B

Events Relating to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Missile Defense in Europe: A Selective Chronology*

1997

• Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)/Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Demarcation Agreements,^† including Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures, were discussed at March Helsinki summit between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin.

1998

• Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reach an agreement on a Joint Data Exchange Center for exchange of information on missile launches and early warning.

1999

• The NATO Strategic Concept^‡ states the need for missile defense to counter nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.

2000

• President Vladimir V. Putin proposes the development of a pan-European nonstrategic defense system to NATO.^§

2001

• The administration of President George W. Bush announces plans to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.^**
• NATO launches ballistic missile defense (BMD) feasibility studies.

2002

• The United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty.

___________________

^* Based on Brad Roberts’ March 25, 2015, presentation to the joint committees.

^† See ABM Treaty 1972; Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,” available at https://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/s970321at.htm, accessed on October 26, 2018.

^‡ NATO, April 24, 1999, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm, accessed on October 26, 2018.

^§ Federation of American Scientists, June 11, 2000, “Top Russian Military Official Outlines European ABM Plans,” available at https://fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/FBIS-SOV-2000-0611.htm, accessed on October 30, 2018.

^** Neilan, T., December 13, 2001, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake,” The New York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html, accessed on October 26, 2018.

• On May 24, Presidents Bush and Putin sign a Joint Declaration, together with the Moscow Treaty, which includes an agreement on “strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense.” It lists a number of specific measures, including “exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems.”⁸⁹
• The NATO-Russia Council initiates missile defense cooperation, with a focus on TMD, and establishes the Theatre Missile Defence Ad Hoc Working Group.⁹⁰
  • The objective is to create conditions to enable joint TMD operations during a crisis.
  • The NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency develops a detailed, step-by-step plan for analyzing and evaluating levels of interoperability between NATO and Russian TMD systems.
  • Activities include four joint exercises conducted between 2004 and 2008, both tabletop and command post.

2003

• In December, Stage 1 of the NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defense Command-Post Exercise is conducted at the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency in The Hague, Netherlands.⁹¹

2004

• The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence begin discussions on a proposed umbrella agreement to provide the legal framework to support Defense Technology Cooperation (DTC) projects, including missile defense, among others.
• In March, Stage 2 of the NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defense Command-Post Exercise is conducted at the Royal Air Force Base in Venray, Netherlands.⁹²

2005

• The NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme is established to protect NATO-deployed forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats (up to a 3,000 km range).

2006

• In October, Stage 3 of the NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defense Command-Post Exercise is conducted at the 4th Central Research Institute, Ministry of Defence, in Moscow, Russia.⁹³

2007

• In January, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation William Burns informs Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak of the U.S. decision to begin negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic on the “third site” of the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
• In April, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates briefs Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov at the NATO-Russia Council on U.S. objectives.⁹⁴
• In April, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Rood presents Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak with a nonpaper regarding a comprehensive proposal for cooperation with Russia across the total missile defense spectrum.^*

___________________

^* A “nonpaper” is a position paper not part of an official record or official discussion.

• U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates discusses missile defense with President Putin, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, and Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov.
• U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discusses potential BMD cooperation at the NATO-Russia Council meeting.
• In May, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates proposes to Russian Minister of Defense Serdyukov a meeting of technical experts to discuss missile defense cooperation.
• In June, President Putin proposes an alternative plan based on sharing data from Russian-leased Gabala radar in Azerbaijan in return for cancellation of U.S. missile defense plans in Europe.
• At the July U.S.-Russian presidential summit at Kennebunkport, Maine:⁹⁵
  • President Putin proposes joint U.S.-Russian use of radar under construction at Armavir.
  • Agreement is reached for a group of experts to meet to try to resolve differences on BMD cooperation. Over the following year, this group meets 10 times.
• Transparency measures are implemented, for example:
  • The Russian Federation air attaché and a delegation from the Russian Federation Duma tour airborne laser at Andrews Air Force Base.
  • U.S. DOD delegation visits Gabala, Azerbaijan.
  • Russian Federation embassy personnel observe a missile defense intercept test at Missile Defense Agency headquarters.
  • U.S. presentation on conceptual cooperative radar architecture.
  • U.S. presentation on potential joint regional missile defense architecture.
• At October 2+2 ministerial,^* the United States presents ideas for transparency and confidence-building measures, encompassing (among many measures):
  • Clear statements of U.S. and NATO intent regarding regional BMD.
  • Regular exchanges of information on missile defense plans, programs, technical developments, funding, and threat assessments.
  • Assurances that no major modifications would be made to the interceptor and radar sites without prior discussion with Russia.
  • Sharing of near-real-time early warning information at joint data exchange centers in Moscow and/or near Brussels.
  • Possible co-location of a U.S. radar at an existing Russian site.
  • Russian liaison officers working at U.S. sites, with reciprocity rights at Russian sites.
  • Russian Federation technical monitoring of the activity and status of the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
• In November, the United States presents a nonpaper providing further details on these proposals.

