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Construction Timelines

Unforeseen technical challenges, workforce constraints, regulatory hurdles, capital costs, and supply chain bottlenecks are all barriers that have led to delays in nuclear construction, especially for first-of-a-kind facilities. Aditi Verma, University of Michigan, moderated a panel discussion to explore these issues and consider what is needed for nuclear plant construction to stay on time and budget. Drawing on recent experiences in recent Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) Vogtle 3 and 4 builds and supply chain experience in naval nuclear systems, panelists considered multiple facets of the challenges surrounding the construction of new nuclear power plants. The discussion highlighted potential solutions to develop resilient and agile supply chains and minimize construction costs, schedule overruns, and supply chain issues, including through repeated construction components and processes; approaching nuclear deployments as products rather than projects; and appropriate updates to codes and standards.^1,2,3,4,5

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¹ G. Locatelli, M. Mancini, and E. Romano, 2014, “Systems Engineering to Improve the Governance in Complex Project Environments,” International Journal of Project Management 32(8):1395–1410, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.10.007.

² N.J. Brookes and G. Locatelli, 2015, “Power Plants as Megaprojects: Using Empirics to Shape Policy, Planning, and Construction Management,” Utilities Policy 36:57–66, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2015.09.005.

³ Nuclear Energy Agency, 2021, “Small Modular Reactors: Challenges and Opportunities,” Paris: OECD Publishing.

⁴ Idaho National Laboratory, 2024, “Meta-Analysis of Advanced Nuclear Reactor Cost Estimations,” July, https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/sti/Sort_107010.pdf.

⁵ Systems Analysis and Integration, 2024, “Quantifying Capital Cost Reduction Pathways for Advanced Nuclear Reactors,” June 6, https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/sti/Sort_109810.pdf.

The panelists were Giorgio Locatelli, Politecnico di Milano; Stephen Kuczynski, The Nuclear Company; Barry Fletcher, Newport News Shipbuilding (retired); Erik Nygaard, BWXT Advanced Technologies, LLC; and Abdalla Abou-Jaoude, Idaho National Laboratory.

OPENING REMARKS

Locatelli outlined the different expectations and considerations as development moves from prototype to first-of-a-kind to “n of a kind” units. To move toward mass production of nuclear technologies, he said, requires a clear-eyed assessment of how much units at each level should be expected to cost and how much electricity will be produced, who will pay for the deployment and who shoulders the risks that are involved, and what business value will be created through these investments. He also highlighted how the nuclear industry can learn from megaprojects in other industries, such as aerospace and chemical engineering, to improve reactor construction and deployment timelines.

Kuczynski, who served as chief executive officer and president of the Southern Nuclear Operating Company during the completion of the Vogtle 3 and 4 units, stressed that the costs of deploying nuclear reactors must be brought down in order to fully realize the role of nuclear energy in America’s energy future, and he posited that the only way to bring down those costs is to reduce the time it takes to build reactor units. Building on Locatelli’s comments, he emphasized that deploying first-of-a-kind designs is expensive, slow, and unpredictable, whereas repeated “n of a kind” deployment is far faster and less expensive because it uses the same design, built by the same people, with very few changes. While other designs have potential, he suggested that AP1000s are closest to “n of a kind” status, with far fewer risks now that they are licensed and operational.

To get to nuclear energy deployment at scale, Kuczynski underscored the importance of improving project management and construction execution. While the struggles faced in nuclear construction are not unique, he noted that one disadvantage is that the nuclear ecosystem does not have a legacy, as other industries do, of consensus-approved best practices and proven designs that are used again and again. To address this, he said it is important to focus on management and incentive structures that enable the nuclear industry to become more unified and coordinated and ensure that stakeholders share risks and returns. He added that government subsidies should become unnecessary as the industry moves beyond first-of-a-kind deployments and reactors become products—rather than projects—that can be reliably delivered at scale.

