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Introduction

Many U.S. institutions of higher education host foreign-funded language and culture institutes on campus, in addition to other formal and informal foreign-funded programs, partnerships, and collaborations. While the first report by the Committee on Confucius Institutes at U.S. Institutions of Higher Education (NASEM, 2023) focused solely on Confucius Institutes (CIs)—Chinese government-funded centers established to extend the reach of Chinese language and culture and to enhance worldwide opinion of China by offering classes in Mandarin Chinese and highlighting positive aspects of Chinese culture—this second report focuses on foreign-funded language and culture institutes more broadly. CIs, designed and overseen by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are modeled on similar cultural programs, such as those of the United Kingdom’s British Council, Germany’s Goethe Institut, and France’s Alliance Française (CRS, 2022). However, these European public diplomacy initiatives do not bear the stamp of any one British, German, or French political party and do not tend to be physically located on, adjacent to, or near U.S. college and university campuses.

The committee acknowledges that in addition to formal foreign-funded language and culture institutes, informal foreign-funded language and culture programs, partnerships, and collaborations exist on U.S. campuses. These informal programs include “rebranded” CIs, or newly developed language and cultural institutes receiving funding from Hanban’s successor organizations (Peterson et al., 2022).¹ The committee notes that some U.S. institutions hosting a CI had

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¹ “Hanban” is the colloquial term for the Chinese International Education Foundation, or CIEF, now known as the Ministry of Education Center for Language Education and Cooperation, or CLEC. This is the Chinese government agency affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education that promoted, managed, and funded CIs on foreign campuses (NASEM, 2023).

relationships with the Chinese university designated as their CI partner institution before formally establishing a CI. These U.S. institutions may have reverted back to their prior partnerships and arrangements with the respective Chinese institutions after closing their CIs; no additional action was required or expected by the U.S. institution to continue with other collaborations involving China.

Foreign-funded language and culture institutes may create risks for host institutions regarding academic freedom, freedom of expression, academic governance, and national security (Seldin, 2019). This is particularly true if the values of the sponsoring nation do not align with the democratic values held in the United States and if the sponsoring nation is suspected of engaging in activities adversely affecting human rights, academic freedom, freedom of expression, association, dissent, and U.S. national security. The committee notes that one source of the cautionary view about CIs was the values espoused and actions by the Chinese government and the associated effects on human rights and the rights of Chinese students and scholars on U.S. campuses.²

In the extreme case, students from a sponsoring nation can experience surveillance or harassment activities, such as those pursued by the CCP. Indeed, the Chinese government intimidates and harshly silences its critics, and this behavior has only grown more pronounced in the past few years (Hannas et al., 2013; Cohen, 2021; CECC, 2022). This issue is not restricted to China, as other foreign-funded language and culture institutes can bring foreign nationals to campus as instructors and have a chilling effect on students from the sponsoring nation, including students who have fled their native land for various reasons.

As the first report by this committee stated, “academic freedom and freedom of expression and dissent are the foundations of the research, teaching, and learning environment at U.S. colleges and universities. Together, they guarantee that students and faculty members can express their views in free and open intellectual exchange and without censorship or sanction. They also guarantee students and faculty the right to pursue academic inquiry on whatever topic they choose and without fear that others will impose their views—including political views—on them” (NASEM, 2023; see Appendix B for a summary of the first report).

While there may be risks to hosting a foreign-funded language and culture institute, depending on the sponsoring country, these institutes also provide benefits to the host institution. Primarily, these include providing a source of funding and other resources that enable U.S. colleges and universities to provide students and often the local community with exposure to and education in foreign languages and cultures, to build capacity, and to offer supplemental programming.

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² As in the first report (NASEM, 2023), the committee wants to state upfront that when referring to China, this report is referring to the People’s Republic of China, the State, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and not to its people, many of whom are invaluable contributors to the global scientific enterprise (Albert et al., 2021). The CCP has more than 96 million members as of 2021, while China’s total population is more than 1.4 billion people (Rui, 2022; World Bank, 2023).