2008

• In January, Stage 4 of the NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defense Command-Post Exercise is conducted in Ottobrunn, Germany.⁹⁶

___________________

^* A “2+2” ministerial refers to a meeting of the appointed foreign and defense ministers of two countries.

• At the March 2+2 ministerial, ministers discuss a draft U.S.–Russian Federation Strategic Framework Declaration and focus further on missile defense Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs).
• The United States provides a nonpaper on TCBMs, building on 2+2 discussions.
• On April 3, the Bucharest NATO Summit Declaration announces an alliance missile defense strategy, encourages Russia to take advantage of the U.S. missile defense cooperation proposal, and expresses willingness to explore linking U.S., NATO, and Russian Federation missile defense systems.
• On April 6, the U.S.-Russian Federation summit at Sochi results in a U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, stating that
  • “Both sides expressed their interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners. The Russian side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to establish sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and reiterated its proposed alternative. Yet, it appreciates the measures that the U.S. has proposed and declared that if agreed and implemented such measures will be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns.”⁹⁷
• After the Georgia conflict, DTC Agreement negotiations are put on hold.^*
• In August, NATO-Russia Council TMD cooperation is suspended.

2009

• In May, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher briefs Moscow on the Barack Obama administration missile defense strategy and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Patrick O’Reilly provides an overview of U.S. ideas for U.S.-Russian Federation missile defense cooperation.
• In September, at the recommendation of Defense Secretary Gates, White House announces a shift from “third site” to “phased adaptive” missile defense (European Phased Adaptive Approach [EPAA]).
  • Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller briefs Ambassador Kislyak.
  • MDA Director O’Reilly provides a technical overview of EPAA to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence.
• Over this period, U.S. proposals included the following:
  • Data sharing from existing U.S. and Russian Federation radar installations.
  • Cooperative development of laser and advanced optic technologies.
  • Joint analyses of U.S.-Russian Federation-NATO BMD architectures for defending against common regional threats.
  • Collaborative flight tests over the Pacific Ocean.

___________________

^* The Georgia conflict refers to the military invasion by Russian Federation forces into Georgia from August 7 to August 12, 2008. The conflict resulted in formation of the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhaz. See the CIA World Factbook, updated 2019, “Middle East: Georgia,” available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html, accessed on January 22, 2019.

• • Experiments that would combine data from U.S. ground- and space-based tracking and surveillance systems with data from Russian sensors.
• Over this period, U.S. presidential administration objectives included:
  • Conducting mutually beneficial and pragmatic joint BMD projects.
  • Establishing regular consultative mechanisms.
  • Establishing a regime for transparency and confidence building.

2010

• In November at Lisbon,^* NATO decides to develop territorial BMD expanding its existing ALTBMD Programme.^†
• Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposes a common missile defense architecture for all of Europe, shared command and control, but with different sectoral responsibilities.
• In December, the NATO-Russia Council establishes a new missile defense working group. The objective is to develop a Comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defense cooperation.
• DTC Agreement⁹⁸ negotiations were mutually reinitiated in conjunction with the establishment of the Defense Relations Working Group in late 2010.

2011

• In March, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates visits Russia and proposes a scaled-back agenda of cooperation, focusing on the joint data centers and information sharing on missile defense plans and exercises; U.S. reemphasizes that conclusion of the DTC Agreement would facilitate missile defense cooperative efforts.
• In April, the United States amplifies the prior proposal for joint analysis, arguing that it would facilitate development of missile defense cooperation among the United States, Russian Federation, and NATO while enhancing strategic stability via technical analysis and operational understanding.
  • The U.S. proposed work plan included architectural analysis, concept of operations, sensor information sharing, and future capabilities.
  • The United States also proposed examining how NATO and the Russian Federation could create a data-fusion center that would also address planning and operations.
• Following the May Group of 8 Deauville summit, President Medvedev states that he is “not satisfied with the American side’s reactions to my proposals and with NATO’s reaction in general … after 2020, if we do not come to terms, a real arms race will begin.”⁹⁹

___________________

^* The Lisbon Summit was a high-level NATO meeting held in Lisbon, Portugal, November 19–20, 2010. See NATO, November 20, 2010, Lisbon Summit Declaration, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, accessed on January 24, 2019.

