Susan L. Cutter

The American hazardscape stretches from coast to coast and from border to border. There are very few states that are not affected in one way or another by environmental hazards—be it a flood, severe weather, seismic activity, or a hazardous material spill. There is no such thing as a “hazard- or disaster-free” environment, but there are clearly places that are more hazard-prone than others. What accounts for the geographic distribution of hazard events and losses and how can we reduce the impact of hazards and disasters in the future? What actions must local communities and the nation take to reduce our current and future vulnerability to environmental hazards?

The conservative estimate of losses used in this book presents a grim picture for the nation during the past two and a half decades. Dollar losses have been escalating, especially during the 1990s. During the past 24 years, economic losses averaged more than $12 billion annually. The 1990s were the costliest decade on record ($17.2 billion and still counting), and 1992, 1993, and 1994 the costliest years ever. Economic losses in the mid-1990s were almost

double those of a decade earlier. To place this in perspective, these cumulative losses represent about 4 percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product in 1997. We can say without equivocation that hazard losses are escalating.

Less conservative estimates, for example, suggest that the figures range from $54 billion annually in direct losses (during the past 5 years) to over $160 billion (in direct and indirect damages) annually between 1988 and 1998. Although we can argue about the magnitude of the losses and what they cover (direct, indirect, or hidden costs), the trend remains clear—expect greater economic losses from environmental hazards in the future.

Although the trend in human injuries and fatalities has improved somewhat over time, more than 350 people die every year as a direct result of environmental hazards. Floods, lightning, and tornadoes caused the most fatalities, historically, but on an annual basis, heat waves result in the greatest loss of life by an individual hazard. It is not the singular catastrophic event (such as Hurricane Andrew or the 1993 Midwest floods) that is solely responsible for the current snapshot of the American hazardscape. Rather, it is the cumulative impact of frequent, yet lower consequence events (a winter snowstorm, a midsummer heat wave) that contribute to an overall national pattern of hazard events and losses. This is not to downgrade our concern with the potentially catastrophic event. Instead, it highlights the need for increased monitoring, preparedness, and mitigation of these more pervasive and less catastrophic events.

As suggested by others (Changnon and Easterling 2000, Easterling et al. 2000) an increase in atmospheric extremes is partially contributing to increased losses during the past two decades. Equally important, however, if not more so, is the increasing movement of people, infrastructure, and investments into hazardous areas—such as coastal areas or seismically active regions. Our vulnerability has increased during the past two decades and will continue to do so, with or without an increased frequency of hazard events.

So what can be done to reduce the impact of hazards and disasters on society? First and foremost, a shift in public policy is required. We need to move away from a disaster assistance mindset (rewarding individuals and communities for building and living in hazard-prone areas) to one that fosters long-term thinking about mitigation, loss reduction, and personal responsibility for actions. As suggested in the findings of the second assessment of hazards (Burby 1998, Kunreuther and Roth 1998, Mileti 1999) and others (Platt 1999), we need to work toward

sustainable and disaster-resistant communities. Specifically, we need to defederalize the costs of disasters and limit federal subsidies on risk. We need to make sure that individuals and communities who choose to build in known hazardous environments take responsibility for the risk they assume. Second, we need to improve hazards mitigation and reduce our vulnerability through wiser land-use decisions and ensure that land-use policies are integrated so as to preclude development and redevelopment of hazardous environments.

Achieving sustainable and disaster-resistant communities will take time. A first step toward that goal, based on a very pragmatic concern, is to establish our current level of hazards vulnerability, describe how this has differed from the past level and what we might anticipate in the future. To accomplish this, we need to immediately implement two of the recommendations of the Second Assessment (Mileti 1999):

• Conduct a nationwide hazard and risk assessment:

  Not enough is known about the changes in or interactions among the physical, social, and constructed systems that are reshaping the nation’s hazardous future. A national risk assessment should meld information from those three systems so hazards can be estimated interactively and comprehensively, to support local efforts on sustainable mitigation (p.11).

• Build national databases:

  The nation must collect, analyze, and store standardized data on losses from past and current disasters, thereby establishing a baseline for comparision with future losses (p. 12).

We have not adequately developed the integration between natural sciences, engineering sciences, and social sciences to produce credible vulnerability assessments at the local level. Vulnerability science is still in its infancy, yet there are major parallels with the development of hazards research almost 25 years earlier. Both fields bring together researchers (from many disciplines) and practitioners who are interested in reducing hazard losses, who recognize the complex nature of the task, and who understand the need for different approaches, methods, and tools in effecting policy changes.

There is considerable research activity addressing various components of vulnerability (social systems, estimations of risk, infrastructure), but there is no standard technique for determining vulnerability from a range of hazards, as we demonstrate in Chapter 2. There are specific

hazards assessments, ranging from locally based studies to global perspectives, from single-hazard sources to multiple hazards. There is only peripheral interest in differential vulnerabilities, that is, the potential impact of hazards and disasters based on gender, wealth, race/ethnicity, and age. In fact, rarely are data systematically collected on the impacts of disasters on various subpopulations.

