State of Knowledge Regarding Transmission, Spread, and Management of Chronic Wasting Disease in U.S. Captive and Free-Ranging Cervid Populations (2025)
Chapter: 7 The Human and Socioeconomic Dimensions of CWD
7
The Human and Socioeconomic Dimensions of CWD
CWD threatens a national resource and entire ecosystems that are valued, relied upon, and enjoyed by Indigenous communities, hunters, cultural and ecological conservationists, and recreationalists across North America. Although biomedical and epidemiological research have contributed to general knowledge about CWD, human attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors also influence how CWD is understood and responded to. Animal and wildlife health and diseases such as CWD cannot be managed effectively without understanding the people and policies that affect or are affected by wildlife health (Stephen, 2022b). The social dimensions of CWD, including the values, perspectives, preferences, and behaviors of different affected parties, rightsholders, and agencies, need to be identified and understood. The multiple governmental agencies responsible for managing or controlling some aspect of CWD are also governed by different interests, responsibilities, or priorities. For example, the authority to
protect and manage cervid species held in public trust lies with state, provincial, and territorial governmental wildlife and environmental authorities. However, state and federal agricultural departments have primary responsibilities for regulating captive cervids in most states.
Human dimensions refer to how and why people value natural resources, their priorities regarding management of those resources, and the impacts of official decisions and control strategies applied to people. This chapter addresses aspects of human dimensions associated with CWD, the complexities of understanding and managing CWD as discussed in previous chapters, and the economic impacts of CWD. Box 7.1 provides some insights on the different dimensions impacted by the detection of CWD in a state. Human dimensions encompass multiple disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and economics, and thus refer to all social considerations in a variety of fields including those of fisheries and wildlife (Decker, Riley, and Siemer, 2012). Economic theory and application are critical for understanding both the monetary and utility-based incentives and challenges associated with CWD prevention, surveillance, and management, and the realized costs generated by this disease. And finally, while tribal communities may be socially and economically impacted by CWD in many of the same ways as non-tribal individuals or jurisdictions, deep-rooted cultural values and practices exert an additional dimension of complexity.
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CWD
Numerous individuals and interest groups hold diverse and opposing views regarding many aspects of CWD and its management. The motivations of landowners, alone, regarding CWD surveillance participation, for example,
are diverse and nuanced (Rubino and Serenari, 2022; Landon et al., 2023). Individuals and interest groups make up an intricate human ecosystem that influences public participation in interventions, decision-making by officials, and preferences by the interest groups themselves (Ufer et al., 2023). Vaske (2010) conducted a literature review, which resulted in seven findings that outline attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs among various interest groups regarding CWD based on human dimensions research methodologies below, along with examples of the individual studies that informed the specific conclusions (Vaske, 2010, p. 166):
- Hunters vary in their behavioral response to CWD (e.g., Needham, Vaske, and Manfredo, 2004; Brown et al., 2006a; Needham and Vaske, 2006; Vaske and Lyon, 2011) (see Box 7.2)
- CWD affects a variety of stakeholders (e.g., Brown et al., 2006a,b; Anderson, Frosch, and Outlaw, 2007; Stafford et al., 2007; Arnot et al., 2009)
- Perceived human health risks can influence behavior (e.g., Gigliotti, 2004; Miller, 2004; Gore et al., 2009; Sjöberg, 2000a, 2000b; Heberlein, 2004; Cooney, 2008)
- Perceived health risks and agency trust influence acceptance of management actions (e.g., Needham and Vaske, 2006; Stafford et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2006a; Miller, 2003; Cooney and Holsman, 2010)
- Stakeholder knowledge about CWD varies (e.g., Miller, 2003; Brown et al., 2006a; Vaske et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2010; Lischka, Shelton, and Buhnerkempe, 2010)
- CWD has social, economic, and managerial costs (e.g., Bishop, 2004; Heberlein, 2004; Seidl and Koontz, 2004; Stubier et al., 2006)
- Not all management actions are equally acceptable and/or effective (e.g., Williams et al., 2002; Petchenik, 2006; Cooney and Holsman, 2010)
Figure 1.2 introduced variables that, individually and collectively, determine disease outcomes. The factors are interconnected and constantly changing within different contexts of space and time. Critical insights of the disease are found at the interface of these domains and variables. Understanding the different human dimensions, the factors that drive them, and how they can be factored into solutions exemplifies the concept of convergence (see Box 7.3). Convergence models have been used to explain the complexities and relationships of factors that determine disease outcomes and can inform comprehension of the evolution of emerging infectious diseases including CWD (e.g., IOM, 2003). In this model, the host-pathogen interactions are embedded and influenced by four domains including genetic and biological, environmental, ecological, and social-economic-political factors. Found within these domains are numerous drivers or factors that further influence and impact the dynamics of CWD, including human dimensions. Because human interests and behaviors drive many reactions, decision-making, and response to CWD and management interventions, it is logical to assume that understanding and addressing the socioeconomic
factors and their impact on CWD disease process, progression, and control options will be important. The underlying differences in values that motivate action on behalf of free-ranging cervids or the captive cervid industry must be addressed (Organ, Decker, and Lama, 2016).
