Testimony Date: 06/21/2023
Congress Session Name: 118th Congress (First Session)
Witness: Cary Coglianese
Witness Credentials: Edward B. Shils Professor of Law
and Director, Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania,
and Chair, Committee for a Study on New Coast Guard Authorities, Marine
Board and Ocean Studies Board, Transportation Research Board and
Division on Earth and Life Studies, The National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine
Chamber: House
Committee: Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Subcommittee, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Testimony of
Cary Coglianese
Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Director, Penn Program on
Regulation
University of Pennsylvania
and
Chair, Committee for a Study on
New Coast Guard Authorities
The National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Before the
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. House of Representatives
June 21, 2023
Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to testify about the recently issued National Academy of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) committee report on “The Coast Guard’s Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging
Challenges and Statutory Needs.” Congress requested this report to identify emerging issues that
are likely to demand U.S. Coast Guard action over the next decade
and then to assess whether the Service’s existing statutory
authority will be sufficient to meet these future demands.
I served as the chair of the NASEM committee that developed this
report. By way of additional background, I am also the Edward B.
Shils Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, where I
serve as the Director of the Penn Program on Regulation. I am also
currently a Senior Fellow of the Administrative Conference of the
United States. The focus of my research and teaching throughout my
career has been on administrative law and government regulation,
with an emphasis on the empirical evaluation of alternative
regulatory processes and strategies and the role of public
participation, technology, and business-government relations in
regulatory policymaking.
Although I am before you today owing to my service as the chair of
the NASEM study committee that led to the report I will be
describing, that report is the product of extensive
information-gathering, deliberation, and ultimately consensus among
the eleven other expert colleagues who served as members of the
committee, to which I wish to give great credit and my many thanks:
Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S. Coast Guard (retired); James-Christian
B. Blockwood, Partnership for Public Service; Annie Brett,
University of Florida; Vice Admiral Sally Brice- O’Hara, U.S. Coast
Guard (retired); Martha R. Grabowski, Le Moyne College and
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute: Donald Liu, American Bureau of
Shipping (retired) and member of the National Academy of
Engineering; Wen C. Masters, MITRE Corporation; Rodrigo Nieto-
Gomez, Naval Postgraduate School; Sean T. Pribyl, Holland & Knight
LLP; Vice Admiral Sandra Stosz, U.S. Coast Guard (retired); and Rear
Admiral David W. Titley, U.S. Navy (retired) and RV Weather.
As part of the committee’s efforts to gather information over the
course of the more than 17- month period of the study, we benefited
greatly from several public meetings at which we heard from senior
leadership of the U.S. Coast Guard, including from the Commandant at
the time the study commenced (Admiral Karl L. Schultz, now retired)
and later from the current Commandant (Admiral Linda L. Fagan). We
also benefited from extensive written input from responses to
questions we posed to the Coast Guard as well as from consultations
at numerous other meetings with more than 50 experts from outside
the Coast Guard, including representatives from maritime shipping
and other maritime-related industries, other government agencies in
the United States and abroad, nongovernmental organizations, experts
in technology, policy, and maritime law, and experts in strategic
foresight and forecasting. The committee’s penultimate report also
underwent a rigorous, independent review process involving 12
outside peer reviewers, all in accordance with NASEM’s customary
procedures.
In a nutshell, the NASEM study’s principal results can be distilled
into the following four points:
-
The Coast Guard will face new or increasing challenges in the coming
decade from climate change, technological and industry innovation,
and global strategic competition.
-
The study committee investigated 10 specific and foreseeable
developments that will present the Coast Guard with new or
increasing challenges. Across these developments, the committee
identified a total of 34 different types of actions that the Coast
Guard will likely need to take in response.
-
The committee concluded that the Coast Guard likely has sufficient
statutory authority to take the needed actions in all but two
instances, namely with respect to specific actions related to
autonomous vessels and commercial space development. In a third
instance— with respect to cybersecurity—the committee did not view
new authority as essential but did note that statutory change may be
prudent.
-
Even with adequate statutory authority, the Coast Guard will need
sufficient mission support capacities and capabilities, such as with
respect to data management, technology acquisition, and workforce
development, if it is to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
Prioritization of strategic foresight will also be needed, and legal
foresight analysis should be systematically incorporated into the
Coast Guard’s ongoing planning for the future.