As a tool for representing vulnerability, many studies employ some type of map based on a geographic information system to display the results. Advances in mapping and in the geographic information sciences have improved our understanding of risk and vulnerability. The Internet has helped to widely disseminate hazards information. Yet, we are still plagued by both conceptual and pragmatic issues. First, we lack consistent and comparable information on exposure or risk indicators. Our science is not at the stage where we can model, let alone predict, future exposures with any degree of certainty. Second, we need a similar set of social indicators that adequately describe the social vulnerability of people and the built environment at the local level. Finally, we need improvements in our capability to analyze and visualize these results.

Federal research programs emphasize seismic risks, yet greater losses result from hurricanes, severe weather, flooding, and drought. Population vulnerability is potentially greater in regions affected by these hazards as well. We need to build our research capacity in the area of vulnerability science. This necessitates support not only for the natural science community, but engineering and social sciences as well. We need to develop the scientific infrastructure (models, methods, and tools) to integrate environmental exposure/risk with the social vulnerability of local communities. In this way, we will be able to produce hazards assessments that can be incorporated into the local planning processes (master plan) throughout the nation and thus inform local decision making about land use.

We have fragmented and incomplete data on hazard events and losses. Without this basic information, we cannot even begin to improve hazards and vulnerability assessments. Hazard events data are collected by many different state and federal agencies (NOAA, USGS, FEMA, EPA), researchers, and the private sector (primarily insurance companies). The federal mission agencies collecting hazards-related data have a broad range of mandates, which are reflected in the type of data they

compile. For example, during a major hazard event, each federal agency has responsibility for a segment of the response, impacts, or losses, as specified under the Federal Response Plan. Unfortunately, archiving much of the data is not mandatory, is not funded, and, as such, valuable information is typically lost in the months or years after the event.

Some of the agencies are more interested in specific types of event information (earthquakes, hurricanes), but do not always collect data on losses. Others are more concerned with loss information (property damage, insurance claim payouts) and do not focus on specific hazard events or risk. The time frame for the existing data sets (as pointed out earlier in this volume) varies substantially, limiting historic comparisons. Lastly, geographic resolution is an issue for many of the data sets currently used.

Data sharing or collaboration is an infrequent event, and so, when a hazard falls in the domain of two federal agencies (or within different branches of the same agency), the result is a fragmented and often incomplete database. Historic trends in hazard events are not systematically archived because it is often beyond the agency’s mandate. We have become so overly specialized both in our agencies and in academe that trying to pull together an “all-hazards” approach or team is almost impossible. However, there are some good event databases, which we describe in Chapter 4, most notably those on seismic and atmospheric events.

The problems with loss data sets are more critical. The definitions of “loss” are often inadequate, and we have difficulty in standardizing what is meant by loss. As noted by Gilbert White, “Accurate and comparable data on losses of lives and property from extreme events are very difficult to assemble; standards and methods of data collection are far from uniform and consistent” (1994:1237).

Mission agencies, although able to monitor hazard events, often lack the infrastructure and capability to provide damage and/or loss estimates. Direct versus indirect, public uninsured versus private insured—all need to be included when we describe what hazards and disasters cost this nation. Currently, they are not. Loss estimation is often more of an “art” than a science. In response to the preliminary findings of Mileti (1999), the NRC (1999b) proposed an initial framework for systematic data collection for determining hazard losses. The Heinz Center (2000a) also provided a foundation for examining direct, indirect, and hidden costs associated with one hazard—coastal erosion—which could be seen as a prototype for a national loss inventory.

We are the most advanced and wealthiest nation in the world and to find the nation does not have a systematic accounting of hazard losses by specific hazard source by location for the entire country is an appalling situation. Our conclusion is simple. There is no national commitment to loss reduction assessments; if there were, these data would be readily available so that we could monitor our progress toward that goal. Although the task may seem daunting, it does not obviate the need for this national data set. Rather, it makes the compilation of such a national inventory an essential and important task.

Once we have this inventory of hazard events and losses, we must make the information available to researchers and practitioners. Therefore, we need to establish a National Loss Inventory/Natural Hazard Events Data Clearinghouse. The goals of the clearinghouse are to (1) facilitate the creation of the national hazard event and loss inventory and (2) serve as the data archive or repository for current and historical hazard events and loss data. The clearinghouse would assist in research efforts to develop better loss estimation metrics and better exposure data. Where data are currently unavailable, the clearinghouse should have the authority to work with agencies in producing the necessary data collection tool and then collect the data. It would monitor trends over time and geographic location and thus provide the initial infrastructure for baseline vulnerability assessments at the local level. The clearinghouse would be the central repository for event and loss data with storage, catalog, geocoding, and metadata functions—all the tools and procedures necessary to respond to the most basic inquiries regarding hazard losses.