An effective CWD management plan requires research about and accounting for varied responses to uncertainties, risks, and knowledge gaps to build the trust necessary for policy deployment (e.g., Heberlein, 2004; Needham and Vaske, 2006; Vaske and Lyon, 2011; Heffelfinger, Geist, and Wishart, 2013). In the case of CWD, there is a need to understand the behavioral responses of different interest groups to both the disease itself and to policies surrounding disease management. This includes, for example, incentivizing the behavior changes that align with the social considerations of varied interest groups, and maintaining regulatory authority and consistency to evaluate CWD management options (Xie, Adamowicz, and Lloyd-Smith, 2023; Ufer et al., 2023). The consequences of not building trust among interested and affected parties in knowledge about the disease (i.e., the state of science) and in policies related to its management could result in additional or faster spread of the disease and threats to resources.
Collective and collaborative management planning has long been recognized as challenging especially when public policy decisions are involved (e.g., Rittel and Webber, 1973). This is true regarding CWD interventions given the different levels of awareness and understanding of CWD among interest groups, the lack of a single policy or intervention that will satisfy the interests of all interested groups, and any complacency that may exist about the disease among the public. Gaining the political support across local, state, and national governments is difficult even though CWD is an emerging, growing, and serious threat spreading into new geographic sites and populations. Without the political support and subsequent actions, CWD will almost certainly progress and spread into more states and become more difficult to control and more expensive to control.
A successful response to management of CWD is more likely through strategic collaborative efforts among the various groups interested in cervids (see Table 1.1) and CWD management (e.g., the CWD Task Force to be convened in response to the America’s Conservation Enhancement (ACE) Act [P.L. 116-118]) when such groups are committed to identifying and defining the problems to be solved and deciding on and using an analytic-deliberative process that is appropriate to those problems (e.g., NRC, 1996). Such approaches allow for sharing and integrating knowledge; identifying objectives and metrics for their measure; identifying the priorities and rights of the individuals and groups affected; identifying management alternatives, capacities, resources, and consequences of those management alternatives; and acknowledging and agreeing to the compromises that will be necessary to reach decisions (e.g., Keeney and Raiffa, 1993). Identifying the interest groups whose livelihoods and quality of life may be affected by management decisions, recognizing that values and priorities will vary among and between groups (and among and between individuals in groups), and assimilating their knowledge into the decision process is an important part of the process.
There is also a need for effective communications—especially risk communications—that can help guide behavior and counter misinformation and misunderstandings (Leong and Decker, 2020). While understanding
and managing wildlife populations is crucial, managing diseases within these populations is different. Both are needed but should not be confused as interventions evolve. See Box 7.4 for discussion of how views may differ among agencies.
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CWD
CWD poses risk to the abundance and health of cervid populations. In turn, this risk can disrupt the provisioning of highly valued ecosystem services and result in losses or costs to cervid farmers (and consumers of their goods and services), free-ranging cervid hunters (both recreational and for subsistence), outfitters, wildlife viewers, and conservationists. While changes in expenditures or costs are important components of measuring loss, they do not capture the change in values induced by CWD.