^† The Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme focused on the “upgrade, test and integration of NATO’s command and control (C2) systems and underlying communication network to enable effective information exchanges between various NATO and national missile defence systems.” It now exists as the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Office (NATO BMD PO). See NATO, “Ballistic Missile Defence Programme,” available at https://www.ncia.nato.int/BMD/pages/ballistic-missile-defence.aspx, accessed on January 22, 2019.

2012

• In March, a NATO-Russian exercise is held in Germany to explore and assess options for NATO-Russian BMD cooperation in Europe. The objective is to inform the NATO-Russia Council’s Comprehensive Joint Analysis, but key differences in NATO and Russian political approaches remain.
• Between March 26 and March 30, a NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Computer-Assisted Command-Post Exercise was conducted in Ottobrunn, Germany.
  • Objectives of the exercise were as follows:
    • Exploring options for early warning data exchange in the framework of a Joint BMD Centre.
    • Examining means of coordination for intercepting ballistic missiles by both Russian and NATO assets.
    • Exploring options for coordination and operation of Russian and NATO BMD command and control forces.
    • Planning, implementing, and assessing joint missile defense options.¹⁰⁰
• At its Chicago summit in May, NATO clearly states its intention that “NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities” and proposes to establish two joint centers (on data-fusion and joint-operations planning) and to develop a BMD transparency regime (built around a regular exchange of information).¹⁰¹
• In Moscow, the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies issues a report concluding that “the United States has not, and in the foreseeable future will not have, a strategic missile defense system capable of fending off a retaliatory counter-strike … by Russian strategic nuclear forces.”¹⁰²
• In December, the inaugural meeting of the Military-Technical Cooperation Working Group was held, under the framework of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission.

2013

• In May, press reports describe an exchange of letters between Presidents Obama and Putin:
  • President Obama reportedly proposes to focus on managing strategic issues with the aim of achieving near-term breakthroughs, including a mutually legally binding agreement that would make U.S. and Russian Federation missile defenses transparent to each other.^*
  • President Putin reportedly responds with a call for improved U.S. cooperation; his spokesman emphasized that Russia did not agree with the United States on several issues related to missile defense, which would be presented at a later date.^†
  • At the May Moscow conference on European security,¹⁰³ the First Deputy Prime Minister sharply criticizes the one-sided approach of the West, Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu described the missile defense problem as critical, and Valery Gerasimov

___________________

^* See BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 24, 2013, “Russia needs ‘clear and reliable’ missile defence guarantees,” available at https://www.nexis.com/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=58GX-TDV1-DYRV314N&csi=8399&oc=00240&perma=true, accessed on August 1, 2019.

^† Ibid.

• • threatened Russian Federation withdrawal from the New START Treaty if the United States continues with missile defense plans.
• In June, President Putin says, “The disagreements still remain, but I agree, in general, with U.S. President Obama that what we must and certainly can do in this area is make all our actions more open and transparent,” after the G8 Summit.¹⁰⁴
• In October, President Putin dissolves his government’s interagency working group on missile defense cooperation with NATO; discussions on BMD cooperation shift to bilateral U.S.-Russian meetings.
• In December, the last U.S.-Russian working group meeting takes place in New York to exchange proposals on BMD cooperation; the U.S. interagency working group is led by Dr. Jim Miller, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD.

2014

• President Putin argues that his decision to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation¹⁰⁵ was “partially prompted” by continued disagreements on missile defense, because of its “offensive potential” against Russia.
• On March 7, DOD suspends all U.S.-Russian Federation military-to-military contacts due to Russia’s incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation and subsequent actions in eastern Ukraine.¹⁰⁶
• In May, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov states that a missile defense compromise is still possible, as a result of which both NATO’s and Russia’s security will benefit.

This page intentionally left blank.