ministries, including MITI. This is summed up in the familiar phrase "MITI proposes, and the MOF disposes."51
In the United States, any description of government policy is greatly complicated by differences in philosophy over the appropriate federal government role in national research and development activities, differences which have sharpened in recent years with the end of the Cold War and increased pressure to balance the federal budget. For example, in the aftermath of the November 1994 elections, federal programs supporting the development and diffusion of generic or precompetitive commercial technology have come under attack. A number of federal initiatives in this area were launched during the Reagan and Bush administrations, and funding support grew rapidly in the first few years of the Clinton administration. To some, this restraint or scaling back of federal civilian technology programs signalled a return to the traditional U.S. policy of caution in economic intervention and S&T policies that emphasize the support of basic science and mission-oriented technological developments in defense and public health.52 However, the 105th Congress has seen a substantial reduction in the conflict over industrial policy, as both Democrats and Republicans in the political center have accepted the concept of public-private partnerships in R&D with certain policy safeguards.53
One of the main differences between the currently emerging policy and that of the past is that there is no longer a consensus on the role of government in such areas as energy and space, and even in defense the long-term trend has been toward shrinking budgets despite recent relative increases. For some time, experts have noted a decline in commercial spin-offs from government mission-oriented R&D, particularly in defense.54 Consequently, there is no longer any theoretical or financial basis to expect much technological spin-off from the government to the private sector. Instead the policy has shifted to a concern for "spin-on," as defense agencies seek to use commercial products and technologies in military applications.
In conclusion, it is clear that in responding to global developments, U.S. and Japanese companies are adopting and adapting each other's approaches. To that extent, it can be said that they are converging in their approaches. However, some movement toward convergence in approaches does not mean that the U.S. and Japanese environments for innovation are the same, and problem convergence itself is not premised on U.S. and Japanese top managements or policymakers sharing the same core beliefs. As long as differences remain in the basic relationships between manufacturers and suppliers in Japan and the United States, in their respective business networks abroad, and in the structure of their R&D systems, areas of convergence should be considered in balance with continuing differences in formulating innovation strategy. Therefore, the caution expressed in a 1990 National Research Council report is still valid today:
It is highly unlikely, given vastly different historical backgrounds and the different industrial bases which Japan and the United States are building, that there will soon be a homogenization of the patterns of R&D within industrial firms in the two countries. But in an age of increasing competition both in technology development and market position, firms on both sides of the Pacific are finding it necessary to learn from each other's strengths.55