Fletcher, who spent nearly four decades supporting nuclear-powered ships and submarines for the Navy, posited that nuclear resources

should be approached as a fleet. While incremental improvements may be needed, once the first of a class is established and the risk and nonrecurring engineering costs are retired, ramping up production to a larger number as quickly as possible can essentially spread the developmental cost across a larger population of units. For this to work, he also underscored the importance of strong management, contingency funding, and engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) coordination to keep the process moving forward and avoid getting caught in cycles of blame when complications arise. He also emphasized the critical role of workforce development in order to rapidly deploy and successfully manage the next generation of reactors.

BWXT manufactures nuclear reactors for aircraft carriers and submarines and supports nuclear deployment more broadly through heavy-component manufacturing and reactor system development. From his experience delivering the hardware to make nuclear systems work, Nygaard agreed with other speakers who had noted that strong project management is critical to successful nuclear projects. He also added that there must be a balance between project managers, business leaders, and technical leaders in order to execute the entire scope of a project, hit economic targets, and deliver successful nuclear systems.

Abou-Jaoude highlighted some tensions and shifts in thinking around how to bring new nuclear deployments to fruition. While SMR designs have potential, he said that the field is coming to realize that they are not inherently cheaper than light water reactors (LWRs) on a per-megawatt basis. An important limiting factor for all reactor sizes, he posited, is that the requirements, restrictions, codes, and standards on nuclear energy are sometimes inefficient, unrealistic, and not adapted for the current context. In addition to addressing these issues, he said that applying lessons from other megaprojects, such as the importance of strong project management, cost-sharing, experiential learning, to ultimately deliver reactors as products, not projects, will drive down costs and make nuclear energy more competitive. He also pointed to the debate between economies of scale and economies of multiples—that is, the question of whether it is better to build one large reactor or many small ones—and suggested that this debate will remain unresolved until actual construction and deployment at scale enables a true determination of reactor costs.⁶

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⁶ B.N. Hanna et al., 2024, “Navigating Economies of Scale and Multiples for Nuclear-Powered Data Centers and Other Applications with High Service Availability Needs,” Energies 17(20):5073, https://doi.org/10.3390/en17205073.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Lessons Learned

To start the discussion, Verma prompted panelists to share lessons learned about nuclear construction from their experiences in this space. Kuczynski replied that constructing Vogtle Units 3 and 4, which are AP1000s, was a struggle initially, in part due to challenges that are inherent to doing something for the first time. Particularly problematic was the fact that management lacked experience and the project’s structure and incentives were not optimal. In addition, significant delays occurred when design fell behind the construction schedule, supply chain challenges emerged, and inexperienced vendors failed to deliver on contracts. He added that the workforce for the project had limited hands-on experience in construction methods required to meet quality standards for nuclear energy.

Things began to turn around, Kuczynski said, once robust construction management was established and the incentives were better aligned to accelerate progress. As a culture of building with excellence developed, the pace increased, teams learned from experience, and Unit 4 was ultimately completed much faster than Unit 3. While new projects are always challenging, he said that successive projects are faster, cheaper, and can take advantage of new construction techniques and technologies that further simplify the process. For further lessons learned, he pointed to the report Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Advanced Nuclear.⁷

Fletcher offered several lessons learned from his experience in the nuclear Navy. First, he said that in his experience, robust mock-ups of manufacturing processes and workforce qualifications can be immensely valuable for validating procedures and reducing risk. He also emphasized the importance of driving “nuclear culture” into supply chain and EPC vendors, many of which have limited experience in nuclear work. For example, component cleanliness standards are very different for nuclear projects than for other types of construction, and ensuring that all contributors fully understand these requirements in advance can help to minimize delays and costs. In addition, in order to retain maximum flexibility to resolve issues quickly, he posited that design certification should only be required for elements that actually need U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval while avoiding unnecessary certification processes for those elements that do not need it. Finally, he said that designs also have to be maintainable and fixable to ensure confidence in

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⁷ Department of Energy (DOE), 2024, Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Advanced Nuclear, September.

the durability of these assets that are intended to remain productive for many decades.

