8

Cost of Alternative Controller Staffing Plans

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2024 requested that this study “examine the current and estimated budgets of the FAA to implement the FAA Controller Staffing Standards included in the 2023 Controller Workforce Plan [CWP] in comparison to the funding needed to implement the [Collaborative Resource Working Group] CRWG [Certified Professional Controller] CPC operational staffing targets.” The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) 2014 report on air traffic control (ATC) staffing devoted a chapter to a review of FAA budgets, costs for ATC operations, and revenue sources. It offered options for covering the costs of the ATC workforce in the future, but did not include findings or recommendations. Although placing the cost of ATC staffing in the context of FAA’s historic budget and funding sources is also done in this chapter, it has a somewhat different task: to compare the costs of staffing according to FAA’s Office of Finance and Management (AFN) with that of the CRWG. Similar to the 2014 report, it places the cost of the ATC workforce within the overall context of FAA’s budget and the revenue streams from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF),¹ which, among other items, covers most of the cost of FAA operations. This chapter also does not offer findings or recommendations but does offer conclusions.

The chapter begins with an overview of FAA budgets, the line items it includes, and how these line items have traditionally been funded. The chapter then compares the number of future CPCs, overall headcounts, and ATC supervisors implied by adopting the CRWG staffing targets with

TABLE 8-1 FAA Budget Authority by Function, FY 2014–2024 ($ millions)

NOTE: Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.

SOURCE: FAA Annual Budgets.

TABLE 8-2 FAA Operations Budget Line Items, FY 2014–2024 ($ millions)

NOTE: Columns may not sum to total due to rounding.

SOURCE: FAA Annual Budgets.

TABLE 8-3 ATO Budget Line Items, FY 2014–2024 ($ millions)

NOTE: Columns may not sum to total due to rounding.

SOURCE: FAA Annual Budgets.

In summary, Operations ($11.9 billion in FY 2024) is the largest share (60–65%) of the FAA budget; ATO ($8.8 billion in FY 2024) is the largest share (about 75%) of the Operations budget, and ATS (covering the ATC workforce and $4.7 billion in FY 2024) is a bit over half of the ATO budget. FAA Operations, ATO, and ATS have grown by 24%, 21%, and 22%, respectively, between FY 2014 and FY 2024. FAA’s overall budget increased 16% over this period. Since FY 2014, the parts of the FAA budget related to ATC have grown faster than the total FAA budget.

FAA Operations Revenue Sources

Unlike most federal agencies and departments, FAA is not fully reliant on General Funds (all general tax revenues and borrowing). Instead, FAA Operations is mostly funded from the AATF, which receives revenues from taxes and fees imposed on aviation system users. About 75% of the various user fees that flow into the AATF come from the 7.5% ticket tax on commercial aviation passengers. Although not fully guaranteed, authorized AATF revenues are much more reliable than General Fund revenues because they are less susceptible to the waxing and waning of annual budgets enacted by Congress. Approval of budgets in the past two decades has involved contentious annual debates about taxes, budgets, and the federal deficit as well as frequent delays in approving funding for federal agencies. Authorized spending from trust fund revenues usually also has to be appropriated but has been subject to less debate in Congress. FAA authorization legislation specifies the amount of funding that FAA should receive in multiyear authorizations, which provides stability and predictability in FAA funding.

As shown in Table 8-4, the General Fund covered 33% of the Operations budget back in FY 2014, but that percentage steadily declined afterward. During COVID, $19.2 billion was transferred from the General Fund to the AATF.

Revenues flowing into the AATF from all sources grew 37% over the FY 2014–2024 period (FY 2024 estimated by the Congressional Budget Office [CBO]). The total balance of the AATF grew from $14.2 billion in FY 2014 to $18.1 billion in FY 2024. Thus, potential revenues to fund FAA operations from the aviation trust fund grew faster than FAA Operations or ATO budgets. In its mid-2024 forecast of AATF revenues out to FY 2033 (see Table 8-5), CBO estimates that:

• Excise Tax Revenues (passenger and cargo taxes, etc.) are forecast to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 3.9%. This is lower than the 4.7% CAGR realized during FY 2014–2019.

