This report was requested by Congress out of concern that ongoing and projected growth in liquefied gas exports will stress the U.S. Coast Guard’s ability to efficiently and effectively verify the safety compliance of the foreign tank ships that load these shipments for transportation overseas. All foreign commercial vessels that call on U.S. ports are subject to periodic Port State Control (PSC) examinations conducted by Coast Guard marine inspectors. Tank ships that transport liquefied gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), are required to undergo PSC exams satisfactorily every year as part of the statutorily required Certificate of Compliance (COC) program.
COC exams are conducted by Coast Guard marine inspectors with specialized qualifications for liquefied gas carriers (LGCs) and include checks of gas cargo containment and safety systems in addition to the other assessments and verifications typically completed during a PSC exam. An LGC that passes the exam is granted a COC that is valid for 2 years, but it must also undergo another exam 1 year (with a 90-day grace period) into the 2-year term to maintain the certificate’s validity. This intermediate exam must also be led by a gas-qualified Coast Guard inspector. Because all LGCs must have a valid COC to engage in cargo operations, vessels that are within the time window (plus or minus 90 days) of the mandated annual exam will want to schedule the exam before taking on cargo in order to maintain the certificate’s validity for return visits.
As liquefied gas exports from U.S. ports have grown, Coast Guard marine inspectors can be pressed to conduct the exams right after foreign LGCs arrive from overseas and in advance of their assigned times for cargo
operations. Gas exporters are concerned that growing arrivals of LGCs will outpace the ability of the Coast Guard’s limited force of gas-qualified inspectors to conduct the required exams in a timely manner, complicating the scheduling of exams and risking disruptions to vessel and terminal operations.
In asking for this study, Congress proposed several options for reforming the COC program and its implementation. Each option was to be assessed for likely impacts on the program’s continued efficiency and effectiveness for safety assurance. Before turning to its review of the proposed options, the committee examined liquefied gas export trends and LGC traffic forecasts, the Coast Guard’s methods for implementing the COC program, and the reasons why an efficient implementation can be critical to the smooth functioning of gas export operations. In addition, the committee sought to understand how the COC program fits within the broader Coast Guard, international, and industry regimes for assessing and verifying the safe condition and operations of foreign cargo vessels generally and LGCs in particular.
Informed by these reviews, the committee concluded that reforms to the COC program as it applies to LGCs are indeed needed, including reforms that will have early positive effects on program efficiency given the fast pace of growth in gas exports. The committee likewise concluded that reforms should be possible without jeopardizing the program’s effectiveness for safety assurance. These conclusions and the committee’s reasoning are presented next. This is followed by a summary of the study findings about the set of reform options in the study’s Statement of Task. In the committee’s view, with the possible exception of the introduction of risk-informed processes, none of these proposed options would have sufficient impact on COC program implementation efficiency to be the centerpiece of a program reform. The committee’s recommendations, which are provided at the end of this chapter, propose reforms that will allow the Coast Guard to implement the COC program in a more efficient manner informed by risk assessments that should also bolster the program’s safety assurance role.
Conclusion: Certificate of Compliance program reforms are needed that will have large, early impacts on the Coast Guard’s ability to implement the program efficiently.
Reasoning:
Escalating growth in liquefied gas exports and LGC arrivals is likely to increase substantially the demand for gas carrier COC exams over the next 5–10 years and longer.
The chronic shortage of marine inspectors, including inspectors trained for LGCs, looms large as a challenge for the Coast Guard in keeping pace with the fast-increasing demand for gas carrier exams.
The requirement for all LGCs to undergo an annual exam to maintain COC validity, coupled with restrictions on cargo operations, adds to the scheduling demands on Coast Guard inspectors already facing growing requests for exams.
Conclusion: Changes to Certificate of Compliance program requirements, including exam frequencies, should be possible while preserving the program’s safety assurance role.
Reasoning:
A comprehensive, international, and collaborative regime for assuring LGC safety through standards and codes, inspections and certifications, quality vetting and monitoring, and cooperative enforcement has emerged and matured since the advent of the COC program.
Unlike the COC’s 2-year validity term and required annual exam, other domestic and international programs for vessel certification have settled on a 5-year term, while the Coast Guard determines when PSC exams should be conducted based on vessel risk indicators.
Taken together, the report’s conclusions and the supporting findings summarized above suggest that any candidate COC program reforms should be evaluated with the following considerations in mind:
Box 5-1 summarizes the findings from Chapter 4’s review of the advantages and challenges of the seven reform options proposed in the Statement of Task. Most of the options fall short with respect to these critical considerations. Specifically with regard to those options that focus on the marine inspection workforce, the anticipated high levels of gas exports will almost certainly mean that the Coast Guard will need to explore many workforce-related options to boost the capacity of its gas-qualified marine inspectors to conduct LGC exams. However, workforce options that can be implemented practically in the near term hold the potential for modest capacity gains that are too small to meet the escalating demand for COC exams.
