The Committee on Using Information Technology to Enhance Disaster Management developed three narratives describing fictional disasters illustrative of the current and potential use of information technology (IT) in disaster management practice. The purpose is to provide a realistic context for understanding and analyzing potential goals and capabilities for the use of IT to improve disaster management now and in the future. The committee constructed narratives representing different types of disasters with different proximate causes, varying lengths of warning, different geographic scope, and different levels of responder perspective (local/tactical, regional/strategic and tactical, national/strategic) in order to uncover both common and unique problems that they present. The narratives draw on the experiences of disaster management practitioners and researchers and highlight specific aspects of technology use. Each scenario shows elements of IT use across the goal areas identified in the report, though a scenario may naturally highlight the importance of some goals more than others. Some descriptions may seem more compelling because they are closer to the direct human impact of a disaster, but gaining an understanding of and improving on disaster management practice at all levels are critical to saving lives and reducing economic impacts. Taken together, the scenarios build a picture of the many moving parts that must be coordinated for an effective response.

For each scenario, an introductory paragraph describes the setting and the focus for analysis of IT use. Each scenario concludes with a summary analysis that highlights some of the challenges and opportunities

for potentially improving IT capabilities. The committee emphasizes that, although they are set in specific contexts, these scenarios are fictional and are not intended to reflect in detail the specific response capabilities of particular jurisdictions or agencies.

The first fictional narrative describes the exchange between responders during a chemical attack in the Washington, D.C., Metro system. It presents the use of information and communications technology from the perspective of local and tactical first responders during the onset and immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. The focus of this scenario is on the use of communications and information infrastructure by the police, emergency medical personnel, other responding public safety personnel, and more generally by anyone (including individual private citizens) who can act as first responders. This scenario highlights a number of uses to which IT is currently put in responding to situations that occur with no warning and rapid onset. The response described here is entirely tactical, and the technology used is what has been predeployed and is on hand or can rapidly—in seconds and minutes—be brought to bear. The alert reader will identify a number of technologies used: video, chemical sensors, public safety radio, operational control systems (Metro system), commercial cellular telephone, commercial land telephone, and text messaging during the first few moments. Metro dispatch; firefighting, emergency medical, and hazardous materials personnel; Metro police; emergency managers; and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) units are all rapidly engaged and seeking information.

7:46:00 a.m.

Metro Dispatch (Mary Williams—33 years old, 5 years’ experience as adispatcher):

Unit 332 (John Bison—26 years old, former military):

Metro Dispatch:

7:46:30 a.m.

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 332:

Unit 337 (Billy Boyd, 53 years old, 29 years with Transit Police, 63 daysfrom retirement):

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300S:

7:46:40 a.m.

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300L:

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 340:

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300S:

7:47:15 a.m.

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300L:

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300L:

Metro Dispatch:

7:57:00 a.m.

Unit 300L:

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300L:

As 300L makes this request, he is attempting to dial the EOC on his cellphone, a commercial network that is overloaded with traffic.

Metro Dispatch:

Unit 300L:

Metro Dispatch:

Meanwhile at the EOC

Unit 300C (Unit 300C is the captain):

Sally (staff member in EOC):

Unit 300C:

Sally:

Unit 300C:

Unit 300L:

Unit 300C:

Unit 300L:

Unit 300C:

Unit 300L:

Sally:

Unit 300C:

Sally:

As the video of L’Enfant Plaza comes up, everyone stands motionless. Asthe camera moves, they see fellow Transit Authority workers motionless.They are dead—of that there is no doubt—along with hundreds of others.