Measuring how values are generated is grounded in utility theory (i.e., the costs and benefits that determine choices that people make; Box 7.5). However, given the nature of the goods and ecosystem services affected by CWD, that some of those goods are traded in markets (such as captive cervid products), and that some are not (such as wildlife viewing), standard economic methods may be insufficient to consider all the consequences
of CWD. Behavioral economics combines elements of economics and psychology to understand how and why individuals behave the way they do in the real world including making irrational decisions (Pesendorfer, 2006). Behaviors and decision-making are not always based on facts; those interested in and affected by data are subject to a variety of emotions and biases, and are further influenced by their environment and circumstances. Limited knowledge and misinformation can cause behaviors to emerge that may be difficult to alter and subsequently lead to varied economic consequences.
Behavioral economics offers valuable tools for addressing the economic values different parties have for strategies and outcomes and can help measure and predict the support and participation of interested and affected parties. Behavioral economics tools include contingent valuation, choice experiments, and experimental auctions that are commonly employed in assessing the preferences of interested and affected parties and understanding decision-making that could be applied (Freeman III, Herriges, and Kling, 2014). Incorporating such tools into understanding human dimensions can ultimately help to benefit the management and control of CWD (Ufer et al., 2022).
The next sections explore the economic dimensions of CWD and the associated economic values at risk. First, components of risk from an economic viewpoint are defined, then the text briefly describes how economic values are generated in general market settings, and finally the text focuses on specific markets affected by CWD.
Defining and Managing Economic Risk
There is a large economy directly and indirectly related to cervids, including cervid farming, hunting, and recreation, and thus strong incentives or disincentives exist regarding CWD prevention and management in many of these cases (Organ, Decker, and Lama, 2016). Many wildlife management agencies are funded through the purchase of hunting licenses. People and communities may count on the cervids for their livelihoods or food security, in addition to the cultural traditions or spiritual significance related to the treatment of the cervids, but it is not possible to accurately quantify the costs and economic impact of CWD at a national level. This inability precludes a true understanding of the economic risks and burdens of the disease, which can result in the inability to conduct needed economic assessments or cost-benefit analyses of CWD control activities.
The economic definition of risk combines two elements: the likelihood of any event (e.g., an outbreak of CWD in a captive cervid facility) and the severity of the outcome (harmful effects) if it is realized (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Understanding risk requires a knowledge of both elements (probabilities and outcomes), but a challenge in calculating risk is understanding and incorporating how human actions influence each. The likelihood of a localized CWD outbreak depends not only on forces outside of human control (e.g., climate, migration, and ecological conditions) but also on human behaviors that govern human interactions with wild and captive cervid populations (e.g., hunting, management of captive cervid facilities); trade of captive cervids and related practices and products; and how people, business entities, and government agencies respond to and develop policies in response to the risk. The severity of economic outcomes depends on disruptions to business operations and trade, impacts to the values individual people place on cervids and the ecosystem services they support, and additional costs imposed on government agencies resulting from CWD and its management.
Utility theory (see Box 7.5) can be applied to measure outcomes and, in some cases, employs reported or market-related data. However, in other cases additional information not reported or documented from market transactions is necessary. In addition, as humans act to mitigate a variety of personal risks that may or may not be related to CWD, they alter the likelihood and severity of a CWD outbreak through, for example, limiting or changing interactions with wildlife, changing production processes, or changing trading practices of captive cervids.
The ability of management agencies and officials to identify costs and benefits from a utility perspective enables them to maximize participation of interested and affected parties by aligning the parties’ preferences and decision-making processes to acceptable strategies and actions responsive to those priorities. For example, the costs and benefits of management practices as perceived by hunters and non-consumptive wildlife enthusiasts (e.g., visitors to wild lands) will differ based on their utility functions, yet both groups need to be participants and advocates of CWD control. Development of incentives to implement or comply with management decisions that are based on values of interested and affected parties may help to drive preferences and behavior (Ufer et al., 2023). To address
the economic costs and benefits to a variety of interest groups associated with CWD, Ufer and colleagues (2023) reviewed numerous CWD management actions and their alignment with different interested and affected parties in a behavioral economics and utility theory framework. This means that observed behavior by an individual party was the focus rather than stated intent or theoretical assumptions. The findings summarized human dimensions literature associated with a wide array of interested parties (both indirect and direct beneficiaries of cervids) as it pertained to behavioral economics and expected cost-benefit analyses for interested parties (Ufer et al., 2023). The associated need for regulatory agencies to incorporate behavioral economics and values of interested and affected parties in disease mitigation strategies appears to be critical for management and compliance with CWD programs (Ufer et al., 2023).