TABLE 8-4 General Fund and AATF Revenues for FAA Operations, FY 2014–2024 ($ millions)

NOTE: Columns may not sum to total due to rounding.

SOURCE: FAA annual budgets.

• FAA Operations spending authority is forecast to grow at a CAGR of 3.4%, while airport funding remains flat and F&E is forecast to grow only at 2.3% CAGR.
• As the forecast growth of Excise Tax Revenues exceeds that of FAA Operations spending authority, the End of Year Uncommitted Balance is forecast to triple from $5.8 billion in FY 2024 to $17.5 billion in FY 2033.

CBO’s projected revenues (plus interest) to the AATF compared with outlays to FAA are fairly similar in the future up until FY 2028. In FY 2028, AATF revenues (excluding interest) are forecast to exceed outlays by $50 million and continue to do so through FY 2034, when forecast AATF revenues exceed forecast outlays by $1.3 billion (see Table 8-5). From FY 2028 to FY 2034, the forecasted cumulative amount of AATF Excise Revenues of $168.9 billion is $5 billion more than the $163.9 billion of forecast outlays, excluding interest. Over that same period, forecasted interest payments on the surplus are estimated as an additional $4.3 billion. However, if outlays were increased over the period, the corresponding interest earnings would decrease as well. The surplus of revenues added with annual interest income exceeding $500 million annually that exceed forecast outlays results in the estimated tripling of the AATF Uncommitted Balance from $5.8 billion in FY 2024 to $17.5 billion in FY 2034, assuming that forecast revenues and outlays are accurate.

However, assumptions made in these forecasts are unlikely to hold. CBO projects that F&E outlays, which have increased substantially in the past, will grow only at a CAGR of 2.3% so that by FY 2034 F&E spending would be roughly $800 million more than in FY 2024. However, in FY 2024 the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) ranked 17 out of 20 ATO’s safety critical systems in its modernization efforts unsustainable at their current levels of specification, investment, and schedules for completion (GAO 2024). Although the report does not describe the costs of these systems, the clear implication is that they are underfunded. These investments are necessary to maintain and replace aging technologies and infrastructure that ATC services depend on, many of which are outdated, lack spare parts, and technicians with the skills to maintain them. FAA’s own analysis in 2023 of its systems that support ATC ranked 51 of its 138 systems as unsustainable due to lack of parts, technicians to maintain them, and funding; it also ranked 58 more systems as potentially unsustainable, also in part due to uncertainty about funding (GAO 2024, 15–18). It is likely that outlays for facilities and equipment will increase above the forecast baseline. Furthermore, the CBO forecasts discussed above were released shortly after passage of the FAA Reauthorization Act in 2024. The CBO forecasts do not account for this legislation’s increase in annual

TABLE 8-5 CBO Projections for the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, FY 2024–2034

^a Amounts exclude the effects of general fund appropriations for the Airport Improvement Program.

^b The change in uncommitted balances equals excise tax revenues plus interest earnings minus total spending authority.

^c The Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2024 provided $2.041 million in contract authority (a form of mandatory budget authority) for the Airport Improvement Program through May 10, 2024. In keeping with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, CBO assumes that funding provided by that law will continue at the same rate through the rest of 2024 and in each subsequent year, resulting in an annual amount of $3.350 million. Because projections in this table do not take into account events occurring after May 9, 2024, they do not reflect the budgetary effects of legislation enacted after that date, including the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. In particular, Section 101 of that act increased annual contract authority for the Airport Improvement Program to $4 billion beginning in 2025.

NOTE: FAA = Federal Aviation Administration.

SOURCE: CBO Airport and Airway Trust Fund Baseline 06-2024, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-06/59126-2024-06-aatf.pdf.

contract authority for grants-in-aid to airports from $3.35 billion to $4 billion. If Congress were to appropriate these funds, it would increase outlays by $650 million annually. In summary, the surplus in the AATF is likely to be lower than in the CBO forecast.