Unit 300C (looking over to the Fire Battalion Chief):

Fire Battalion Chief:

Unit 300C:

An analysis of this scenario reveals a number of notable problems with and limitations of IT use. These include radio-frequency conflicts; the lack of means for communicating with victims (using either voice or text) or for obtaining information about them (through automatically transmitted sensor data from their devices); impaired video capability; limits of commercial cellular infrastructure; lack of access to redundant or alternate technologies (e.g., text messaging, wireless Internet); inability to disseminate and share information; reduced timeliness and limitations of sensor data; absence of dissemination of sensor data to responders, hazmat units, and hospitals; and inability to distinguish different information needs of various responders. The ability to interpret the data rapidly (either by getting it to the appropriate expert or through automated analysis) and then to issue appropriate and timely instructions to responders and affected individuals based on the analysis of the data is clearly critical. Some of these problems and limitations could be addressed with existing technology; others require technology advances.

A striking aspect of the response described is the need to gather and disseminate information rapidly in order to create sufficient situational awareness for making effective response decisions in a rapidly evolving situation. For instance, chemical sensors started going off only 40 seconds after the initial report of a casualty—and yet this was already too late to avoid dispatching responders when they could no longer provide effective aid and to keep doors from opening on entering trains. Detection of harmful agents might, for instance, trigger automated response systems to halt or reroute the entry of additional trains into the area. Automated analysis of sensor data could also alert the dispatcher to take appropriate measures to protect and direct responders—not just to avoid putting them in harm’s way but also to make sure that they could be effective if they were deployed. Other possibilities include automated control of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems based on previous plume modeling. Understanding what can be automated and striking a balance between what should be automated and what requires human decision makers are major challenges revealed by an analysis of this scenario. Finally, the scenario does not consider how the increasingly sophisticated

mobile consumer devices that Metro employees are likely to carry could be used to provide better information about the unfolding incident.

The second fictional narrative describes the development and progression of a major hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico and the corresponding disaster management response that is possible now with the current level of technology. It focuses on the use of information and communications technology from the perspective of the regional Emergency Operations Center. The scenario shows how emergency managers use IT during the pre-incident onset phase, through landfall, to the early stages of post-incident recovery. This scenario highlights a number of uses to which IT is currently put when responding to situations with considerable warning and slow onset. Situational awareness and a common operating picture are a particular focus. The substantial lead time and detailed knowledge now available prior to the onset of a hurricane are possible owing to great advances in IT and other scientific disciplines.

The response described here is a mix of tactical and strategic operations. Technologies highlighted in this scenario include computer modeling, simulation, weather sensors, satellites, WiFi and mobile networking, traffic cameras, and unmanned vehicles with onboard communications. For this scenario, information and communications flows are centered largely on the state Emergency Operations Center, with raw data flowing in, being processed, and analyzed; actions being formulated; and instructions flowing back out.

A Category 4 hurricane is churning in the Gulf of Mexico, buildingstrength. It is projected to be the worst storm surge ever experienced onthe Florida west coast. The hurricane begins to make its way toward Cedar Key, a sparsely populated area near Ocala, with expected landfall onSaturday at midnight. Emergency managers develop an Incident ActionPlan (IAP) for the response using previous plans and the results of a distributed simulation exercise. IAPs are specific to an event. At this point inan event, the communities’ and state’s emergency management plansform the framework of response. This approach allows each agency to seeits role in the plan and identify possible bottlenecks. Alternative plans aredeveloped for possible storm deviations.

The state emergency manager activates the plan for Cedar Key basedon computerized weather models showing the highest probability of landfall occurring there. Local and state response teams (e.g., search and rescue, law enforcement) are prepositioned near Cedar Key, and federalteams are prepositioned along the path of the hurricane, which is project-

ed to cut across Florida and then up through the interior of Georgia andTennessee.

The hurricane begins to be felt around 8 p.m. The entire area is undera hurricane warning issued by the National Weather Service. The WeatherService, taking advantage of a network of wind and wave sensors erectedalong the west coast, begins to see in real time that the port city of Tampais unexpectedly bearing the brunt of the storm, indicating that the storm isnot heading north but has turned slightly east, mirroring the behavior ofHurricane Charley. The state EOC dynamically switches to an alternativeIAP previously developed for this area, using simulations and drawing ona cache of plans from previous responses.

