines with multi-point data collection and curation, collaborating with international partners where feasible. The committee recommends that the NSC designate NNSA as the lead agency in this effort. This effort should include improving methods for using sparse datasets and physics based modeling, and the ability to merge unclassified and classified data. Establishing a robust data pipeline will take time and, if started now, may result in being able to support the evolution of the data analytics research in five years.

TABLE B-1 Relationship between the 16 Recommendations Made in This Report and the 3 Necessary Functions of the MDV Enterprise Identified in Section 1.4