The National Loss Inventory/Natural Hazard Events Clearinghouse must take advantage of current technology to provide on-line (or Web) access to information by researchers, practitioners, decision makers, and the general public. There should be a query capability so that users can search by topic or geographic location ranging from census blocks to congressional districts, to entire states. All data should adhere to Federal Geographic Data Committee (FGDC) standards and include the requisite documentation for any spatial database.

Finally, the clearinghouse should not be housed within a single mission agency, but rather operate independently and draw on partnerships

with primary data providers (federal agencies and the private sector). One model would be to expand the purview of the current Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and rename it the Council on Environmental Quality and Hazard Reduction to include the compilation and archiving of hazard event and loss data. Another model would be to task an executive branch agency with these responsibilities. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) currently has an extremely limited “in-house” research or planning capability. The establishment of an expanded office (similar to what the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [USEPA] has done) would help FEMA’s longer-term mission as it moves its orientation from a purely response mode (after the disaster) to a mode emphasizing preparedness, mitigation, and most importantly, vulnerability reduction. Irrespective of its administrative location, the clearinghouse should issue an annual “The State of Disaster” report (analogous to CEQ’s State of the Environment Annual Report) highlighting trends in hazard events and losses, specific improvements (or lack thereof) in loss reduction, and looming issues, thus providing the blueprint and scientific basis for future policy changes.

Like the summary volume (Mileti 1999), this book is more than just a call for an improved hazard event and loss database and a mechanism to disseminate the data. It is a call for a new way of thinking about how we monitor, assess, and ultimately reduce our vulnerability to environmental threats. The path we need to take is obvious, and unless we change course now, we can expect that losses from environmental hazards will increase. The only issues for debate are (1) by how much and (2) where?

The foundations for our future path consist of five different dimensions. First, we must provide a consistent and integrated set of data (and information) in support of public policies. We need to integrate social systems, environmental systems, and the built environmental systems in ways that have not been done before. We need to ensure that the differing agencies collecting data based on each and all of these systems define losses in the same way and calculate damages consistently. We need to take the long view in our understanding of hazard events and losses and examine not only past and present trends and opportunities, but future ones as well. We need to be proactive and forward thinking about our data needs and anticipate future surprises, whatever they may be.

Second, we need to consider distributive justice in our public policies aimed at vulnerability reduction. There were, are, and will be inequities in the patterns of losses based on geographic location and demographic characteristics, and these inequities will be faced by the next generation as well unless we implement policies and programs to redress the present situation. This may require substantial resources in some places or for some socioeconomic groups in order to reduce vulnerability and enable the development of more sustainable communities. How we address the issue of intragenerational equity in hazards reduction will be an important public policy question in the next decade.

Third, we need a strategic plan for hazards reduction at all levels of government. This plan should be based on tangible goals and specific indicators of accountability. Do expenditures for hazards reduction programs make a difference, or do they facilitate the movement of people into increasingly hazardous areas? We need audits of our national disaster aid, recovery, and insurance programs to assess their effectiveness in reducing losses and overall vulnerability. Along the same lines, we should have an in-depth analysis and report for each presidential disaster declaration, providing very detailed information on losses (current and future), opportunities for mitigation, and lessons learned. We also need to increase the qualifying threshold for receiving presidential disaster declarations in order to de-politicize the process and make the declarations more consistent with large losses.

Fourth, we need to support research and public outreach programs on a wide range of environmental hazards, not just the natural hazard “du jour.” The seismic hazard research program is funded fairly well by the National Science Foundation, for example, yet there is not the same level of commitment to weather-related hazards and their impact on society. We need to develop the necessary conceptual frameworks, models, data, and tools to assist in policy choices about hazards reduction strategies in the future. We need to assess the relative impact of hazard events and losses geographically and socially to see if there are certain regions or segments of society that are disproportionately affected, thus reducing their collective resilience to future disaster events. We cannot do that without advancements in vulnerability science. As we begin to understand more fully the cause and consequences of losses and where they occur, resources for research and outreach should be prioritized and allocated accordingly.

Finally, we need to develop a collective national consciousness that places the right to a sustainable quality of life on par with economic

security and emotional well-being. Reducing the nation’s vulnerability to environmental hazards will take public support and political will and needs to be addressed within the confines of local community growth and economic development constraints and national priorities for hazard mitigation. The federal government should not bail out communities and individuals when they make foolish locational decisions. Instead, the burdens will be placed locally, and so will the solutions.

Improvements in vulnerability science and in reducing losses from disasters will rest on the compilation of adequate data to monitor our successes and our failures and the political will to make tough choices. Without a national inventory on hazard events and losses, we have no baseline on current resources spent (or in some cases respent) to keep people out of harm’s way, nor do we have any rational basis for planning future “disaster-resilient” communities. Reducing our vulnerability to hazards should be based on public policies guided by the best science, information, and data available at the time, not political expediency. To do otherwise limits our ability and that of the next generation to lessen the impacts of environmental hazards on people and places.