The current $5.8 billion Uncommitted Balance in the AATF and its past and projected growth rate indicate that more of the AATF revenues in the future could be allocated to FAA and ATO if future Congresses’ authorizations follow CBO’s projections. The AATF balance, however, is not a deposit in an account that can be drawn on when needed. Instead, it is an accounting of revenues that came in that were not allocated for authorized purposes. Moreover, the unspent revenues for aviation taxes and fees were spent for other appropriated purposes, with an IOU made from the U.S. Department of the Treasury to the AATF. In addition, the interest earned on the Uncommitted Balance is also an accounting construct rather than real money. Drawing on the IOUs to the AATF in future years would effectively require additional borrowing (and increase the federal deficit) given that existing taxes and other revenues are projected to be insufficient to cover all General Fund expenses approved by Congress in those years.

COST OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURE ATC STAFFING PLANS

FAA Staff by Operations Category

The shares of total annual Operations staff by category have remained fairly stable since FY 2014 (see Table 8-6). ATO accounted for 72% of the roughly 39,000 Operations staff in FY 2023; the 13,853 ATC workforce accounted for about half of ATO’s total. At the end of FY 2023, 76.5% of this ATC workforce (10,593) was made up of Certified Professional Controllers (CPCs); 7.1% (985) were CPCs-In Training, 13.5% (1,870) were Developmental Controllers (DEVs), and 2.9% (405) were new hires at the Academy (FAA 2024).

Comparison of the Cost of the FAA AFN and CRWG Staffing Plans Through FY 2033

As described in Chapter 4, the CRWG target for facilities in FY 2023–2024 totals 14,633. The CRWG assesses the adequacy of facility staffing with CPCs only, which indicates that meeting this target would require 4,049 more CPCs than were in the Air Traffic Control System workforce at the end of FY 2023. An increase of this size could not be made quickly even using ATO’s typical 2–3-year hiring surges in response to staffing shortages (which also have to cover forecast attrition). Planned hiring surges are already in place that will strain the training capacity of the Academy and at individual facilities, and several years are required for new hires to mature

TABLE 8-6 FAA Operations Staff by Category, FY 2014–2024

SOURCE: FAA annual budgets; FAA 2024 Controller Work Plan.

to CPC status (see Chapter 6). Future hiring to meet CRWG targets would have to wait until FY 2027 after the initial planned surges in hiring occurs to meet the increased annual AFN targets projected in the FAA FY 2024 10-year hiring plan.

In its FY 2024 CWP (FAA 2024) AFN forecasts the future hires required to reach both the AFN and CRWG targets by FY 2033 and their associated costs (see Table 8-7). Based on the committee’s review, the assumptions and baseline total compensation costs made in these projections appear reasonable and appropriate.

By FY 2033, forecasts by AFN based on the CRWG estimate of CPCs required plus the trainees needed in the pipeline to sustain a 4,000+ increase in CPCs indicates a total workforce of 20,334 controllers, versus 16,285 under the AFN forecast, a difference of 4,049 controllers. AFN forecasts a cumulative total cost of the controller workforce for FY 2024–2033 as $48.8 billion versus $52.1 billion to meet CRWG staffing targets (see Table 8-7). While the estimated costs of both staffing plans rise over the period, the cumulative difference in estimated incremental cost for the CRWG plan is approximately $3.3 billion through FY 2033. It should be noted that the differences in annual costs between the two plans grow much larger in the longer term, exceeding $11 billion by FY 2038 (FAA 2024, 51). Note that the last 4 years of the total cost of achieving the CRWG target shown in Table 8-7 is $25.9 billion (half of the total) while the AFN forecast shows $22.9 billion in the last 4 years of the period (46%). Due to the layering of a hiring surge to meet a forecast CRWG 10-year staffing plan on top of the AFN’s increased 10-year staffing plan, the time profile and costs of the CRWG and FAA AFN hiring plans are quite different. The AFN plan ramps up earlier, whereas the CRWG plan has its highest costs in the out-years. A larger share of the AFN cost occurs in the early years due to its initial hiring surge to begin meeting increased AFN headcount forecasts before subsequent hiring surges can boost the number of CPCs to meet the CRWG target.²