With regard to proposed options that would make COC program requirements more risk-informed, the committee supports this general approach to reform, agreeing that a greater concentration of the workload of gas-qualified inspectors on gas carriers posing the highest risks has the potential to preserve both the efficiency and safety assurance role of the COC program. The introduction of such reforms, however, will require actions by Congress that give the Coast Guard more latitude to determine when
Conducting Certificate of Compliance (COC) exams at the Panama Canal has the advantage of early implementation and could be a stopgap measure during periods of high demand for exams, but it could detract from the availability of inspectors to perform other inspections and duties at their home units. Changes in cargo flows and long delays at the Panama Canal due to low water have also decreased the number of LGCs transiting the waterway.
Extending the assignments of gas-qualified inspectors in ports with significant LGC activity could be implemented quickly and marginally increase the pool of inspectors available for COC exams, but it could discourage inspector interest in the gas specialty by limiting rotational assignments and career progression opportunities.
Placing all gas-qualified inspectors in a district under the command of a single officer in charge, marine inspection, has the advantage that it could allow for more intense and efficient use of gas-qualified inspectors, but it could have the downside of increasing the amount of unproductive time spent by inspectors having to travel to conduct exams in distant sectors.
Increasing the number of national verifying officers at the Liquefied Gas Carrier National Center of Expertise, a unique resource for gas carrier marine inspectors, would serve as a force multiplier; however, it would require a devotion of budgetary, recruiting, and training resources to ensure that the added inspectors are net additions to the gas-qualified inspector workforce and not comprised mainly of personnel transferring unreplaced from other marine inspection units.
Hiring more civilians to conduct COC exams would take time to implement due to the need to recruit and train civilians, who may be limited in their ability to conduct exams during off hours even when there is high demand. Delegating COC examination functions to authorized third parties could leverage the services of civilians already possessing knowledge of gas carriers; however, these civilians would nevertheless require supplemental training, and a Coast Guard oversight capability would need to be created.
Extending the COC’s duration for LGCs less than 10 years of age and enrolled in a Coast Guard quality assurance program would concentrate more examiner workload on potentially higher-risk vessels to the benefit of program efficiency and, potentially, safety assurance but only if eligible vessels are no longer required to undergo the currently mandated intermediate exams at prescribed intervals, which draw inspector resources and limit the Coast Guard’s ability to set the exam frequencies informed by risk factors in addition to age and examination history.
Using risk-informed methods to guide the frequency and scope of COC exams holds the potential for early positive impacts on program efficiency and safety assurance that will increase over time as risks are better understood and third-party data sources are accessed and used effectively; however, any significant shift in this direction will require the Coast Guard to have the capacity to monitor for risk factors and the discretion and expertise to decide when to conduct an exam and how to set its scope, ideally using risk information and criteria that are most relevant to LGCs.
to conduct exams and the resources needed to support determinations that are sound and informed by assessments of risk.
On the basis of the conclusions and supporting findings summarized above, the committee believes that reforms to the COC program are needed and should be introduced for the purpose of having early and lasting positive impacts on the program’s implementation efficiency and safety assurance role. In the committee’s view, the following recommended actions will further these aims.
Recommendation 1: To promote the efficient implementation of the Certificate of Compliance (COC) examination program, while preserving and striving to enhance its effectiveness for safety assurance, Congress should modify the program’s statutory requirements for liquefied gas carriers (LGCs) by
Recommendation 2: The Coast Guard, with direction and sufficient resources from Congress as needed, should work to enhance its current Port State Control (PSC) risk assessment and vetting capabilities to support determinations about the appropriate scope and frequency of exams for individual gas carriers that require Certificates of Compliance. The enhancements should incorporate the databases used for PSC functions and leverage other sources of information from the Coast Guard, the International Maritime Organization, industry ship vetting programs, other flag states, and PSC regional regimes such as
Recommendation 3: The Coast Guard should enlist the unique capabilities and technical expertise of the Liquefied Gas Carrier National Center of Expertise (LGC NCOE) to monitor the risk and safety performance of the U.S.-trading LGC fleet continuously to inform modifications to the Coast Guard’s LGC risk assessment methods for vetting individual vessels and determining examination scope and frequency. To establish and sustain an LGC risk assessment program that is supported by the LGC NCOE, the Coast Guard likely will need to augment the center’s staff, analytic tools, competencies, and data capabilities with sufficient resourcing from Congress.
The introduction of a risk-informed approach for guiding the frequency and scope of COC exams for gas carriers could be viewed as an initial step in the Coast Guard’s leveraging of state-of-practice methods for probabilistic risk assessment for its vessel safety assurance programs. In the case of LGCs, the Coast Guard has the advantage of a National Center of Expertise that is already in place to play a key supportive role. The committee’s confidence in its recommendations is bolstered by knowing that the Coast Guard can tap the specialized expertise of the LGC NCOE.
This study’s charge is focused on the COC exam for LGCs, even though other types of tank ships (e.g., chemical and oil tankers) are subject to the requirements of the COC program. The committee believes that any reforms to the COC program for LGCs should not be delayed while deciding on the treatment of other tank ships.
Finally, while concluding that reforms focused on the marine inspection workforce do not have significant potential to boost COC implementation efficiency in the near term (2 to 4 years) to medium term (5 to 9 years),
the committee believes that efforts to enlarge or supplement the workforce will be necessary over the longer term (10 or more years) in part because of the growth in LGC traffic. Conducting COC exams is a small part of the Coast Guard’s overall marine inspection responsibility. Advice on meeting this broader marine inspector workforce imperative, however, is beyond the scope of this study.