Appendix B

Summary of First Report

More than 100 U.S. institutions of higher education hosted Confucius Institutes (CIs—Chinese government-funded language and culture centers) on campus during the late 2000s and 2010s. While CIs provided a source of funding and other resources that enabled U.S. colleges and universities to build capacity, offer supplemental programming, and engage with the local community, CIs presented an added, legitimate source of risk to host institutions with respect to academic freedom, freedom of expression, and national security.¹

By 2017, deteriorating U.S.-China relations led some U.S. colleges and universities to reconsider the value of having a CI on campus. This resulted in part from concerns by U.S. policy makers that Chinese entities on U.S. campuses might attempt to stifle criticism of the Chinese government; that China’s increasing ability to translate its wealth into influence on American administrations, curricula, and public programs might have impacts counter to core academic principles; and that CIs could present a vulnerability to and conduit for espionage and intellectual property theft.

The committee is not aware of any evidence at the unclassified level that CIs were ever associated with espionage or intellectual property theft. While incidents affecting academic freedom, freedom of expression, and shared governance did take place, the most egregious of these happened at CIs outside of the United States. Sustained interest by Congress and political pressure led numerous

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¹ The committee wants to state upfront that when referring to China, this report is referring to the People’s Republic of China, the State, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and not to its people, many of whom are invaluable contributors to the global scientific enterprise (Albert et al., 2021). The CCP has more than 96 million members as of 2021, while China’s total population is more than 1.4 billion people (Rui, 2022; World Bank, 2022).

U.S.-based CIs to close, especially following the passage of the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which contained a provision that ultimately barred institutions receiving Department of Defense (DOD) critical language flagship funding in Chinese from hosting a CI. While this provision allowed for a waiver process—and several affected colleges and universities applied for waivers in 2018 and 2019—DOD did not issue any waivers. Today, seven CIs remain on U.S. university and college campuses, most of which are at under-resourced institutions.

The committee’s Statement of Task was developed with DOD in response to the FY 2021 NDAA, which contained a provision that barred institutions receiving any DOD funding from hosting a CI. However, in this provision, Congress allowed DOD to consult with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in considering waivers that could potentially provide a pathway for an institution receiving agency funding to continue hosting a CI. The Statement of Task directs the committee to deliver a first report after 12 months that recommends conditions that should be in place for DOD to consider granting a waiver to an institution of higher education, and a second report after 18 months that explores foreign-funded partnerships on U.S. campuses more broadly.

This report addresses the first charge and presents a set of findings and recommendations focused on waiver criteria that DOD can use to delineate a clear and transparent waiver process in advance of FY 2024. The committee’s recommendations, developed after receiving input from a variety of key individuals and organizations during open committee meetings, are as follows:

Recommendation 1.1: Granting Waivers

In the absence of any applicable adverse information that cannot be addressed or mitigated through the criteria below or other means, DOD should grant a waiver if an applying institution of higher education meets the stated waiver criteria.

The committee recognizes that there may be classified reasons why a waiver might not be awarded to an individual institution of higher education. However, in the absence of DOD being aware of adverse information that cannot be addressed or mitigated, and in instances where all other criteria are satisfied, DOD should grant a waiver.

Recommendation 1.2: Communicating about Waivers

If DOD does not grant any waivers, or decides not to grant a waiver to a specific institution of higher education when other waivers are awarded, it should specify the reason(s) for denial to the extent possible at the unclassified level.

This will potentially allow an institution denied a waiver to understand underlying concerns and to address security risks on campus that they may not be aware of. Colleges and universities also may want to consider having access to or

retaining a cleared individual in order to have a fuller understanding of security-related issues.

Recommendation 1.3: Establishing the Waiver Application Process

Outside input is critical to ensure that the waiver application process is free from undue administrative and regulatory burden. In addition to U.S. government input, DOD should solicit external input from key organizations, including industry, higher education associations, and universities.

DOD should specify whether this is a one-time, permanent waiver, or provide additional information regarding the duration of the waiver and process for subsequent application, evaluation, and renewal.