The committee found in its first report (NASEM, 2023) that having students who are interested in China and who have received exposure to and training in Chinese language and culture is an economic and national security advantage for the United States in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment (Asia Society, 2005). Given the wide-ranging relationships that the U.S. government and the private sector have with virtually every country, having individuals well-versed in other languages and cultures can only benefit the nation as a whole.

REPORT PURPOSE, CHARGE, AND APPROACH

The Department of Defense (DOD), in response to Congress, tasked this committee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) to develop two consensus reports. The first report, released in January 2023, recommended criteria that colleges and universities should meet if DOD is to consider granting a waiver to the prohibition of DOD research support to an academic institution hosting a CI. This second report addresses additional issues concerning foreign-funded institutes on U.S. campuses and international partnerships (see Statement of Task in Box 1-1).

To carry out this charge, the National Academies formed a committee of leaders and scholars that included higher education administrators and researchers, science and technology policy experts, foreign language and China experts, international programs experts, and national security experts. An additional national security expert was added to the committee for the second report. Members of the committee unanimously recognize the importance of international partnerships, academic freedom and academic self-governance, and the openness and global character of the scientific and research enterprise in the success of U.S. institutions of higher education. The committee also believes strongly that the study of critical languages is essential to national security.

Given its interpretation of the Statement of Task writ large, the committee addressed the following elements in its first report in service of providing a set of findings and recommendations including waiver criteria to DOD (NASEM, 2023):

• Identifying existing CIs and conducting case studies of existing and recently closed or soon-to-be-closed CIs to understand attributes of the relationship between CIs and their respective U.S. host institutions of higher education.
• Exploring why and how closure and renewal decisions were made.
• Examining policies and processes that open CIs have in place to protect against undue foreign influence that could adversely impact the academic education and research environment.

The committee addresses the remaining components of the Statement of Task in this second report:

• Gathering information on other foreign-funded institutes at U.S. institutions of higher education and describing characteristics and features of such institutes.
• Determining characteristics and features of foreign-funded institutes at U.S. institutions of higher education that could be flags for institutions to engage in further deliberation and vetting prior to entering into a partnership.
• Identifying implementable practices for U.S. institutions of higher education to ensure appropriate operations.
• Continuing exploration of what role the sensitivity of research conducted on campus should play in determining which foreign-funded partnerships are appropriate.

This second report goes beyond the findings, recommendations, and waiver criteria proposed in the first report³ and provides a new set of findings and recommendations concerning foreign-funded language and culture institutes at U.S. institutions of higher education more broadly. The committee built upon its earlier analysis of CIs to better understand the characteristics and features of foreign-funded language and culture institutes at U.S. institutions of higher education; determine which attributes may serve as flags and require deliberation and vetting prior to entering into a partnership; identify implementable practices and principles regarding appropriate operations for U.S. colleges and universities; and continue exploring what role the sensitivity of research conducted on campus should play in determining which foreign-funded language and culture institutes are appropriate.

Consistent with the Statement of Task’s focus on “foreign-funded institutes at U.S. institutions,” the committee limited its exploration in this second report to foreign-funded language and culture institutes at U.S. institutions of higher education. However, the committee recognizes that other forms of academic activity—such as collaborative programs with partner universities overseas, student and faculty exchange programs, and externally funded research projects—may receive funding from foreign sources (Binkley, 2020; USF, 2023). The committee anticipates that some of the findings and recommendations proposed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this report may be applicable to other foreign-funded activities on campus.

In brief, this second report explores the question of how U.S. institutions of higher education should approach the decision of whether and in what form to

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³ Most of the waiver criteria proposed in the January 2023 report were adopted in DOD’s “Confucius Institute Waiver Program” released in March 2023. See https://basicresearch.defense.gov/Portals/61/Documents/Academic%20Research%20Security%20Page/Confucius%20Institute%20Waiver%20Program%20Guidance_3.28.2023.pdf?ver=X1NBbbjFwye7ouKrcXtRBQ%3D%3D.

host a foreign-funded language and culture institute, with a strong emphasis on the importance of global education and international partnerships as well as core values including academic freedom and human rights. This includes periodically assessing and evaluating foreign-funded language and culture institutes, should a university choose to enter into a partnership. This report demonstrates there are specific steps U.S. colleges and universities can take to minimize risks associated with hosting foreign-funded language and culture institutions, such as a CI, on or near campus and protect academic freedom and national security. This report is motivated by a desire to provide U.S. institutions of higher education with a set of implementable principles and practices regarding appropriate operations that can preserve and fortify beneficial international language and culture partnerships. The committee hopes that the findings and recommendations presented in this report can assist universities with making risk-mitigating practices visible to DOD, other federal agencies, and most importantly, the public.