In my testimony today, I will describe the scope and process of our
study—that is, what we were tasked to do and what we did—and then I
will turn to explaining in greater detail our conclusions and
recommendations.
Study Scope and Process
The NASEM study was originally called for in Section 8249 of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021. That legislation directed the Coast Guard to
commission an “assessment of Coast Guard Authorities” that was based
on “(1) an examination of emerging issues that may require Coast
Guard oversight, regulation, or action; (2) a description of
potential limitations and shortcomings of relying on current Coast
Guard authorities to address emerging issues; and (3) an overview of
adjustments and additions that could be made to existing Coast Guard
authorities to fully address emerging issues.” The emerging issues
encompassed in the legislation were those “reasonably likely to
occur within 10 years.”
Pursuant to this legislation, the Coast Guard tasked NASEM with
conducting a study of “emerging issues that are likely to demand
Coast Guard services over the next decade and consider whether the
Service’s existing statutory authorities are sufficient to meet this
demand, and if not, where the Service’s authority could be expanded
to do so.” The committee was specifically tasked with considering
“changes in technological capabilities, industry trends,
cybersecurity risks, climate and environmental conditions, and
geopolitical factors that could affect governance and activities in
the maritime domain.” Although the statement of task emphasized that
the committee should focus on the Coast Guard’s statutory authority
to address these emerging issues, it also called for the committee
to consider “related abilities” that the Coast Guard would need to
respond to the identified developments over the next decade.
In accord with these directions, the NASEM study aimed to assess
the adequacy of the Coast Guard’s statutory authority to address
challenges arising under its existing missions over the next ten
years. The committee sought to identify those emerging issues or
foreseeable developments that, as noted in the statement of task,
“it believes are likely to have the greatest relevance to and effect
on the Coast Guard’s missions.” The study was thus not intended as
an overall strategic re- assessment of the roles and missions of the
Coast Guard. Moreover, given Section 8249’s emphasis on the Coast
Guard’s statutory authority to engage in “oversight” and
“regulation,” as well as limitations deriving from the lack of
access to classified information, the committee did not engage in
systematic inquiry of military actions in response to armed
conflicts that could potentially arise in the coming decade. The
committee was, however, attentive to national security
considerations in full recognition of the Coast Guard’s valuable and
essential law enforcement, intelligence, and military
responsibilities. Finally, in keeping with the study’s statement of
task, the committee focused on statutory authority and not the
design of Coast Guard regulations or other legal issues.
Within these parameters, the statement of task called for a
sweeping inquiry. To address the fundamental question of the Coast
Guard’s potential statutory authority needs, the committee first
needed to determine which foreseeable developments might hold
“greatest relevance” over the next decade to the Coast Guard’s
numerous missions—whether as an emergency responder, a maritime law
enforcer, a manager of waterways, a defender of maritime safety and
security, or a protector and steward of the environment. Next, the
committee sought to identify what potential actions the Coast Guard
would likely need to take in fulfilling these missions in response
to the foreseeable developments. Only then was the committee able to
assess whether the Coast Guard’s existing statutory authority would
permit it to undertake these likely actions. The figure at the top
of the next page, excerpted from the committee’s report, illustrates
the three-step approach the committee took to fulfill its study
task.
Figure: NASEM Study Committee Approach
Based on the committee’s engagement with Coast Guard officials and other
experts, as well as the committee members’ own experience and judgment,
we identified 10 foreseeable developments that the Coast Guard is likely
to confront in the coming years. These 10 developments are:
- Autonomous systems;
- Cybersecurity risk;
- Commercial spaceflight operations;
- Offshore wind energy;
- Aquaculture;
- The Arctic domain;
- Ship decarbonization;
- Disasters;
- Migration; and
- Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
To inform the committee’s assessment of these developments, we sought
direct input on each from the Coast Guard as well as independent
experts. Some of these developments present challenges already facing
the Coast Guard but which will only grow in significance in coming
years. Others represent new challenges that are only starting to become
discernible.