Market Values
Economic values generated in a market setting include, for example, those associated with the captive cervid industry and the related products and services they support. In such settings, both consumers and producers of the products (farmers and related industries) have values that can be impacted by CWD—determined by measures such as lost consumer surplus and lost producer surplus. Consumer surplus (Silberberg, 1972) is the benefit to consumers of a market outcome and is generated whenever consumers pay less than their maximum willingness to pay for a unit of a good. As a hypothetical example, if a consumer was willing to pay $5,000 for a captive-bred cervid but pays a market price of $2,000, the difference of $3,000 is a measure of the benefit to that consumer. For all consumers, their maximum willingness to pay (demand) depends on individual preferences, resource constraints (such as their disposable income), and other drivers of demand. Together the number of units sold and the differences between the maximum willingness to pay and market price drive the magnitude of the benefit to consumers. The maximum individuals are willing to pay depends in an inverse fashion on how many units they are able to buy. If CWD results in fewer captive cervid farms or operations, reductions in inventories (or numbers) of captive cervids, and reductions in available captive cervid products or services in the market as shown in Anderson and Chomphosy (2014), the prices consumers would be willing to pay per unit increase. Lost consumer surplus accounts for both the reduction in quantity bought and sold, and the change in willingness to pay.
Producer surplus (or the social cost to produce the good; Schmalensee, 1971) is the difference between the market price and the minimum each seller (farmer or producer) is willing to accept to produce and supply the good. If the minimum a producer is willing to accept for a farmed cervid is $1,000 and the market price the producer receives is $2,000, the difference of $1,000 is a measure of the benefit to the producer. Across all producers, the minimum each seller is willing to accept depends on the producer’s technology and input costs. The greater the differences and the more units produced and sold, the greater the producer surplus.
If CWD results in an increase in costs to producers (infrastructure expenditures such as double fences; operational expenditures such as alternative, higher cost feed sources and increased expenditures on veterinary services; trade restrictions and quarantines that lead to additional costs; costs imposed from herd depopulations) or reduces captive herds and the availability of goods and services (as considered for CWD in Canada; Arnot et al., 2009), the price producers would be willing to accept per unit would change. For many private entities and industries, that acceptable price falls, but this depends on industry specifics. Lost producer surplus considers both the reduced quantity supplied of products and services, and the change in the producers’ minimum willingness to accept to produce and sell the product. The total loss in a specific market setting would be the sum of lost consumer surplus and lost producer surplus from CWD.
Values generated in a related market setting include those associated with hunting (Ufer et al., 2023). The hunting experience is a multi-dimensional good that has elements associated with expenditures such as those on hunting licenses, equipment, and trip or access costs, and elements associated with the enjoyment of the hunting experience. A person’s enjoyment of hunting drives expenditures on these “related goods.” Changes in the abundance and health of a targeted free-ranging cervid population affect the quality of the hunting experience, altering the maximum willingness to pay for related goods, which changes the quantities of related goods purchased and consumer surplus from consumption of the related goods. If CWD reduces the quality of the
hunting experience, there would be a reduction in the maximum willingness to pay for the related goods. Given that the provisioning and prices of related goods will not change with the reduction in quality of the hunting experience, the lost consumer surplus from the reduction in consumption of related goods would measure the loss in value from CWD.
Values generated in a non-market setting are generally termed “non-market values.” Non-market values include those generated by traditional subsistence hunting and cultural practices, wildlife viewing, conservation of cervids in the wild, and just knowing the cervids exist. Such values are challenging to quantify.