Recommendation 2: Waiver Criteria

1. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate that the CI is a formally established Center or Institute at the institution, thereby subjecting the CI to all policies and procedures prescribed in faculty, staff, and student codes, as well as in shared governance documents that ensure that similar units within the university support the key values of American academic institutions, including academic freedom and openness and respectful behavior toward other host institution academic units. If a U.S. host institution is not structured in a way that allows for formal Centers or Institutes, it should develop a structure for oversight and include the details for that structure in the documents governing a CI.
   1. U.S. host institutions should provide documentation of relevant sections on Centers and Institutes in their institutional handbook or policy manuals.
   2. U.S. host institutions should provide documentation of an established, regular review process for Centers and Institutes that would ultimately include the CI and would specify the period/frequency of review. This would include external reviews and advisory councils, as required by the institution.
   3. U.S. host institutions should provide documentation of public statements on academic freedom and freedom of expression as codified in university policy.
   4. U.S. host institutions should provide documentation of posted CI bylaws and governance documents, including operational and administrative policies and practices.
2. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate that they meet and comply with all applicable DOD requirements for information, data, physical, and research security.
   1. U.S. host institutions conducting $50 million or more of federally funded research per year should demonstrate compliance with National Security Presidential Memorandum – 33 (NSPM-33) or

2. 1. subsequent versions of this document. These institutions can satisfy this criterion by demonstrating that they have established and operate a research security program that includes elements of cybersecurity, foreign travel security, insider threat awareness and identification, and export control training.
   2. U.S. host institutions conducting less than $50 million of federally funded research per year should demonstrate the presence and implementation of adequate research security measures on campus. These institutions can satisfy this criterion by providing research security-related documents, including elements of cybersecurity, foreign travel security, insider threat awareness and identification, and export control training.
   3. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate that they have appropriate safeguards in place to ensure that CI faculty and visitors who are not university employees have limited or guest access to university computer networks and cannot access networks that store research results and communications. Institutions can satisfy this criterion by providing the university’s cybersecurity and visitor network access policy and demonstrating that CI faculty and visitors have limited or guest access.
3. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate that they possess full managerial control of CI curriculum, instructors, textbooks and teaching materials, programmatic decisions, and research grants.
   1. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate that CI employees and affiliates are formally associated with the host institution and subject to human resources policies and procedures. Institutions can satisfy this criterion by providing documentation, such as an employment contract or agreement, that the director of the CI is employed by the university with a reporting line to the host institution’s chief academic officer or their designee, and by providing public-facing personnel rosters that clearly state whether the host institution classifies CI-affiliated personnel from the Chinese partner institution as either host institution employees or as visiting scholars. CIs should hire their employees and affiliates in accordance with the host institution’s human resources policies and procedures and subject to corresponding campus policies.
   2. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate that CI curricula, including syllabi, textbooks, and teaching materials, are approved through faculty governance review.
   3. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate oversight over CI-supported research grants. In addition, universities should submit conflict of interest, conflict of commitment, and export control protocols that demonstrate university control.

4. U.S. host institutions should ensure that no contract or other written agreement pertaining to creating or operating the CI calls for the application of foreign law to any aspect of the CI’s operation at any U.S. campus of the host institution.
5. U.S. host institutions should demonstrate appropriate fiduciary and financial oversight of the CI. Host institutions can satisfy this criterion by providing the following:
   1. A publicly available annual budget for the CI, including sources of revenue and expenses.
   2. A copy of the agreement between the host institution and Hanban² to host a CI (a hard or electronic copy of the original document, including the original version of the agreement in Chinese). The host institution should manage the agreement through its sponsored program process.
   3. A copy of the Memorandum of Understanding and contract between the U.S. host institution and Chinese partner institution, if applicable.
   4. A copy of the policy that any financial contribution from foreign or domestic sources supporting the CI must be treated as a sponsored contract, not a gift, with a deliverable (programming, education, etc.).

The committee is optimistic that these waiver criteria will be useful to DOD as the agency formulates a waiver process in the coming months. In the meantime, the committee will continue its work and broaden its exploration to include other foreign-funded partnerships on U.S. campuses and to identify implementable practices and principles regarding appropriate operations for academic institutions in accordance with its Statement of Task. The committee will present additional findings and recommendations in a second report to be released in June 2023.

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² “Hanban” is the colloquial term for the Chinese International Education Foundation, or CIEF, now known as the Ministry of Education Center for Language Education and Cooperation, or CLEC. This is the Chinese government agency affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education that promoted, managed, and funded CIs on foreign campuses.

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