For each of these 10 foreseeable developments, the committee identified
a range of actions—34 in total—that the Coast Guard would likely need to
take in response, such as issuing regulations, conducting or expanding
operations, and improving monitoring and oversight. (See the Appendix to
this testimony for a chart from the NASEM report that lists each of the
types of actions considered.) Having identified the types of actions the
Coast Guard will likely need to take to address the 10 foreseeable
developments, the committee then considered whether existing statutes
provide the Coast Guard with sufficient authority to undertake the
identified actions over the next decade.
In the next section of my testimony, I detail the committee’s principal
findings with respect to statutory authority. But before turning to the
committee’s conclusions and recommendations, five additional
clarifications of the study’s scope will be helpful to keep in mind.
First, although the committee judged the 10 foreseeable developments
listed above as ones having greatest relevance to the Coast Guard’s
missions in the coming decade, the committee makes no claim that these
are all the important issues that the maritime domain will confront in
this time period. As the committee’s report makes plain, we cannot rule
out “new, unforeseen scenarios.” Moreover, plenty of existing and
longstanding challenges confronting the Coast Guard are unlikely to
disappear even as new challenges emerge.
Second, although the committee addressed each of the 10 foreseeable
developments separately in its report, they are unlikely to manifest as
entirely separate and distinct problems. As the report notes, the
effects of these developments on the Coast Guard’s missions “are likely
to be additive and generative.” By way of illustration, consider how a
cybersecurity breach could lead an autonomous vessel to damage an
offshore energy platform. It seems undeniable that, as the committee
notes, “[e]ach of the 10 developments could produce incidents or
phenomena that occur simultaneously or in quick succession.”
Third, the scope of the committee’s legal analysis was necessarily
conducted at a high level, with the aim of identifying glaring gaps or
priority areas needing additional attention. A more complete legal
analysis of the Coast Guard’s many existing authorities would need to
delve into greater detail with respect to any of the issues considered
by the committee. The study committee’s task had been defined in terms
of breadth rather than depth, in light of the number of major issues
likely to confront the Coast Guard in the coming decade. As a result,
the study focused on general types of actions that the Coast Guard will
likely need to take, even though firm legal conclusions ultimately
depend on specifics. Developing those specific details for any new
action might well demand its own separate study. We did not, for
example, make any determinations about the specific design or content of
any new Coast Guard regulations that may be needed to address safety
concerns related to autonomous vessels.
Fourth, even though the committee was charged with assessing questions
of statutory authority, this does not mean that statutory authority
questions will be the only legal questions facing the Coast Guard in the
coming decade. As noted in the report, and discussed further below, some
important legal questions will arise under international law. Even other
important domestic law questions, such as those involving potential
federal-state conflicts, fell outside the scope of this study of
statutory authority.
Finally, as much as adequate statutory authority is a necessary
prerequisite for the Coast Guard to respond effectively to future
challenges, such authority will hardly be sufficient. The committee
highlighted three “foundational” capacities and capabilities that
Congress and the Coast Guard must together ensure are further developed
and maintained: data management, government contracting, and workforce
readiness. These core capacities and capabilities are discussed further
in the next part of this testimony after a review of the study
committee’s conclusions and recommendations on statutory authority.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Major forces such as climate change, technological innovation, and
global economic and political competition are driving change in the
maritime domain and presenting new challenges to the Coast Guard.
Meeting these challenges will necessitate that the Coast Guard take a
broad range of actions in response to foreseeable developments over the
coming decade. The NASEM committee reached key conclusions and
recommendations about the Coast Guard’s statutory authority to take
these actions. Just as importantly, it reached conclusions and
recommendations about the Coast Guard’s need for strong and nimble
mission support capacities and capabilities. Finally, it also offered
conclusions and recommendations about the Coast Guard’s need for
integrating strategic foresight, along with legal analysis, into ongoing
planning and decision-making.
Statutory Authority
For each of the 34 actions identified in the study, the committee
considered questions such as the following: Does the action clearly fall
under the Coast Guard’s existing authority? Is the action specifically
precluded under existing law? Are there obvious instances where
authority to act is missing, insufficient, unduly restricted, or
substantially in need of clarification?