Economic Values Associated with Captive Cervids
The cervid farming industry in the United States comprises two types of operations: breeding operations, and breeding and hunting operations (Outlaw et al., 2017). Revenues of breeding operations come from sales of cervids and cervid products (e.g., urine used for hunting-related products, velvet, and meat). Revenues from breeding and hunting operations come from sales of cervids, cervid products, and hunting on the property. Outlaw and others (2017) estimated the direct and indirect impacts of the cervid industry (breeding and hunting) to be $7.9 billion (in 2017 dollars) and responsible for the employment of 56,320 individuals. In an earlier study Anderson, Frosch, and Outlaw (2007) estimated the direct and indirect financial contribution of the cervid industry to the economy as $260,000 per farm, and $2.3 billion (2007 dollars) in direct and indirect impacts.
CWD and its management affect captive cervid farmers through animal mortality, increased costs of doing business (e.g., double fences, increased veterinary services), and devaluations of farm herds as an asset through restrictions on business operations (e.g., trade restrictions, quarantines, and herd depopulations). If regulatory requirements result in farmers being unable to participate in the market or restrict the sale of their products, revenues decline and profits are lowered, and they may face a decline in economic welfare. CWD may also have indirect and less measurable impacts for captive cervid farmers—for example, the emotional impacts on those deeply connected to their farms.
The economic value at risk to cervid farmers from CWD can be modeled as the reduction in welfare to the farmers relative to the non-CWD outcome. The welfare loss to farmers can be measured as the reduced profits and lost non-market value from direct and indirect impacts of CWD, which requires estimates of farmers’ profit functions, knowledge of the relationship between price and quantity supplied in related markets, estimates of farmers’ non-market values, and estimates of how CWD affects the operations and operational choices of and for cervid farms. The estimates of Outlaw and others (2017) and Anderson, Frosch, and Outlaw (2007) are useful in scoping the problem but do not measure the reduction in individual farmer welfare for the CWD model outcome relative to the non-CWD model outcome. In an analysis noting the difficulty and data requirements in estimating the value at risk, Anderson and Chomphosy (2014) estimated the effect of state-wide presence of CWD on captive cervids and the number of farms in the United States from 2002 to 2007. Anderson and Chomphosy (2014) documented the number of captive cervid operations and herd sizes in state-level inventories of captive cervids. They found that the 2007 presence of CWD in a state led to an over 50% reduction in statewide inventories of captive cervids (relative to a CWD-free state). Most of that was due to a 45% reduction in the number of operations and operators exiting the market. There are insufficient data to allow projections to today.
Similar modeling conducted for Alberta and for all of Canada illustrates methods to estimate the captive cervid values at risk from CWD. Petigara, Dridi, and Unterschultz (2011) used modeling similar to that of Anderson, Frosch, and Outlaw (2007) and Outlaw and others (2017) to consider the effects of CWD as if it mirrored the consequences of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak (i.e., resulting in a complete reduction in the demand for cervid industry products). See Appendix E for more information about the economic impacts of BSE and scrapie. They considered how consumption bans, changes in demand resulting from risk perceptions, and government trade restrictions would impact the cervid and related industries. Arnot and others (2009) modeled potential outcomes of CWD on cervid farms in Alberta resulting from (1) double fencing of farms, and (2) depopulation of cervid farms. Their results indicate that public subsidization of preventative strategies such as double fencing, which can be prohibitively expensive for individual farmers, is a significantly more cost-effective use of public funds than indemnity payments for farm depopulations.
To help scope the problem for the United States, Chiavacci (2022) documents the number of cervid operations or farms and the number of captive cervids (inventories) by state in 2020. Appendix F provides several visualizations of those data from different perspectives to help the reader understand the numbers and locations of facilities. Some states such as Texas have both breeding and breeding and hunting operations. Little data exist on the scale of those operations apart from the facilities surveyed by Outlaw and others (2017).