As shown in Table 8-7, the costs of meeting the incremental costs of CRWG targets extend to FY 2033. By that time the forecast total headcount for the ATCS would be just above 20,300 compared with 14,000 in FY 2024 (estimates provided by FAA). The AFN forecast of total headcount would reach roughly 16,300, or 4,000 less than the CRWG plan.

The largest headcount of controllers that ATO has ever had was roughly 15,800 in FY 2009. The highest number of operations ATO has ever had to manage was in FY 2000. The FY 2024 CWP, whose forecasts extend to FY 2033, indicates that forecast operations would not exceed those in FY

TABLE 8-7 Comparison of AFN and CRWG Headcount and Budgetary Costs, FY 2024–2033

SOURCE: FAA and committee calculations.

2000 until after FY 2033. In FY 2033, when forecast operations would be approximately the same as in FY 2000, the forecast CRWG headcount would be 20,334 and the AFN headcount would be 16,285, or about 4,500 and 500, respectively, above ATO’s largest ever headcount.

Funding the Alternative Staffing Plans

A broad coalition of aviation system users, led by Airlines for America and including the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, has advocated for easing the appropriation limits on use of AATF revenues for FAA’s Operations and F&E accounts to provide additional funding for expanding the controller workforce and modernizing the ATC technologies the workforce depends on.³ The committee estimates the funding capability of the AATF to meet CRWG targets, as shown in Table 8-8.

The table shows the CBO forecast of AATF revenues and outlays for FY 2024–2033 versus the incremental estimated cost of the CRWG plan relative to the AFN plan. As a starting point, the table excludes any imputed interest income as well as the initial Uncommitted Balance of $5.8 billion as of FY 2024. Table 8-8 suggests that the annual AATF surplus would

be insufficient to fund the incremental CRWG staffing. The total shortfall is about $1.1 billion, with deficits in the early years and surpluses in the out-years as AATF revenues exceed forecast outlays. Thus, if the CRWG plan was to be funded from AATF surplus on a year-by-year basis, it would require a drawdown of approximately 20% of the current $5.8 billion AATF Uncommitted Balance. Alternatively, if it is assumed that any AATF surplus would be used to fund the AFN plan, the incremental $3.3 billion cost of the CRWG plan would require just under 60% of the current Uncommitted Balance. However, it should be noted that any increased use of the estimated AATF annual surplus would not necessarily be applied only to increased controller staffing.

Furthermore, this assumes all other assumptions in CBO’s forecast hold. But they would not if, for example, Congress funds F&E and the Airport Improvement Program at higher levels. NATCA has also advocated for making the investments required to modernize and sustain the facilities and equipment the ATCS workforce depends on.⁴ Doing both may not be possible within the existing gap between projected total revenues to the AATF and outlays, which returns to the option of using the Uncommitted Balance in the AATF.

It should also be noted that the AFN staffing plan requires substantially more funding relative to FY 2024 as well, so that funding even this plan will require a larger share of AATF outlays as well. The estimated incremental costs of the projected CRWG staffing would require about 60% of the Uncommitted Balance. That said, even with lower growth rates in Excise Tax Revenues, the AATF Uncommitted Balance appears adequate to fund the controller forecast hiring to meet the AFN and CRWG’s respective Staffing Targets.

However, as noted above, the CBO revenue and outlay forecasts may not hold. As this chapter was written in April 2025, the administration was proposing additional funding for FAA Operations, to cover an increase in controller hiring and wages. At the same time, Congress was proposing to cut $2 trillion in costs from the federal budget over the next decade.⁵ Regardless of how this proposal plays out, it indicates that the new administration and Congress intend to reduce federal funding substantially to make way for $4.5 trillion in tax cuts. In this environment, future federal spending is difficult to forecast. Any reduction in General Fund contributions would result in greater reliance on AATF funds to cover all aspects of the FAA budget, resulting in fewer resources for staffing initiatives.

