5

Findings

During its discussions and information-gathering activities in support of both the first report and this second report, the committee identified several findings on foreign-funded language and culture institutes. These are grouped into seven categories, as indicated below. The first category presents overarching findings on background and context and is followed by subsequent categories focusing on foreign language and culture and foreign-funded language and culture institutes, respectively. The fourth category presents findings on practices in place to address risks presented by foreign-funded language and culture institutes. This is followed by subsequent categories focusing on the effect of foreign-funded language and culture institutes on academic freedom and university governance, as well as on Department of Defense (DOD) research. The final category presents findings on foreign contracts and gifts. Findings from the first report that also apply to this report are incorporated under the appropriate category and identified as such.

FINDINGS REGARDING BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1. The context in which U.S. institutions of higher education operate is changing rapidly as a result of shifting geopolitical pressures.
2. U.S. institutions of higher education are deeply engaged in international partnerships, mobility, and research collaborations in service of their academic missions.
3. Over the past 6 years or so, the U.S. government, higher education community, and industry have had an increasing number of discussions about the changing geopolitical context and the associated risks posed for American higher education, government, and industry.

4. Deeper mutual understanding and heightened transparency will help the U.S. government, higher education community, and industry to navigate this space more effectively and in service of their respective missions.

FINDINGS REGARDING FOREIGN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

5. Instruction in foreign languages and cultures is an important part of the curriculum at colleges and universities nationwide.
6. Having students who are interested in foreign nations and affairs and who have received exposure to and training in foreign languages and cultures is an economic and national security advantage for the United States in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment (Mansilla and Jackson, 2022; cited in NASEM, 2023).
7. Industry needs foreign language and cultural training and programming, as it depends on global professionals who understand other cultures and speak other languages to support trade and other international engagements (Delfosse, 2020; cited in NASEM, 2023).
8. Federal dollars for language education and area studies have decreased over the past several years, leaving a funding gap and creating an opening for other sources of nonfederal funding to support such activities (Flaherty, 2018, 2019; Franks, 2019; Friedman, 2015; NHA, 2022; cited in NASEM, 2023).
9. Institutions of higher education have expressed interest in working more closely with DOD and other U.S. government agencies to achieve greater support for training in language and culture.

FINDINGS REGARDING FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES

10. Foreign-funded language and culture institutes can help to expand the availability of and access to information about and instruction on foreign language and cultures.
11. Forgoing or closing foreign-funded language and culture institutes has a disproportionate effect on smaller and less-funded schools that otherwise do not have the financial or staff resources to offer language instruction (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2018; Haime, 2021).
12. Many U.S. institutions hosting foreign-funded language and culture institutes feel that there is real benefit to having the organizations on campus (Fowler, 2018; Kaleem et al., 2022; cited in NASEM, 2023), and that they can maintain the relationship appropriately through increased control, transparency, and clarity in the contractual relationship and management of the foreign-funded entity (Kaleem et al., 2022; cited in NASEM, 2023).

13. The purpose of foreign-funded language and culture institutes is to influence international perspectives of a specific nation and promote positive views of a specific nation abroad (Dobriansky et al., 2021).
    1. Some foreign governments, through multiple means, sponsor language and culture institutes to influence international perspectives and promote positive views of their language and culture as part of their soft power toolkit.
       1. Confucius Institutes (CIs), for example, are one aspect of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) government-coordinated, long-term plan to influence international perspectives about China (Kluver, 2017; cited in NASEM, 2023).
       2. The presence of a foreign-funded language and culture institute can lead to self-censorship on the part of the host institution’s faculty, staff, and administration for fear of losing the financial support provided by the foreign funder.
       3. The presence of a foreign-funded language and culture institute can lead to self-censorship on the part of international students and scholars from the partner nation who might feel that they are being surveilled by faculty and staff affiliated with the institute. These students may choose not to discuss issues sensitive to the partner nation or to limit their associations on U.S. campuses out of fear of monitoring (NASEM, 2023).
14. The most visible threat that foreign-funded language and culture institutes present to U.S. institutions of higher education is to academic freedom and academic governance, although the presence of an institute may also lead to self-censorship (NASEM, 2023). The committee recognizes that these partnerships may present a risk to research security as well (Redden, 2018; Rogin, 2018; Wray, 2018).
15. In some circumstances, foreign-funded language and culture institutes may be part of a more pervasive strategy to gain information and influence with respect to economic and military development.
    1. Some Chinese “science and technology diplomats” leverage a network of CCP-sponsored organizations called the “United Front” to gain intimate details regarding leading-edge science, along with the entities and individuals capable of accelerating China’s development (Fedasiuk, 2020; Fedasiuk et al., 2021; Joske, 2020; cited in NASEM, 2023). CIs receive substantial oversight from the United Front Work Department, which reports directly to the CCP Central Committee (Joske, 2020; Xinhua News Agency, 2018; cited in NASEM, 2023).