Economic Value of Free-Ranging Cervids and Hunting
In the United States, in general, free-ranging cervids are held in public trust by state fish and wildlife agencies responsible for insuring healthy, sustainable populations for the benefit of the public. On Tribal lands where state agencies do not have jurisdiction for wildlife management, that responsibility falls to Tribal natural resource agencies, and in some cases, there is co-management responsibility. In some cases, jurisdiction falls under federal authority (e.g., National Park Service, National Wildlife Refuge System). There are costs associated with those responsibilities, but there are also other values at risk from CWD including those associated with conservation, culture, and hunting. Hunters, in combination with anglers, boaters, and recreational shooters, contribute most directly to conservation of species and habitats via license sales and excise taxes on gear and equipment sales that, in aggregate, generate approximately 60% of state fish and wildlife management agency annual budgets (Thompson and Mason, 2022; Association of Fish & Wildlife Agencies and the Arizona Game and Fish Department, 2017). Hunters, specifically, generated $824,973,807 (actual costs, not adjusted for inflation) in license and permit sales allocated to conservation budgets in 2016, $375,000,000 of which was provided by deer hunters who also contributed $20.9 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product that same year (Southwick Associates, 2018).
However, much of the value of free-ranging cervid populations has not been established for the non-hunting public (Vaughan Branch et al., 2022; Organ et al., 2012). The likelihood of CWD introduction and spread varies by locale and over time, and the severity of outcomes varies by locale, time, and species compositions on the landscape. In addition to impacts to consumptive (hunting) values, conservation and cultural values at risk can be expected to comprise of changes in non-market values that depend on the abundance and the health of free-ranging cervid populations. This study committee has been unable to identify related literature or reports that quantify the effects of CWD on conservation or cultural values, which may represent a gap in knowledge.
Hunting may occur on private or public lands, with or without access fees, and possibly through a hunting outfitter service. This variability makes it difficult to quantify the effects of CWD on the economic value of hunting free-ranging cervids. In addition, hunters may or may not respond directly through behavior change to the risk of CWD, and hunters may or may not respond to policies made in response to the risk of CWD. All these responses may vary in intensity over time as the prevalence of CWD varies and people become more familiar with the disease (Pattison-Williams et al., 2020). The typical approach to determine the change in surplus (also known as the net benefit) to hunters is to quantify changes in the willingness to pay for hunting (which measure the benefits of hunting), net of changes in hunting related expenditures (license fees, access payments, equipment, and travel costs) and the opportunity cost of leisure with and without the effects of CWD.
While no national-level estimates of CWD-related loss of hunter welfare or expenditures exist in the current literature, there are a few state-level analyses. For example, following the discovery of CWD in Wisconsin in 2001, losses in hunter expenditures were estimated to be $55 million in 2002 and $33 million in 2003, with a reduction in household incomes due to the expenditure losses of $41 million in 2002 ($71.2 million in 2024 dollars) and $25 million in 2003 ($42.4 million in 2024 dollars) (Bishop, 2004). That same study concluded that the total loss to Wisconsin deer hunters based on the surplus hunters generate from hunting was between $53 million and $79 million in 2002 ($92 million-$137 million in 2024 dollars), and $45 million to $72 million in 2003 ($76.3 million-$122.1 million in 2024 dollars). In a follow-up study of the effect of CWD on hunting in Wisconsin, Erickson, Reeling, and Lee (2019) found a total reduction in hunter surplus for the period of 2002-2015 of $96 million (in 2012 dollars, or $130.5 million in 2024 dollars) (Erickson, Reeling, and Lee, 2019). Given the findings of Bishop (2004) for Wisconsin, Menard, Jensen, and English (2004) predicted the potential short-run effect of CWD discovery in Tennessee on Tennessee’s economy. Following Bishop (2004), a 15% reduction in hunter days was modeled and was found to result in direct losses of $46 million (in 2004 dollars, or $76.6 million in 2024 dollars) and a reduction of almost 900 jobs (Menard, Jensen, and English, 2004).
Considering indirect and induced effects across the economy in Tennessee, losses were estimated to climb to $98 million (in 2004 dollars, or $163.1 million in 2024 dollars) with almost 1,500 jobs lost. Losses to hunters were not estimated.