Based on the alternative plan, the state EOC generates modificationsto the existing response plan, notifying all critical agencies (i.e., those designated in the plans as key agencies for interagency emergency communications and operations), rerouting Coast Guard flyovers and prioritizingnight flights. The broadcast media interrupts programming to saturate theairwaves with hurricane warnings, and the state communications officesets up a 511 number for information. Law enforcement officers are dispatched to close down entertainment areas, alert the areas most at risk,inform them of how to respond, and survey the status of voluntary evacuations, identifying specific high-risk targets such as nursing homes thathave not been evacuated. The Department of Transportation (DOT), another designated critical agency, brings in crews and orange cones to helproute traffic out of the popular bayside night club district. Traffic camerasshow real-time traffic flows along designated evacuation routes, and DOTforwards assessments to the media for broadcast to the public.

The hurricane makes landfall at midnight, but stalls unexpectedly.The Weather Service projects 18 inches of rain in the Tampa Bay regionby morning. The rainfall, coupled with the storm surge, could topple thelevees surrounding toxic phosphate mine tailings. The state emergencymanager calls for the deployment of pre-identified assets for the large-scale testing and monitoring of water quality and designated environmental mitigation teams. EOC staff work through the night with computerprograms projecting damage to key areas, residential areas, and infrastructure; these become rapid reconnaissance plans. Intermittent reportsfrom pre-positioned recon teams and law enforcement provide some indication of damage, but the winds and rain must die down before the CoastGuard can fly or reconnaissance teams can venture out. The governorand president are briefed about potential ecological and economic damage, based on models and the current storm path.

The hurricane finally passes in the early morning hours, and the windand rain begin to subside. Electric power and cellular coverage were lostearly on due to wind damage from the leading edge of the storm, and

satellite phones are waiting for the skies to clear. Recon and responseteams are set to mobilize at 4 a.m. Teams have refined their plans throughout the night, generating search grids for the area, reviewing land usemaps, and assigning teams and assets. As they begin to deploy to thefield, they find it difficult to reach designated areas due to extensive damage to transportation infrastructure. Limited ability to communicate difficulties and receive updated damage information further hinders progress.

A large neighborhood near downtown is flooded, and survivors are onthe roofs, while a major senior and assisted-living development in the suburbs previously identified as not having been evacuated is also damagedand flooded. Rescue teams deploy miniature unmanned helicopters togeolocate survivors on roofs, remotely talk with them, and also look aroundroofs and attics for signs of survivors trapped inside. The Coast Guardsends manned helicopters to the suburbs to lift survivors from the rooftops, while the rescue teams talk directly with the pilots and provide prioritization and data on rooftop conditions from a portable anemometer. Themajority of the rescue teams focus on determining who in the urban areaneeds immediate evacuation. When the rescuers find a group of looters,they alert the police, who in turn dispatch the nearest law enforcementpersonnel. Boats are tasked to help the elderly and handle medical priorities, but routing them to appropriate care facilities is hampered by damage infrastructure making it impossible to regularly communicate information about the operational status of medical facilities.

As operations transition slowly from response to recovery, law enforcement agencies attempt to separate curious bystanders from returningauthorized responders, residents, and repair crews. But, due to limitedmeans to make such distinctions, they tend to deny access to some appropriate personnel—slowing the repair and recovery process. Utility providers (e.g., electrical, water, communications) gather information about damage and determine how to re-establish services. Portable radio broadcasttowers are erected and by 7 a.m., news and response directions are beingtransmitted to the public in the affected areas. While the EOC has a general picture of where resources have been dispatched and has piecedtogether an overall picture of damage from information coming from fieldoperations, detailed situational awareness continues to be elusive.