Locatelli added that nuclear construction cost overruns—a key factor contributing to the high costs of nuclear energy—are mostly due to construction mistakes, which can be avoided with improved workforce education, increased factory fabrication, and the development of standardized equipment and procedures. He also pointed to three lessons learned from other megaprojects, such as wind and solar farms, subways, and airports, which can also apply to nuclear reactors, namely, (1) the importance of aligning incentives with costs and timelines to deliver infrastructure on time and within budget, (2) the value of standardizing factories to enable quality control when producing components that are repeatable, and (3) the benefits of employing component modularization for designs that are one-off rather than built repeatedly.

Envisioning a Path for Near-Term Deployment

Verma asked what it might take to see near-term nuclear deployment. Nygaard replied that balancing risks and opportunities, aligning incentives and business models, and securing financing for orders are key steps but can take a long time. Given the level of risk involved, it is not feasible for one investor to do it all, making it important to employ appropriate systems for sharing the risks and the rewards among multiple stakeholders. He added that investors will feel more comfortable when nuclear projects demonstrate that they have learned from other megaprojects and have a sound business model supported by legal and regulatory acceptance. These factors are all critical to building a creditworthy, risk-tolerable project with market value.

Lindsey Motlow, Darcy Partners, asked panelists whether they expect that more AP1000s will be deployed. Kuczynski replied that, as a technology with a proven track record in construction, AP1000s are well positioned for further deployment. While there are no current orders, he posited that that may change as interest in the decarbonization potential of nuclear energy grows. However, he pointed to two key impediments: the lack of an integrated product presentation to enable utilities, investors, and other stakeholders to determine cost and delivery models; and a need for new development models that rely on a synergy of multiple stakeholders to form shared-risk partnerships and create the conditions for successful mass deployment at lower costs and with more predictable timelines. To spur further development and drive costs down using a fleet-deployment approach, he said that it should be possible to issue 50 early site permits around the country in the very near future. He also emphasized the importance of maintaining the financial incentives

needed to move from first-of-a-kind into “n of a kind” units, and Nygaard agreed that financial incentives are needed to drive investment.

Reliability is also an important cost consideration, Kuczynski added. He said that one strength of AP1000s is that they are largely based on equipment and operational strategies that have been in use for decades, with only a limited number of new components. By contrast, new designs do not have the same level of use and experience, which puts more pressure on ensuring reliability through design robustness, manufacturing quality, testing, and demonstration.

Abou-Jaoude noted that China has been successful in cutting the time it takes to build its CAP1000 and CAP1400 reactors from about 9 years to less than 6, and posited that the United States could achieve a similar improvement in deployment speed with AP1000s, especially by reaping the benefits of modular construction once the supply chains and construction best practices are established. He suggested that momentum could be increased through financial incentives that de-risk capital-intensive projects, such as Inflation Reduction Act (P.L. 117-169) subsidies, tax credits, low interest rates, and loan guarantees. He also pointed to the Systems Analysis and Integration Campaign study, which developed a framework for learning from megaprojects and includes strategies for reducing the costs of building first-of-a-kind technologies.⁸ Prototyping and testing new reactors will help to narrow down the vendor and design pool while encouraging a competitive marketplace that avoids monopolies and price stagnation and can drive a healthy nuclear ecosystem, he said.

Sola Talabi, Pittsburgh Technical LLC, asked panelists to comment on strategies to manage the risks associated with developing first-of-a-kind technologies, especially for new companies. Kuczynski stated that first-of-a-kind risks are virtually impossible to eliminate but should be carefully managed. Locatelli explained that financial risks for any design have two dimensions: the amount of money at risk, and the amount of risk. Because both are very high for nuclear energy, it is important to distribute the financial risks, either by lowering the amount of investment required or sharing the risk with other parties, such as government.