An extensive literature review and study of relevant legislation, think tank reports, and recommendations issued by universities, higher education associations, and by other organizations informed this study. The committee heard from university representatives from Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and received written input from a university representative from Pacific Lutheran University. Furthermore, the committee released a Call for Information seeking community input about ongoing and innovative foreign-funded programs, partnerships, and practices that support and protect international collaborations while enabling and maintaining openness, transparency, and the free flow of talent and ideas.⁴ However, the committee received no responses.

The committee notes that this does not mean the issues discussed in this report are only of interest and concern to large, well-resourced R1 institutions.⁵ Smaller and less-resourced institutions also need to take the risks presented by foreign-funded language and culture institutes located on campus—as well as international engagements more broadly—seriously. Higher education organizations, such as the American Council on Education, should provide support, visibility, and recommendations on international collaborations to the full range of their members.⁶ A collection of international engagement strategy documents developed by a sampling of U.S. institutions of higher education is available in Appendix F.

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⁴ Additional information regarding the March 2023 Call for Information in support of this report can be found at https://www.nationalacademies.org/documents/embed/link/LF2255DA3DD1C41C0A42D3BEF0989ACAECE3053A6A9B/file/DEFF99E84405069D6626210DFA5FDC648E8AC1640C06?noSaveAs=1.

⁵ R1 institutions denote universities that offer doctoral degrees and have very high research activity according to the Carnegie Classification System (NASEM, 2023). For more information, see https://carnegieclassifications.acenet.edu/classification_descriptions/basic.php.

⁶ See https://www.acenet.edu/Programs-Services/Pages/Professional-Learning/ACE-Internationalization-Laboratory.aspx.

As stated in the first report (NASEM, 2023), the National Academies and DOD agreed to conduct this study at the unclassified level to ensure maximum transparency and accessibility and to engender trust between institutions of higher education and the agency. However, this decision led to the committee working with a deficit of information throughout the information-gathering phase of the study, as it was unable to consider classified data, evidence, and threats. Multiple speakers from federal government agencies were invited but declined to speak with the committee in support of the study. The lack of engagement with the law enforcement and intelligence communities hindered the committee’s exploration and understanding of security issues presented by foreign-funded language and culture institutes to U.S. institutions of higher education. The committee notes this does not mean that adverse information or legitimate concerns regarding the presence of foreign-funded language and culture institutes on U.S. campuses does not exist. Indeed, the committee sought to conduct a rigorous exploration to the extent possible while working and developing findings and recommendations with available unclassified information.

REPORT STRUCTURE

The remainder of this report addresses the committee’s activities, findings, and recommendations. Chapter 2 describes the current landscape, characteristics, and features of foreign-funded language and culture institutes. Chapter 3 describes the benefits and risks from hosting a foreign-funded language and culture institute on campus. Chapter 4 proposes implementable practices for U.S. institutions of higher education to assess and mitigate risks to ensure appropriate operations, many of which will bolster guardrails and measures already in place. Chapter 5 presents the committee’s findings, and Chapter 6 presents the committee’s recommendations.

As in the first report (NASEM, 2023), the committee finds it is possible to implement measures on campus to mitigate—but not to fully eliminate—the risks associated with the presence of a foreign-funded language and culture institute and protect academic freedom, freedom of expression and dissent, and national security. Therefore, the committee developed recommendations that U.S. institutions of higher education can consider to protect U.S. academic values, research integrity, and security while allowing for foreign-funded language and culture institutes.

It is once again the committee’s hope that this study will contribute to safeguarding U.S. higher education and the U.S. innovation system while promoting the vigilant openness that has made U.S. colleges and universities among the finest in the world.

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