Information and communications technology is obviously critical to managing the widely distributed and massive operations described in this scenario. Indeed, IT is used effectively from identification of the emerging situation through to the recovery phase. Lives are saved, damaged reduced, and steps toward recovery made rapidly by extensive use of IT. Yet, there are many opportunities to extend and improve the use of IT. A combination of existing technology, further technology advances,

and organizational innovations should be able to extend the excellent situational awareness that was available prior to onset into the response phase, and beyond to the recovery phase. Interagency communication and coordination are especially critical in this scenario, and the planning operations described stress this point.

However, the single global situational awareness developed at the EOC is inadequate for developing the task-specific situational awareness needed by different participants. For instance, a search-and-rescue team incident commander should see where search teams are, what they have searched, and what the results are. He or she would have the ability to report looting or unauthorized entry to law enforcement, using authorized access to directly input the information into the system managing the operational picture. The medical community should also see the progress and projections of injuries, heatstroke, local capacity for medical care, and so on—and be able to send information about its situation to other operational units for (automatic) inclusion into their operational picture. The EOC should receive continuously updated information that can then be used to revise its operational picture on an ongoing basis using adaptive planning tools.

While transportation officials are able to identify traffic congestion using cameras and to communicate problems that have already developed, use of traffic sensors that measure speed and volume of traffic could be incorporated with information about infrastructure damage and other situational variables into decision support systems to recommend alternate routes proactively before the transportation system bogs down. Civilian volunteers at homes and shelters, fire departments, and police stations could be pre-equipped with WiFi network capability and designated as an integral information source in emergency plans. Civilians in the damaged areas with functioning IT systems (e.g., cell phones) could have a channel for sending pictures and other information from areas to a designated repository that can be used to build situational awareness.

With technology available and on the horizon, it is possible to imagine rescue teams, as they drive into designated areas, receiving constant updates from DOT reconnaissance teams on road conditions and damage. A roadmap on a responder laptop could glow with red overlays on known or suspected damaged bridges. Navigation software could attempt to create directions for each of the teams that would get them to their assigned grid. Driving in, a team member could use infrared and laser cameras to videorecord the geolocated damage. As a team passed a WiFi hot spot, the laptop could download new information from flyovers, and the Weather Service could transmit video to the incident commander on a priority basis and then to the EOC. Decision support tools could begin combing emerging information, correlating and analyzing who needs

what kind of help and what the transportation conditions are. They could also identify areas where no information is available and target quick reconnaissance teams to check out those blind spots. As new and better information becomes available, adaptive planning tools could be used to change response activities to reflect the evolving situation. Visualization software could present task-specific views of the situation for each emergency support function, and provide an integrated view of the overall situation. Law enforcement could have access to centralized databases, with pre-identified authorization for efficient and accurate screening of affected areas.

The third fictional narrative describes the occurrence of a major earthquake in the San Francisco Bay area and the resulting response. The focus is on the use of information and communications technology from the perspective of the federal-level emergency manager as part of a national response. In this case onset is rapid, but such an incident has been anticipated, and detailed plans exist for responding to it. The blizzard of acronyms blanketing this scenario is a clue to the complexity involved in coordinating a response at this level and the degree and sophistication of interagency interaction required. Resource allocation, logistics, tracking, and mobilization are of particular concern in this scenario. Planning triggers, such as the declaration of an Incident of National Significance, also affect what IT resources are applied and when. Most of the technology employed in the two fictional scenarios above would also be applied in this scenario. However, technologies (and issues) highlighted here are those focused primarily on strategic response: for example, collaboration tools, modeling, information analysis and filtering tools, logistics and tracking, system scalability, and geographic information systems (GIS).

At 4:03 a.m. on a Monday in March, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake occurs on the Hayward fault, with an epicenter very near the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. The Hayward fault event is not unanticipated and hasbeen studied by scientists and emergency managers for years. However,in the darkness and confusion surrounding the early hours, it is difficult toget an accurate picture about what has just occurred.