Nygaard suggested that developers could focus on identifying end users whose energy needs and long-term goals align with nuclear energy. The process of gaining orders will be slow, especially at first, but experience and incremental victories will enable the industry to hone business models and supply chains, creating cost-effective scaling. In the

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⁸ Systems Analysis and Integration Campaign, 2024, “A Tool to Quantify Capital Cost Reduction Pathways for Advanced Nuclear Reactors,” June 11, https://fuelcycleoptions.inl.gov/Shared%20Documents/Nuclear-Reactor-Capital-Cost-Reduction-Pathway-Tool.pdf.

meantime, he suggested that it can be productive to cultivate relationships with vendors to ensure that they are ready to scale up when nuclear products can be deployed at scale. Supply chains, especially, require careful planning, oversight, and management. Relying on one vendor for a component can make projects vulnerable to delays, interruptions, or quality control issues. Developing new supplier relationships requires proactive planning, scheduling, capacity, and forethought. There is no one correct number of vendors—it depends on the situation and the particular risks involved—but for unique or essential materials, he said it is worth the time and effort to line up a back-up in order to keep the project moving ahead if a vendor fails to deliver.

Drawing a parallel between the economies of scale versus economies of multiples debate in the nuclear field and the evolution of high-performance computing from large mainframe computers to thousands of smaller computational units, Frederica Darema, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, asked whether small modular reactors (SMRs) are better positioned than large reactors to scale nuclear energy, reduce costs, and increase reliability. Nygaard stated that the end users’ needs will determine which reactor types are built and speculated that the ultimate result is likely to be a spectrum of nuclear products. While he said that microreactors and SMRs may be easier to build and suitable for powering small data centers or industrial facilities, he posited that deploying nuclear power across society will also require bigger reactors. Abou-Jaoude added that while SMRs may lose out to their larger counterparts due to diseconomies of scale, they may benefit from higher learning rates per gigawatt and higher flexibility for end customers. He posited that even microreactors might be more broadly competitive, especially if they use less expensive fuel types and can be factory fabricated.^9,10 Nygaard also agreed with Darema that testing first-of-a-kind designs system-wide with digital twins can improve efficiency without sacrificing quality.

Fletcher stated that partnerships will be essential to spurring nuclear energy deployment. For example, forming a large consortium could lower component costs through volume and allow stakeholders to co-manage projects, share operating and maintenance costs, and institute consolidated inventory control. Successful partnerships require transparency and mutual trust that all stakeholders are working to benefit the whole project. As part of this, he also noted that it is crucial to nurture and guide

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⁹ A. Abou-Jaoude et al., 2023, “Assessment of Factory Fabrication Considerations for Nuclear Microreactors,” Nuclear Technology 209(11):1697–1732, https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2023.2206779.

¹⁰ B. Hanna et al., 2024, “Technoeconomic Evaluation of Microreactor Using Detailed Bottom-Up Estimate (Rev.1),” November 1, https://doi.org/10.2172/2447366.

the supply chain, especially for vendors new to the nuclear industry. Currently, the domestic nuclear reactor supply chain is highly constrained and will require careful expansion to support mass deployment. To move forward, he suggested creating a stakeholder collaboration to outline a construction schedule for two to three promising technologies, encourage coordination and cooperation, and minimize siloing. Verma agreed with this vision, which she characterized as “a mix of cooperation and competition.”

Challenges for Factory Fabrication

Given the benefits of standardization and scaling, Verma prompted panelists to comment on whether it is possible to make reactors in factories, and Locatelli highlighted several challenges to achieving this. First, establishing a factory would be very expensive, and no company would want to make such a large investment with an empty order book, especially in the United States, which lacks vertically integrated vendors. In addition, the components that would need to be fabricated are very large, which increases the construction risk. SMRs have a size and cost advantage, but he said that the economies of scale and economies of multiples are not equivalent because the risks and prospective markets are so different.