Costs and Implications of CWD for Government Agencies
Recent governmental agency costs of surveillance, testing, and management for the United States have been calculated by Chiavacci (2022) who differentiates the costs by those born by natural resource agencies and those born by agriculture/animal health agencies for 2020. Chiavacci estimated that federal government agencies collectively spent over $284.1 million on CWD-related activities between 2000 and 2021, with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) spending $203.6 million of this total (Chiavacci, 2022). State natural resources agencies and state agriculture/animal health agencies are estimated to have spent over $25.5 and $2.9 million, respectively, just in fiscal year 2020 (Chiavacci, 2022). Cost data by state from Chiavacci (2022) are provided in Appendix F. As stated previously, license and permit fees as well as excise taxes paid by hunters, anglers, boaters, and recreational shooters provide over half the funds expended by public fish and wildlife management agencies for all their conservation activities (Thompson and Mason, 2022; Casellas Connors and Rea, 2022; Association of Fish & Wildlife Agencies and the Arizona Game and Fish Department, 2017). These state and tribal agencies also typically bear the burden of costs from CWD-related programs. Often, these costs must be reallocated from other wildlife conservation or management efforts (Chiavacci, 2022) and if the threat of CWD lowers hunter participation and license revenues, already sparse budgets for conservation can be spread even thinner.
Where CWD prevalence has been low, hunter participation and license applications have been relatively unaffected over time in many cases, although there have been instances of greater consequences when prevalence rates have risen to higher levels (Pattison-Williams et al., 2020; Erickson, Reeling, and Lee, 2019; Haus et al., 2017). For example, following the discovery of CWD in Wisconsin, data indicated an initial CWD-related reduction in the demand for hunting licenses of greater than 5% (Bishop, 2004). Over the years following discovery, the magnitude of this reduction was found to have diminished gradually with time (Erickson, Reeling, and Lee, 2019). The reduction in hunting permits during 2002-2015 led to a decline in permit revenues of $17 million (in 2012 dollars, or $23.1 million in 2024 dollars) (Erickson, Reeling, and Lee, 2019). Box 7.1 includes a description of hunter response to CWD in New York.
The expenses associated with CWD management represent economic vulnerabilities of agencies and underlie the importance of prevention and early detection and response capabilities—especially in states that have not yet discovered CWD cases. State agencies may be unequipped or underequipped to meet the current challenges of CWD. Their present levels of resources and capacity may not be sufficient to address the challenges of CWD if the disease continues to spread and more cases occur.
Better Understanding of Economic Dimensions
An incomplete understanding of the economics of CWD is a detriment to an in-depth understanding of the disease and its control. Although pertinent data exist on some state and federal costs and expenditures, it is not currently possible to quantify the full economic burden or economic impact of CWD on most states at any jurisdictional level and certainly not on a national scale. The inability for economists to generate economic impact analyses has negative consequences including the inability to calculate cost-benefit analyses on CWD prevention, reduction, and control programs. Without accurate and up-to-date economic information, interested and affected parties may not perceive a sense of urgency to act, and decision makers and policymakers lack critical data for planning and implementing cervid programs.
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS: IMPACTS ON NATIVE AMERICANS
There are 574 federally recognized tribes in the United States, each a sovereign nation, as well as state-recognized tribes and Native American communities. It was not possible for this committee to glean the many different perspectives of these individual tribes to ascertain the threats and concerns of tribal communities related
to CWD. Thus, the committee leaned on the limited published studies and the expert opinions of those identifying as a tribal member, employees of tribal natural resource agencies, or those working directly with tribal communities on CWD to develop this report. CWD may impact the economic, food security, cultural, and spiritual connections tribal nations have with cervids (Parlee et al., 2021; Maraud and Roturier, 2021; University of Minnesota, 2023). Research on the impacts of CWD on tribal nations and their communities is underway in the Midwest; however, more is needed to fully understand the breadth of those impacts across tribal communities more broadly.
For many Native American people living in the United States, cervids are historically important and present-day subsistence species. The negative impacts of CWD on Native Americans are not unlike those of other local communities; however, long-standing cultural practices and knowledge related to cervids bring unique cultural perspectives and concerns (e.g., Priadka et al., 2022; Moore et al., 2024). Many rely on cervid meat as a locally sourced protein in their diets (e.g., Parlee et al., 2021; Moore et al., 2024). Native Americans may use cervids for other purposes, including the brains for tanning and hides for drums, and may derive additional benefits including shelter and community connections (Great Lakes Inter-Tribal Council Snap-Ed Program, 2015). Some tribes benefit from trophy elk and deer hunts that bring in substantial economic support (Francisco, 2023). In addition to considering how the presence of CWD might impact these practices, the surveillance and management of CWD might also infringe on sacred cultural practices that may or may not be readily changed or adapted (Francisco, 2023). Currently, any direct cultural and economic effects of CWD might be felt by those who harvest cervids on tribal lands with, or adjacent to, areas where CWD has been detected.1 However, it is important to recognize that tribal nations balance the perceived risks of CWD as related to impacts on economics and cultural practices while managing them as sovereign nations negotiating sometimes complicated relationships with governing bodies and regulators operating under a colonial framework (Donatuto, Satterfield, and Gregory, 2011; Donoghue, Thompson, and Bliss, 2010; Schwabenlander et al., 2022).