State Office of Emergency Management (OEM) officials in Sacramento and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS) officials in Washington, D.C., get their initialsituational awareness from prior modeling results: the Association of BayArea Governments, FEMA, and the state of California have developed

loss-estimation models for this scenario. Initial estimates are that morethan 100,000 dwelling units are severely damaged in the Bay area, primarily in Alameda and San Francisco counties. The models predict thatalmost 400,000 people will be displaced and will need food and water, and110,000 will need emergency shelter. Oakland and San Francisco airportsand the Port of Oakland are expected to be closed, as are major interstatehighways (I-80, I-580, I-880, Highway 13, Highway 101) and bridges (BayBridge, Dumbarton Bridge, Richmond–San Rafael Bridge). Models developed by the University of California, Berkeley, predict severe damage tothat institution. Significant casualties are also expected.

The information from the models is enough for the secretary of DHS todeclare an Incident of National Significance, to activate the CatastrophicIncident Annex of the National Response Plan, and to deploy specializedresources. Resources deployed include Rapid Needs Assessment Teams,FEMA Advance Teams, Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USART), National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams, and Disaster MortuaryTeams. The mobilization of government and Red Cross resources is alsobegun.

The common operating picture and situational awareness problemsbegin almost immediately. Due to bridge and highway failures and communications problems, the Bay area has been transformed into four or fivedisconnected “islands,” complicating coordinated response efforts. Initialcommunications with FEMA Region Nine are restricted to satellite phone.Although Travis Air Force Base is open, it is not clear to emergency managers where the greatest needs are and how to bring resources to bear tomeet them.

Rain and fog impede overflights and generation of satellite imagery inthe hours immediately following the incident. Scattered reports from citizens, media, and responders from the area are conflicting and vague. Forexample, reports have been received that the Bay Bridge is “down,” but noone in Washington, D.C., or Sacramento knows if that means that thebridge has collapsed, a section has collapsed (as occurred during theLoma Prieta earthquake), or an on-ramp is closed. Similarly, unconfirmedreports have been received from the media that there are “thousands” ofcasualties at the University of California, Berkeley, and that people aretrapped in collapsed buildings in Oakland.

In Washington, D.C., the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center(HSOC), the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), andthe White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) have delivered conflicting initial assessments to the president: FEMA NRCC’s assessment isbased on HAZUS model output; DHS HSOC’s assessment is based oninitial reports from the media, NORTHCOM, and the State of CaliforniaOEM; HSC’s assessment is based on conversations with the governor of

California. The HSOC and the NRCC were operationally, but not physically, combined after Hurricane Katrina into the National Operations Center(NOC). The Berkeley earthquake is demonstrating that the two operationscenters are still operating independently. The secretary of DHS has convened his interagency Incident Advisory Council (IAC) and is receivinginformation directly from senior officials in other cabinet offices. For instance, health and medical information, including the status of medicalassets in the region, is processed through the Department of Health andHuman Services (DHHS) EOC. The president’s homeland security advisorhas convened the Domestic Readiness Group (DRG) to provide policyadvice to the president and to the secretary of DHS.

Even after communications are established, the situational awarenessproblems persist. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),developed to provide uniform, richer, information-sharing capabilities andcollaborative tools, has been overwhelmed. Information available throughHSIN is not quality-checked and is inconsistent, inaccurate, and incomplete. The information available is changing rapidly, and it is difficult todetermine the source or timeliness of the information. In particular, GISimagery is available on HSIN from several sources (State of California,U.S. Geological Survey, FEMA), and different images convey different information. No process exists for updating and date-stamping situationalinformation as reports from the field ground-truth initial estimates producedby models, media, and rapid needs assessment teams. In particular, thestatus of critical infrastructure (e.g., road closures, water availability, sanitation) is difficult to determine, since reports are using non-standard, non-technical, and inconsistent language.