Abou-Jaoude concurred that uncertainty around costs is a key factor that will influence the feasibility of factory fabrication for non-LWRs. Costs would doubtless go down substantially if production could be ramped up high enough. However, he noted that the nuclear energy field faces some unique constraints, such as aircraft-impact rulings, which impose strict guidance on civil works and onsite activities that represent a large portion of the costs for deploying and operating nuclear facilities.¹¹ In addition, the operating costs can vary significantly depending on the fuel source used and the type of reactor. For example, sodium fast reactors have high fuel enrichment costs due to their large fuel loading requirements. As a first-of-a-kind design, they may also incur other unexpected costs, even if they appear less costly in initial estimates and tout a high fuel burnup. For these reasons, he emphasized that each design must be examined holistically to fully understand its costs, identify potential efficiencies, and apply lessons learned from other large-scale energy projects.

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¹¹ A. Abou-Jaoude et al., 2023, “Assessment of Factory Fabrication Considerations for Nuclear Microreactors,” Nuclear Technology 209(11):1697–1732, https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2023.2206779.

Workforce Development Needs

The importance of a workforce with the appropriate expertise was raised throughout the discussion, and Verma asked panelists to comment on strategies to build the needed workforce. Noting that “investing in workforce is expensive, [but] not doing it is far more expensive,” Locatelli said that it is worthwhile to invest in workforce training and retention programs targeting a broad range of roles and career levels. He pointed to South Korea for a model of successful workforce development that the United States could learn from.¹² “Nuclear reactor projects [don’t] fail because of the wrong neutronics, don’t fail because the thermodynamic is wrong, don’t fail because [of] engineering mistakes,” Locatelli stated. “They fail because carpenters, because welders are not properly educated to the nuclear quality, to the nuclear business.”

Kuczynski agreed that workforce needs, especially for skilled trades, are a “top tier challenge” that will continue to be a limiting factor for nuclear construction if not addressed. Abou-Jaoude noted that to triple nuclear energy production will likely require a four-fold operational workforce increase, along with more than 200,000 workers for construction and manufacturing.¹³ He suggested that transitioning coal sites, whose workforce has similar skill sets, into nuclear plants can help fill gaps,¹⁴ and Fletcher added that coal sites are often located in areas with high unemployment, making them well suited for recruiting workers into a new field. Abou-Jaoude also noted that DOE also funds more general workforce training, including demonstrations from government-owned reactors.

Nygaard added that factory fabrication can help workforce development and total workforce staffing requirements. Building the same component over time creates expertise that improves system design and quality. Real-world testing and demonstrations in factories—not just on paper—are also extremely valuable for learning, risk management, and systems analysis; it also reduces the required labor in the field which is a major source of project cost and risk.

Fletcher noted that nuclear deployment requires specialized, short-term construction workers in addition to local, long-term operating employees. Emphasizing that workers need consistent, consolidated,

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¹² Nuclear Business Platform, 2024, “South Korea’s Nuclear Know-How Is Just What ASEAN Needs,” November, https://www.nuclearbusiness-platform.com/media/insights/south-koreas-nuclear-know-how-is-just-what-asean-needs.

¹³ DOE, 2024, Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Advanced Nuclear, September.

¹⁴ DOE, “Coal-to-Nuclear Transitions: An Information Guide,” https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/24_DOE-NE_Coal%20to%20Nuclear%20Report_04.01_digital%20%281%29.pdf, accessed April 14, 2025.

efficient training, he suggested that close partnerships with high schools, community colleges, job training centers, apprenticeship programs, and other local resources can help identify both types of workers, teach specific skills, build management potential, and create stable, long-term careers.

Updating Standards

Steven Arndt, University of Tennessee, asked panelists to share their views on whether the codes, standards, and regulations associated with nuclear energy are appropriate for today’s environment. Kuczynski answered that in his view, they should be made more flexible, especially when proficiency is the main goal. Abou-Jaoude concurred, stating that many of the nuclear-specific codes and standards are outdated and do not encompass new materials or technological advancements. He added that codes and standards are updated too rarely, too slowly, without the guidance of the right experts, and without examining features of non-LWRs that have specific considerations. “The nuclear energy community, and nuclear engineers in general, need to engage more in the codes and standards and encourage them to move faster and consider things beyond the historical,” Abou-Jaoude said.

Nygaard added that in addition to safety metrics, the NRC certification process could evaluate other socioeconomic factors.