In general, the study committee answered these questions by concluding
that “the Coast Guard possesses sufficient statutory authority that can
be exercised to allow it to respond to most developments foreseeable in
the maritime domain over the next decade.” As the committee report
further notes, “[f]or an agency with so many vital responsibilities, the
Coast Guard is already bestowed with much statutory authority to act,
including authority that affords the Coast Guard latitude to take a wide
range of actions, both existing and new.”
The Coast Guard’s extensive authority notwithstanding, the range of
developments and the number of likely actions needed to respond to them
made it not unreasonable to inquire whether the Coast Guard might need
some new or modified authority for at least some types of actions. After
methodically addressing 34 actions need to respond to the 10 foreseeable
developments, the study committee found that “[i]n only a few instances
did the committee find reason to suspect that existing authority could
have limited or questionable applicability to the kinds of future
actions the Coast Guard will likely need to take over the next decade.”
In particular, the Coast Guard likely lacks sufficient statutory
authority “to respond fully” with specified actions with respect to two
of these developments: autonomous vessel technology, and commercial
space operations. For a third development—cybersecurity risks—the
committee concluded that the Coast Guard already possesses sufficient
authority to take all the likely actions needed; however, the committee
also noted that it might nevertheless be prudent for Congress to
consider clarifying that the Service’s general security authority also
includes authority specifically to address cyber incidents. Together,
these three areas deserving of additional congressional attention are
summarized in Table 1 below, which is excerpted from the committee’s
report.
Table 1: Three Candidates for Legislative Attention
As the committee’s report makes clear, even with respect to autonomous
vessels and commercial space operations, the Coast Guard possesses
sufficient authority to take most needed actions. It is simply that, as
indicated below, without further legal change the Coast Guard could find
itself constrained to take some specific actions that may be needed to
address facets of these developments.
Autonomous systems. When it comes to autonomous vessels, it is
important to note that the degree of autonomy can vary from mere
decision support for the onboard crew to a full level of autonomy that
would made it possible for a vessel to operate without any human crew on
board. For most of these levels of autonomy, the Coast Guard will have
sufficient authority to address safety concerns that may arise for
vessels operating with this new technology. As the committee report
notes:
The Coast Guard has a broad range of statutory authorities intended for
safety at sea, including those related to vessel operation, safety
management systems, navigation, and design and engineering. These
authorities will likely allow the Coast Guard to address most regulatory
needs for autonomous systems, such as perhaps even by eventually
creating a comprehensive regulatory regime that addresses a range of
issues presented by these systems.
Nevertheless, the committee concluded that the Coast Guard will likely
find its authority constrained with respect to taking action that would
allow fully autonomous, uncrewed vessels to operate in the marine
transportation system (MTS). As noted in the report, “manning
requirements for vessels currently call for human operators to be on
board all vessels and may thus limit the Coast Guard’s ability to
approve, as appropriate, vessels that use autonomous systems in lieu of
an onboard crew.”
Currently, federal statutory law requires that “vessels propelled by
machinery or carrying passengers shall have a licensed master” and
“shall be under the direction and control of a pilot” with “a suitable
number of watchmen.” As these so-called manning requirements contemplate
human personnel being present on vessels, it would seem to require
statutory change for the Coast Guard to allow the operation of uncrewed
vessels. Congress has authorized, of course, the Coast Guard to grant
limited waivers from these manning requirements, but so far only with
respect to one specific use of autonomous technology: uncrewed vessels
used for at-sea recovery of components of commercial space vehicles. At
some point in the coming decade, uncrewed autonomous vessel technology
may have demonstrated sufficient safety to justify its more widespread
general use. For this reason, the NASEM committee recommended that the
Coast Guard and Congress continue to monitor this technology as well as
assess whether, at an appropriate time, to lift statutory “constraints
on the ability of the Coast Guard to approve vessels that use fully
autonomous systems in lieu of an onboard crew.”