First responders and infrastructure managers, engaged in critical lifesafety and lifeline repair tasks, cannot provide consistent or complete information. Managers in the NOC are suffering from information overloadand are beginning to narrow their focus to one or two sources of situationalinformation (often CNN and one source from the field), a typical humanresponse. HSOC is relying on reports from the state OEM, and the NRCCis relying on the FEMA Advance Emergency Response Team. The predesignated Federal Coordinating Officer has been briefed by the NRCCand has been deployed to Travis, as have the pre-designated PrimaryFederal Official (after briefings from DHS HSOC) and the pre-designatedDefense Coordinating Officer (after briefings from NORTHCOM).

The White House DRG is collecting information from all availablesources. On Day 2, as a Joint Field Office (JFO) and unified federal/statecommand is established in Sacramento, it is apparent that the operatingpicture of the president, the secretary of DHS, the governor, the PFO, theFCO, and responders on the ground in the Bay area is not yet a commonone. It is also clear that even where there is a common understanding of

situational information, substantial differences exist in meaning attributedto that information depending upon the background, experience, and organizational responsibilities of the manager/decision maker.

For FEMA, the American Red Cross, NORTHCOM, and the U.S. ArmyCorps of Engineers, this is the largest mobilization and deployment of people and resources since Hurricane Katrina. The Corps has activated itscontracts with vendors and has ordered hundreds of truckloads of bottledwater and ice. New radio-frequency identification (RFID) systems will trackthe relief commodities from the point of manufacture, to federal warehousesites, and to state and local distribution sites. Attempts will be made by theCorps to ensure that DHS and FEMA have access to this logistics information to enable them to assess the gap between needs and supply. FEMAhas activated pre-scripted mission assignments with the National Communication System (for cell on wheels and switches on wheels to restore cellphone communication systems) and with DOD (for Navy vessels for shelter and command support, for Army and Air Force logistics, and for troopsto assist the California National Guard).

The American Red Cross is mobilizing 50,000 volunteers using itsDisaster Services Human Resource system, and FEMA has mobilized anddeployed its disaster reserve corps. NORTHCOM has established JointTask Force California to manage the influx of Department of Defense resources. FEMA has activated its National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) and its call centers to create the ability to registerdisaster victims for individual assistance. NEMIS has been dramaticallyexpanded since it collapsed during Hurricane Katrina, but it has not beentested. As Day 3 progresses, DHS, FEMA, and White House managerscontinue struggling to determine both what the situation is on the groundand to assess the adequacy of the response resources on scene andresources in the pipeline.

The scenario above exposes the complexity involved in coordinating numerous agencies at all levels, with often widely overlapping and conflicting responsibilities but different perspectives. Those perspectives as well as organizational culture and instincts affect how information is interpreted, what information is trusted, and even where information is sought. This has profound implications for decision support tools, logistics, and resource allocation systems. One specific implication is how IT systems deal with incomplete or uncertain information and how such information is presented to disaster managers. Another is integration of and coordination with civilians and ad hoc groups in this environment. How can the volunteer groups that stand up be integrated and coordinated? The scenario illustrates the extent to which hierarchical command and control are assumed in organizational structures and how that is

reflected in the implementation of IT systems. Introducing distributed networks and applications—and the organizational and cultural innovations necessary to leverage them—constitutes a major challenge for making use of advances in IT.

The dependence on models for rapid initial deployment is an especially striking aspect of this scenario. Aggregating the status information from FEMA, DHS, the Red Cross, DHHS, and DOD logistics and human resource systems is particularly difficult. Without a significant level of confidence in status information, managers cannot be sure that they know what impacts have occurred, what resources are needed, or what resources are responding. Models could also be valuable to responders and other on-the-scene personnel whose perspective might lead to insights not necessarily accessible to more distant emergency managers. However, this level of sharing is not typical. Also, modeling results are not often shared with lower-level personnel, who might be able to act more efficiently if they were. Finding ways to give more people access to modeling systems could yield significant benefits.