Where tribal communities have not yet felt the direct impacts of CWD, tribal natural resource agencies, recognizing the need for surveillance and management in their role to protect this important cultural and food source, are already experiencing impacts on agency funding and resources (Schwabenlander et al., 2022; M. Schrage, personal communication, November 29, 2023). The capacity of tribal wildlife management programs is commonly limited to a single biologist with few support staff, where total natural resource agency personnel might include 1-200 employees (Thorstenson, 2023; Schwabenlander et al., 2022; M. Schrage, personal communication, November 29, 2023). Tribal agencies rely on a combination of game license revenue and federal contract and grant funding for much of their management (Thorstenson, 2023). Tribal natural resource agencies do not receive support through the Pittman-Robertson or Dingell-Johnson Funds (Thorstenson, 2023; Casellas Connors and Rea, 2022), even though tribal members pay into these funds when they purchase fishing gear, firearms and ammunition, and other hunting supplies (Thorstenson, 2023). Furthermore, the “user pays” model of conservation funding (i.e., license, tag, permit fees) is not culturally acceptable to some tribes given hunting is viewed as a treaty right and harvests are primarily for subsistence purposes (M. Schrage, personal communication, November 29, 2023). Where state agencies do offer tribal agencies some logistical and technical support, priorities of the state do not always align with those of Tribes.
Box 6.3 describes a midwestern tribal collaborative effort to coordinate CWD surveillance and management. However, tribal wildlife programs often lack the staff and time to apply for and administer grants such as the USDA APHIS cooperative agreements,2 and a competitive process is not conducive to building sustainable, long-term surveillance programs (S. Moore, communication with the committee, December 14, 2023; M. Schrage, personal communication, November 29, 2023). A new law through the Chronic Wasting Disease Research and Management Act (H.R.5608 - 117th U.S. Congress) governs the distribution of funds to support the research and management of CWD and specifies that USDA will enter into cooperative agreements with state and tribal agencies to administer the funding program. Continuation of the current competitive and burdensome funding process to distribute CWD support to tribal agencies will not serve the needs of those agencies. In contrast, the
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1 See https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/distribution-cwd-relation-tribal-lands-us (accessed November 5, 2024).
2 See https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/fy2024-tribal-wild-cervid-cwd-funding-opportunity-announcement.pdf; see https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2023/12/06/white-house-tribal-nations-summit-usda-fulfills-long-standing (accessed April 11, 2024).
Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (U.S. Department of the Interior et al., 1996) provides a mechanism for the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to contract with tribes such that tribes have the necessary support “to operate programs serving their tribal members and other eligible persons.” Over time, a series of amendments were created to “increase tribal participation in the management of Federal Indian programs and to help ensure long-term financial stability for Tribally-run programs” and to “remove many of the administrative and practical barriers” to accessing funding. Under the direction of Congress, the two federal agencies worked in cooperation with tribes and tribal organizations to co-develop regulations for implementation (U.S. Department of the Interior et al., 1996). This is an example of a model for transferring funds to tribes. There is need for similar models that make CWD funding more accessible and sustainable for tribal-led CWD management (S. Moore, personal communication, November 28, 2023). As the impact of CWD on cervid harvest and use is a food sovereignty issue, the USDA’s commitment to consultation, better support, and partnership with tribal nations in empowering their food sovereignty right is promising for resolving present funding challenges. Supporting tribal priorities and capacity-building for CWD management by tribal nations may open doors to better coordination in and improved control of CWD through co-stewardship of cervid populations (e.g., Moore et al., 2024).