Commercial space operations. Over the last five years,
commercial space launches and reentries in the maritime domain have more
than doubled. The Coast Guard has already taken a host of regulatory
actions to protect safety and security of waterways during periods of
space operations, including by establishing hundreds of safety zones at
varying times every year. The Coast Guard possesses sufficient statutory
authority to establish these safety zones for all vessels in U.S.
territorial waters and for U.S.-flagged vessels even outside of
territorial waters. But as commercial space operations move farther to
sea, the Coast Guard lacks the authority to impose binding safety orders
on the operation of foreign-flagged vessels outside of territorial
waters. At present, the Coast Guard can only provide non-enforceable
safety warnings to such foreign- flagged vessels operating outside
territorial waters. The committee concluded:
Limitations on the authority to establish spaceflight-related safety
zones that are binding on foreign-flagged vessels in the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) may impede the Coast Guard’s ability to protect both
those vessels and commercial spaceflight operations in the EEZ.
It is imperative to note, though, that these two limitations on the
Coast Guard’s statutory authority—both for commercial space operations
as well as autonomous vessel technology— have corresponding constraints
in international law. With respect to autonomous vessels, for example,
several international maritime conventions include manning requirements
similar to those reflected in U.S. legislation. And the limitation on
the Coast Guard’s authority to impose mandatory safety zones on
foreign-flagged vessels outside of U.S. territorial waters derives as
much from international law’s protection of the freedom of navigation as
it does from a lack of statutory authority. It is for this reason that
the committee did not recommend any specific legislative changes at this
time, but instead simply recommended that Congress “closely analyze”
these matters further. As the committee report notes, before making any
legislative changes with respect to these two issues, Congress “should
carefully weigh [such changes] against U.S. adherence to principles of
international law” and “consider coordinating any statutory changes with
any changes in international legal standards.”
Cybersecurity risk. With respect to a third foreseeable
development—cybersecurity—the study committee noted that “it may be
prudent for Congress to consider making a clarifying set of changes” to
statutory law. Cyberattacks are increasing across all sectors of the
economy, including in the maritime domain. In the coming years, as
maritime transportation further relies on advanced digital systems and
satellite navigation, the vulnerability for serious disruption to the
MTS from cyber incidents are likely only to increase. The Coast Guard is
already taking numerous actions to address cybersecurity risks in the
maritime domain, including adopting regulations under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The study committee concluded that
the Coast Guard possesses adequate authority to take necessary future
actions under the MTSA and other relevant existing statutes. In 2021,
however, Congress amended the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to clarify
that this legislation does encompass the authority for the Coast
Guard to address cyber incidents. Having made this change to one
statute, it may be appropriate for Congress now to affirm that the MTSA
and the Magnuson Act of 1950 also authorize the Coast Guard to take
actions addressing cybersecurity risks.
Mission Support
Beyond these three issues of statutory authority that merit
congressional attention, the study committee also concluded that
“[o]ther congressional support may be needed to strengthen the Coast
Guard’s mission support capacity and capability, ensuring that it has
the necessary resources and authority to be nimble and effective in its
preparation and responses.” In other words, statutory authority alone
will not be sufficient to meet the many demands that the Coast Guard
will confront in the years ahead. If the Coast Guard is to meet new and
unexpected challenges, it must strengthen three core mission support
pillars, namely its ability to (1) manage and analyze data, (2) act
nimbly to procure needed technology, and (3) develop and maintain a
workforce ready and able to meet future demands.
These three mission support capabilities and capacities will be so
crucial to the Coast Guard’s performance over the next ten years that
the committee devoted an entire chapter in its report to detailing the
abilities that the Service will need in each of these three areas. Table
2 below, taken from the committee report, illustrates the types of
institutional capabilities addressed in the report with respect to each
of these vital mission support pillars. The report elaborates on these
needs in much greater detail and relays important ideas for
strengthening each of these pillars.
Table 2: Vital Mission Support Capacities and Capabilities
As the committee report explains, congressional action will be needed
not only to provide necessary fiscal resources to sustain these mission
support functions but also potentially to make targeted statutory
changes that can alleviate barriers or give the Coast Guard new
management- related authorities. Although the scope of the study
precluded the committee from fully analyzing potential statutory reforms
related to mission support, the committee was in agreement that further
exploration of these issues would be definitely warranted by both
Congress and the Coast Guard. As the committee recommended:
The Coast Guard will need the mission support capacity and capabilities
to meet foreseeable demands and to respond quickly and effectively to
developments that may not be foreseen. Congress should ensure that the
Coast Guard has the requisite statutory authority and flexibility to (a)
manage, share, and analyze data; (b) procure and manage assets; and (c)
support and develop a workforce, all in a manner that is suited to a
fast-changing environment. Because the Coast Guard already has many
existing broad authorities for mission support, the Service should
continue to review the latitude afforded by these existing authorities,
including the procedures and processes used to implement them, to make
sure that the authorities are being used in the most effective manner,
such as to update internal systems and meet evolving workforce needs.
