Completed
An ad hoc committee reviewed and updated the analysis and recommendations in the 2002 CISAC report titled Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the 2002 National Academies’ report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. It drew on the latest evidence in each area, and on relevant science and technology developed since the original study. The report produced by the study was to inform future Senate debate of the Treaty. Maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile, nuclear explosion detection, location and identification, sustainability, and technical advances were considered.
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Consensus
·2002
Drawing upon the considerable existing body of technical material related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed and assessed the key technical issues that arose during the Senate debate over treaty ratification. In particular, these include: (1) the capacity...
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Description
An ad hoc committee will review and update the analysis and recommendations in the 2002 CISAC report titled “Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” drawing on the latest evidence in each area, and relevant science and technology developed since the original study. The report produced by the study will inform future Senate debate of the Treaty.
PROPOSED REVISED STATEMENT OF TASK
The National Academies will review and update aspects of the analysis in the 2002 National Academies’ report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, drawing on the latest evidence in each of the following areas:
1) Maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile. The committee will assess, including information developed for and produced by the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration’s plan to manage the risks in ensuring, over the longer term, a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile absent underground nuclear testing. The experience of the U.S. stockpile stewardship program, particularly in the last decade, will also be taken into account.
2) Nuclear explosion detection, location and identification. The committee will assess present nuclear explosion detection capabilities, taking into account the totality of assets accessible to the United States, including: (a) any improvements in U.S. national technical means in the last decade, and (b) operating experience of the international monitoring system. The committee might also consider how these capabilities are expected to improve over time.
3) Sustainability. The committee will assess what commitments are required to sustain: (a) America’s nuclear stockpile; (b) the U.S. monitoring system; and (c) an adequate international verification regime, including On-Site Inspection.
4) Technical Advances. The committee will assess the potential technical advances to nuclear weapon capabilities for other countries: (a) that result from evasive and non-evasive testing at levels below the U.S. detection capability; and (b) that result from returning to full-yield testing in a non-test-ban environment.
The report will include a classified appendix to permit an evaluation of the evidence on these points.
Contributors
Sponsors
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Internal Funding
Other, Federal
Private: For Profit
Private: Non Profit
Staff
Greg Eyring
Lead