FINDINGS REGARDING PRACTICES IN PLACE TO ADDRESS RISKS PRESENTED BY FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES

16. Campuses have multiple policies and practices in place to protect academic freedom and shared governance, both internal and external. Checks and balances are in place via several organizations and mechanisms in the United States to assist host institutions of higher education with living up to their values. These include the following:
    1. Academic governance
    2. Institutional accreditors
    3. External watchdog organizations, such as the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression and the American Association of University Professors
17. Practices and cultures across institutions vary significantly in the assessment of potential foreign-funded language and culture institutes.
18. Information on research security can be better disseminated, both to certain constituent groups on campus (such as faculty) and to smaller, less-resourced institutions.
19. Meaningful partnerships with foreign entities, whether funded or not, rely on a culture of awareness and understanding of the risks and benefits of that partnership at all levels, including faculty. Offices of research and/or international programs that are engaged with faculty can help increase awareness, promote open dialog about potential risks, and enable self-reporting and assessment by faculty.
20. Language and culture collaborations with foreign-funded entities can lead to other beneficial collaborations on campus, including research collaborations.

FINDINGS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

21. When foreign-funded institutes are not subject to the host university’s governance structures and policies, they can create or present potential risks to academic freedom, freedom of speech, and university governance.
22. Some foreign-funded language and culture institutes may serve as a means of monitoring or even harassing students, staff, faculty, and other citizens from the sponsoring country who do not conform to the views and ideology of the sponsoring country (Rotella, 2021; Seytoff, 2022; VOA, 2022; Wong, 2021).
23. Foreign governments that seek to stifle criticism of their nations and governments through the activities at their sponsored language and culture institutes violate the basic tenets of academic freedom and freedom of expression.

24. In the past, some foreign-funded institutes, including some CIs, may not have been subject to the usual academic policies that ensure robust faculty governance and oversight at U.S. institutions of higher education (NASEM, 2023).
25. Some agreements governing the creation and operation of foreign-funded institutes contemplated the application of foreign law under certain circumstances (NASEM, 2023).

FINDINGS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES ON DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH

26. Foreign-funded language and culture institutions on campus pose a risk that U.S. host institutions can manage—but not fully eliminate—with policies, procedures, and controls (NASEM, 2023).
    1. CIs are at one end of the risk spectrum; other language and culture institutions sponsored by different countries may present less risk or different classes of risk.
27. U.S. institutions of higher education are required to have research security programs in place that include foreign travel guidelines and research security training featuring insider threat training, cybersecurity training, and export control training, as applicable.
28. Good digital and physical security for research is paramount and necessary to protect DOD-funded research, regardless of whether a foreign-funded language and culture institute is present on campus (Mroz, 2021; cited in NASEM, 2023).
29. New organizations can play an important role in filling existing research security information and resource gaps and facilitating awareness and information sharing across government, academia, and industry.
    1. The National Science Foundation (NSF) Research Security and Integrity Information Sharing Analysis Organization proposed in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 will play a key role, among other organizations, given appropriate and sustained resources and staffing.
30. The current processes to protect classified research at institutions of higher education, including compliance with the National Industrial Security Program and the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, are necessary and sufficient to protect classified research against risks associated with foreign-funded language and culture institutions, including CIs (NASEM, 2023).

FINDINGS REGARDING FOREIGN CONTRACTS AND GIFTS

31. Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 includes reporting requirements for gifts and contracts from foreign sources that would apply to gifts and contracts related to foreign-funded language and culture institutes.¹
32. The new NSF gift and contract reporting requirements present in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 are potentially duplicative of Section 117 requirements and impose additional administrative burden on institutions of higher education (Mitchell, 2023).
33. The U.S. higher education community has articulated the difficulties in complying with inconsistent reporting standards of different agencies for gifts received from foreign sources, contracts with foreign entities, and ownership interests in or control over U.S. institutions of higher education by a foreign entity (Mitchell, 2023).

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¹ Higher Education Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-329, 89th Congress, 1st session (November 8, 1965), Section 117 (U.S. Congress, 2022).