Cost of Staffing-Related Delays

Safety is the primary reason to justify increasing staffing levels, but efficient traffic flow in the National Airspace System (NAS) is also a priority. One aspect of staffing shortages is the increased prevalence of controller overtime, which in 2024 was approximately 2.2 million hours, costing in excess of $200 million. Another aspect of staffing shortages is that they can induce delays in operations, sometimes for extended periods and for multiple flight operations.

Staffing-related delays are a very small percentage of total delays, which are primarily driven by adverse weather. However, these staffing delays impose costs on passengers and airlines. In Appendix D, the committee estimates the cost of delayed flights attributed to facilities that are short of staff to handle the demand for flights. The committee finds that delays attributed to staffing shortfalls imposed delay costs on airlines and passengers of between $135–$165 million in calendar year 2024 alone. If these results were to continue over the next decade, there would be more than $1.3–$1.6 billion in delay costs. Moreover, these estimates are most certainly conservative in that they do not include delays in which staffing may be a contributing secondary factor, nor do they include any estimates of delays that cascade across subsequent flights or passenger delays from missed connections.

These staffing delays are highly concentrated in understaffed facilities. Fully 86% of staffing delay times experienced in FY 2024 were attributed to seven facilities; they were not experienced at all facilities. As noted in Chapter 2, the relatively small number of facilities in and around a few metropolitan areas that are staffed at less than 85% of their staffing standards are having an outsized impact on the efficiency of the NAS.

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 8-1: The committee was asked to compare the cost of the forecast AFN headcount to meet its 10-year staffing forecast with the forecast CRWG headcount to meet its 10-year staffing target. For perspective, in FY 2033 the forecast total headcount to meet the CRWG targets would reach 20,300 and forecast headcount to meet the AFN would reach 16,300. The highest headcount ATO has ever had was 15,800 in 2009, which the CRWG headcount would exceed by 4,500 and the AFN headcount would exceed by 500 in FY 2033. In FY 2033, forecast operations would be roughly the same as actual operations in the peak year of operations in FY 2000 when total headcount was 15,150.

Conclusion 8-2: The AATF that funds 80% or more of FAA Operations has been growing faster than outlays to cover the cost of FAA Operations and other FAA line items the AATF covers; this trend is forecast to continue out to FY 2034 by CBO. The Uncommitted Balance in the AATF forecast by CBO is expected to triple between FY 2024 and FY 2034. The Uncommitted Balance of the AATF would be large enough to cover the cost of either the AFN or CRWG forecast 10-year staffing plans assuming that all other items in the CBO forecast are accurate and would not change. However, this assumption may not hold for a variety of reasons. Among them, the administration’s and Congress’s commitment to reduce federal spending over the next 10 years by $2 trillion makes forecasts about future federal spending highly uncertain at the time of this writing in May 2025. Increased reliance on AATF to replace General Fund revenues may result in Congress appropriating these trust fund revenues to cover a larger share of FAA’s budget, which could compete with the cost of an increased ATCS workforce.

Conclusion 8-3: The primary driver of the increased AFN and CRWG forecasts is to ensure an adequate level of safety, however this adequacy might be defined. In principle, a staffing standard adequate to ensure safety would provide controllers reporting to work on a peak travel day enough time for each task to maintain separation between traffic as specified in FAA orders. The committee is unable to evaluate the level of staffing needed to ensure an adequate level of safety for reasons explained in Chapter 3. A secondary reason to increase staffing is to promote efficiency. The committee’s estimate of the annual cost of delays attributed to a relatively small number of short-staffed facilities in FY 2024 is between $135–$165 million. Over a 10-year period, this cost would total $1.35–$1.65 billion. Although improving safety would be the primary justification for increasing staffing levels, the estimated benefit of reducing delays is also important.

REFERENCES