Nuclear technology contributes valuable services to modern society in the form of clean energy, medical diagnostics and therapy, nondestructive evaluation of materials, and fundamental research. Nuclear facilities also exist in the defense and national security sectors. With these benefits comes a responsibility to develop, design, operate, and decommission nuclear equipment and facilities safely and securely. It is necessary to design these technologies for safety and security, but good design and manufacture alone are insufficient for this purpose. Nuclear energy, radiotherapy, and nuclear research are not just machines run by individuals. Each is a sociotechnical system made up of complex machinery and software operated by individuals and teams of people. Safety culture and security culture are, in essence, commitments by organizations and the people who make up those organizations to value safety and security above other goals and practices, and to behave according to those values by incorporating safety and security considerations in every aspect of design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. Strong safety and security cultures are essential to achieve safe, secure operations and to realize the benefits of nuclear technologies.
At the August 2014 Brazil-U.S. Workshop on Strengthening the Culture of Nuclear Safety and Security, participants shared research, perspectives, and practices. The key points are described in abbreviated form below.
Many workshop participants noted that successful safety and security culture is achieved through interactions among system designers, operators, and overseers (regulators). A successful independent regulatory authority requires its own strong culture. This is as true in the context of nuclear reactor safety or nuclear materials control and accounting as it is in aircraft safety or safety and security in other complex systems.
The world nuclear community is inextricably linked, a number of participants said, so sharing learned experience on safety and security culture best practices and features is critically important. Transparency is a key to a good safety culture. However, individual countries and organizations will need to determine how to balance or resolve the tension between the need for transparency and open discussion, and the restriction of sensitive or proprietary infor-
mation. Major challenges include the transition from analog/direct-control systems to digital/cyber systems, insider threats, and the arrogance of excellence (complacency and belief that we fully understand the systems).
Both safety and security are reinforced by training, but training is different from education. Good training involves exposure to alternate work environments, as rotations allow for greater understanding of an entire system. It is important to learn about past failures so that these lessons can be applied to future design, planning, and operations.
Many people working on safety and security culture draw on Edgar Schein’s model of organizational culture, several participants observed, whereby one understands the state of an organization’s culture by examining artifacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions. The model is used widely by leaders and managers to effect improvements in safety and security culture. Culture change, noted one speaker, is only possible when basic assumptions change.
Most participants agreed that there is not a generally accepted body of metrics (qualitative or quantitative) for assessing safety and security culture. Methodologies to measure effectiveness of organizational safety culture need to be based on performance and progress and must be sound and validated. However, a speaker warned not to let the quest for measurement postpone or interfere with actions that should be taken now. Risk assessment can serve as a framework for focusing attention in this sociotechnical system on critical components, both mechanical and human, for the safe operation of the facility. This framework can help to improve regulations (as seen in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
Leadership, argued more than one speaker, is the most important factor in creating organizations with strong nuclear safety and security culture. Safety and security culture can be changed, both positively and negatively, by what leaders say, by how decisions are made, and by what is done in response to failures. Perception drives behavior. If leadership places a high priority on safety and security, then the organization will reflect those beliefs. Complex systems demand attention and constant vigilance. The level of risk is growing with the increasing complexity of activities undertaken. The bedrock of industrial and corporate culture in the nuclear field must remain an unwavering commitment to safety and security.
Individual participants offered additional points:
- Institutional safety culture and security culture can be changed, both positively and negatively, by
- What is said;
- How decisions are made; and
- What is done in response to failures.
- Transparency is a key attribute for good safety culture.
- Communication can take a positive or negative tone. Examples cited include the following:
- Negative: United States—Y-12 National Security Complex non-questioning complacency.
- Positive: Brazil—Eletronuclear public outreach.
- Nuclear institutions should share experience and best practices and features of successful safety and security culture across organizations and industries.
- Organizations should link authority and responsibility for implementing safety culture by empowering and expecting employees to raise safety issues themselves, including stopping work, if necessary.
- Organizations would be wise to expose safety and security staff to alternate work environments through staff rotation to allow for greater understanding of the entire systems.
- Nuclear systems are not just technical, but sociotechnical.
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