The committee also emphasized that, “[w]hile these three domains are by
no means the only areas of institutional capability that matter, they
emerged as recurring themes in the committee’s gathering of information,
and, in the committee’s view, they are foundational to the Coast Guard’s
ability to respond effectively to a range of future demands.”
Strategic and Legal Foresight
The NASEM study revealed more than potential gaps in the Coast Guard’s
statutory authority and renewed needs for strong mission support. Given
the likelihood that “the Coast Guard may well face other developments
that are difficult if not impossible to anticipate now,” the Coast Guard
will need to remain vigilant and ready to adapt as needed to respond to
all that comes its way in the next decade and beyond. The undeniable
dynamism of the maritime domain means that the Coast Guard will continue
to benefit from the scenario- building and other forecasting efforts
that are part of its Evergreen process. As the committee concluded:
No matter what the future holds, it behooves the Coast Guard, with its
many responsibilities in the vast and varied maritime domain, to
continue to monitor the horizon for future developments and assess their
likely implications on Coast Guard actions, plans, and preparations.
The committee observed that the Coast Guard’s Evergreen process could do
more to incorporate a “wider range of strategic foresight methods [that]
can be valuable for maximizing insights.” The committee also considered
“the importance of having a dedicated institutional capacity for the
continual execution of strategic foresight planning, as opposed to ad
hoc, periodic exercises conducted to inform leadership transitions.”
Rapid flux in the maritime environment makes plain the need for giving
strategic planning “a high priority among the Coast Guard leadership.”
At the same time, the NASEM study revealed “the critical importance of
building stronger connections between legal foresight and operational
and strategic planning.” After all, it is not just the operational
maritime environment that is changing, but the legal environment can
change as well, with new developments occurring in international law or
with domestic courts changing their approaches to statutory
interpretation. These legal changes, combined with changes in the
operational environment, make it critical that the Coast Guard integrate
legal foresight into its strategic planning processes. By “legal
foresight,” the committee means the
regular, systematic assessment of statutory authorities to ensure that
they will be sufficient to allow the Coast Guard to take needed actions
and to build the capacity to carry them out. Such legal
foresight would seek to anticipate not only the likely adverse
impacts of foreseeable developments, but also the statutory authority
needs that the Coast Guard will require to address them.
Robust strategic planning, combined with legal foresight, will not only
help the Coast Guard be better prepared for the future, but it will also
better ensure that Congress can “act responsively to ensure that the
Coast Guard has the flexibility and capacity, through its statutory
authority and other resources, that it will need to face a rapidly
changing maritime domain with agility and efficacy.”
Finally, the NASEM committee believes that the value from its study goes
beyond the insights reflected in its conclusions and recommendations.
This study and its conceptual framework also offer a kind of a template
for future efforts at legal foresight by the Coast Guard itself. It
shows by its example “how to search for obvious instances where new and
expanded Coast Guard actions may be needed—and then to assess whether
such action might be precluded or inhibited by insufficient or unclear
statutory authority.”
* * *
In conclusion, I wish to thank you—Chairman Webster, Ranking Member
Carbajal, and Members of the Subcommittee—for the opportunity to testify
before you about the NASEM committee report, “The Coast Guard’s Next
Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory Needs.” The
Coast Guard has throughout its history protected the nation by
successfully undertaking a broad and diverse array of vital missions
that protect, among other things, maritime safety, homeland security,
and environmental quality. These mission demands appear likely only to
increase in significance over the coming decade. Indeed, precisely
because the future will bring new developments and increased challenges
calling for continued Coast Guard response, I am grateful for your
committee’s support in seeking to ensure that the Coast Guard will have
the statutory authority and mission support capabilities it needs to act
with agility in the face of these future challenges.
*****
An archived webcast of the hearing can be found on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s Website.